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Abstract  
 
From mid-2006 to 2010 grassroots perspectives of Acholi people in Northern Uganda followed 
Non-Governmental Organisations’ roles in post-war social recovery. For over 20 years of war 
between the Lord’s Resistance Army and Uganda Government, displacement and home-returns, 
Acholi people relied on NGOs.  
This study explores how far NGOs can transform and rebuild social authority structure and 
support social reconciliation in Acholiland. Using a qualitative methodology, Acholi returnees’ 
views were triangulated with those of NGOs, Government officials and relevant actors following 
grassroots perceptions on roles NGOs played.  
From this study, NGOs play participatory political and social roles at grassroots level; fail to 
address the root causes of conflicts. The contentious NGO roles involve a separation of inflated 
expectations from what is achievable. Social realities of Acholi people are in theory and ideally 
over-ridden by practical NGOs’ levels, typologies, activities, budgets, policies and codes of 
conducts. NGOs played key roles in the interlocution and encouragement of a discourse for 
rebuilding Acholi lineage-based authority without middle-class elites that links grassroots 
population.  
With NGOs’ withdrawal from post-war reconstruction, Acholi remained in a weak social authority 
and loose social bonding with lesser meaning and reality of social reconciliation. With raised 
disappointments on NGOs, Acholi people are stuck between a rock and hard place in respective 
villages. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This study is about grassroots perspectives of Acoli [widely written as Acholi] people in Northern 
Uganda on roles of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The study is conducted in a post-
war social recovery settings from mid 2006 to 2010. It lies within the context of the “return” of the 
formerly Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Northern Uganda caused by war between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony and Yoweri Museveni’s Government of 
Ugandan (GoU) Army, the National Resistance Army (NRA) now called Uganda People Defence 
Force (UPDF). The war started in August 1986 after Museveni took over power in February 1986 
from the Northern domination of state-power and military since pre-independence of 1962.   
This research explores the experiences and views of Acholi IDP-returnees whose grassroots 
perspectives were widely sought on the extent to which NGOs play a role to address the internal 
and external crises that resulted to total breakdown of Acholi social authority structure and 
relationships. After Acholi returnees gradually moved back to respective villages from IDPs-camps 
from mid 2006, peacebuilding initiatives continued to rely mainly on NGOs’ support sometimes 
seen more as added value to Ugandan Government’s initiatives and not reaching the population.  
This chapter captures the researcher’s experience and positionality to the study (1.1),  context of 
the research (1.2), study problem (1.3), research questions and objectives (1.4), overview of  
NGOs definition and categorisation (1.5), the study significance (1.6), limitations and delimitations 
(1.7), and the structure of the thesis (1.8) before conclusion (1.9). 
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1.1 RESEARCHER’S EXPERIENCE AND POSITIONALITY TO THE STUDY 
This section discusses my experiences and the position this research has taken following firstly, 
my background as an Acholi who got caught up in the war. My experiences of the war started in 
Febraury 1986 which later led me to leave my village Namokora and the country after losing my 
father, dear ones and a home. NRA were campaigning to collect guns from suspected ex-Uganda 
National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A), the housted Uganda’s national army. The defeated 
Acholi soldiers who were traumatised at their loss of power had to hand in their guns, surrender, 
join the NRA or be “crashed”. The external linkages Acholi enjoyed in the country was effectively 
ended. Internally, the Acholi crisis deepened at the time the external pressure from the NRA was 
intensifying.  
Secondly, I got involved in peace-building activities for many years using the peace by peaceful 
means ideology inspired by Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederarch and the Responding to Conflict 
(RTC) training organisation based in Birmingham, United Kingdom. Seeing that little support from 
Non-State actors were targeting the local population, the particular question about how far NGOs 
can support Acholi people who were caught up between LRA and UPDF war bothered me. This 
questioned later drove me to train practioners in conflict transformation and consequently study 
NGO roles in the post-war social recovery.  
As an Acholi, my hope in Acholiland was taken over by the fear of the social contradiction (conflict 
context) grounded in the commonly held views in most parts of Uganda that the war in Acholiland 
is Acholi war, rather than Ugandans’ that has regional and global contexts and implications. The 
resultant impact based on the breakdown of lineage-based and social authority that once 
bounded Acholi people together relied mainly on NGO interventions. And yet, the views of Acholi 
people on how and why the broken-down lineage-based social authority can be rebuild has to 
consider support and mobilisation from NGOs. But, NGOs also work following their own  
principles and codes of conduct. It was becoming increasingly unclear to me why the 
representative roles of NGOs on Acholi problems to the international community very minimal. 
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Amidst the growing numbers of NGOs in Acholiland, the perceptions of Acholi people on NGOs 
were also changing as the war drew to a close towards July 2006. There was also varying 
perceptions of Acholi people on how far NGOs can support them, especially in respective villages 
of returns.  
Thirdly, my experiences needed to be placed within an academic debate, how it both positively 
and negatively affected the study, and how I dealt with it. As an Acholi, I share much empirical 
reality Acholi people went through. However, the academic theoretical considerations both 
challenged and inspired me to conduct this research, especially while critically following on the 
importance of NGO roles in transforming conflict. Placing this study within the social constructivist 
views, war-affected realities of post-conflict recovery population, NGOs are considered never 
apolitical and yet are social actors. This view suggests that NGOs actually constitute to the 
formation of social reality of those war-affected population. NGOs engage in discussions about 
the meanings of activities, interactions, ideas, and perceptions in situations like that of Acholi IDP-
returnees.  
The challenges based on balancing my practical peacebuilding training background to that of 
theoretical perspectives of post-Marxist structuralists and non-violence pacifist movementists 
whose incorporated Realists’ perspectives continued to dominate academic debates. The 
traditional peace movement and pacifist discourses were being taken over by many newly 
established conflict resolution organisations such as International Alert (IA), Saferworld, and the 
International Crisis Group (ICG). I met some of these challenges by understanding the diversity 
and interface of peace practice in Northern Uganda and in finding relevant literature explanations.  
Where NGOs got involved, the diversity and interface of peace practice is found to coexist with 
complementary and/or mutually compatible transformative and conditionality approaches. While 
the transformative approach is blamed not to safeguard the prime condition of good governance 
and pluralism, it does consider the most effective way of promoting human rights. This was 
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clearer in following NGO roles who engage with local actors in critical-constructive process of 
dialoguing and capacity building. On the other hand, the conditionality approach safeguards 
individual human rights and pluralism, a fundamental precondition for peace processes. All these 
conform to the position of this research that NGOs can create fertile ground for many 
developments in the governmental and nongovernmental actions (Dijik 2009) and (Carroll 1992).  
Therefore, my framework of analysis follows the scope of transformation along the various 
typologies of NGOs activities and their direct and indirect involvement in post-war recovery. 
Grassroots, intermediary and advocacy NGOs as well as INGOs are analysed. The next sub-
section (1.2) puts this research into context.  
1.2 THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH  
The specific context of this study investigates NGO involvement in rebuilding crises in Northern 
Uganda. A region destroyed by the more than twenty years of war, commonly defined by the GoU 
as thugs-like, baseless and backwardly. However, the changing contexts of the war to peace 
transformation later left Acholi IDP-returnees to continue with or turn more to NGOs. This study 
context is about IDPs’ return to respective villages from mid 2006 to 2010. 
“Returnees” are understood in this study as those formerly internally displaced persons (IDPs) by 
war and have decided to go back to their villages of origin. There is no legal definition of internally 
displaced persons as there is for refugees. However, a United Nations report contained in the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement uses the definition: “internally displaced persons as 
are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes 
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (Deng 1998: 16-
19). 
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The return has global, national and local contextual explanations. The explanations lie in the 
typology of NGOs involved in post-war peacebuilding activities, kinds of actions they engage in 
and at different levels. Internal Displacement is a “global” crisis and has affected more than 20 
million people in more than 55 countries (UN-OCHA 1999:1). An estimated 27.5 million people 
were internally displaced by conflict or violence worldwide (IDMC March 2011). While 2.9 million 
people were newly displaced in 20 countries in 2010, in over 40 countries, internal displacement 
has continued for years (IDMC March 2011). Amongst them is the war in Northern Uganda that 
recorded a number of factors in terms of devastation, internal displacement, abductions and killing, 
the geographic range of violence and the indirect and direct losses in both human and economic 
terms (Lancina 2006: 276-289). According to Oxfam (2007) in the last 20 years some 1.2 million 
people, representing more than 90 percent of the total population in the four districts of Amuru, 
Gulu, Pader and Kitgum were displaced in over 200 camps. UNDP (2007) rates the level of 
displacement in Northern Uganda as one of the highest in the world.  
 
The return of IDPs to places of habitual residence – known in this thesis as “villages of origins or 
returns” (VoR) situates the Acholi people within the context of uncertain post-conflict transitional 
definitions (see detailed definition in sub-section 2.2). The conditions of return offered difficult 
analysis to gauge the “size” or “severity” of the the war (Lancina 2006: 276-289). Phealan (2005) 
argues that gauging the size and severity of war is the means-to-ends dichotomy of transforming 
war- to peace-system. Phealan (2005) adds that must address not only when, but how wars and 
their destructions are ended. Consequently, the return of IDPs to places of habitual residence 
came when LRA issued some form of political demands (Buhaug 2006: 691-708) at the Juba 
Peace Talks (JPTs) that resulted into the cessation of hostilities agreement, post-conflict recovery 
although it was clouded with uncertainities. Brown et al. (2008) and Phealan (2005) argue that 
within this uncertain post-conflict context, “cold” peace or normalcy needs to address the structural 
causes of the conflict.  
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Still within the global context, the policy contained in the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement (UN-GPID) issued in September 2004, sets out 30 principles based upon 
existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments. “Displacement shall last no 
longer than required by the circumstances” (UN-GPID Principle 6.3 September 2004) and, 
“competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as 
provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and 
with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part 
of the country” (UN-GPID Principle 28.1).  
 
These principles were set to serve as policy standards to guide governments as well as 
international humanitarian and development agencies to provide durable solutions to IDPs. 
Uganda was one of the first countries to develop a formal policy on IDPs with its National IDP 
Policy which was enacted in August (NIDP-Policy 2004: VI). According to the report issued by the 
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2010, IDPs achieve a durable solution when 
they no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement 
and they can enjoy their human rights without discrimination, returned to their place of origin, 
integration in areas of refuge (local integration) or settlement elsewhere in the country and must 
be voluntary and sustainable.  
 
Further, it includes giving adequate information to the returning IDPs so as to make a free choice 
between return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in their country. Mere physical 
movement, such as return to one’s community of origin, moving to another part of the country or 
settling at one’s current residence does not amount to a durable solution. IDPs may continue to 
face displacement-related assistance and protection needs upon settlement in these areas. Until 
these needs are met, they have not achieved durable solutions (Brookings-Bern Project on 
Internal Displacement, IASC FDSs for IDPs April 2010).  
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From the global to the local context, analysis can be made on exploring futher on post-war social 
structures, the return of formerly displaced IDPs to respective villages and the social realities they 
face without relying on NGOs. This calls for Lederarch’s peacebuilding and Miall’s et al. (1999: 79) 
post-settlement peacebuilding framework with particular focus on the goal of relational 
transformation - reconciliation at the local level of returnees. These include rebuilding of lineage 
based social authority- meaning (social and economic well-being that focuses on the fundamental 
social and economic basic needs (relief aid); restoration of social services and adressing 
sustainable programmes (long term social and economic development)); the transformation of 
security sector - meaning both human and food security; and in the transformation of governance 
and participation - meaning leadership (rules and procedures of political decision-making, public 
service). Leadership includes the participation of an-all-inclusive voices of returnees through NGO 
representation, advocacy, policy orientation, the provision of relief and humanitarian aid and 
empowerment / transformation.  
 
Miall’s et al. (1999: 79) post-settlement peacebuilding framework is used in this thesis to 
categorise NGOs levels of activities and involvement in post-war recovery. This fits into the three-
tier levels of Lederach’s model of peace-building as is briefly shown in sub-section (1.5 and 
chapter two). The purpose of using the frameworks are that the “return” of Acholi-IDPs to VoRs 
draws a different attention to the forms of NGOs and activities involved in peacebuilding process. 
Miall’s framework and Lederach’s model of peacebuilding in social recovery relies heavily on the 
context of Acholi IDP “return” to VoR because local integration and protection which are aspects 
of durable solution policy were not of priority to returnees. Local integration and protection were 
under-valued for several reasons. One reason is that land is of paramount importance to the 
Acholi people and their ties to their ancestral clan land that they were forced to flee remain strong: 
the prospect of not returning to that land or not keeping some link to it is almost unthinkable. 
Another reason for return is that land is tied very closely to wealth, and therefore remains of 
critical importance for most of the population. Thirdly is the cultural and economic links to 
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ancestral lands, and most feel no tie or yearning to stay in the area of displacement, but to return 
to cultivate and build a hut on the land. 
 
The Geneva based report of the internal displacement monitoring centre [IDMC] (2009) argues 
that the “return” defied the view that IDPs should have chosen to remain in IDP-Camps for 
economic reasons because it gave them a viable business or enterprise that was created during 
displacement at the site of displacement. The lack of options, in cases where the homeland is not 
known or accessible, or vulnerabilities such as no caregiver for an elderly person, or lack of 
proximate or adequate access to services in home areas such as schools or clinics, caused only a 
few people to stay in their communities of displacement (IDMC 2010).  
 
Therefore, staying in the area of displacement in these three cases is neither a complete solution - 
as evidenced by maintaining strong ties to the area from which displacement occurred, nor often 
seen as a permanent one - as demonstrated by those who are there because of services, 
vulnerabilities, or the absence of a realistic option to return home. Certainly it is not a durable one 
as situations of IDPs and ability to remain in precarious conditions is at the mercy of landowners. 
The next sub-section addresses the research problem. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities is based on the 
predominantly historical ethnic political identities and crises created by the British colonial regime 
leading to “regional political identity” (Branch 2010: 26).  
In February 1986, two major crises, the internal and external crises confronted Acholi people after 
Museveni’s takeover of government. Musevni’s take over, shifted the historically North-Nilotics 
domination to South-Western Bantu-domination of power which set forth the crises. Internally, the 
Acholi people were faced with how the defeated retreating soldiers would fit into civilian lives. This 
caused internal breakdown of lineage-based institutional authority. Externally, Acholi people were 
faced with how to regain the lost political and military control of the country’s crisis. Both crises 
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resulted into the destruction of Acholi lineage-based bondings and the political links and glory that 
once tied the Acholi together in the local, district to the national state.  
Attempts to “fix” these crises target rebuilding the destroyed social structure and strengthening the 
lineage-based relationships. Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies against the UPDF – the 
enemy, were/are led by the regrouped former Uganda Nationl Liberation Army (UNLA) who called 
themselves the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) respectively. These military options, including the persistent 
LRA who are currently not in Acholiland worsened the internal and external social bonding and 
relational crises in Acholiland. 
The worsening Acholi crises saw the emergence of the HSM, a spiritually led insurgency by Alice 
Auma “Lakwena” who trumped the elder’s authority and their claim to represent the Acholi. 
Lakwena offered a route to cleansing and forging social inclusion for those ex-UNLA who did not 
want to submit to the elder’s authority (Allen 1991b: 378). The LRA operations escalated the 
internal crises within Acholiland by representing the impure and the corrupt Acholi who are also 
understood to be government colaborators against the younger abducted Acholi children. With the 
unresolved crises, the reality or hyper reality of the cosmology of war in Acholiland, nationally and 
internationally excluded Acholi people on the basis that they are the enemy of the state.  
Consequently, the Acholi people are subjected to more serious conditions of internal 
diaplacements and increased cleavages and crises. The internal and external Acholi crises are 
replaced by donor-suported programmes, and NGO-oriented interactions emerged, but were 
unrepresentative of the non-political Acholi “civil society” composed of the Diasporas and some 
who called themselves middle class Acholi people.  
Uganda’s political development and the related crises in Acholiland still haunt Acholi people. 
Donor funded activities for Uganda’s national development excluded Acholi people although 
GoU’s claims have been argued to be legitimately balancing democratic processes in the country. 
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But the direction undertaken by Uganda government’s pursuits of foreign aid has been in the 
name of ending the violent conflict in northern Uganda. Further international diplomatic outcry 
from northern Ugandan leaders and politicians and the steps taken by Ugandan government 
against the northern war and eventual return of Acholi-IDPs to villages of origins attracted many 
NGOs. The roles of NGOs in the support and mobilisation of Acholi people during and after 
dispacements has been to address internal and external crises of Acholi population.  
  
The general problem faced in the post-war peacebuilding social recovery in Acholiland is how far 
NGOs can transform and rebuild the once destroyed social authority of civilian war-affected 
population. NGOs’ actions in post-war peacebuilding still lack clear model of analysis and 
intervention from the broader conflict transformational goals Llamazares (2005: 31). The unclear 
model of analysis leaves a gap for NGOs to apply in the local context like that of Acholi IDP-
returnees in Northern Uganda. Within this study problem lie the different types of actors in which 
NGOs work with, considering NGOs assigned interests, values, principles, codes of conduct and 
modes of operations. The implication raises questions on how far NGOs play a role in the support 
and mobilisation of IDPs-returnees; the facilitative roles and their representation in the 
international, national and local levels for addressing the historically complicated crises in the local 
context.  
The purpose of this study was to explore the roles of NGOs in rebuilding the broken linege-based 
social structure and relationships amongst the Acholi IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda. The 
study also sought to explore in-depth description of IDP-returnees’ perceptions on the need to 
address the crises, now that NGOs and other multiple actors remain the most promising hope. But 
NGOs were packing bags and consequently leaving. 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The major research question aims to address: 
1. How far do NGOs play a role in supporting and mobilising IDPs-returnees after experiencing 
crises in the breakdown of lineage-based social authority and destroyed relationships? And 
why do NGOs get involved? 
To help answer the above major questions the study adopts sub-questions asking: 
1.1 Can NGOs facilitate post-war peacebuilding social recovery using sets of principles and 
models in a way that takes into account the views on rebuilding social authority and relationships 
between Acholi IDP-returnees? Can understanding the root causes of the war help NGOs to 
facilitate to rebuild Acholi people’s destroyed social authority and restore the broken-down 
relationships?  
1.2 How far are Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining their models of post-war social recovery 
based on the many years of war to peace transformation experiences?  
1.2.1 How representative have NGOs been in the international, government and local 
levels for returnees? 
1.3 How did Acholi IDPs perceive the role NGOs play using the models and sets of practices they 
deploy to mobilise and support them in post-war social recovery?  
There are three objectives that discuss several sub-issues:  
(i) To investigate the actions NGOs undertake to rebuild the once broken-down Acholi lineage-
based social authority and in strengthening such weak social institutions with the external actors, 
the GoU and international community. This objective is achieved by examining why NGOs get 
involved in an historically deeply rooted and complex causes, and how far they play their role in 
ways that supported Acholi IDP-returnees using local post-war peacebuilding tools. Within the 
changing context of the war to peace, the study follows the internal and external crises of Acholi 
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people, the transformational goals to identify IDPs needs, their relationships with various actors in 
their local environment and their social structural recovery settings.  
(ii) To examine how far Acholi-IDPs-returnees are involved in defining what happens to them 
during the transformation from war to peace. This objective is achieved by first demonstrating how 
the multiple actors facilitated or not, the helplessly caught up Acholi people between the LRA and 
UPDF insurgency since NGOs became the only source of survival. This particular consideration 
follows from returnees’ experiences and views about support and mobilisation from NGOs and 
other relevant actors.  
(iii) To explore the experiences and perceptions of Acholi IDP-returnees on NGOs and other 
actors’ actions. This is achieved by deploying an indepth methodological approach that explores 
into the post-war Acholi peoples’ realities. 
1.5 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
This sub-section defines NGOs and clarifies their categories and typologies. It identifies the 
activities of NGOs within their operation levels based on Miall’s post-settlement and Lederach’s 
peacebuilding models. These arise from the literature review that formed the framework of 
analysis in chapter two (see section 2.4). Figures 2.6.2, 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 give detailed explanations 
about NGO categorisation, activities, and their involvement in transforming conflicts.  
By any general definitions: 
  NGOs are legally constituted organisations created by private organisations 
or people with no participation or representation of any government; are 
totally or partially funded by governments; maintain their non-governmental 
status insofar as they excludes government representatives from 
membership in the organisation. NGOs are non-profit, voluntary citizen 
groups who are organised on a local, national or international level; NGOs 
address issues of justice and peace (Brown et al. 2008: 18).  
Categorisations 
Salamon (1987 and 1994) categorises NGOs by distinguishing between operational and non-
operational modes and conducts. Operational organisations include member-serving 
organisations who provide services to members of the organisation and public benefit/social 
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service organisations. They also provide services to other beneficiaries who are not their 
members. The modes and conducts of these non-operational organisations are to engage in 
activities such as research, advocacy, lobbying and fund-raising. Salamon also includes a 
separate category for religious organisations whose modes and conducts are similar.  
Building on NGO categorisations by Fowler and Bratton, Ian Gary breaks NGOs into four types 
(Gary 1996). The first type, community-based organisations (CBOs) are small, intimate and are 
run by the members and rely on locally generated resources. The second types are service or 
intermediary NGOs, which are organisations with paid staff that provide social services to some 
beneficiaries (these can be individuals or community-based organisations). The third types are 
intermediary NGOs that are involved in policy and advocacy. The fourth types of NGOs are those 
NGOs that are international relief and development organisations with large, professional staffs, 
huge budgets and offices in many countries (Nesbet 2003: 8-16). 
According to Carroll (1992), intermediary NGOs are a special subset of the family of NGOs. He 
identifies two kinds of intermediary NGOs - Grassroots Support Organisations (GSOs) and 
Membership Support Organisations (MSOs). GSOs are organisations that provide services to 
grassroots organisations and individuals. These GSOs often serve as links, or intermediaries, 
between individuals and organisations at the grassroots level and higher-level government 
agencies or donors. An MSO is very similar to a GSO except its members are grassroots 
organisations and the MSO provides services directly to these organisations (Nesbet 2003: 8-16). 
NGOs Activities  
NGOs perform a variety of services and actions in all stages of conflict, and many NGOs perform 
several different functions. According to Brown et al. (2008) NGOs exercise task-oriented 
programmes with people-driven common interest to perform a variety of services and humanitarian 
functions, bring citizen’s concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage 
political participation through provision of information.   
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Because of the varied nature of NGO activities, NGOs can be hard to classify and categorise by 
function. However, NGO activities can be grouped into several different categories. Four main 
kinds of NGO actions in conflict transformation can be identified as advocacy, policy work, the 
provision of relief and humanitarian aid and empowerment/transformation (Nesbet 2003), (see 
analythical framework in figures 2.6.1 and 2.6.2).  
Types of NGOs Involvement in Transforming Conflict 
The typology of NGO involvement in transforming conflict aligns the four activties with the levels in 
Lederach’s peacebuilding model. Miall’s framework shows which organisations are involved in 
which activities at the different activity levels within Leaderch’s model in post-war recovery. It must 
be realised that the same organisations involved in conflict transformation may be performing 
other activities related to development, providing social services, or other activities at any point 
before, during, and after the conflict (see figures 2.6.3 and 2.6.4). According to Annan (2004) 
NGOs promote and sustain one another, and, the question then is not when but how they work. 
1.6 STUDY SIGNIFICANCE  
The significance of this study realises on how far away returnees are removed from being self-
reliant and how far apart the desired social equilibrium has been broadened as they remain so 
stuck in between rocks and hard surface. The perspectives indicate significant evidence of the 
impact of structural violence that decayed the social, economic, cultural and political structure of 
the Acholi people and the region as a whole. It looks not into changing the status quo of returnees, 
rather on the significant roles of NGOs in so far using models and sets of practices to mobilise and 
support the returnees.  
Post-war peacebuilding, social recovery models or sets of practices NGOs use for IDPs-returnees 
have no one-size-fits-all.  NGOs continue to test and improve on models so as to transfer “best-
practice” to add value to government development plans. In all these, returnees tend to continue 
to depend on or think it is the role of NGOs and government to mobilise and support them. Their 
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social realities are created along experiential patterns in the social realities, which in the post-
conflict stage now has left them with bigger/wider social burden, parasitisim and frustration. NGO 
models and, sets of practices may not be applicable any longer. 
Therefore, it is significant that this research assists in understanding the nature of transforming 
violent social conflict based on theoretical and contextual analysis of understanding social burden, 
frustration and parasitism derived from overly dependence on NGOs. Suggested areas of further 
research are significant to derive many questions about the impacts and effectiveness of NGO 
interventions to transform violent conflicts with the recovering post-war population locally.  
1.7 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
Scope: The scope of the study was sub-Saharan African intra post-civil war social recovery 
involving the international/national non-governmental organisations, Ugandan government and its 
military, leaders in Uganda’s Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader districts. The focus was on NGOs’ 
roles in the mobilisation and support to Acholi IDP-returnees. The transformation of war to peace 
recorded changes in the dynamics and complexities of sustaining peace. The scope does include 
analyses of the root causes of the conflict with Acholi IDPs-returnees.  
Limitations: Internal validity to this study may have been limited by several factors. Post-war 
returnees’ condition is followed based on the outcome of the war. The limitations may lie in the 
processes and social structural orientations NGOs undertake to support and mobilise Acholi 
returnees. One such several factors limit the internal validity of the study.  
External factors limiting this study include limited access to the broader population of returnees in 
the selected conflict region. In addition, not all returnees and NGOs in the selected conflict region 
were willing to participate in an academic study. Not all NGOs and returnees with wide range of 
opinion in all conflict regions were accessible and not all identified respondents and communities 
as possible participants were willing to participate. The selection of participants considered the 
need to achieve reaching out to each of the four districts which has implications in terms of 
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geographical, ethnic, political, and demographic and perspective compositions. The budget for the 
current study restricted the maximum number of participants, thus the purposive sampling 
technique may have limited the potential range of opinions.  
The varying experiences and different social conditions of Acholi IDP-returnees may limit the 
choice of respondents. James et al. (2005) argues that the top-level leaders limit the potential 
application to mid-level and lower-level leaders. Studying one particular conflict context raises 
questions about generalisability. The study is limited to the specific context of Acholi people, 
Acholiland in Northern Uganda. The range in opinions included validation of the desired diversity 
and representative nature of perspectives. These opinions do not assure generalisability of the 
findings. Northern Uganda alone may not be representative of all conflicts, past, present, or future 
to apply for other cases.  
 
IDPs-returnees value continued relief distribution from NGOs. They hope that NGOs exit 
strategies will include them when the GoU takes over. Therefore, some respondents were 
reserved resulting sometimes to having divided views amongst the displaced population who 
prefer to stay in camps for continued handouts distribution to those in VoRs. Consolidating the 
perceptions and perceived consensus from such social recovery basing it on participants can limit 
study findings.  
 
The theoretical discussion within a suitable methodology aimed at dealing with generalisation may 
limit the study. However, the methodological uniqueness centred on triangulating methods and 
data from interviews, observations, reports, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and my prior 
experiences.  
 
Peacebuilding NGOs whose roots have international, national, district and local connections were 
choosen for this study. This may have limited the study as NGOs influx in the region resulted in 
sectoring NGOs to suit geographical, programmatic and project adjustments. The regulation of 
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NGOs after overwhelming the local population and the GoU imposed new social dynamics which 
caused concern for the coordination mechanisms of policies, programmes and projects. This limits 
the transfer of “best-practice” and “added-value to government development plans”. To these 
limitations, NGOs neutrality and legitimacy is further evaluated, guided and shaped by global 
agendas of multilateral and bilateral donor governments.  
 
Delimitations: Several internal factors, delimiters, limited the current study. The current study 
focused on one conflict, one country, and one people group, the Acholi of Northern Uganda. The 
focus may limit the generalisability of the findings to other conflicts, other countries, and other 
people. 
 
FGD participants and key government officials who were key informants were purposively 
sampled and not randomly choosen. The basis of the selection of the participants was knowledge 
of the conflict in Northern Uganda involving the LRA, the GoU, and the Acholi of Northern Uganda. 
The responses were not random and may not be representative of all people, NGOs, all 
Ugandans, all Northern Ugandans, or all Acholi people. The responses may have been 
representative of the collected perceptions of the participants alone. Selection of the participants 
may limit generalisability.  
 
Internal factors limiting this study acknowledges differences to meet the “expectations” between 
the researcher and the sampled FGDs, participants and financial constraints to travel within the 
region. Returnees in all conflict regions, including Northern Uganda, have limited accessibility. The 
participants in the current study may not have been representative of any returnees outside the 
participant group. These uniquenesses pose implications to theory, policy and practice, 
methodology and suggests further areas for research (see chapter eight).  
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1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This study seeks to explore the experiences and views of Acholi IDPs-returnees on the lack of 
clear model, or sets of practices that NGOs undertake to transform the delipadated social 
structure and relationships of Acholi people.  
Chapter two is the contextualised theory and practical understanding of the descriptive and 
prescriptive conflict transformation goals. The actions of NGOs in mobilising and supporting IDPs-
returnees are reviewed. But also follows on Lederach’s (1999) view that theories without practice 
are if not dead, at least lifeless and of little use.  
The background chapter on Uganda provides the political development, crises and reconstruction 
in Northern Uganda. The crises to be rebuild includes, but are not limited to Acholi social structure 
and relations. The chapter sets the understanding to returnees moving back to their respective 
villages.  
Chapter four discusses the research methodology. The detaled perspectives from IDPs, NGOs 
and local government representatives in the Acholi sub-region were considered. Their 
experiences, perceptions, systems for explaining collective meaning, emotions and the connection 
to any human behaviour which are significant factors in the generation, maintenance and the 
experience of the conflict and peace are captured. The particular methods for collecting and 
analysing data are presented in details in the study chapter. The study addresses its limitations 
while pointing to issues related to the data validity and reliability for the research.  
Chapter five focuses on identifying the causes of the war so as to explore whether understanding 
the root causes of the war can help NGOs to facilitate the rebuilding of Acholi people’s destroyed 
social authority and in restoring the broken-down relationships. Fundamental needs of rebuilding 
relationship and the social authority in Acholiland after the crises are identified. This chapter 
provides an in-depth explanations on how far Acholi returnees were involved in defining what 
happened to them of which convergences and divergences in perspectives emerged. 
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Chapter six is about rebuilding Acholi lineage-based strong social authority in Acholiland. It 
locates social structures within which the Acholi social institutions was based in the past and are 
needed for future rebuilding. The broader views on NGOs actions are discussed.  
Chapter seven discusses about societal relationship building, mainly social reconciliation. Internal 
relationships amongst Acholi people takes a traditional form of traditional restorative justice 
commonly known as Mato Oput. NGOs’ roles to play a representative role in the national and 
international level is discussed. External and internal relationship building are discussed in this 
chapter.  
Chapter eight is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It revisits the research questions and study 
objectives to see if the findings are consistent with the evidences. The chapter ends with 
observations relating to the research implications, the thesis itself and suggestions to possible 
areas for further research.   
1.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter is the background and the justification for the study. It set out the research questions, 
study purpose and objectives. The limitations of the study are highlighted. The next chapter forms 
the review of the existing literature on the subject. My framework of analysis arises from literatures 
to suit the methodological consistencies in the research questions and study objectives. The next 
chapter deals with the understanding of contextualised theoretical and practical concepts of 
conflict transformation discussed within the post-war peacebuilding social recovery terms.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW – CONTEXTUALISED IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews relevant theoretical concepts of conflict transformation drawing from the 
inter-disciplinary literatures on roles of NGOs in post-war peacebuilding social recovery. Section 
2.2 reviews the literature development from the Realists’ views that incorporates Post-Marxist and 
Non-violence pacifism conceptions.  
In subsection 2.3, conflict transformation and peacebuilding are understood in this thesis as are 
complementary concepts to another. Conflict has not to be confused with violence (2.3.1) and the 
destructive and constructive nature of conflict has to provide insights into the conceptualisation of 
positive and negative peace practices (sub-section 2.3.2). All these have implications of theory, 
policy and practices in both conceptual and analytical terms once reflected on NGOs’ involvement 
in post-war peacebuilding (2.3.3). In sub-section 2.4, the relevance of the review to NGOs actions 
can be understood from empirical studies. The theoretical discussions include practices of NGOs 
in the contextual and complementary role they play in facilitating post-war social recovery 
peacebuilding using sets of principles and modes. This is reviewed in consideration to the views of 
local context of post-war societies.  
Sub-section 2.5 discusses NGO roles with particular focus on rebuilding a once broken-down 
social structure and restoring relatationships among post-war social recovering population. The  
explanations revolves around how far local populations are involved in defining their own models 
of recovery based on their experiences. A framework of analysis in figure 2.6.1 combines 
Lederach’s peacbuilding and Miall’s post-settlement framework. I use these combined frameworks 
to analyse NGOs’ categorisation and typology (2.6.1) followed by sub-section 2.6.2 relating it to 
the respective activities, and the relevant analysis of returnees while in IDP-Camps, on return and 
those who already returned to respective villages.  
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2.2  LITERATURE REVIEW  
Conflict transformation is still a relatively new, poorly defined and growing concept. The evolution 
of contemporary literatures have gone through four major periods; The preliminary developments 
from 1914-1945 and until the end of The First World War (1914-1918) saw the growth of pacifist 
sentiments and organisations as is articulated in the Dada art movement and in political cynicism 
(Barcovitch Kremenyuk and Zartman 2009: 16-30). This period marks the incorporation of the 
realist approach to conflict transformation with Post-Marxist and Non-violence pacifists’ views from 
Galtung (1975: 9-13; 1998: 17-18, 66 and 1990). Conflict and violence were to be understood 
differently based on the differentiation between “positive peace – sustainable/durable peace” from 
“negative peace – cold/unsustainable peace”. The latter was defined as the absence of war which 
does not necessarily mean peace.  
 
From 1946-1969, laying the ground for many developments in the governmental and 
nongovernmental actions to prevent future wars where transnational institutions and the fostering 
of reconciliation  between enemies emerged; for example the United Nations (UN), the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisations (UNESCO), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the International Peace Research Centre (IPRC) set up by 
Johan Galtung in Oslo in 1959 and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
in 1969 (ibid.). This period sets one goal of conflict transformation as of rebuilding broken 
relationships (Lederach 1999). 
 
The third period (1970-1989) is the expansion and institutionalisation that had three distinctive 
international environments of early 1970s when Cold War became more managed through arms 
control agreements. There was disappointment on the achievement of conflict resolution (Boulding 
1978; Harty and Modell 1991), the normalisation of relations between the People’s Republic of 
China and the United States; and Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1989 end of Cold War in the Soviet Union 
(Ibid.). This period is vital in understanding NGOs since their appropriate actions at the different 
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levels of aggregation helps to understand how representative they can be in the various levels of 
institutions. 
 
And the fourth, diffusion and differentiation (1990-2008) period marked profound UN engagement 
in conflict and adherence to human rights protection, increases in democratic countries, 
engagement of women in governance and decline in international wars (Eriksson and Wallensteen 
2004; Human Security Centre 2005; Marshall and Gurr 2005). The September 11, 2001 attacks 
carried out by Al-Qaeda against the US and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq marked a 
seemingly new beginning of a new world order (Barcovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman 2009: 28). 
On the other hand, more specialised research like the John Hopkins Washington Interest in 
Negotiation Group emerged, with growing literatures focusing on post-agreement problems and 
solutions relating to external intervention and institutional building (Paris 2004; Stedman et al. 
2002). This period is fairly wide but provides policy discussions like that of the UN-Internally 
Displaced Persons (UN-IDPs) policy which is being used as guiding principles by governments 
and non-governmental organisations. 
 
In all these developments, conflict transformation concepts have gone through a series of stages 
since the beginning of its regular usage (Miall 2003; Reimann 2003; Rupesinghe 1995; Lederach, 
1999; Värynen 1991). NGO modes and practices of conflict transformation have been identified by 
Miall (2004) as a response to the changing nature of contemporary conflicts are in their 
incomplete stages of synthesis. Senghaas (2004) introduces the guiding notion of civilising 
conflict, a constructive pacifism for conflict transformation deriving a model of complex peace 
architecture of "civilisation hexagon" (Berghoff Handbook Dialogue Series [BHDS] 2007). Conflict 
transformation requirements rest with “healing” (Roswitha 2001), “reconciliation” (Negowetti 
2003; Lederach 1999), “the discovery of peace” (Louise 1994), “constructive confrontation” 
(Burgess 1996), shifting “from violence to peace politics” (Francis 2000), and “justice with fair 
share, fair treatment and fair play” (Maiese 2003: 1-2).  
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The evolution of literatures contributed hugely to increases on NGO literatures by known scholars 
of conflict transformation such as Lederach (1993, 1995, 1999 and 2003) and Paffenholz (2006, 
2003a, 2001a and 1998). These literatures have sometimes been expressed in the name of civil 
society. Roles and responsibilities of NGOs attracted considerable attention on humanitarian and 
development sectors (Anderson 1996 and 1999). Specific functions of NGOs are often overlooked 
(Aall 1996). More relevant literatures emerged from (Arthur 1999; Cooper and Berdal 1993; 
Crocker et al. 1999) adding onto NGOs to include Multi-Track Diplomacy roles (Diamond and 
McDonald 1996; McDonald 1991, 2003; Notter and McDonald 1996). Multi-track diplomacy 
originates from track-one diplomacy. Track-one diplomacy carrys the common view that 
governmental activities concerned with building and maintaining orderly communications and 
relationships are carried out by professionals who are politically appointed by the state. They 
focus on negotiating peace, drafting peace treaties, and handling day-to-day implementation of 
protocols. According to Bolling (2010) these roles are not enough in reality and are limited in 
influence and forms. 
Bolling (2010: 72) argues that the attitudes, knowledge, words, and deeds of ordinary citizens, as 
well as activities of private organisations and institutions in their interactions with other people at 
home and abroad, can have significant impact on international relations, fostering either friendly 
cooperation or suspicion, hostility, and conflict. It is in this view and with the growing influence 
from NGOs that Bolling (2010) suggests that track-two diplomacy has to deal with the realities of 
the growing involvement of private individuals and NGOs in activities related to conflict analysis, 
conflict management, and attempts at conflict resolution (conflict transformation). These intiatives 
from private sectors are now natural, welcomed manifestations of track-two diplomacy, or what is 
now often called Multi-track diplomacy (Bolling 2010: 73).   
These intiatives require a transformative approach to focus on understanding/analysing the root 
causes of the war and in dealing with the aftermath of war realities on war-torn societies. Austin et 
al (2004: 446-465) define conflict transformation as actions and processes which seek to alter the 
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various characteristics and manifestation of conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular 
conflict over the long term. In regards to the transformative approach towards a post-war era, 
most wars fought in Africa in the post-cold war era seemingly dictates distinctive conditions on 
how post-conflict reconstruction concept can be adopted and implemented for durable peace. The 
altering characteristics of transforming violent conflict to peace in peace studies and research 
focuses on how negative peace are reduced and negative relations eliminated; and how positive 
peace are built to enforce harmounous relationships (see sub-section 2.3.2).  
These views are explained within the objective that investigates actions NGOs undertake to 
rebuild the once broken-down Acholi lineage-based social authority and in strengthening such 
weakened social institutions. According to an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) report 
(2007), governments and donors are keen to see an early end to the relief phase of any 
emergency. There is often a political incentive as well as a humanitarian goal to save lives and get 
people home. Hanlon (2006) argues that these two interests can be uneasy bedfellows if the 
timetable driving return is quicker than is practically appropriate. The framework of analysis from 
when the war started can be quite mechanistic, over ambitious and inconsiderate because a 
whole range of conceptual terms such as triggers, proximate causes, root causes, permissive 
conditions, mobilising causes are misleading (Hanlon 2006).  
An examination of what happens to the post-war population has to be based on post-war affected 
people’s perspectives amidst the multiple actors. Conceptually, the institutionalisation of the post-
conflict appears to be a resounding success whenever impressive numbers of organisations 
contribute to the cause of ending and preventing deadly conflict and use triggers, proximate 
causes, root causes, permissive conditions, mobilising causes as post-war concepts to frame and 
organise post conflict activities (Krasner (2005: 153-163). Krasner (2005) adds that the holistic 
post-conflict concept should embrace political development, security, justice, community 
relationships, economic and social development; and community participation and consultation 
that should be a national and international agenda from peace negotiations to peace enforcement 
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(see sub-section 2.5). According to Annan (1997c) peacebuiling has various concurrent and 
integrated actions that must be undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and 
prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Such views help to explain why conflict 
transformation goals uses peacebuilding as a tool rather than contesting concepts (see sub-
section 2.3). The transformation goals are then used to identify IDPs needs, their reltionships with 
various actors in the local environment and in rebuilding the social structure.  
2.3  CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING   
This study regards peacebuilding and conflict transformation goals as complementary to one 
another, rather than stand-alone contesting concepts. The aim of conflict transformation is to 
transform negative destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict and deal with structural, 
behavioural and attitudinal aspects of conflict (Austin et al. 2004: 464-465). The goal suggests that 
NGO actions do not only have to focus on how-to-do-it but also what-to-do. This is also the overall 
aim of peacebuilding, to create sustainable peace, a peaceful future, conducting an overall needs 
assessment, developing a coherent peace plan, and designing an effective implementation plan 
(Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 12). In the post-war statges, Annan (1997c) and Miall (2004: 188) 
view post-conflict pecebuiling as very distinctive of humanitarian and development peacebuilding 
activities to have specific aim of preventing a relapse to violence (see subsection 2.2).  
The important point is that the negative tasks of preventing a relapse into covert violence and the 
positive tasks of aiding recovery and expediting eventual removal of the underlying root causes of 
internal war provide distinctive closer relationships between complementary sets of tasks (Miall et 
al. 2004: 185-215). Conducive conditions have to be created for reconciliation, reconstruction and 
recovery. These peacebuilding views complement the concept of conflict transformation which is a 
“process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if 
necessary, the very structure of constitution of society that supports the protraction of violent 
conflicts” (Miall 2003: 5). 
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The processes of conflict transformation utilises peacebuilding as a tool that must rely on and 
operate within a peacebuilding framework defined by sustainable transformation (Lederarch 
1999). Wormgoor (2004: 39-40) acknowledges the importance and relevance of peacebuilding 
approaches, but also suggests countries choose conflict transformation as the main focus for a 
country as a whole. This is because “the very structure of groups and relationships may be 
embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of 
conflicts” (Miall 2003: 5). If successful, the process might result in benign spirals of relationships. If 
not, conflicts develop into vicious spirals. Conflict may broaden (suck in new issues), widen (suck 
in new actors) and intensify (suck in new victims) (Ibid). 
Lederach (1999) believes that conflict transformation addresses structural issues and the 
development of a supportive infrastructure for peace (sub-section 2.4). Conflict transformation 
stresses on inclusions of more than a post accord reconstruction focusing on a dynamic social 
construct of interrelated interactions. Wallenstein (2006) concurs with Lederach (1999) that 
peacebuilding is a tool of conflict transformation, and it should be viewed as a comprehensive 
concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and 
stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships.  
While they agree that the term involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede 
and follow beyond formal peace accords, post-war peacebuilding does not bring out and embrace 
structures and systems, psychosocial concerns, policy as central focus rendering peace-building 
as a tool of conflict transformation, a concern for conflict transformation (Wallenstein 2006: 4; 
Lederach 1999; Galtung 1997). Schirch (2004) reinforces the divergent view that conflict 
transformation is one tool in a peace building toolbox. Her suggestion on conflict transformation 
depends on dialogue, mediation and negotiation to build relationships and address the root 
causes of conflict and that peace building includes a far wider variety of processes. The point of 
contention seems to situate itself in Schirch’s (2004) narrow vision of conflict transformation of 
restoring relationship (reconciliation), transforming structural and cultural violence. All these 
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should happen when conflict changes from war to its post-war stages and the contextual and 
dynamic challenges of the protraction of every conflict.  
Frieters et al. (2008) argue in a joint Utstein Report that the cornerstone of future peacebuilding 
work is to address structural causes of conflict. Utstein report is contained in a German National 
Report to allow all peacebuilding praxis to include all activities to mainstream justice and cover the 
context of reconciliation and participation. This report makes complements to structural and 
psychosocial peacebuilding to include security, relief, good governance, democratisation and 
economic development. Lederach (1999) proposes the use of conflict transformation not to be 
reserved only for situations of direct violence but it can also be used to tackle structural and 
cultural violence. Fisher et al. (2000) places the view within a time frame that it needs the longest 
and most wide-ranging commitment centring on changing the relationships, behaviours, attitudes 
and structures from negative and destructive conflicts to positive peace.  
Peacebuilding tools include negotiated agreements for ending civil strife, disarmament, 
repatriating refugees, advisory security reform, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect 
human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and 
informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Lewer (1999: 12) and 
Llamazares (2005: 2-4) are concerned about the inclusion of so many activities, levels and actors 
under the umbrella term peacebuilding that has rendered its definition so broad that it is in danger 
of becoming meaningless. The concern here is not what post-war peacebuilding is, but what it can 
be, a complement to conflict transformation about how-to-do-it as well as what-needs-to-be done. 
2.3.1 CONFLICT VERSUS VIOLENCE  
According to Fisher (2000), the exploration of conflict transformation within a social context views 
conflict as a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think 
they have incompatible goals. Violence is “the avoidable insults to basic human needs and more 
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generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” 
(Galtung 1990: 291-305).  
Galtung (1999) argues that “conflict cycle” is embedded in the attitude (minds and hearts of 
actors), behaviour and in the social contradictions, sometimes referred to as context - the ABC-
traingle. According to Galtung (1999) “conflict the creator” can bring “dynamic change which 
keeps relationships and social structures honest, alive, and responsive to human needs, 
aspirations and growth” (Lederach 2003: 18) if handled well. If mishandled “conflict the destroyer” 
(Galtung 1999) can generate violence, thus violence, not conflict itself, is the antithesis to peace 
(Lederach 2003 and Gawerc 2006: 435-478).  The views can direct NGO actions and modes of 
operation, because, according to Dugan (1996) and Lederach (1999) conflicts have nested 
multiple levels (1999). Both Mitchell (2002) and Boulding (1990) agree that multiple actors are 
accompanied by their attitudinal cognitive, affective, emotional aspect which are relevant for their 
behavioural dynamics. 
2.3.2 FROM NEGATIVE PEACE (DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT) TO POSITIVE PEACE 
(CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT)  
According to Galtung (1999) the overt destructive violent conflict behaviour leads to physical 
violence; the overt destructive violent conflict in attitude becomes cultural violence and the overt 
destructive violent conflict in social contradiction/context leads to structural or systemic violence. 
Negative peace is defined as the ceasation of direct violence and positive peace is the removal of 
structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1990). Galtung (1998, 1996, 1990 and 1975) argues that 
averting structural violence requires addressing structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspect of 
conflict. The view suggests that where structural violence occurs, a wider social, economic and 
political source of conflict needs NGOs to transform both the negative energy of war into positive 
peace.  
Simon (1995: 30) argues that it is not always easy to distinguish one type of violence from the 
other. Buckley-Zistel (2003) assumes violence and culture are disconnected and that violence can 
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not be a cultural expression. The answer lies in the levels of structural and cultural violence that 
serves as early warning indicators for direct violence, as well, too late warning of structural and 
cultural violence (Galtung 1990: 294 and 2002). Galtung (2002) answers that cultural violence 
legitimises direct and structural violence.  
According to Francis (2006) and Lederach (1999) constructive conflict or positive peace as is 
opposed to negative peace is vital if it focuses on transforming the people, conflict parties, the 
affected society or region and outsiders with relevant human and material resources, as all having 
complementary roles to play in the long-term process. Lederach (1999) recommends a 
comprehensive and wide-ranging bottom-up approach that needs to emphasise on the support for 
grassroots within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of top-down outsiders. By this 
explanation, the representative role of NGOs and views of the local people can be analysed.  
Both Lederach (1999) Galtung (1996) agree that conditions where exploitation is to be minimised 
or eliminated and where there is neither the overt violence nor the subtler phenomenon of 
structural violence creates conducive social condtions for lasting peace. 
2.3.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE  
The gaps in theory, practice and policy are still wide. As mentioned above in sub-section 1.1, 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s the social reality reflects less in the strife for social change 
and justice, although many nonviolent conflict prevention and transformation development policy 
were being announced. Defining structural and systemic causes of conflicts drifts away from 
bridging the theoretical-gap discourses so as to understand the social reality creation of meanings 
and how peacebuilding policies and theories link with practices. 
Vivienne and Körppen (2006) argue that a positivist view makes it unclear on how the individual 
and social are interwoven in the inherently socio-political struggle during conflict transformation. It 
causes gaps that arise from the consensus that both levels – the individual and the social – can 
and must be influenced since there is not yet very clear understanding on how the transfer from 
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one level to the other works, builds up and is sustained. The implication is not only in the levels, 
but also in the linkages of theories to practices involving policy implementations. Vivienne and 
Körppen are referring to Lederach’s peacebuilding model that has three levels (sub-section 2.6). 
According to Galtung (2000) bringing both practitioners and policy makers closer for thorough and 
far-reaching strategy is preferable. Theory without practice in the context of peacebuilding is, if not 
dead, at least lifeless and of little use (Ledearch 1999). Therefore, the descriptions and 
explanations of theory are accompanied by practical examples in order to make them more 
comprehensible and more based on real life experiences (Lunqvist 2009: 2).  
Bloomfield and Schmelzle (2006: 6) argue that bridging the gap between theory and practice is a 
continuing challenge. They try to answer  Vivienne and Körppen that a positivist and a 
constructivist approach, in particular, have come against each other, suggesting an underlying 
struggle of paradigms. The paradigms are distinct and have relevant advantages to the 
constructivist stance, since this is a case study. The case study approach to the practice of conflict 
transformation leaves a tangible imprint to the politics of conflict and peace and more have yet to 
emerge (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6). A case study approach does not necessarily require 
a paradigmatic shift (Nueman 2003). Therefore, further development of theory needs to 
accommodate practice, not simply in providing empirical answers, but by integrating practitioners 
into the process of generating questions (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6). 
Berghof Handbook Dialogue (BHD) (2007) writers emphasise on the role of change agents, 
relative importance of third party interveners (outsiders versus insiders), and implicit over-reliance 
on external agents, no replacement for insiders and internal resources and asymmetry of power. 
There is need to re-examine and possibly re-align our categories of analysis and modes of 
engagement (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6; Dudouet 2006). Shapiro (2006) says conflict 
interventions indeed start at diverse levels of analysis and assume different levels of influence. It 
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is in her contribution that the issue of what needs to change (first) becomes most tangible and 
reveal its potential counterproductive consequences.  
Barash and Webel (2002: 7) argue that good citizen may participate in settings within which 
individuals may do enormous amounts of harm to other human beings without ever intending to do 
so, just performing their regular duties as a job defined in the structure. This ‘just following orders’ 
argument is to say everyone is restricted by frameworks in which they live and anyone existing 
within a conflict will do anything to survive. That is not to approve of their actions though, but also 
not to condemn it without understanding. Major argument in the literature reviews suggest that 
conflict transformation stresses on rebuilding social structural aspects of the war-affected 
population and their relationships. The role of NGOs are paramount to view conflict as different 
from violence, and the shift from negative peace to positive peace has implications on theoretical 
discussion, practitioners’ views and in the policies of NGOs’ principles and codes of conducts. The 
next section narrows the literature discussion down to roles of NGOs.  
2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW – RELEVANCE FOR NGO ROLES IN 
TRANSFORMING CONFLICT 
From the previous sub-section, the emphasis has been on rebuilding structural damages and 
broken down relationship war brings. This section explains how far NGOs can play their roles in 
rebuilding structural damages and broken-down relationship in the post-war stages of recovery. 
The section explains why NGOs have increasingly gotten involved in peacebuilding activites, and 
how representative they are in the international, national and local levels to support the local 
contexts. These explanations are done in consideration to actors’ interests, sets of principles and 
models of operations NGOs work along with.  
My framework of analysis is therafter arrived at to critically analyse NGOs’ actions in post-war 
social recovery. Most conceptual and analytical reflections on NGOs involvement in conflict 
transformation have occurred in the context of empirical studies and yet the roles of NGOs in post-
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conflict studies have failed to address structural violence. The locals carry-on with social burden 
and loose copping mechanisms even when they return to villages of origins. MacFarlane (1998) 
argues that one dominant pattern in both academic and praxis-oriented contributions have been to 
contrast a description of the ideal role of an NGO with empirical reality. The empirical reality 
leaves locals with further social burden and imbalance. Opong (2009) admits that there are gaps 
in the limited literatures to contextualise NGOs, mostly INGOs who provide local sevices to the 
community and how this is often discordant with the worldview and socio-political values of the 
local people.  
 
According to MacFarlane (1998: 245) the proliferation of NGOs is part and parcel of the pluralist 
conception of the rooting of democratic governance within a society; to the extent that citizens 
aggregate on the basis of common interests into effective organisations for the promotion of the 
latter, this limits the power and flexibility of government. NGOs can strengthen and develop civil 
society so as to effect democratic governance that may provide oversight over the state. 
MacFarlane (1998: 245) tends to concur with Lederach’s middle level leadership role of NGOs.  
 
In a World Bank (2006b: 12) report, NGOs have many roles to play in peace processes, aside 
direct mediation such as bringing issues to the attention of the international public and getting 
them on to the political agendas; building local constituencies for peace by organising dialogues 
with civil society leaders and at the grassroots; and working with media and schools. “In addition 
to their direct effect on public policy, NGOs have an important indirect effect in increasing the 
awareness of the public at large because of the nature and significance of policy issues before 
government” (MacFarlane 1998: 245). NGOs can make a contribution in situations in which 
traditional diplomacy is unable to take an initiative or to proceed further (Simonse et al. 2010: 
223).  
NGOs do not carry the baggage of government status (MacFarlane 1998: 245). “Another potential 
strength of NGOs is that they have no formal connection to government, and, generally, an 
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aversion to military force. This frees them from direct political interest in the outcome of the 
conflict” (Natsios 2003: 343-344). They can establish contacts with the conflicting parties, initiate 
and facilitate peace talks, and help the parties to implement an agreement (Allen and Vlassenroot 
2010: 223).  
NGOs may have organisational interests in establishing their presence in regions of conflicts 
although various NGOs deal with various activities, but structurally embedded violence are left for 
the locals to take the burden. In as far as the content of peace process is concerned, NGOs tend 
to be “interested in particular outcome, […] because they beleive in its inherent desirability” 
(Zartman and Touval 2007: 442). NGOs’ value orientation has particular outcome too, for 
example, effect peace agreement that is inclusive and that tackles the root causes of the conflict 
(Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 224). Although various NGOs deal with various activities at different 
levels, they actually leave structuraly embedded social issues to the post-war society. 
Several authors cite the chaotic nature of contemporary conflict as a reason why NGOs should be 
directly involved in peacemaking (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 223). According to Galtung (1990) 
the chaotic nature of many NGOs is that they still perceive structural and cultural violence only as 
early warnings of direct violence, not as bad in and by themselves, therefore they rely so much on 
lessons-learnt from many years of experiences. According to Danielle (2007: 138), “there are 
potential riks in reclassifying acts of violence” and Vivienne (1996: 59) argues that “exploitation, 
injustice or inequalities as is believed by Clausewitzians require rational action so as to separate 
the individual from the community”. Within the two arguments, agreement lies in equating 
injustices with acts of violence to victims of justice and victims of violence. “Major structural 
changes will always be necessary conditions for any successful effort as relationships have to be 
replaced and rebuilt” (Mitchell 2002: 15). Systems that created violence and injustices according 
to Francis (2002) and Fisher et al. (2000) allows NGOs to support discriminated groups, 
communities and nations. Lederach (1999) argues that NGOs’ roles are to encourage attitudes of 
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openness, behaviour of restraint and creativity, most importantly, alter the contradictions/context 
that brought structural violence in post-conflict social recovery.  
 
Familiar “NGOs with countryside good network of local contacts with the different factions can act 
as intermediary. They may be better able to get into contact with the different factions” (Allen and 
Vlassenroot 2010: 224). Galtung (1990) argues that actions of NGOs should transform hatred, 
provide social exclusion that activates deprivation of services. Galtung adds that NGOs’ actions 
should bring down polarisations, bridge the lack of trust, lack of co-operations. His argument 
bases on the view that people get stuck into their protective positions, social disintegration and 
social stagnation and may lack creativity and innovations, powerlessness and hopelessness. 
While the argument could be the basis for social disintegration and social stagnation, NGOs have 
left an imprint of social burden, parasitism and frustration in Acholiland. Compared to states, 
NGOs have informational power (being a communication link between parties) and expert power 
(based on the knowledge and experience) (Aall 2007: 481-6). 
Bergman (2000) argues that many changes are in the levels of shifting conflict, reduction and/or 
increase in numbers of actors, issues getting sucked in and out as people start recovering from 
past atrocities. NGOs’ typologies has to be developed for the purpose of understanding the levels 
of actors (Knox and Quirk 2000; Lederach 1995, 1997 and 1999). “NGOs’ actions and activities 
should address a range of dimensions of micro- to macro-issues, local to global levels, grassroots 
to elite actors, short-term to long-term timescales” (Miall 2004: 17). According to Simonse, 
Verkoren and Gerd (2010: 224), since the elites that ruled conflict-ridden countries are often in 
exile, dead or traumatised, diplomats have lost their traditional counterparts. Peace processes 
necessarily reflect the confused reality of these conflicts. There has to be “a mixture of de-
centralised, flexible adaptable, and multi-pronged efforts loosely orgainsed in the pursuit of 
common goals” (Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd 2010: 224). 
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Wong (2006) thinks liberal peace roles of NGOs have to adopt and identify conflict transformation 
process to diminish the means and motivations for conflict. According to Wong (2006) the goals of 
liberal peace are to develop and strengthen local institutions so that they can take the lead in their 
own governance, economic development and security. Local ownership is emphasised essential 
but, Wong’s liberal peace approach is more rooted on war on terror and re-building collapsed 
states like in Somalia.  
Jeong (2000: 25) maintains that theoretical underpinnings of transforming conflict through 
enforcing democracy in the liberal sense does not explain how to deal with unacceptable social 
order, the changing human conditions, an important goal of positive peace. Jeong’s view relates to 
the arguement that NGOs involved in conflict transformation requires to understand the root 
causes of direct violence and the ways of thinking and acting that perpetuate direct and structural 
violence (cultural violence) (Barash and Webel 2002:129). The central point here is that, “the 
philosophies of most NGOs emphasise that grassroots people know best, that solutions need a 
backing of local communities on the ground and indigenous culture and authority have to be 
respected” (Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd 2010: 224).   
“Efforts of NGOs often help to strengthen the context” (Zartman and Touval 2007: 451) offering 
indirect and direct service provision. The direct service may include provision of contingency and 
incentives that include advocacy and fund-raising, and the direct short term responses, 
contingency and incentives include relief distribution, resettlement “demobilisation and 
reintergration” (Natsios 2003: 344). NGOs’ cooperations among different NGOs involved may also 
pose a serious weakness: NGOs proliferation and highly guarded authonomy often leads to 
competition and contradictory approaches (Ibid.: 342). NGOs may be the only one with 
operational capabilities in the area (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 225) offering both operational 
and non-operational functional modes (Salamon 1987 and 1994).  
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According to Simonse, Verkoren and Gerd (2010: 224) NGOs are needed to implement peace 
agreement, in which may not warrant an end to NGOs’ roles. NGOs’ roles in rebuilding the once 
broken down social structure and relationships poses huge challenges.  
This section discusses NGOs involvement in and how far they play their roles in post-war 
peacebuilding at grassroots levels. Within the changing context of the war to peace, most 
conceptual and analythical studies on NGOs’ involvement have accrued in the context of empirical 
stusdies. Further contextualisation following the transformational goals of NGOs, mainly focusing 
on rebuilding relationships and the social structural dimensions of local service provision to the 
local population is relevant information to the wider socio-polical world view.This is also the 
subject of the next sub-section 2.5.   
2.5 NGO ROLES IN REBUILDING SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS  
The extent to which NGOs get invoved in rebuilding social structures and relationships was earlier 
on discussed. The discussion locates structuralists’ views on how NGOs create social, political 
and economic space for recovery after war, and that, that usually happens over time. In the case 
of rebuilding relationships – meaning mainly reconciliation, NGOs’ ability to create social 
conditions and realities are paramount when their representative roles include local experiences 
(see research question 1.2 and 1.2.1). Rebuilding a once broken down social structure and 
relationships does not only lead to behavioural change but also requires changes in social 
structures and relationships (Azar and Burton 1986: 47). The perceptions of loal population are 
therefore paramount.  
The perceptions can only be completed if the modes and sets of principles NGOs work with 
include policy, practice and theory (sub-section 2.3.3). Mitchell (2004) believes that scholars and 
practitioners alike are faced with, not only when but also how to act to transform social structures 
and the once broken relationships. Literatures especially from Forrester (2003) warn that 
transforming a once broken-down social structures and rebuilding relationships require 
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discernment and wisdom. As was already mentioned before, Vayrynen (1991: 4-7) and Miall 
(2004: 9-10) emphasise that the conflict context, social structure, actor, conflict issue and 
personal/elite cannot be neglected.  
Rebuilding the once destroyed social structures in a violent conflict in the short-term through to the 
long-term (Lederach 1999) has to realise that conflict does not disappear only because a peace 
agreement has been signed. Post accord reconstruction must consider human needs (Azar and 
Burton 1986: 47). Galtung’s (1997) concept recapitating on structural violence and according to 
Azar and Burton (1986) must consider interests of politically established structures which enabled 
the full development of individuals and the groups’ belonging (Azar and Burton, 1986: 49). The 
Refugee Law Project ([RLP] 2004: 3) publications argue that it calls for provision of sufficient 
assurance of safety, security, law and order to allow people displaced by conflict to return to their 
homes and livelihoods. It also requires a holistic and multifaceted process (Lederach 1999) of 
conflict transformation to engage with actors. 
Third-party peace practitioners should act as enabler or facilitator in building peace constituencies 
(Garcia 2006). NGOs and other agencies should be considering timely interventions, respect for 
cultural context, patience and persistence and a comprehensive understanding of the conflict 
(Vayrynen 1994). Azar and Burton (1986) argue that individuals could be socialised and coerced, 
that differentiates between needs and interests, that is between values that are not negotiable and 
interests that can be traded be clearly understood. It is impossible to socialise the individual over 
any length of time in its behaviours that runs counter to the pursuit of security, identity and other 
aspects of development (Azar and Burton 1986: 51). 
Lerderach (2000), Galtung (1996), Azar and Burton (1986: 51) argue that post-war social recovery 
tend to stress more on rebuilding broken social structure and rebuilding relationships. Meeting 
basic human needs involving NGOs and agencies as enabler and facilitator in a multi-faceted 
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process has to avoid classical thinking that leads to some form of Utopianism (Azar and Burton 
1986: 51). The next two sub-sections focus on rebuilding social structure and relationships. 
2.5.1 REBUILDING BROKEN-DOWN SOCIAL STRUCTURE  
How far NGOs are involved in post-war recovery relates to the need to rebuild a once broken-
down social structure by war. According to Gawerc (2006), NGOs need to develop systems and 
structures that respond to the full range of psycho-political and socio-economic communal needs. 
This literature view bases on Galtung’s views contained in the ABC-Triangle and how they are 
inter-linked. Both Galtung  (1996) and Lederach (1999: 74) agree that transforming structural 
dimensions of war must highlight the underlying causes of conflict, and the ways in which social 
structures, organisations, and institutions were built, sustained vulnerability and dependency. 
They both stress the importance of analysing the social conditions that caused conflict and the 
ways conflict transformation affected social structural changes in the existing social, political and 
economic institution.  
According to Azar and Burton (1986) structures that are decentralised and rely on functional 
cooperation rather than elite power are the logical extension of the trends that are part of social 
evolution. The functional cooperation may focus on the cultural transformation of violent conflict to 
create reconciliation, systems and structures that needs to be developed. On reconciliation, Abu-
Nimer (2006) suggests that reconciliation only succeed if it is not divorced from structural 
arrangements.  
Rebuilding realtionships for reconciliation (subsection 2.5.2) without addressing physical 
reconstruction, infrastructural elements and other economic needs will be resented (Abu-Nimer, 
cited Gawerc 2006: 459). Mitchell (1981), Fisher and Ury (1992) argue that these linkages help 
transform oppressive relationships with the help of third party outsider intermediaries and insider 
involvement so as to confront and prevent violence to overcome exploitation, discrimination, 
exclusion and oppression. The view is widely supported by Curl (1996), Lederach (1999), Francis 
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(2002) and Galtung (1995). Their views are consistent with transforming a once broken down 
social structure. 
Key authors like Specht (2008: 6), Francis (2002) and Miall (2002 and 2003) all agree that 
constructive changes are necessary in the conflict context to include the society in conflict, the 
wider international and regional level in the short, medium and long term. It is the long-term goal 
of transformation that is validating and builds on people and resources within the setting 
(Lederach 1995 and 1999). Fisher et al. (2000) include the wider social and political sources of 
conflict to be transformed into positive social and political changes.  
Dijik (2009: 12) argues that conflict transformation is comprehensive enough to address the 
underlying structures of a conflict, relating policy and practice to the different peacebuilding 
approaches and what lessons that can be learnt from analysis. Adding policy discussion, Dijik 
(2009) concurs with Galtung (1999) on the positive peace view to bringing changes in the 
economic and institutional structures that generated conflict and institutional policy responses.  
Most scholars and practitioners have come to agree that issues of identity, security, and 
recognition – meeting basic human needs are critical (Postel 2003). Postel (2003) adds that they 
are one of the important issues that must be dealt with if an intractable conflict is to be 
transformed. She argues that ignoring the underlying needs and just negotiating the interests may 
at times lead to a short-term settlement, but it rarely will lead to long-term resolution.  
Max-Neef et al. (1991) developed a 36-cell matrix that projected onto the Human Needs and 
Human-Scale Development (HN&HSD) report (Manfred A. Max-Neef with Elizalde, Hopenhayn 
1991). The “Human Scale Development" sees condition of being human to be  very few, finite and 
are possible to classify. This is distinct from the conventional notion of economic "wants" that are 
infinite and insatiable (Max-Neef et al. 1986).    
Fundamental needs are common and constant throughout cultures (Max-Neef et al. 1989: 7-80). 
Maslow’s self-actualization needs reflects on humankinds’ desire to use every gift and ability to 
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achieve all that they are capable of, imagining that this will bring happiness and fulfilment. 
However, Max-Neef’s summary in Appendix B-5.1 is important in that human needs are 
understood as a system, arguing that they are interrelated and interactive (Max-Neef et al. 1989: 
7-80). In this system, there is no hierarchy of needs, apart from the basic need for subsistence or 
survival as postulated by Maslow; rather, simultaneity, complementarities and trade-offs are 
features of the process of needs satisfaction (Max-Neef et al. 1989: 7-80). 
Burton (1997) raises concerns on the adversarial institutions of society leadership, legislatures, 
the work place, the legal system and the international relations system has to resolve basic 
human needs problems. In Burton’s (1997) view, strategic leaders from the government, civil 
service, military and faith groups, middle level leaders maybe from professions such as head 
teachers, NGOs and traditional societal structures (chiefs) and grassroots communities such as 
IDP camp leaders, village elders are mostly hierarchically located necessary leaders beyond any 
immediate conflict (Burton 1997).   
Practitioners and partners or beneficiaries particularly NGOs’ aims and objectives and their 
respective fields of academic viewpoints have considered socio-economic resource categories of 
action, responsibility and commitment, and socio-cultural resources (Lederach 1999: 87-98). 
Similarily, skills, operating frameworks and training manuals (Fisher et al. 2000), strict codes of 
conducts (International Alert 1998) based on NGOs’ principles, the Uganda NGO-Policies (2008) 
and the different knowledge are requirements for the transformation of conflict.    
The argument above tends to support the structuralists viewpoints who prescribe NGOs’ activities. 
Galtung (1999) argues that structure is a pattern of interaction whereby people are enacting roles 
without reflecting on what they do because “everybody does it” (in social space), and “we always 
did it that way” (over time).  
NGOs’ responses and interventions to rebuild broken social structure amongst conflict-affected 
communities can be mainly viewed from their deliberate interventions. Some structuralist NGOs 
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whose responses to transforming conflicts provide insights into underlying causes and social 
conditions that create and foster violent expressions of conflict. Lederach (2003) adds that such 
NGOs openly promote non-violent mechanisms that reduce adversaries, minimise and ultimately 
eliminate violence, and foster structures that meet basic human needs (substantive justice) and 
maximise participation of people in decisions that affect them (procedural justice).    
2.5.2 REBUILDING BROKEN-DOWN RELATIONSHIPS   
The previous sub-section is directly linked to rebuilding a once-socially broken down relationship. 
The mechanisms for rebuilding social relations in post-war recovery focus primarily on 
reconciliation between antagonists (Lederach 1999: 23-35). Social relations between individuals, 
groups, NGOs and Governments are a part of relational goal of transforming impacts of conflict. 
Rebuilding a once-broken relation and that which looks at the ways in which peaceful means to a 
once structurally violent conflict was created requires that NGOs be institutionalised. 
The particular focus of this research is on NGOs role who tend to create catalyst for reconciliation 
in post-war social recovery. The problems associated with some of these NGOs who sometimes 
regard themselves unconsciously as structuralist, assume that everyone believes in the same 
thing (human rights) and that this is unpolitical. This is a huge assumption and NGOs eventually 
become politicised. 
Relationship building is the basis for both conflict and its long-term solution but, as well, requires 
mechanisms that engage the sides of conflict with each other as humans-in-relationships 
(Lederach 1999: 35). According to Lederarch (1999: 29) contemporary conflicts need to 
conceptualise reconciliation based on truth, mercy, peace and justice.  
Truth is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and validation of painfull loss and experiences, 
but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a new 
beginning. Justice represents the search for individual and group rights for social restructuring, 
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and for restitution, but it is also linked with peace, which has to underscore the need for 
interdependence, well-being, and security (Lederach 1999: 29). 
Lederach (1999) stresses on the patterns of how people perceive themselves, one another, and 
the conflict itself, and in their hopes for their future relationship: how close or distant, how 
interdependent, how reactive or proactive a role to play, what the other party want. For him, 
reconciliation involves the creation of “social space” (Galtung 1999), where both truth and 
forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in which 
one must win out over the other or envisioned as fragmented and separated parts. 
Confirming the structuralist viewpoint, Lederach (1999) observes reconciliaition as both a focus 
and a locus built of paradoxes and yet must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where 
people can focus on their perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another, with the goal of 
creating new perceptions and new shared experience.  
The roles of NGOs and Governments are to facilitate relationship building with innovative ways so 
as to create “time and space”, within various levels of the affected population, to address, 
integrate, and embrace the painful past and the neccessay shared furture as a means of dealing 
with the present (Lederach 1999: 35). In this way, reconciliation is seen as a process of encounter 
and as a social space (Lederach 1999: 29) and (Galtung 1999). 
On Justice, Buckley-Zistel (2003: 121) empahsises that if conflict is about tangible issues, it can 
be resolved through distribution that is more equal or sharing. However, this notion of justice does 
not take into account that conflicts are not only about issues, but also about relations between 
parties. Lederach (1999) refers to the general transformational goal on relational patterns of 
communication and interaction to look beyond the tension around visible issues based on the 
underlying changes produced by the conflict.  
This section (2.5) discusses about rebuilding of social structure and relationships while placing 
human needs requirement in the centre. In particular, sub-section 2.4 teased out relevant 
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literatures about peacebuilding and conflict transformation to the specific roles of NGOs and 
human needs discussions. Rebuilding of relationships in sub-section 2.5.2 aregues that 
reconciliation and its elements of truth, justice, mercy and peace are key mechanisms for NGOs 
roles to deploy.  
The litearture discussions is narrowed down to Lederach’s (1999) peacebuilding framework so as 
to crtically follow the levels of actors and their intervention patterns and NGOs’ typologies (2.5.2). 
Together with Miall’s (1999: 203) post-settlement peacebuilding framework, NGOs’ 
categorisations and their typologies in the involvement to rebuild post-war recovering society 
provides a framework of analysis in this study. These are presented in the next section. 
2.6 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
My peacebuilding framework of analysis is arrived at from the literature discussions, and its 
relevance to NGOs’ roles in sub-sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. The different patterns of 
interventions actors undertake to build peace at various levels of post-war recovering populations 
is discussed. John Paul Lederach’s peacebuilding framework is deployed as one of the bases for 
analysing NGOs’ typologies with the purpose of understanding the levels of actors (Knox and 
Quirk 2000; Lederach 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001).  
Lederach believes that there are three levels of actors in peace-building process, and each level 
of actors engage in different peace-building tasks. Figure 2.5.1 above presents Lederach’s 
peacebuilding model based on the three levels. It shows the top level leadership to include 
military, religious and political leaders who have high visibility. The mediating roles of NGOs can 
also be based on personality and on high level negotiators who arrange ceasefires. Top level 
leadership is important in getting the middle level leaders to reach agreement and also in building 
confidence that the conflict is over. The middle range level leadership includes ethnic and religious 
leaders, leaders of humanitarian NGOs, academics and intellectuals and other respected leaders. 
The middle range leaders provide problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, peace 
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commissions, and insider-partial teams. Finally, the bottom-grassroot level leadership is 
comprised of the grassroots leaders, such as local leaders, leaders of local indigenous NGOs, 
community developers and local health officials. 
FIGURE 2.5.1: LEDERACH’S PEACE BUILDING MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
These leaders focus on local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction and 
psycho-social work in post-war trauma. Those grassroots leaders at the bottom of the pyramid are 
many, while leaders higher up in the pyramid are fewer, despite the fact that their actions become 
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increasingly more visible. Top leaders can have direct links at the grassroots especially where 
opinion and religious leaders and elders are organised and stronger. 
 
Revisiting sections 2.3 and 2.4, Lederach (1999) argues that the most effective peace-building is 
the kind that stresses reconciliation between parties in conflict and eventual transformation of their 
attitudes and institutions. He argues that true peacebuilding is the social, economic, 
sociopsychological, and spiritual changes in lives of the people involved. Lederach’s model is very 
helpful in distinguishing which activities need to take place at the different levels of action (see 
subsections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2).  
 
However, Lederach does not thoroughly discuss particular types of organisations and leaders are 
better suited to activities within each of the levels. Another drawback with Lederach’s model is that 
it applies specifically to periods of intensive conflict and the post-conflict stages, but fails to 
discuss the prevention of conflict into a relapse into renewed war. Some of these criticisms come 
from positivists who tend to employ linear and monocausal approach to conflict interventions, and 
favour an approach which reflects that, every intervention becomes itself part of a conflict system 
that needs to be analysed and planned accordingly (Bloomfield and Schmelzle 2006: 6). In sub-
section 2.3.1 conflict and violence are delineated, but particular levels and forms of conflict and 
violence (Ross 1993: 35 and Vivienne 1996: 60-61) are not explained by Lederach especially at 
the outbreak of any particular incident of violence or where conflict needs to direct attention to 
forces which makes a society more or less prone than another.  
 
Vivienne (1996) argues that these limitations lie within the structuralist approach to developing an 
understanding of violent conflict by not having provided an ontological conception of social 
structure and its relation to social action (Vivienne 1996). It fails to account for primacy of some 
interests over others and the process through which structurally defined interests develop. Social 
transformation underlies structural and context specific conflicts, coupled with many invisible 
actors, with little empirical research in the post-war social recovery. The problems are associated 
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with the links between and within the actors’ levels, the coordination and allocation of resource on 
“how-to-do-it”. This was discussed is based on the implication of policy to practice and theory n 
subsection 2.3.3. 
To resolve these drawbacks, Miall’s post-settlement peacebuilding framework (2.4.2) considers 
Galtung’s (1958 and 1969) three approaches. First it works to reduce the manifested violent 
conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role; secondly, peacemaking 
which is directed at reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, 
arbitration and conciliation at elite level; and thirdly, peacebuilding which addresses the practical 
implementation of peace through soci-economic reconstruction and development (Galtung 1975: 
282-304) in (Miall et al., 1999: 187).  
Miall’s (1999) framework also includes Lederach’s (1999) characterisation of peacebuilding model 
to address the underlying structural, relational and cultural roots of conflict (Ibid.). Miall (1999) 
argues that the ceasation of “direct” violence – negative peace and the removal of “structural” and 
“cultural” violence developed by Galtung (1990) are important for the post-settlement 
peacebuilding framework.  
Miall et al. (1999: 188) framework is made up of the “negative” task of preventing a relapse into 
overt violence and the “positive” tasks of aiding national recovery and expediting the eventual 
removal of the underlying causes of internal war. It addresses strategic form of post-settlement 
peacbuilding actions within the scope of short, medium and long term transformation (Miall et al. 
1999: 203).  
The framework presents a reconstruction of the scope of transformation along the 
military/security, political/constitutional, economic/social, psychosocial and internal methods of 
interventions. The interim/short and medium terms require responsive and contingency task to 
prevent a relapse into war. The long term structural and institutional transformation requires 
creating a self-sustaining peace (Miall et al. 1999: 201-203).  
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The military/security make-up considers the usual pattern of cantonment, disarmament and 
demobilisation of rival regular and irregular forces, and the reconstruction of the remainder into a 
national army and civil police force (Miall et al. 1999: 202). The political/constitutional method 
prescribes power-sharing arrangements, free and fair national/local elections, liberal democracy 
and independent judiciary (Ibid.: 202).  
The economic/social make-up underpin conditionalities that may be undertaken to minimise on 
cutbacks on peace process, humanitarian aid, the widened social, economic and structural 
inequalities that was created by war, strengthening peace-oriented policies and local 
empowerment for social justice by NGOs and having an integrated post-war social transformation 
(Ibid.: 202).  
The psyco/social make-up underpins conditionalities of managing peace and justice. These 
include overcoming distrust, healing, dealing with negative peace (the absence of violence) via 
justice (truth, acknowledgement, reparation, rehabilitation, punishment and pardon) towards long-
term reconciliation (positive peace) (Ibid.: 209).  
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FIGURE 2.6.1: POST-SETTLEMENT PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORK 
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Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse (1999: 203) Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 
Polity Press. 
 
The international dimension is directed towards the culturally sensitive support against peace 
interference or process that may be neglected, transference to local control, integration into 
cooperative and equitable regional and global structures, advocacy and transformation. Miall et al. 
(1999: 156-157) argues that it requires transformation regionally and/or internationally. Clearly, 
what happens in one country is to some extent dependent on what happens with the neighbours. 
Neighbouring countries may contribute to a civil war directly by supplying their own troops, 
49 
 
allowing bases for warring parties, expressing political support or indirectly by not being capable to 
control their own borders (Wallenstein 2006: 13). 
Gawerc (2006: 435-478) argues that there is unfortunately no order of priority of activities. She 
adds that all must be done at once and at the same time, and the steps kept apace of each other 
as the process moves along, rather than a series of discrete steps taken one step at a time. 
Lederach and Maiese (2003) argue that Miall’s framework can be applicable by NGOs outlining 
several core practices that are useful in addressing social conflict from a transformational 
approach.  
These includes developing a capacity to see presenting issues as a window; the capacity to 
recognise what sorts of processes and time frames may be needed to address the different kinds 
of change; the capacity to reframe conflict that enables NGOs to more clearly identify goals and 
seek innovative options for action; develop a capacity to make complexity a friend, not a foe; and, 
develop a capacity to hear and engage the voice of identity and relationship. Using Miall’s 
framework, the transformation scope and the methods that include a typology of NGOs’ actions 
and activities are shown in sub-section 1.6.  
2.6.1  CATEGORISATION AND TYPOLOGY OF NGOS ACTIVITIES  
NGOs categorisation mentioned in sub-section (1.6) can be narrowed down to their operational 
and non-operational modes (Salamon 1994). Needless to go through NGOs’ categories again, the 
typology of NGOs’ activities in figure 2.6.2 on page 46 suggests that NGOs perform a variety of 
services and actions in all stages of conflict. Many NGOs perform several different functions. 
Because of the varied nature of NGOs’ activities, NGOs can be hard to classify and categorise by 
function (Nesbet, 2003). However, NGOs’ activities can be grouped into several different 
categories. Figure 2.6.3 on page 50 presents a typology of NGOs’ activities with particular 
involvement of NGOs. 
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As seen in (Figure 2.6.1 on page 44) Miall’s framework makes distinctions in the transformation 
scope column showing the interim/short term and systemic long-term, and the method relating to 
indirect and direct service provision to IDPs-returnees. During the interim and short term 
transformation scope, NGOs engage in activities relating to direct/indirect service provision to 
IDPs-returnees. The short term/interim indirect responses, contingency and incentives include 
advocacy and fund-raising, and the direct short-term responses, contingency and incentives 
include relief distribution and camp demolition.   
FIGURE 2.6.2: TYPOLOGY OF NGO ACTIVITIES 
Method 
Scope  of 
Transformation 
Activities Relating to Indirect 
Service provision to IDPs:  
Advocacy, Policy and Fund-Raising 
Activities Relating to Direct Service Provision 
to IDPs: Relief, Camp Demolition, Empowerment 
and Transformation 
Interim / Short to 
Medium Term - 
Responsive, 
Contingency and 
Incentives  
ADVOCACY RELIEF AID DISTRIBUTION 
Systemic and 
Long-Term 
Structural and 
Institutional  
POLICY and FUND-RAISING EMPOWERMENT / TRANSFORMATION 
Source: Author 
 
Based on the reviewed literature, humantarian NGOs undertake peacebuilding activities based on 
the tradition of meeting basic human needs (saving lives through humanitarian relief and aid 
distribution). United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR 2004) points out that 
humanitarian NGOs act to secure social conditions aimed at maintaining life, livelihood and 
dignity, access to social services, security, and to ensure absence of discrimination and 
community level dispute. Buckley-Zistel (2008) confirms that key ideas and assumptions to 
transforming the deep-rooted conflict is to satisfy basic human needs.  
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Within the systemic and long term transformation scope, the activities relating to direct service 
provision to IDPs include structural and institutional transformation while, activities relating to 
indirect service provision to IDPs include empowerment that has a broader transformation goal.  
These two types of NGOs’ methods could easily be termed as operational and non-operational. 
 
System’s thinkers like Dijik (2009: 13-14) argues that better policy and practice are required 
(subsection 2.3.3), but also found few evidence on how to coordinate policy instruments that 
sustain NGOs who transform violent conflicts even when a participatory context-based approach 
is taken. The systemic traditions have been arguing that each conflict is embedded in a wider 
system that contributes to invisible root causes, influences process and dynamics for how it plays 
out. For the functioning role of NGOs, a collection of policy deployment mechanism to mobilise 
post-war societies (Boekhlke 2009:15) has to bear similar characteristics especially in the 
influencing and governing of social process (Ringeling and Van Nispen 1998:14). The systemic 
traditions pose problem with NGOs’ practices that still need exchanges of knowledge, sharing of 
experience, time, support to staff and partner organisation and considerations to be “both an art 
and science” (South Research c.s. 2008: 29).  
 
Literature confirms in figure (2.6.2) four main kinds of NGOs’ actions in transforming conflict. The 
first kind is advocacy. Under this type of action would be early warnings from NGOs when conflict 
is likely to erupt, pressuring the international community to become involved in conflicts, attracting 
media attention to expose violent conflicts, and encouraging warring parties to engage in peace 
talks (Nesbet 2003). According to Simon et al. (2000) advocay works even in a post-war recovery 
since it [post-war] issues can also act as triggers to the relapse in fresher wars. This arguments is 
also linked to the cause of conflicts’ arguments in chapter five. 
 
Paffenholz (2003a and 2009) argues that approaches that combine in-country peacebuilding with 
peacebuilding advocacy at the international level can be used to analyse the validity of conflict 
transformation. He argues that conflict transformation dimensions may exist within the shifting 
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focus from the international to local actors, attracting more scholars/practitioners and the 
international peacebuilding NGO communities, yet has not been subject to any fundamental 
critique for a while (Paffenholz 2009: 3). Paffenholz (2003a) concurs with Lederach (1997) that 
theory and practice within the regional and local context has to adopt a community-based bottom-
up peacebuilding, but also with the focus on the inside-out mid-level approach focusing on 
grassroots perspectives.  
 
The second kind of NGOs’ action is policy work which is linked to the previous discussion, but one 
that is more systemic and preventive in nature. This includes general lobbying for human rights or 
women’s and children’s rights. It also includes more lobbying of governments to change local 
institutions, to democratise and to give funding for NGO services. Under this rubrick, NGOs can 
carry out research on the root causes of conflict and about how to re-order social institutions to 
mitigate and prevent conflict. The third kind of action is the provision of relief and humanitarian 
aid. The activities in this category include giving food and medical services to the affected 
populations and caring for displaced persons (Nesbet 2003).   
 
The systemic action of NGOs in empowerment/transformation bases on providing services to help 
change the attitudes and institutions of people involved in conflict as a means of preventing further 
occurrences of conflict. Activities that would fall into this category are trauma counseling, spiritual 
healing, reforming local institutions to span groups in conflict, rebuilding the local economy, 
seeking justice and retribution, and building local capacities. NGOs working with the psychosocial 
views on civil wars still emphasise on the material conditions of social life that constrains the 
development of human potential and therefore causing conflict. The basis for this argument is that 
actors have attitudes in conflicts that are cognitive and emotional, behaviours that can generate 
violence and pacifisms (Galtung 1999).  
 
NGOs are both social and political actors. Such linkages make NGO representative roles closer to 
the state, government, policies, public administration, civil-military relations, political parties, 
53 
 
political leaders than the the people in need. NGOs must also relate to leaders, political processes 
and state institutions (Fisher et al. 2000). Their social tendencies tend to focus on “the people” 
and to explore how conflict emerges from and contributes to the development, organisation and 
functioning of communities and the wider societies.  
 
Attention can now turn to addressing which types of NGOs are performing these activities. Figure 
2.6.3 focuses on the typology but with particular focus on four types of NGOs involvement. 
FIGURE 2.6.3: TYPOLOGY OF NGO ACTIVITIES – INVOLVEMENT OF NGOS 
Method 
Scope of 
Transformation 
Activities Relating to Indirect Service 
provision to IDPs:  Advocacy, Policy 
and Fund-Raising 
Activities Relating to Direct Service 
Provision to IDPs: Relief, Camp 
Demolition, Empowerment and 
Transformation 
Interim / Short 
to Medium 
Term 
Responsive, 
Contingency and 
Incentives  
ADVOCACY 
NGOs Involved: 
 INGOs 
 Advocacy Intermediary NGOs 
 
Level of Activity: Top, Middle & 
Grassroots 
RELIEF AID DISTRIBUTION 
NGOs Involved: 
 INGOs 
 
 
Level of Activity: Grassroots 
 
Systemic and 
Long-Term  
 
Structural and 
Institutional  
POLICY and FUND-RAISING 
NGOs Involved: 
 INGOs 
 Advocacy Intermediary NGOs 
 Service Intermediary NGOs 
 
Level of Activity: Top, Middle & 
Grassroots 
EMPOWERMENT / TRANSFORMATION 
NGOs Involved: 
 INGOs 
 Advocacy Intermediary NGOs 
 Grassroots NGOs 
 
Level of Activity: Grassroots 
Source: Author 
 
In the above figure 2.6.3, INGOs tend to be involved in all types of activities. Intermediary NGOs 
are more likely to be involved in responsive, contingency and incentive related activities focusing 
on indirect service provision to IDPs, such as advocacy and policy work. Carroll (1992) adds that 
other two types of intermediary NGOs are Grassroots Support Organisations (GSOs) and 
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Membership Support Orgnaisations (MSOs). GSOs can provide services to grassroots 
organisations and individuals and serve as links, or intermediaries, between grassroot-level and 
high-level government agencies or donors. GSOs are similar to MSOs except their members are 
grassroots and provide services directly to the communities. Grassroots organisations are most 
likely to be involved in empowerment and transformation activities. 
 
Generally, intermediary NGOs can be involved in responsive, contingency and incentive activities 
relating to indirect service provision to IDPs’ activities, but they also do empowerment work at the 
grassroots-level. With the background information about NGOs and the functions they perform, it 
is time to turn attention to the typology of NGOs’ involvement in conflict transformation. 
2.6.2 TYPOLOGY OF NGOS ROLES IN PEACEBUILDING 
The typology of NGOs’ involvement in peacebuilding builds on four important elements as was 
discussed above. Levels of NGOs’ activities in Lederach’s model are employed and Miall’s 
strategic framework completes the analytical framework. Drawing from NGO literatures, the types 
of NGOs involved and the activities they engage in to support post-war social recovery shows 
which organisations are involved in which activities at the different levels during recovery. Before 
discussing the typology, it is important to note that the organisations and activities are directly 
linked to the analysis. 
 
The same organisations involved in conflict resolution may be performing other activities relating 
to development, providing social services, or other activities at any point before, during, and after 
the conflict. The typology is broken down by the make-up of activities relating to indirect and direct 
services provided to IDPs. In the boxes are the various activities taking place at that particular 
level of activity and make-up of activities during the transformation, along with the organisations 
performing those functions. 
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The typology of NGOs’ involvement according to (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994) follows 
patterns of interactions that can change with the understanding of their environment and the 
current rules-in-use. NGOs can influence the incentive structures surrounding disputes and 
conflict as well as how NGOs themselves are embedded in incentive structures that in turn affect 
their behaviors. We have seen that NGOs at different levels of activities they do, are better suited 
to altering given conflict incentive structures. Because NGOs are embedded in different 
environments and have different participants and resources, their involvement in conflict resolution 
should mirror those differences.  
 
Although literatures have discussed the actors that need to be involved in post-war recovery and 
has given warnings about the involvement of external actors (such as NGOs), sometimes, there 
are no comprehensive delineation of which NGOs should be involved in different activities 
associated with conflict resolution (Nesbet 2003). The biggest issues about NGOs who intervene 
in peacebuilding centers on the large INGOs who could also be involved. INGOs are powerful and 
prolific actors in conflict resolution, although many of their actions have unintended consequences 
and can be a subject of controversy. The first issue is that of civil society. Many authors claim that 
building a strong grassroots civil society is vital for resolving conflict and reducing tensions in 
societies.  
 
However, Stewart (2002a, 2002b and 2000) argues that the sheer presence of NGOs does not 
mean that civil society is growing or improved. According to Stewart (2002a, 2002b and 2000) 
many donors and organisations mistakenly feel that the best way to promote democratisation is 
through promoting civil society and that the confluence of NGOs is equivalent to strengthening 
civil society. He advocates about determining the specific factors that can contribute to local civil 
society followed by democratisation. This is closely linked with the middle range leadership role 
mentioned before. 
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Because the presence of NGOs do not indicate civil society, others advocate that outsider NGOs, 
such as INGOs need to focus more on capacity-building and strengthening local grassroots 
organisations (and NGOs) that are truly indicative of local civil society (Nesbet 2003). International 
NGOs should be more involved in supportive roles rather than direct provision of services, 
meaning that they should identify and strengthen local indigenous institutions and knowledge 
systems (Edward and Hulme 1996). Lewis (2006) argues that NGOs need to think more about 
good governance and the relationship between its agenda with donor control in Africa.  
 
Another issue is that while INGOs do try to work through local organisations and NGOs, they often 
do so in the wrong ways. For instance, NGOs and donors can smother local grassroots 
organisations with too much money and attention and it is difficult for them to cope with the rapid 
growth and role expansion (Carlson, Jerker et al. 1990). Grassroots organisations that function 
well in their own limited sphere and purpose might not thrive with too many resources and projects 
to manage. Thoughtful development of INGO programs can lead to improved civil society, but 
care must be taken to distinguish between the proliferation of NGOs who talk about conflict 
resolution and the development of true civil society that aids in the conflict transformation process 
(Nesbet 2003). 
 
Accroding to Marshall (2000) one thing that many authors agree on is that INGOs should foster 
more partnerships and collaboration among NGOs of all types. Marshall (2000) urges that NGOs 
build partnerships and collaborative networks, lobby for political involvement, and encourage more 
funding and support to help grassroots women’s organisations. INGOs are in a good position to 
sponsor collaborative networks, and these networks can be instrumental in conflict resolution. 
Referring back to Lederach’s peacebuilding model, the actions at each of the three levels of the 
pyramid are necessary for true peacebuilding. He believes that one of the major faults of current 
peacebuilding efforts is the lack of coordination of actions within and among the three levels—
what he calls horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontal integration entails leaders within the 
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same level developing relationships with each other and coordinating their efforts. Vertical 
integration requires that leaders cultivate relationships with people at different levels. By fostering 
collaborations and partnerships, INGOs can aid horizontal integration. INGOs are also in a good 
position to create more vertical integration because of their activities and connections in each level 
of the pyramid (Ledearch 1999 and 2000). 
 
Another issue surrounding INGOs’ involvement is the state and local government relations. 
According to Gary (1996) INGOs are susceptible to being manipulated by local governments or 
other major parties in conflict, and they can inadvertently (or purposefully) weaken local governing 
institutions. Gary (1996) argues that international donors are trying to undermine state 
governments in Africa from below by increasing NGOs’ funding and from above by a loss of 
legitimacy and sovereignty (through World Bank and IMF policies) (Gary 1996). As this African 
state is being weakened, Gary believes that it can sometimes co-opt and control these NGOs to 
its own purposes as a consequence of their battling together for the same resources. As a result, 
Gary (1996) believes that local African NGOs might not be as independent as claimed. 
Concerning the role of NGOs and the state in agricultural development in Africa, Puplampu and 
Tettey (2000) raise similar concerns specifically about increasing globalisation forces that are 
conditioning the state and NGOs. The heightened competition between the state and NGOs for 
resources makes it so that INGOs are increasingly being substituted for good local policies 
(Puplampu and Tettey 2000). According to Terry (2002) another aspect of INGOs’ activities that 
can be manipulated is aid to IDPs and refugees. Terry (2002) discusses the paradoxes of the 
humanitarian refugee situations. The first paradox is that of protection - that refugee camps are 
often not fully de-militarised and thus become targets for violent action. Humanitarian aid can also 
be manipulated by factions to bestow legitimacy on their cause and to control the local population. 
Refugee camps can also involuntarily feed into the war economy by creating a space for other 
groups to make a profit off of the displaced persons or through providing services and resources 
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to the groups providing aid. Terry (2002) argues that these groups have little incentive to see the 
conflict end because it will dry up their own sources of revenue. 
 
Manipulation is a huge problem for several reasons. It can add to the incentives surrounding the 
conflict and inadvertently perpetuate the conflict, and it can also jeopardise the organisations’ 
central missions through a loss of neutrality. Rieff (2002) also points out the dangers of 
humanitarian aid and how numerous large, international aid agencies are succumbing to the 
dilemmas of aid and forsaking their neutrality and independence by lobbying governments and the 
UN to take action on human rights issues (Rieff 2002). This jeopardises these organisations’ free 
access to all victims because they are no longer seen as neutral participators, and it also opens 
them up to be manipulated by world leaders and governments to serve their own political 
purposes. 
 
Even more alarming is when NGOs become more and more politicised. In Sudan, NGOs with 
clear political agendas have been proliferating and that can hinder conflict resolution and entangle 
the NGOs in the conflict (Riehl 2001). NGOs have strong incentives to get involved politically 
because the political situation affects their ability to make headway with conflict resolution. 
Although giving aid appears to be a benign and benevolent activity, aid can inadvertently 
perpetuate patterns of conflict. Anderson (1999) argues that international humanitarian aid can 
negatively affect conflict in two main ways - it can either feed into tensions between groups or it 
can weaken existing connections between the groups (Anderson 1999). An example of this would 
be targeting the aid to a particular group of people - ethnic, religious, or some other group. If this 
group receives aid and another group with whom they have tensions doesn’t receive aid, it can 
serve to reinforce those divisions. Anderson (1999) thinks humanitarian aid needs to be given in a 
thoughtful way, including an analysis of the causes of the conflict and how existing institutions and 
norms either feed into the conflict or serve to mitigate it. These organisations need to be careful 
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that any resulting aid will strengthen local capacities for peace and not serve to strength existing 
tensions and divisions. 
Accordiing to Nesbet (2003) INGOs are the largest sources of controversy when it comes to 
NGOs’ involvement in conflict resolution. Referring back to Figure 2.6.2, the most dangerous thing 
for NGOs is when they try to engage in activities relating to both direct/indirect service provisions 
to IDPs. For instance, trying to combine relief and advocacy can lead to jeopardising the neutrality 
that is so vital in relief work. Even combining policy work and empowerment /transformation 
activities can be difficult because then NGOs might be looked on as taking sides as well. Referring 
to Figure 2.6.3, we see that INGOs are most likely to try to cross this divide - ergo the controversy 
surrounding INGO activities. Advocacy intermediary organisations might be crossing the divide as 
well, but the evidence isn’t nearly as strong.  
The typology of NGOs’ involvement in post-war social recovery is summarised based on the 
periods of recovery; While IDPs were staying in camps (responsive on contingency), during the 
return of IDPs (responsive on incentives) and after their return (transformation of institutions and 
social authority). The level of NGOs’ activities as we have seen above vary. This is indicated in 
figure 2.6.4 below. 
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FIGURE 2.6.4: TYPOLOGY OF NGO INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: 
POST-WAR SOCIAL RECOVERY PERIODS 
 
Period One: While Returnees are in IDPs Camps (Short term-Responsiveness on 
Contingency) 
During this stage, the primary work of NGOs is advocacy. Although many of these NGOs are 
providing services or performing other functions, these functions aren’t usually directly connected 
to conflict resolution at this point. The main task at this point is that NGOs, especially the large 
INGOs, engage in advocacy through observing the local populace and the relations among 
various religious, ethnic, or political groups. Through this monitoring, NGOs are often aware of 
what is going on. It is posited that because NGOs work with local populations at the grassroots 
level, they are in a good position to warning national and international leaders before widespread 
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Source: Author 
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violent conflict breaks out (Miall 1999: 200). It often takes the larger INGOs with their resources 
and international legitimacy to serve as effective advocates to get the international community 
involved in the conflict before it becomes uncontrollable. 
 
Period Two: During Return of IDPs (Meduim -Responsiveness on incentives) 
Before return of IDPs, NGOs begin to get involved in earnest. At the top leadership level, INGOs 
are still engaged in advocacy - with more favour and with more evidence to support their claims. 
At this point, the INGOs often begin more extensive use of the media to report on violence and 
human rights abuses being committed as a means of stirring the international community to 
action. More advocacy work also begins to take place on the middle level during this stage. This 
type of advocacy work is usually done by INGOs and advocacy intermediary NGOs who 
encourage leaders to engage in peace talks and to initiate ceasefires. 
 
The biggest change during this period is that the conflict has usually reduced to the point that 
there are severe problems with the return of displaced persons, food shortages, extreme medical 
needs, and other major issues as part of peace dividends. The relief and humanitarian NGOs that 
get involved with providing food, medical services, and refugee camp services to those who are in 
need is reduced. The reduction hits the grassroots level most, since this is where these items 
were needed the most. Doctors Without Borders provide medical services in refugee camps like in 
Rwanda or Somalia (Terry, 2002) leaves the area first. In fact, the literature on INGOs is replete 
with examples of large, international organisations providing relief and humanitarian services to 
those involved in conflict. 
 
Period Three: After Return to Villages of Origins (Long Term - Rebuilding of Lineage-based 
social authority and in the relational and socio-economic well-being) 
 
In this stage, the conflict has died down, but tensions still remain within the society. It is this 
environment that NGOs can have a huge impact. Their most important actions take place at the 
grassroots level where they engage in empowering the people and helping them to transform their 
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attitudes and institutions in order to help reduce future tensions and prevent further violent conflict. 
INGOs, service intermediary organisations, and especially grassroots organisations are involved 
in empowerment and transformation activities. 
 
In Somalia, women grassroots organisations have been instrumental in initiating interclan dialogue 
and getting clan leaders to engage in peace discussions (Marshall 2000). In Nigeria, USAID/OTI 
worked as a third-party intervener to encourage media campaigns to promote peaceful living as 
well as supporting workshops about peace and bringing people from different groups into 
discussions (Albert 2001). In Burundi, the International Committee of the Red Cross studied local 
traditions and folklore and met with local social and political leaders to develop extensive media 
campaigns promoting peace - especially through local playwrights and artists (Anderson 1999).  
 
As has been pointed by Lederach above, relief and humanitarian work at the grassroots level also 
continues during the initial periods of this stage until the local agricultural and market 
infrastructures can be built back up. Relief is also transferred more and more to grassroots 
organisations in some areas (Marshall 2000). For instance, women’s organisations in Somalia 
have helped to ensure access to potable water, and have helped provide services to internally 
displaced persons (Ibid.). Gradually, relief activities shift to more empowerment and 
transformation activities as local people are engaged to rebuild their institutions and infrastructure. 
 
Marshall (2000) notes that another major difference during this stage is that the advocacy work at 
the top and middle levels now shifts to a longer-term focus and takes on a policy bent. INGOs at 
the top level encourage national and international leaders to change their policies concerning 
conflict-prone areas and to be more systematic about their approaches to solving conflict. After 
the failure of the international community to intervene during the genocide in Rwanda, many 
INGOs feel that it is their mandate to make sure that this situation never happens again. Relating 
to Lerderach’s model, the middle level NGOs can influence national and regional governments 
and politicians to adopt more favourable policies toward intervention in conflicts. Along with the 
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policy work at the mid-level, NGOs also help with training government leaders and holding 
workshops as they go through the peace-building process. In Rwanda after the genocide, NGOs 
were instrumental in helping to rebuild the court structure and assisting in the truth and 
reconciliation commissions (Marshall 2000 and Nesbet 2003). 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical disussions in this chapter contextualises conflict transformation and peacebuilding 
with considerations to contributions from inter-disciplinary literatures.  
 
In subsection 2.2, the theoretical development of conflict transformation saw the growth of pacifist 
sentiments and organisations that later incorporated the realist approaches with the Post-Marxist 
and Non-violence pacifists’ views. In sub-section 2.3, concepts and models relating to conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding are reviewed based on the many years of theoretical 
development. The processes of conflict transformation to utilise peacebuilding as a tool relies on 
and operates within a framework defined by sustainable transformation (Lederarch 1999). “The 
very structure of groups and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual 
relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflicts” (Miall 2003: 5). Conflict 
transformation depends on peacebuilding tools of dialogue, mediation and negotiation to build 
relationships and address the root causes of conflict and that peace building includes a far wider 
variety of processes. The separation of conflict from violence in (sub-section 2.3.1) has played an 
important role is understanding the negative and positive peace arguments, initially defined peace 
as an absence of war.  
The chapter argues in sub-section 2.3.3 that NGOs do provide policy adherence to increases in 
democratic processes and post-agreement problems and solutions relating to external intervention 
and institutional building. The implications of theoretical, policy and practical discussions, 
especially in understanding how far NGOs can paly their roles in post-war peacebuilding social 
recovery, derive structural and societal relatationship conceptual underpinnings. However, the 
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expansion and institutionalisation of NGOs and governmental actions over many years, suggests 
that NGOs have different levels of operations and activities. These have brought inconsistencies 
amongst writers although some generally agree that each conflict must be analysed uniquely 
especially, when viewed from within its context, social structural compositions, social relations and 
the entire dynamic complexities of human lives. This would also form the conceptual basis for 
explaining how far NGOs play a role in supporting and mobilising IDP-returnees after experiencing 
the breakdown of lineage-based social authority and relationships, and why? There is also the 
question about how NGOs’ representation of the local views and contexts to the international, 
national and local levels are. 
 
Sub-section 2.5 adopts Lederach’s peace-building model, as very helpful in distinguishing which 
activities need to take place at the different levels of action. This is helpful to address the 
problems associated with rebuilding social institutions so as to understand the underlying 
structural and context specific conflicts, coupled with many invisible actors, with little empirical 
research in the post-war social recovery. This sub-section 2.5 also addresses particular structural 
issues and the development of a supportive infrastructure for peace that can support broken-down 
social structure and relationships. NGOs have to undertake their actions not only based on how-
they-should-do-it but also what-they-should-do.  
The problems was found to be in the links between and within the actors’ levels, the coordination 
and allocation of resource on “how-to-do-it”. Therefore, Maill’s post-war framework of analysis 
addresses strategic forms of post-settlement peacbuilidng actions within the scope of short, 
medium and long term transformation (Miall et al. 1999: 203). Because of the various NGOs 
typologies and activities, NGOs can be hard to classify and categorise by function (Nesbet 2003), 
thus overshadowing their operational and non-operational roles. Therefore, various NGOs’ 
actitivites, the typology of NGOs who work with different models and sets of principles has to 
consider addressing structural causes of violence.  
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In conclusion this thesis has two major conceptual and analytical reflections on rebuilding of social 
structure and restoring broken relationships for reconciliation after the end of the war. Whenever 
NGOs get involved the contextual and practitioners’ empirical studies indicate that tranformation of 
institutional development requires the governing and participatory leadership that may include 
rules and procedures of political decision-making and public services. The suggestion arises from 
the discourses on structural violence that a wider social, economic and political source of conflict 
needs NGOs to transform both the negative energy of war into positive peace.  
Rebuilding and supporting social institutions has to include the social and economic well-being to 
address fundamental basic needs (relief aid), restoration of social services, and adressing 
sustainable programmes (long term social and economic development). These include the 
transformation of security sector, the human and food security. The different patterns of 
interventions actors undertake to transform conflict at various levels of post-war recovering 
populations is therefore required. 
Rebuilding relationships focuses on societal reconciliation that has elements of justice, truth, 
mercy and peace (Lederach, 1999). Likewise, NGOs need to address the root causes of the 
conflict and work with the local cultures. However, most NGOs still perceive structural and cultural 
violence only as early warnings of direct violence, not as bad in and by themselves. They [NGOs] 
rely so much on lessons-learnt from previous years of experiences. Much as peacebuilding actors, 
practitioners, policy makers and researchers are trying to understand the root causes of conflicts, 
there are still no one-size-fits-all, blue-print or best-fit model that exist to apply.  
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF UGANDA ’S POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the background of Uganda’s political development, crises and 
development in subsection 3.2. Uganda’s political background has the basis of “tribal” and 
“regional” identities and conflicts. These led to the internal and external crises of Acholi people’s 
lineage-based political authorities and relationships so much damaged from 1986 to date. In sub-
section 3.2.1, the background of Acholi people and the formation of lineage-based authority is 
discussed. The discussion also looks at the breakdown of lineage-based authority and social 
institutions in Acholiland.The conflict in Northern Uganda in sub-section 3.2.2 duscusses on the 
insurgencies and counter insurgencies in Acholiland fought in attempts to resolve the crises.  
Sub-section 3.3 discusses on the various forms of responses to resolve both crises following the 
internal disorder within the Acholi society, mainly using insurgent attacks on the external enemy – 
the National Rrsistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) government. The insurgent groups in 
Acholiland were the ex-UNLA reorganised troops under the Uganda People’s Democratic Army 
(UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the persistent Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).  
In response to the insurgencies, the NRA/M government forced Acholi people to go to “protected 
villages” - the internal displacement camps/persons (IDPCs/Ps). Nearly two million people were 
kept in ID-Camps for two decades while other parts of Uganda were experiencing economic, 
social and political recovery. NGOs became the lifeline of the IDPs (sub-section 3.4 and 3.4.1).  
Out of the many peace negotiation processes and the roles NGOs played outlined in sub-section 
3.5, the JPTs brought relative peace, good enough for the return of IDPs to their respective 
villages of origins (sub-section 3.6). 
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3.2 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRISES AND RECONSTRUCTION IN  
UGANDA 
This section focuses on Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities that 
has a basis for the predominantly historical ethnic political identities and crises. Basing mainly on 
Branch (2010), Northern Ugandan war often fails to account for the historical processes by which 
ethnic identities were constructed and politicised, instead neutralising them and not questioning 
how they came to be bases for communal political identification and action (Ibid:, p.26).    
Branch argues that “tribal” ethnic identity arose out of “tribes” demarcated by the British during 
colonialism as the administrative indirect rule – the five “treaty kingdoms” of Southern Uganda and 
the “districts” of Northern Uganda (Ibid:, pp.26-31). The British colonialisation went through 
phases of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, was administered under the Imperial British 
East African Company (IBEAC) until 1893 and later became an official British Protectorate in 1894 
(Mamdani 1993: 6).  
During these phases, Buckley-Zistel (2008) argues that the colonial rule changed the political 
landscape of Uganda dramatically, the repercussions of which are still prevalent today. The 
colonial rule introduced taxes, the growth of an ethnically heterogeneous and racially administered 
population, the creation of hierarchies of civil service chiefs as leaders, mission education as well 
as the growth of small middle sector education (Jorgensen 1981: 176). MacGregor (1967) argues 
that the British administrators were codifying and promulgating traditions they considered 
valuable, thereby transforming flexible customs into hard prescriptions (see Buckley-Zistel 2008: 
61). It resulted to each “tribe” to change from a category of colonial administration to a category of 
political identity and action, each became to be an internal aspect of Uganda’s political identity 
(Branch 2010: 26).    
Regionally, the British administrative impact in Uganda also left political tension between the 
Kingdom of Buganda and the colonial state of the Uganda Protectorate (Jorgensen 1981: 176). 
The distinctly British political demarcation of Northern Province - a “regional political identity” 
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(Branch 2010: 26) was referred collectively to the Northern districts of Karamoja, Lango, Acholi, 
West Nile and its sub-district of Madi (see Map of Uganda pages ix and x). Finnstroms (2003: 54), 
Atkinson (2000) and Allen (1984) both argue that the local Acholi people were encountered and 
further labelled after clans, such as Koch, Patiko or Payira. The native tribes were set against 
each other in a mindless, self-destructive struggle (Markakis 1987: 29).   
The separation of a sense of belonging to the nation from “tribe” is lost (Finnstrom 2003), but 
consequently becomes a dominantly internal political order and the current Uganda’s North-South 
divide respectively. Although the coalition government between Obote’s Uganda People’s 
Congress (UPC) political party leadership and Mutesa’s Kabaka Yeeka’s [Luganda word meaning, 
Only The Kings’ Party] was formed immediately after independence. The purpose was to win over 
the five parties who posed threats to assume future leadership of the country on independence 
day, 9th, October 1962 (Dicklitch 1998: 38). Mazrui (1967) refers to the coalition government as 
“politics of reconciliation” because the coalition government leaders were not strong enough to 
command own military support.  
The Presidency of Milton Obote’s first period of power (referred to in Uganda as Obote I), and in 
the independent Uganda from 1963-1971 continued to operate along ethnic, linguistic and 
religious divisions that remained deeply rooted in colonial politics (Rugumamu and Gla  2003: 12). 
Branch (2010) argues that the Presidency of Obote I became a basis for collective political 
identification and action of regional divide between north and south alongside ethnic dimension in 
the putative distinction between the “Nilotic” groups living in the north of the Nile river and the 
“Bantu” groups living to the south (Branch 2010: 27).   
According to Mudoola (2008, 1993) Obote’s seizure of power brought the Uganda Army on the 
stage of Uganda politics since the army was then used as an instrument of policy to resolve 
domestic struggle for power. Obote expanded the army in the 1960s, entrenched the Northern 
dominance of the armed forces; the army grew from 700 troops at independence to 9,000 at the 
69 
 
time of Idi Amin’s inception coup in 1971 of which over one third were Acholi and Obote’s Langi 
tribemen (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 51, 81-5; Mudoola 1996: 97).  
The consequence of Amin’s rule from 1971-1979 was a continued tribal political identity and 
ethnic tension in Ugandan politics (Mudoola 1996: 103; Mutibwa 1992: 71-2: Omara-Otunnu 
1987: 87-91). From North-Western Uganda, West Nile, Amin was widely welcomed by Buganda. 
He returned the body of Baganda’s King - the Kabaka Edward Mutesa II, had died in exile in 
London. Amin released prisoners and was widely hailed as “a man of peace”, declared an end to 
ethnic favouritism but, took steps to eradicate the Langi and Acholi from their hold on state power 
(Branch 2010: 27). Amin suspended all democratic rights, gave the army - he mainly recruited 
from his own West Nile and Southern Sudanese tribes, to execute dictatorial powers of arrest and 
punishment, and set up a military tribunal to try political offenders, purged it on Langi and Acholi 
(Omara-Otunnu 1987:104; 133-6; Mamdani 1993; Sathamurthy 1986: 615). He used the military 
and other security forces to purge the national service of the Acholi and Langi political elite 
(Mutibwa 1992: 108; Sathamurthy 1986: 613, 664-5 nn. 22, 23). At the district level, the local 
government had become an extension of the security services, as military and police officials 
displaced political leadership and lineage-based authorities suffered significant losses as tens of 
thousands Acholi and Langi were killed (Kasozi 1994:121; Mutibwa 1992:88).  
When the exiled Acholi and Langi including other exiled Ugandan tribes united under the Uganda 
National Liberation Front (UNLF) later to be known as Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) 
with the Tanzanian Defence Force (TDF) to overthrow Amin in April 1979, the social order that 
had pertained in Acholiland was destabilised, and the link between the Acholi in the district and 
the national state was destroyed (Ibid.: p. 29). The formation of UNLF was mared with divisions in 
Tanzania before Idi Amin’s overthrow. Nonetheless, Obote returned to Uganda on May 27, 1979, 
but his return marked an ideologically divided nation (Bantu dorminated Democratic Party (DP) 
and others, and Yoweri Museveni’s small groups who had formed the Front for National Salvation 
(FRONASA) in Tanzania in 1972.  
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The two spheres of political animosity coupled with dislikes from other factions in exile against 
Obote’s leadership intensified, but the political bearings of the country later changed when Obote 
returned to power for the second time (referred to in Uganda as Obote II) from 1980-1985. Obote 
governed the country under the state terror, had no sharp line of military option rule from previous 
Obote I (Fabian 2000: 146). There was no wide-scale political rehabilitation of the Acholi middle 
class (Mutibwa, 1992:  153). Instead, Acholi people were brought into the state principally through 
the military, and the officer corps of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) again became 
heavily weighted towards the Acholi and Langi (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 149-51).  
While Yoweri Museveni, the founder of FRONASA, then Minister of Defence in the UNLA officer 
corps was already fighting a bush war he initiated in 1981 against Obote II government, and on 
the account that the 1980 election that brought Obote II to power was rigged. Despite his loss in 
the election, his NRA/M based in Luwero District, one of Buganda’s districts, designated Northern 
ethnic enemy by appealing to tribal ethnic commonality of Bantu against Nilotics, and in part 
framing their revolution along regional terms – South against North (Branch 2010: 30).  
When the Army commander David Oyite died in a helicopter crash, his replacement with another 
Lango, Opon Acak triggered division between Acholi and Langi. While the cleavages between the 
Acholi and Langi, a North-North officer corps of UNLA worsened and weakened the UNLA, the 
possibilities to resolve antagonisms within the military and political bloc failed. General Tito 
Okello, a King’s African Rifle (KAR) army veteran from the colonial period took over Obote’s II 
government from mid 1985 to February 1986. Tito Okello offered peace talks and positions in the 
government to Museveni. In his unpublished book, “Inside the Turmoil in Uganda” (1989) Okello’s 
extended invitation including to pro-Amin insurgents was a gesture of great symbolic importance 
meant to stop the political upheaval in Uganda. But the invitation of pro-Amin insurgents insulted 
many people and became a source of mutual mistrust in the post-Obote turmoil (Finnstrom 2003: 
101). Museveni ignored the agreement and fought on to take over power on 26 January 1986.  
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Finnstrom (2003: 101) notes that two governments led by Ugandans from the North (Obote is 
from Lango, and the late Okello was an Acholi) followed in the aftermath of Amin (of Kakwa origin, 
from West Nile region in North-Western Uganda). Northern domination of Uganda’s power house 
was effectively ended and power shifted to the Bantu-led southern people, a move welcomed by 
Buganda (Pirouet 1988). Branch (2010) concludes that, the development of Uganda’s national 
politics and its crisises and state’s lack of accountability to the Acholi have remained more or less 
constant, deriving lack of national elite, and the failure of the Acholi diaspora to engage 
meaningfuly in Uganda’s politics.  
3.2.1 STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES OF ACHOLI AUTHORITY SYSTEM  
The Acholi are a part of Luo people, came to Northern Uganda from Bahr el Ghazal, Wau area 
in the contemporary South Sudan in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuary. In the late 
seventeenth century, the physical environment (the 11,000 square miles – 28,400 square 
kilometres), social and economic systems developed among the Luo of Northern Uganda. During 
this time, the socio-political structures and organisation of Acholi had no strong formal political 
structures, but people lived in lineage-based, single-village political communities (Atkinson 2001: 
66). The two major linguistic representation of the Central Sudanic (Moru, Madi, Lendu and 
others) and Eastern Nilotic ((Teso-Maasaian -Teso, Karimojong cluster) and Lutuko-Maasai and 
Bari) of which the Western Nilotic central Luo group of Alur, Acholi and Lango are a part of, all 
share the same environment, technology, staple food crops, means of production, kinship-based 
socio-political institutions and ideology.  
Before the pre-colonial period, there were between 35 to 40 (Oruni, 1994: 17) sovereign territories 
and each territory was headed by the chief (Rwot). The current Acholi Traditional Institution kwon 
as Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) has now over 50 original traditional leaders. The KKA current structure 
was re-constituted in 2000 under article 246 of the Ugandan Constitution as a legal cultural 
institution. Since then, the anointed chief(s) (sg. Rwot and pl. Rwodi) with their elders, women and 
youth leaders have set up the Acholi Traditional Leaders Council.  
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The process and structure of being a chief is hereditary, with the eldest son being the next one in 
the line. Acholi authoritative system is based on arbitration by chiefs and elders who carry out 
wide consultations at grassroots level during the processes of conflict resolution.They form a web 
of special duties to their people. An Acholi chief is seen as a ruler to the socio-political institution, 
a factor that contributes to the distinctive commonality of Acholi social order, political culture and 
collective identity. The socio-political order that was established in the eighteenth centurary is 
characterised by large-scale socio-political structures that has superimposed chiefdom-lineages 
(kal). The instruments of sovereign domination like the royal drum (bul ker), royal spear (tong pa 
Rwot) and shield (kwot), and sovereign secrets (mung) authenticate the identity of his people, his 
sovereignty and determination to the recognition of the sovereign territory by another. The “Unity 
of spears” ribo tong is called for in times of emergency. 
The authority of relationships is central to Rwot’s status and deeply rooted in Acholi tradition. The 
aspect of Acholi life, rights, obligations and privileges of the individual, social service 
administration, civics, politics, defence and security (bravery and conquest), gender and children 
are all ascribed in the authority of relationship. Within the web of relationship, lies the central 
aspect of “relation” derived from “relative” meaning wat. Nevertheless, Acholi single-village (gang) 
is characterised by exogamous, patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal lineage (kaka) composition. 
According to Atkinson (2010) a village can on average range from two hundred to not more than 
four hundred although some villages vary in numbers. A clan, which is a combination of a group 
of villages can have on average of a population of four hundred to a thousand people. Village-
lineage system had recognised rights to agriculture, hunting land, usually organised in the day-to-
day cooperative village-lineage labor (awak) in the farm, and (dwar) in the hunting land (Ibid.: 13).  
Women leaders Lawii mon are also respected and their voices listened to. They, Rwodi Mon 
[women leaders] more formally, are those who are knowledgeable in all aspects of women’s 
affairs. They are also respected on clan affairs. They (usually one) can be traditionally anointed 
at the same time as the Rwo Moo. 
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The processes of leadership styles in times of conflict resolution are consensual with a common 
view based on free debates and arguments. 125 years ago, Samuel Baker is said to have initially 
thought that the Acholi lacked a leader because of their consensus approach.1 Every clan, parish 
or village may have an elder(s) whose determinants to wisdoms are mainly based on experience, 
respect and age. Other special attributes to be considered for investiture include maturity, sense 
of truth, honour, dignity, justice and social responsibility. Age without clear consent in opinion and 
open mindedness may not count. An elder who is highly respected can also have a very 
extended family with many children and whose homestead can resemble a chief’s. At a village 
level, elders can constitute a council of elders who can also include elderly woman/women. So the 
numbers of elders are not limited by any administrative means. An elder can be older than a 
Rwot Moo and therefore, there is always co-oporation and collective consultation between the 
elder and chief, especially during council meetings, ceremonies and rituals, rulings and functions. 
Elders’ role can extend but is not limited only to his area of domain. This means that an elder can 
preside over an opinion ruling in another’s clan or together if necessary. Traditionally the eldest 
woman in a clan should always give her blessing in accordance with such event.  
With the arrival of British colony, Acholi people were classified based on the above mentioned 
membership identity, presumptively determined by their origin and background (Atkinson 2010: 14 
and Barth 1969: 14). The classification; a tribe, changed British colonial policy in 1902 (Ibid.: 5) 
considering Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” identities to be 
predominantly based on historical ethnic political identities. This destroyed Rwot system, political 
and social structure followed by the subsequent political changes in Uganda, thus the outset to the 
crises under this study.  
                                                             
1 Albert Lloyd: “Uganda to Khartoum” London - refers to Mato Oput resolution approach in Acholi: 1906. 
Nowadays, because of this kind of approach to consensus leadership, it has led so many Ugandan tribes 
especially southerners to believe that “the Acholi leaders have failed them”. 
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The outset of crises were followed by two simultaneous dimensions that formed two intertwining 
types of ethnic political identity in Uganda and Acholiland respectively. The first, the internal crisis 
came about as a result of the missing local political elite, and threatened Acholi lineage-based and 
institutionalised authorities that have undergone change (Branch 2010: 43). The resultant impact 
from the breakdown of social authority in Acholiland was a reality after Museveni’s take over of 
power in February 1986. Attempts to recapture power through insurgencies and rebel groups to 
rebuild the internal crisis further destroyed the relationship Acholi held amongst themselves, with 
neighbours and in the country. The lineage-based political authorities of Acholi people were also 
being destroyed from within by the LRA war ideology.  
The second, the external, has been as a result of the destruction of Acholi peoples’ political, 
economic and military links that had tied the Acholi people in the district to the national state. The 
external tribalistic demand by Acholi elites also left Acholi people vulnerable in the local, Uganda’s 
national politics and international diplomatic representation. The instrumental formation of an-
overall ethnic belonging orchestrated institutionalised lineage-based political authorities – an 
aspect of external tribalistic demand by Acholi elites in the national politics. According to Branch 
(2010) many nationally and locally based Acholi elite, especially the middle class including the 
political elite, lacked an independent base from the state. The middle class were easily eliminated 
by Idi Amin and in Museveni’s regime respectively. Acholi people remained without the middle 
class elites and there is no independent economic foundation, and may yet to come by way of 
NGOs support by building a new mediating class between the peasantry and government (Branch 
2010: 27). 
3.2.2 CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA  
This section focuses on the post February 1986 conflict in Northern Uganda. After NRA takeover 
of power in February 1986, Uganda’s new beginning marked the era of a liberated Uganda by 
Museveni to install a system-overhaul of the old guards and install a new beginning for a broad-
based government. Jackson (2002) argues that with the final defeat of the UNLA in March 1986, 
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the Acholi were adrift from any power structure within Uganda and effectively under occupation. 
Anger, fear and rage increased amongst Acholi people as the cosmology of the war changed 
when NRA reached Gulu in March 1986 and Kitgum in April 1986 respectively. In the context of 
both destabilisation of the social order in Acholiland under Idi Amin or even during the 1950s 
when decentralised pre-colonial socio-political structure was challenged by British imposition of 
administrative chiefs, the Acholi crisis continued from 1986 (Branch 2010: 25).  
The two major crises mentioned above; the internal, caused disruption, unmanageable by the 
weakened internal authority structure, and the national political crisis failed to link Acholi political 
middle class elites with the Acholi peseantry and the central state. Secondly, the arrival of NRA in 
Acholi had a fundamentally misinterpreted situation. NRA understood neither the political 
bankruptcy of the Acholi ex-UNLA nor the alienation of the returning soldiers from significant 
sections of the civilian Acholi society (Ibid:, p.33). While the NRA prepared a long battle with the 
Acholi - along ethnic lines as enemies, the Acholi were and probably still being perceived as the 
consummate Northern tribe. On the one hand, the Acholi troops, ex-UNLA presumed there would 
be an automatic, natural bond with the rural Acholi population.  
This presumed identity gave rise to the spectra of substantial political-military force in Acholiland, 
so the NRA prepared for a long and difficult fight in Gulu and Kitgum (Amaza 1998: 62; Behrend 
1998: 109; Pain 1997: 48). The NRA could not escape the ethnic terms in which it had framed its 
rebellion, and the North-South articulation that the NRA/M had given the question of national 
power determined its political military approach to the Acholi: it proceeded as if they were 
occupying enemy territory and tried to solve the “Northern Question” for good by destroying the 
putative ethnically based power of the ex-UNLA (Ginyera-Pinycwa 1992 and 1989).  
In June 1986, reports of looting and rape by NRA soldiers while on “their frequent operation for 
hidden guns”, despite civilian Acholi’s willingness to cooperate and assist, degenerated and 
76 
 
became frequent. NRA stepped up their use of force, robbery, rape, and killing of civilians on 
accusation that Acholi as a group refused to cooperate in collecting/returning guns.  
Branch (2010) argues that “again, the NRA/M’s ethnic lens prevented it from distinguishing 
between Acholi civilians and the ex-UNLA” (Branch 2010: 34). By mid August 1986, the NRA 
began broad “security swoops” or “screens”, detaining hundreds of “lodgers” in Luzira and other 
major prisons, and carrying open massacres, like in the most infamous incident where over forty 
people including my father in Nam-okora were killed by NRA and FEDEMU (Amnesty 
International 1989, 1991; Gersony 1997: 21-3). According to Branch the paradoxical results would 
be that the NRA/M’s wrong-headed strategy, in particular its violence in Acholi civilians would give 
birth to the very rebellion the NRA/M had expected.  It created the conditions for the temporary 
resolution of the internal crisis through a mutually convenient alliance between the ex-UNLA and 
Acholi elders oriented towards military struggle against the NRA (Branch 2010: 35). 
3.3 REBUILDING ACHOLI SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS  
In response to both crises (the Acholi-Acholi: internal, and Acholi–Bantu: external), the post-1986 
rebel movements in Acholiland saw the emergence of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army 
(UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attempts to 
impose internal order upon Acholi society by building constituency against the NRA/M based on a 
particular conception of Acholi political identity (Branch 2010: 35). Attempts to rebuild the social 
structure and relations were mainly military in nature through formations and transformation of 
above named rebel groups. 
Branch argues that each rebel group endeavoured to resolve the internal crisis through the violent 
resolution of the national crisis, to create internal order through military struggle against a 
common enemy, all cast in ethnic terms (Branch 2010: 25).  The ex-UNLA troops reorganised, got 
elder’s recognition and formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/M) in 
South Sudan (Ruaudel and Timpson 2005).  
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3.3.1 UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC ARMY/MOVEMENT 
The defeated ex-UNLA soldiers, mainly the Acholi, sought bases in South Sudan, and linked up 
with one of Southern Sudan break away force from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA), the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) (Allen 2005: 4). The unity force between UPDA and 
EDF led to the claim that Museveni sought agreement with the late SPLA leader John Garang to 
destroy and disarm the UPDA.  Garang later died in a 30 July 2005 helicopter crash.  
However, the unity force between UPDA (the defeated trained army) and EDF (the break away 
force from SPLA) would be dangerous for both Museveni and Garang. The UPDA crossed into 
Uganda from Southern Sudan and got support from Acholi people based on the need to restore 
the lineage-based institutional authority. The UPDA provided the only hope and still held 
legitimacy in Acholiland. One common external enemy, Museveni’s Bantu-led government under 
the NRA/M whose defintion of all Acholi are enemies, attracted Acholi elders to tenously come 
together and stabilise internal order around a discourse of Acholi identity (Branch 2010: 33). 
Disgruntled and disoriented youths, some had direct support of education and finances from the 
ex-UNLA were either coherced or recruited to give support to UPDA, since the traditional “Acholi 
authority” agreed to UPDA’s rebuilding of Acholi social structure and restoration of order.    
UPDA tailored their need for popular support to regain national power by promising to retake 
Kampala, derived from the mindset of ex-UNLA. They promised to bring to an end to the NRA 
violence, capture NRA bases and restore democracy and political rights in Uganda. UPDA 
surrounded Gulu in early 1987 for two weeks within a radius of half kilometres from the town 
centre, but failed to take Gulu Barracks that was meant to be used as a military advancing base to 
Kampala. The UPDA were defeated. The NRA counter insurgency proved very brutal that the 
UPDA was unable to provide adequate protection to the population, and it appears that the elder’s 
authority was too attenuated (Branch 2010: 33).  Subsequently sections of UPDA signed a peace 
accord with Museveni in Gulu in June 1988 (Lamwaka 2000 and 2002). In addition, in early May 
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1987 Obote’s currency, the most widely used medium of exchange was abolished and a new 
national currency was introduced. 
The internal social crisis of the Acholi worsened, the unclean young men, the ex-UNLA and the 
UPDA once more challenged the elder’s fragile authority. UPDA failed to score military victory 
over the NRA/M to ensure Acholi political crises was ended. The politically inexperienced and 
experimenting armed group took stage, internal crises erupted the more, and a new rebel group, 
the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) emerged to assert legitimate moral and political authority over 
the population (Branch 2010: 36).  
3.3.2 HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT  
The emergence of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by the Priestess Alice Auma ‘Lakwena’  - 
meaning messenger, staged a new conventional warfare through the creation of a supernatural 
Acholi force (Jackson 2003).  
Although it was initially Lakwena’s father, Severino Lukoya, who formed an insignificant 
movement called Lord’s Army based on creating a supernatural authority in Acholiland, was 
mainly to fill in the gaps of an incompleted peace by UPDA/M (Dolan 2005: 34) and to give way to 
Lakwena’s HSM. According to Branch (2010) Lakwena’s HSM attempted to mediate the crises – 
Acholi internal and external crises and to complete the UPDA failed attempts to assert 
authoritative Acholi social structure against the common external enemy. Lakwena managed to 
establish the HSM in Acholiland by April 1987, tried to co-opt remnants of the UPDA, but the 
leadership of the UPDA refused, and subsequently turned on the HSM (Behrend 1999a: 372-3). 
Lakwena’s forces counterattacked and she overran a number of UPDA brigades, notably in Korna 
Kilaka, collecting guns and absorbing trops (Allen 1991b: 272-3).   
The discourse behind Lakwena’s HSM is of spiritual cleansing within Acholiland, drawing upon the 
long-standing alternative tradition of Acholi spiritualily that contested the claims to authority made 
by male Acholi elders and “chiefs” and which allowed her to assert authority over the UPDA, the 
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ex-UNLA and Acholi civilians generally (Branch 2010: 36). According to Allen (1991b), Lakwena’s 
spiritual cleansing claim presented a challenge to the elder’s claim to exclusively possess the 
power to cleanse; thus, through appealing to aspects of Christian imagenary that were outside the 
authority of the elders; Lakwena trumped the elder’s authority and their claim to represent the 
Acholi, while offering a route to cleansing and social inclusion for those ex-UNLA and ex-UPDA 
who did not want to submit to elder’s authority (Allen 1991b: 378).  
Finnstrom (2003) argues that the gathered support and remnants of the UPDA was based on the 
accumulated fears of Acholi people aimed at preventing the disappearance of the Acholi people. 
Doom and Vlassenroot (1999) describe HSM as a millennial assault on reality. Jackson (2003:8) 
goes further to state that HSM captured the unique cosmology of conducting war. Lakwena’s 
claim to restore social order in the internal authority of Acholi, proving that Acholi “traditions” or 
“customs” which is typified by the custodian male elders’ and traditional chiefs’ has been a 
contested terrain of inter-generational, inter-gender and intra-Acholi struggle (Branch 2010: 37).  
Lakwena’s other claim to spiritual authority took on a national and universal aspect, going beyond 
the concern of Acholi identity, something the UPDA failed to deliver. Through a discourse of 
cleansing, Lakwena focused on purging not just Acholiland but Uganda, the corruption and 
violence of NRA/M, …next target after Kampala would be South Africa  (Branch 2010: 37). Within 
this universal claim, Lakwena gained support, and in July 1987, she began moving east- and 
southwards through Lango and Teso, recruited heavily in Teso and confirmed the testament to the 
appeal her movement had through the North and East of Uganda (Behrend 1999a: 67-8). The 
HSM found regional, not only tribal, appeal and was able to temporarily unite non-Bantu groups – 
Acholi, Langi, Teso and Jo-Padhola (Branch 2010: 37; Omara-Otunnu 1995: 443-63). Lakwena 
developed “War Mobilisation Committees” (WMCs) since, she saw NRA/M’s system of local 
governance, the Resistance Councils (RCs) a challenge in the new areas of advancement. She 
organised WMC at sub-county and village levels to help supply, information and recruitment 
functions (Behrend 1999a: 70).  
80 
 
Lakwena eventually assembled an army of 7,000-10,000 troops (Behrend 1999a: 76-71). The 
HSM troops advanced crossing into the Bantu area, Magamaga in Busoga near Jinja town, a few 
miles away from the capital city Kampala. In the area, the HSM was not only looked at as a 
liberator but rather was an invading Northern army (Branch 2010: 38). The peasants cooperated 
with the NRCs and Local Defence Units (LDUs) and within weeks, the HSM degenerated in the 
face of the combined NRA-LDU-Civilian defence (Behrend 1999a: 50-2).   
Aspects of Lakwena’s secular strategies - creating the WMCs, were ultimately subjugated to her 
spiritual project, whose military defeat wiped out any institutional developments the movement 
might have catalysed. Acholiland was left even more devoid of leadership, responsible 
organisations and basic security (Branch 2010: 39).  
3.3.3 LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY  
After the defeat of the HSM in 1987 the full emergence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from 
1987 onwards (Behrend 2000) was a replica of HSM’s non-conventional warfare. Kony was one of 
the UPDA junior officer operating side by side, sometimes against the fragmented UPDA/M. The 
break-away rebel groups, the HSM and the fragmented UPDA terrorised each other’s civilian 
supporters. Lakwena had exhausted the supply of volunteers and those factions had to step up 
forced recruitment (Branch 2010: 38). Kony emerged victorious and began to take a centre 
position on the institutional establishment of lineage-based authority, but without volunteers.  
While the Acholi pursued non-conventional methods (Jackson 2003: 12) since the conventional 
warfare totally failed, Museveni’s war of containment, probably working on the fear for the Acholi 
people who are a consummate tribe and a “never-give up people”, pressured Kony. Finnstrom 
(2003: 144) and Gersorny (1997: 59) note that, [“o”]f the Acholi people in Gulu and Kitgum [and 
Pader], more than 90% do not respect, welcome, encourage, support or voluntarily assist the 
LRA. Weeks (2002: 11) argues that he “could find no one in Acholi who would admit to having any 
sympathy for the LRA”. The Refugee Law Project (RLP) (2004: 21) argues that the LRA 
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occasionally carried out large-scale attacks to underline the inability of the government to protect 
the populace.  
The destruction of the once large herds of Acholi cattle has been blamed on the NRA by Acholi 
people. Weeks (2002: 4) originally puts the figure of rustled cattle to 123,375, then later estimated 
that in 1983, the number droped to 3,000 in 2001. Gersony (1997: 27) claims a drop from 1985 to 
285,000 and to 5,000 in 1997.  
The reality or hyper reality of the cosmology of war in Acholiland was nationally and internationally 
duped on Acholi. Kony’s reality was not gaining significant progress against the NRA. There was 
lesser support by Acholi civilians. While NGOs were taking different approaches to safe lives of 
IDPs, the Government was doing nothing to support Acholi civilians. Acholi civilians were left 
without clear leadership or agents of political change: none of the rebel factions had achieved 
dominance, and the government had only displayed its incapacity and unwillingness to provide 
protection (Branch 2010: 38). 
Towards late 1987 to early 1988, the UPDA had phased out and those who had not joined 
Lakwena accepted gvernment’s offer of Amnesty and concluded a Pece Peace Agreement with 
the NRM in June 1988, or joined Kony. Kony’s force was strengthened, and the rebel group, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army became commonly known. According to Lamwaka (2002: 31) the 
government entered into a peace negotiation with Kony in 1988, but Kony was very suspicious on 
both the government and the Acholi who crossed over – the betrayers.   
The government stepped up its violence against civilians, launching a wave of forced 
displacement in October 1988 (Lamwaka 2002: 32-3). At this stage, Odoi-Tanga (2009) argues 
that the causes and consequences of armed conflict in Northern Uganda, particularly in 
Acholiland; the reasons for it and the “facts” about it all differ, depending on who is telling the story 
or writing about. The principal asset base of the Acholi people were stripped away, and LRA’s 
political ideology to install a government led by the Holy Spirit, using the ten commandments of 
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God was unable to provide a comprehensive appreciation of the causes of political conflicts in 
Northern Uganda. According to Titeca, “An emphasis on these characteristics, fundamentally 
unfamiliar practices to Western observers, has often been used in portraying the LRA’s actions as 
primitive and irrational madness, a similar action potrayed by the Revolution United Front (RUF) in 
Sierra Leone or the LURD in Liberia” (Titeca 2010: 59). 
With the rejection of a foreign force in Acholiland, the NRA/M began to disappear although hatred 
remained as the government RC system was being consolidated, and became stronger. The roles 
of RCs in Acholiland were being viewed as an organ of the NRM’s state agents of surveillance 
and control on the local. On that basis Kony gained support based on the context that the previous 
rebel groups had failed, and he proposed a violent and new resolution to the twofold political 
crises. Nationally, it was debatable whether RC functions were to serve the state, the NRM or the 
people (Ddungu 1994: 367-9; Mamdani 1995b; Oloka-Onyango 2000). Eventually, the LDUs and 
RCs effectively localised the state down to the villages, although its administration continued to 
create undemocratic local representations in Acholiland.  
Kony existed and dominated because of the previous failure to assert legitimacy by previous rebel 
groups; the overwhelming UPDA alliance with Acholi elders, and the redemptive reduction of 
violence through cleansing, and to lead that new purified community against the external enemy, 
the NRA. On the one hand, Lakwena claimed to resolve key internal cleavage – between 
UPDA/ex-UNLA and the Acholi community against the external enemy, the NRA. She had failed.  
Additionally, the insurgency intensified due to Sudanese support to the LRA from 1994 to 2002. 
Sudan and Uganda were both providing weapons and shelter to each other’s insurgencies. 
Violence was renewed beginning with the offensive by the UPDF in 2002. LRA fighters crossed in 
and out of the Northern border to establish bases in South Sudan with the approval of the 
Khartoum government and crossed back for attacks on civilians inside Northern Uganda. 
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Kony maintained a more fundamental and stringent internal cleavage, one between the genuine 
Acholi whom he would lead against the NRA/M, and on the corrupt, false Acholi who had crossed 
over to the NRA/M. Kony proposed the cleansing of an internal enemy (Allen 1991b: 378), just like 
Lakwena, but with particular focus to fighting political corruption of the administrative and security 
apparatus of the NRA/M, embodied in its Acholi agents (Branch 2010: 40). 
Kony’s discourse was limited to Acholi, as UPDA’s was. The internal crises merged with the 
national crisis. NRA/M was an external enemy that transposed to the inside of Acholi society in the 
form of NRA collaborators, the new internal enemy (Branch 2010: 40). Kony defined the Acholi as 
false – colloborators of NRA/M and the genuine Acholi, while dismissing the powers of elders or 
any other Acholi leadership to determine the bounds of Acholi identity. The LRA alone would 
decide who would be relegated to the category of the impure, corrupt Acholi, needing to be 
cleansed from Acholi society (Branch 2010: 41). Attempts by two elders, Okot Ogony of Cwero, 
eastern Gulu, Chairman of the Peace Commission of the Council of Acholi Chiefs, and Olanya 
Lagony, a respected elder from Koc-Goma, south-western Gulu resulted in them being killed on 8 
June 1996 (Finnstrom 2005: 95-93 and Okello Angoma 2005).  
Mutilations had started in 1994 that also saw the first mass forced abduction of children and young 
people. Jackson (2002: 43) terms LRA’s philosophical approach of mutilations and forced child-
recruitment as similar to that taken by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, referring to it as auto-
genocide. LRA’s attacks on civilians had at least three strategic objectives. Firstly was to deny the 
government information about its movements by forcing the rural population to flee; secondly to 
gather resources from the looted villages (RLP February 2004:19) and thirdly and most bizarrely, 
to show the populace that the government is unable or unwilling to provide protection, and thus 
encourage people to support to the LRA (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999: 30). The Acholi people 
found more support coming in from NGOs.  
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While Kony turned his aggressions on both NGOs and Acholi, the North-South divide was of equal 
pressing importance, the spiritual discourse of cleansing became one of violently expurgating the 
internal enemy from Acholi society (Ibid.: 42). The LRA framed its goals exclusively in a secular 
political language (Finnstrom 2008b), conducted information campaigns in the villages, and issued 
political statements and manifestos, set up a series of rules with violent sanctions, example, no 
riding bicycles, all meant to prevent reporting LRA positions, operations and movements to the 
NRA/M. Like Lakwena’s WMCs strategy to subjugate her powers in Acholiland, Titeca argues that 
the “strategic functions of the spiritual order in the LRA had internal strategic functions – ensuring 
internal cohesion, through motivating, legitimising and intimidating the individual fighter centred 
towards the spiritually posed leader, Joseph Kony” (Titeca 2010: 62-73). 
According to Branch (2010) LRA perspectives presented itself with problems in the internal crises 
within Acholiland. First, the LRA’s ideas of about who represented the impure, corrupt Acholi were 
constantly in flux and had little to do with who the civilians understood to be government 
collaborators. For example, LRA incorporated RC/LC system into their pro-government versus 
anti-government decampaign and therefore, targeting RCs/LCs. Secondly, the LRA often blamed 
Acholi civilians for going along with policies that those civilians felt the government had forced 
upon them; for example, when Acholi were forcibly displaced into camps, the LRA stepped up 
their violence against displaced people, accusing them of being government supporters, burning 
camps down, and calling on people to go back to their villages (Branch 2010: 40-3). “LRA is firmly 
embedded in the local belief systems” (Titeca 2010: 38), a means or “strategic imperative” (Vinci 
2005: 362). 
Kony followed the footsteps of UPDA and the HSM to assert what he saw as legitimate authority 
over the Acholi, and thus resolve the internal political crisis against NRA/M. Branch argues that 
the Manichean political framework within which the LRA was operating, however, and according to 
which it sought to establish its legitimacy, led its use of violence to be subject to imperatives alien 
to the population’s own interests or needs. The result has been a regime of violence that might 
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make sense from the LRA’s perspective but has failed to resonate with the Acholi population, 
serving only to further entrench the political crisis (Branch 2010: 42-3).  
In the nearly two decades of war, the national political crisis and the state’s lack of accountability 
to the Acholi have remained more or less constant, deriving from the lack of a national political 
elite, the exclusion of legitimate Acholi representatives from the government, the expression of 
Acholi opposition leadership, and the failure of the Acholi Diaspora to engage meaningfully in 
Ugandan politics (Branch 2010: 43). The replacement of the ex-UNLA by regrouped UPDA 
followed by the HSM and LRA, the missing local political elite, and the threatened Acholi lineage-
based authorities changed the social reality in Acholiland.  With the missing Acholi political middle 
class to serve as links between the rural population and the national government of NRA/M – the 
enemy deepened the crises in Acholiland.  
Instead, the crises in Acholiland has been replaced by donor-suported, NGO-oriented, and the 
unrepresentative non-political Acholi “civil society” composed of the Diasporas and younger 
middle class Acholi people. The status of Acholi lineage-based social authority is still 
controversially weighted against relying on a donor funded form of traditional justice support and 
the traditional authority having waned not only as a result of continued war and displacement, but 
also as a result of new upsurge of authority amongst women and youths. The women and youths 
have profited from foreign-sponsored humanitarian and peacebuilding initiatives in the camps, 
while older men have not comparatively (Branch 2010: 44).  
With the unresolved crises through military modes of operation – the UPDF, HSM and LRA, nor 
institutionalised political modes of operation, the Resistance Council / Local Council (RC/LC) 
system and multiparty elections, nor non-institutionalised political modes of organisation – 
“traditional” authority, a new political middle class or the emerging youths – managed to establish 
legitimate local political authority or leadership among Acholi  (Branch 2010: 44). The political 
development and the related crises in Uganda, the Acholiland in particular, leaves Acholi people 
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with an incapacitated participatory roles and continued elusive legitimacy in Uganda’s national 
politics. The roles of NGOs in the support and mobilisation of Acholi people, especially during and 
after dispacements substituted not only the internal and external crises in Acholiland, but also 
been the direction undertaken by Uganda’s political pursuits of foreign aid in the name of ending 
the violent conflict in Northern Ugandan and other rebelions.  
3.4 PROTECTING ACHOLI AND RECONSTRUCTING UGANDA 
One of Uganda government’s strategies for 
dealing with LRA insurgency was to remove 
the people from rural areas where they might 
assist the rebels, either out of choice or 
owing to fear of what would happen to them 
if they did not (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 
14). Clearly, the internal and external crises 
in Acholiland discussed above was taken advantage of and/or manupilated by the NRA/M, mainly 
by using Acholi individuals who crossed over to the NRA/M – “the collaborators”, the weakened 
and unsuccessful Acholi rebel groups, and by the confidence the Western governments had 
extended to support Museveni’s government. The government policy of creating “protected 
villages” was not entirely to deny LRA safety nets and protect Acholi civilians but also “has been 
an intergral part of Uganda’s foreign-aid-driven reconstruction process” (Mwenda 2010: 45).  
For over two decades of war and displacements (1986 to mid-2006), “Almost two million people 
have been living in internal displacement (ID-camps), many of them in conditions of extreme 
deprivation” (Ibid.: 45). Dolan (2002) argues that “a strategy of resettlement, or “villagisation” is a 
common anti-insurgent technique used extensively for example by the United States throughout 
the Indian Wars to isolate Native Americans in reservations. The camps are also crowded, 
unsanitary, and miserable places to live” (Dolan 2002: 19).  
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Besides “failures” to defeat the LRA, several authors have given many accounts as to why the war 
in Acholiland was taking so long to end despite the rag-tag nature of LRA. NRA/M conducted 
several failed military operations despite the higly trained and sophisticated NRA personel and 
logistics. Mwenda argues that “Uganda’s politics of foreign aid and violent conflict using LRA 
rebelions [and others in parts of the country – author’s addition] was to a large extent charity from 
non-governmetal organisations (NGOs) has substituted the state” (Mwenda 2010: 45).  
Immediately after the 1986 Museveni announcement at the takeover of power in Uganda, the 
economic reform and political consolidation presented challenges to the NRM in providing basic 
security and offer of economic dividends to NRM “supporters”, mainly Bantu people. NRM needed 
foreign exchange to import industrial parts to run the broken down industries and provide basic 
social services. Between January 1986 to May 1987, Uganda tried to pursue a development 
strategy involving barter trade, but the NRA/M that adhered to its left-wing organisation ideology 
felt into the trap of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and appealed for foreign financial 
support  from Western powers. Between 1987 and 1990, the government received an average 
US$650 million per annum as foreign aid and economic growth average 7 per cent (Mwenda 
2010: 47). In all these, the entire Northern Uganda was considered an enemy population and 
therefore generated resistance – both violence and pacific (Ibid.: 47). The exclusion of the North 
from the national reconstruction process became an added factor to the internal and external 
crises in Acholiland. 
The need to transform the NRA as a national army came at the time the Northern Ugandan war 
was raging - the need to rebuild the broken down social structure and relationships compounded 
to the dynamics of the internal and external crises in Acholiland. Mwenda argues that “the NRA 
were built around personalised and informal structures and at the same time most of the officers 
were dying of HIV/AIDS. High ranking officers enriched themselves with war front logistical 
supplies and businesses” (Ibid.: 49). HIV/AIDS infected soldiers were sent to war fronts in the 
North.  
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During this period in 1989, General Omar el Bashir took over power in Khartoum, Sudan and 
established the National Islamic Front (NIF), which alerted the US interest. Uganda became US’s 
conduit while assisting the SPLA and in retaliation, Sudan began to support the LRA, transformed 
them. These eventually altered the US alliance with Ugandan Government (Mwenda 2010: 49). 
For over a decade the international dimension of the war continued to take another direction when 
the U.S. pressure on Sudan intensified following the 1998 bombing of the American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania by al-Qaeda operatives with links to Sudan. Over the next few years, 
Khartoum is believed to have substantially curtailed aid to the LRA (Weeks 2002:16). When there 
was an al-Qaeda attack in 2001 upon the World Trade Centre and The Pentagon in the U.S, the 
relationship between Sudan and Uganda changed abruptly. Following the LRA's designation as a 
terrorist organisation by the U.S. State Department on 5 December 2001, Sudan agreed to stop 
supplying aid to the LRA (see US Terrorist Act, Terrorist List 6th December 2001; Afarko 2003:6). 
Weeks (2002: 16) argues that cross-border tensions were dialled down as support to proxy forces 
fell. The LRA itself appeared settled into their Sudanese base camps and only periodically 
crossed the border (RLP 2004: 30), but the Acholi people were in IDPs. 
Mwenda (2010) argues that the rebellion and the politics of economic reform favoured Museveni 
with a free hand to pursue his preferred political and military objectives. He was politically able to 
consolidate a one party system when donors, during the on-set of the Cold War democratic 
reforms, were forcing multiparty politics down the throat of other governments. Militarily, the 
donors allowed Museveni to pursue his preferred security agendas in the North, creating IDPs and 
regionally invading Rwanda, Sudan and later DRC (Mwenda 2010: 49). In Mwenda’s view, 
Museveni always won over donors, thus the more donors gained control of the policy and budget 
process, the more Museveni called for increased defence spending. From 1992 onwards, defence 
spending had been US$42 milion, in 1996, it had increased to US$88 million, in 2001 it reached 
US$110 million, and today, it is at US$260 million (Ibid.: 51). Donors focus on inputs, not outputs, 
they were unable to link increasing defence spending to increased efficiency or effectiveness of 
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the military in countering insurgence (Ibid.: 51). The discourse of protecting civilians were 
contained in the “protected villages” philosophy of the Western donors, than the reality on the 
ground.    
The dynamics of the rebellion of the LRA brutalities in the North against civilian population allowed 
Museveni to potray himself as a victim rather than a perpetuator of the war in Northern Uganda 
and the regions. The international community favoured Museveni with increased diplomatic 
concerns, foreign assistances and humanitarian help. Dolan argues that UNICEF gave a taste of 
interventions in June 1998 that called for LRA abductors to be tried at the International Criminal 
Court (Dolan 2005: 40). Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 51) argue that at the end of 2003, Museveni 
was persuaded to refer the situation in the North of his country to the new International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Mwenda adds that “The real victims were the Acholi people in IDPs, were caught up 
between fire and the frying pan. A camp of 15,000 thousand people would be defended by about 
14 soldiers” (Ibid.: 53).  
The government preferences to combine mixed military operations with amnesty and peace talks 
potrayed Museveni as a promising leader in forging peace in the North, thus in the country. 
Museveni sidelined, although listened to the Acholi civil society groupings’ request for a negotiated 
peace solution. The Acholi Diaspora group named Kacoke Madit (KM) – meaning the big 
gathering in Acholi, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI), and the revived Acholi 
Traditional Leaders, Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) (Dolan 2005: 40) were of secondary importance to 
military options. Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 10) argue that from the time of the peace 
agreement with the UPDA in 1988, President Museveni in particular, has persistently tried to 
downplay what has been happening. The Government wanted to broadcast its new status as an 
engaging member of the international community (Mwenda 2010: 45-58). Confident that the war in 
Northern Uganda was basically solved, Museveni appointed Betty Bigombe in 1988 as Minister of 
State for Pacification of Northern Uganda, resident in Gulu. 
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However, in 1991 LRA’s continued insurgency led Museveni to conduct a four months military 
offensive, the “Operation North” to antagonise and alienate non-combatants. Bigombe took a 
middle-ground approach to counter the insurgency by arming community defence groups, the 
local defense units (LDUs) called “Arrow Groups”. Nyeko and Lucima (2002) argue that the 
creation of the “Arrow Groups” angered LRA leader, Joseph Kony, who began to feel that he no 
longer had the support of the population. The violent reaction of the LRA included the amputation 
of limbs and cutting lips, noses and ears. Nyeko and Lucima (2002) argues that “Kony used his 
rhetoric to explain the reasons for these actions as, “If you pick up an arrow against us and we 
ended up cutting off the hand you used, which is to blame? You report us with your mouth, and we 
cut off your lips? Who is to blame? It is you! The Bible says that if your hand, eye or mouth is at 
fault, it should be cut off”” (Nyeko and Lucima 2002: 25). Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 11) argue 
that the NRA seemed reluctant to provide protection, and Bigombe’s lightly armed “arrow 
bridgade” were especially vulnerable. 
Maintaining the middle ground approach, Bigombe was willing to talk to LRA, Khartoum 
government, any relevant leaders, and GoU officials. In 1994, she engaged the LRA in 
discussions about peace, went into the bush and had four meetings with Kony to ease tensions 
that seemed a real prospect of a peace agreement (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 11). In February 
1994, Museveni’s attitude to the talks was not enthusiastic, when he [Museveni] announced a 
seven days ultimatum dateline for LRA to disarm and turn themselves over to government forces 
(Ibid.: 11). LRA resumed killings and abductions three days after the ultimatum. Bigombe 
maintained contacts with the LRA, but in 1996 she was replaced by a Minister Owiny Dolo after 
she lost the elective seat in Gulu minicipality to Norbert Mao. Acholi Parliamentary Groups (APG) 
lobbyed the parliament to allow for formal investigation of atrocities in the north. The Acholi 
Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI) also pushed for a blanket Amnesty that would cover 
all Ugandan rebel groups, including the LRA. An Amnesty Act was enacted in January 2000. The 
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discussions to carry out investigations in the Northern atrocities was overturned and military 
operations was supported.  
The anti-terrorism act of 2002 also played a big role. The NRA who at this time changed their 
name to Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) launched assault on LRA strongholds in South 
Sudan such as the “Operation Iron Fist” in 2002. LRA forces began crossing back into Uganda 
and carried attacks on a large scale and of a brutality not seen since 1995 to 1996.  
3.4.1 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION INTERVENTIONS  
Following the establishment of IDP-Camps by the turn of 1990s, cultivation and movement was 
impossible outside the camps for Acholi people. Food and other commodities were provided by 
aid agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 14-15). 
WFP was providing relief distribution to over 1.5 million internally displaced people in early 2004, a 
figure which reflects 80–90% displacement of Acholi population in the sub-region, and the addition 
of hundreds of thousands in Teso and Lango sub-regions (Dolan 2005: 48). An idea of how 
dreadful these camps could be gleaned from the shocking crude mortality rates (CMRs) was 
recorded by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Ibid.: 
15). In the extreme situations in 2005, MSF report and Jan Egland’s visit to Northern Uganda in 
2003 (see below) listed the conflict in northern Uganda as one of the “Top-Ten” most 
underreported humanitarian stories of 2004 (MSF 2005).  
Against this background, the anticipation of extreme emergency was affecting on how to deal with 
Acholi ”internal” crisis, as well as the “external”. The bigger question remains how representative 
NGOs have been in the international, government and local levels to mobilise and support the 
Acholi people? Consistently, the description of northern Ugandan war in the international media 
was known along Uganda’s discourses as: LRA is a shadowy organisation, Kony is a “madman” 
and “evil witchdoctor”, “LRA is just a couple of kids and a few fanatics”, and “they ought to be 
extracted pretty easily” (Jackson 2007: 5). The emphasis on LRA’s characteristics as religious 
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lunatics, sinister former priest, a bizzare ritualists and ruling Uganda using the ten commandments 
gave an ethnocentric descriptions of religion and spirituality discourse can act as a medium 
through which other grievances can be framed (Titeca 2010: 59).  
Jackson (2007) analyses the conflict in Uganda and came to the conclusion that it is less written 
about in academic texts than Sierra Leone and Liberia, which have received excellent coverage, 
partly because Ugandan war is less easy to categorise into current literature on the logic of 
African violence. Jackson argues that the Ugandan context of framing LRA sees evil as the 
principle of irreconcilability, i.e. the energy of the rejected channelled into undermining the 
prevailing consensus within society (Jackson 2007: 5). 
The description of Northern Ugandan war blured the international awareness from transforming 
conflict to peace. Carter Centre hosted a further implementation of the UN Office for Co-ordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Nairobi in June 2001. OCHA then reported on the improved 
security and access in Northern Uganda to encourage relief agencies to establish semi-permanent 
offices in Acholiland (Dolan 2005: 46). In July 2000 the European Union (EU) drew up a resolution 
calling “on individual EU Member States to ban LRA operations and travelling of LRA 
representatives within the EU and between EU Member States and Non-EU Nations’ (2002: L12). 
US Department of State (USDoS) was following the LRA. Later, the USDoS added LRA on US ‘B-
List’ of ‘other terrorist organisations’, and there were talks of using the Terrorism Act of January 
2002 against LRA members in the UK. Similarily, UK froze bank accounts of known LRA and 
Western Ugandan based rebel group, Allied Democratic Force (ADF) collaborators as part of the 
crack down on terrorism (OCHA 28 February 2002: 31-32). From 2001 onwards was an era that 
marks Global War on Terrorism (GWT) generated by the US and its allies. The post 11 September 
2001 al-Qaeda attack in the US translated into very concrete anti-LRA actions on the ground. 
There was no direct international intervention in the LRA case, rather, Presidents Basir of Sudan 
and Museveni together with the then UK Secretary of State for Development, Clare Short, held 
bilateral talks while attending an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in 
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Khartoum. The agreement from the meeting allowed Uganda to cross into Sudan to “rescue 
children” and deal with LRA once and for all. 6, 000 troops were sponsored for “routine training” by 
US. 
During a November 2003 field visit to Uganda the United Nations Undersecretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland stated, "I cannot find any 
other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda that is getting such 
little international attention" (BBC News 2003). This was followed by the UN Security Council 
condemnation of the atrocities committed by the LRA and expressions of concern about the 
plights of the displaced children. Perrot (2010) argues that Jan Egeland’s visit to IDP camps in 
Northern Uganda marked a turning point that raised international awareness and prompted the 
intervention of hundreds of state and non-state external actors. Egeland’s ensuing floodlighting of 
the Ugandan humanitarian crisis hastened an unprecedented, uncoordinated and fragmented rush 
of hundreds of UN agencies, local and international NGOs, journalists, consultants and 
researchers (Perrot 2010: 187). Perrot records from the interviews conducted in Gulu, Kitgum and 
Pader NGO Forums’ representatives in October 2005 more than 216 NGOs were registered in 
Gulu NGO Forum’s list, 50 in Pader and more than 100 in Kitgum” (Perrot 2010: 305). 
Perrot (2010: 188) continues that for local actors and peace activists, the internationalisation of 
the conflict was expected to raise international awareness of a humanitarian and security 
situation. There was hope that donors and multilateral institutions, intervention would soften the 
government policy on the Northern Ugandan conflict and bring alternative solutions to the unlevel 
dialogue between the military option prioritised by the government since 1986 and the negotiated 
solution put forward by Northern NGOs and civil society organisations (Perrot 2010: 189). 
Mwenda (2010) argues that from 2004 onwards, the Northern conflict became a magnet for 
international attention and funding. Total humanitarian assistance increased from US$19.5 million 
in 2000 to US$56 million in 2002 and US$119.5 million in 2007 (UNOCHA 2000, 2002, 2007). At 
the same time the total official development assistance and official aid increased from US$817 
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million in 2000 to US$1.2 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). Perrot (2010) argues that “Ten years 
before, Comboni Fathers and a few NGO representatives were the only “white people” locally 
termed in Swhaili word as Bazungus, in major towns in Acholi districts. Today, bars and chic 
hotels are mushrooming in Gulu, four-by-fours ride up and down its main streets, NGOS’ signs 
thrive on every corner. Gulu has become NGOs city! One day NGOs will displace us from Gulu to 
get more space for their offices and compounds” (Perrot 2010: 189). 
Another important dimension of the international intervention was the involvement of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). In December 2003, President Museveni referred the LRA to the 
ICC to determine if the LRA is guilty of international war crimes. ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo formally opened an investigation in January 2004. Some local Ugandan groups have 
criticised this move as an ICC conviction of Joseph Kony and his senior lieutenants is seen to 
make a negotiated end to the conflict nearly impossible. 12 arrest warrants were to be issued for 
LRA war crimes suspects, the first such warrants since the ICC was established in July 2002. The 
ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, said the court intends to start its first war crimes trial 
in Uganda by July 2005 (Palme 2005). Palme (2005) the ICC spokesperson said, during the 
coming year, there will be warrants. The prosecutor was looking at a very small group of LRA top 
leaders. Palme (2005) did not rule out possible prosecution of members of the Uganda People's 
Defence Forces in relation to their conflicts with the LRA, but stated that LRA crimes are far more 
serious than the crimes of UPDF. Following a visit to meet local leaders in Northern Uganda by 
Ocampo in 2005, the possibility to be able to delay issuing warrants in deference to any peace 
negotiations was slim. Bigombe (2005) urged that she would abandon mediation of the peace 
process if the ICC prosecution continued, something she did. Alen and Vlassenroot (2010) argue 
that “President Museveni was using the court to deflect attention away from the illegal activities of 
the Ugandan army in DRC. There had been many allegations of serious crimes carried out by 
Ugandan government forces in Northern Uganda: what was ICC going to do about those?” (Allen 
and Vlassenroot 2010: 16).  
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According to Allen and Vlassenroot (2010: 16) “Aid agencies expressed concerns that the LRA 
would be unwilling to release abducted peope because they might be used as witnesses. On the 
other end, the ICC referral would affect the Amnesty processes, implying the blanket amnesty 
could no longer be viable”. Allen and Vlassenroot (2010) argue that the best way was to combine 
amnesty and traditional reconciliation – Mato Oput. In November 2004 President Museveni was 
exploring ways to withdraw the referral made to the ICC, which was seen as a complication to 
what appeared to be a significant movement towards a negotiated peace. The human rights group 
Amnesty International (16 November 2004) vigourously protested Museveni’s move. 
Nonetheless, the ICC issued arrest warrants of senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony 
in September 2005. Green (2008:11) argues that Kony himself faced thirty-three counts. This is 
believed to have angered Kony. Green (2008) adds that rumours had it that the rebels had 
circulated hand written note in Gulu in which they threatened to kill any foreigners they found. A 
British man who had gone to help rafters in trouble on the Murchison Falls National Park a couple 
of months before, and two de-miners had been shot dead in an ambush across the border in Southern 
Sudan. Natsios (2003: 343-344) argues that “another potential strength of NGOs is that they have 
no formal connection to government, and, generally, an aversion to military force. This frees them 
from direct political interest in the outcome of the conflict”. This may diverge from the case of 
Northern Uganda. Ugandan government have strong and formal connections to NGOs. The 
proliferations of NGOs in Northern Uganda according to Zartman and Touval (2007) may have an 
organisational interest in establishing a presence in a region. As far as the content of peace 
process is concerned, NGOs tend to be “interested in particular outcome, […] because they 
believe in its inherent desirability” (Zartman and Touval 2007: 442). Outside interventions were 
being either initiated, steered or frustrated by the Ugandan government. 
“Rushing into the humanitarian breach opened by Egland, an impressive increase in more or less 
good-quality international informing, sensitising, lobbying and fundraising initiatives have 
flourished on the Web” (Perrot 2010: 189).  A noticeable long list can be found to include the 
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Uganda Conflict Action Network-Uganda-CAN, the joint International Crisis-Group-Center for 
American Progress’s ENOUGH project “to establish genocide and mass attrocities”,  the Gulu 
Walk initiated by two Canadians, or the International Rescue Committee’s Campaign: “Stop the 
violence in Uganda!”. College students, Hollywood actors and peace activitsts produced 
documentaries on the Northern Ugandan “plight”, such as Canadian seven-award-winner Uganda 
Rising, Daniel Simpson and Matthew Green’s Rebels without a Cause of Journey into Sunset, 
produced a report by the former special adviser to the president at the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) John Pendergast (Ibid.: 189). Perrot (2010: 189-90) argues that the controversial 2004 
documentary film Invisible Children (Rough Cut), dedicated to night commuters, has been shown 
on almost every campus in California from suburban living rooms to Capitol Hill, with coverage on 
Oprah, CNN, and the National Geographic Channel.  
According to Perrot (2010) these marginal and limited emergency aid from non-state actors in the 
public awareness and international mobilisation converged only at the top levels with growing 
political support from highest international forums, UN members and diplomatic circles for a quick 
resolution of the conflict (UN Security Council 2006). These effected a quick diplomatic strategy 
towards  Museveni’s government, reflecting the arrival and growing influence of new actors in the 
diplomatic landscape in Uganda and in the UN institutions (Perrot 2010: 191). Harsher diplomacy 
of public awareness and international mobilisation partly broke the status quo policy towards 
responsibility in the conflict that had been implemented by traditional donors. Museveni’s success 
stories of the 1990s and its military interventions including in the DRC, corruption scandals 
involving Ugandan officials, and the slow democratic process mobilised growing criticism of the 
regime’s humanitarian laissez-faire and obstinacy in pursuing  military option which, until then, had 
brought only modest results (Perrot 2010: 191-2). Perrot (2010) argues that the relatively “naïve” 
donors  became realists that suggested the peaceful path to conflict resolution in Northern 
Uganda. Museveni tactically launched the Peace and Recovery Development Project (PRDP) in 
October 2008, as a three-year Shs1.1 trillion ($606.5 million) programme to provide 30 per cent of 
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the funding, the rest being financed by donors (Perrot 2010: 199-200). This was to ensure that 
vital foreign aid was not cut off and encouraged UN agenices and NGOs to address the problems 
(Chabal 2005; Dolan and Howel 2006). 
In conclusion, the humanitarian and regional bias used by external actors to analyse the conflict 
adds to the depoliticising of conflict and its resolution. The crises in Acholi, the internal and 
external were overwhelemed and got more complicated by NGOs interventions (humanitarianism),  
regional Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) reached between SPLA and Kharthoum 
government, the confrontational policies towards political oppositions, the North-South divides, the 
fueling tensions on Acholi people, and the fact that the army remains the chief actor in the North 
will have to be addressed. However, the reality of a negotitated peace process, the Juba peace 
talks emerged and NGOs involvement in forging peaceful dialouge between the GoU and LRA 
became real.  
3.5 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND NGOS INVOLVEMENT 
Section 3.3 discusses on the failed attempts to resolve and rebuild the Acholi internal and external 
crises through insurgencies. The government policy to protect the Acholi population moved them 
into IDP camps. Donor-funded reconstruction programme did not include the North that was at 
war. NGOs assistances remained the lifeline, mainly in terms of humanitarian help. Several 
attempts to have a negotiated peace agreement failed, but hope came to the effective reality of 
engaging GoU and LRA in the Juba Peace Talks (JPT) in South Sudan in July 14, 2006. Aspects 
of regional changes brought about by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in South Sudan contributed to the Juba Peace talks. Also, in the previous section was discussed 
the diplomatic pressures that eventually led GoU to subscribe to the participation in the JPT. This 
thesis is directed towards the role of NGOs in Northern Uganda peace process and eventual 
return of IDPs to respective villages of origins (sub-section 3.6). 
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According to Simonse et al. (2010), initially, low-profile civil society initiative evolved into a hugely 
publicised negotiation process chaired and overseen by six African and three Western 
governments as well as by representatives of the United Nations and the European Union. 
Simonse et al. (2010) argues that NGOs that brought parties to the northern Ugandan conflict to 
the table in Juba is Pax Christi Netherlands, starting from the process initiated in 1997 (Simonse 
et al. 2010: 225). Contacts made with the Uganda Catholic Episcopal Conference, Pax Christi 
commissioned Dr Simon Simonse as an independent consultant to carry out a study (Pax Christi 
Netherlands 1998).  
An initiative by the British Comic Relief mediation process was being undertaken by Dr Onek 
Leorenzio, a South Sudanese Acholi based in Nairobi, Kenya. Preliminary talks between Dr Obita, 
the external representative of LRA and the Uganda Minister of the North took place in Lancaster 
with Professor Aseefa as a mediator. Aseefa was working closely with Dr.Obita. British Comic 
Releif ran out of funding, but Dutch Interchurch Aid made arrangements for a second secret round 
of talks in the Netherlands in March 1988 (Simonse et al. 2010: 225). The Dutch government 
arranged for travel document for the rebels, including Joseph Kony, but another parallel process 
was being facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome through an intra-LRA group 
(Simonse et al. 2010: 225). Betty Bigombe’s peace attempts came when Pax Christi Netherlands 
had tried many initiatives. Pax Christi came in after getting to know that the LRA rebels viewed 
Bigombe as too close to the government. The other issue was the ICC interventions in 2005 
(Simonse 2010). 
Other initiatives came as a result of the signing of the CPA between Sudanese government and 
the SPLA on the 9 January 2005. CPA made important provision for South Sudan to have a semi-
autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS). Atkinson (2010: 208) argues that the provision 
included amongst other conditions in the CPA to deal with LRA and the presence of the UPDF in 
South Sudan. The GoSS took LRA issue seriously and SPLA leader John Garang pledged, he 
would not allow the LRA to operate in the south once he gained formal control of the region 
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(Atkinson, 2010: 208). Months later, Garang died on 30 July 2005 in a helicopter crash but his 
death did not appear to shake the close cooperation between SPLA and Uganda.  
Salvar Kiir Mayardit replaced Garang and Dr Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon became Kiir’s Vice-
President. Paulino Matiep Nhial became Kiir’s deputy commander and effective head of the SPLA. 
The new GoSS leaderhip considered ending the LRA factor important, but none had stronger links 
to Museveni as Garang. However, both Matiep and Riek had substantial dealings with the LRA 
(Atkinson, 2010: 209). Atkinson (2010: 208) argues that GoSS leadership reasoned that talks with 
LRA offered chance, and GoSS would serve as mediators in peace negotiations between LRA 
and GoU; the LRA would cease initiating hostile activities inside Southern Sudan; and if LRA 
could not accept these two provisions, then GoSS would force them to leave.  
On July 14, 2006 JPT began between delegations from the LRA and GoU with the Vice-president 
of Southern Sudan Riek Machar as the chief mediator. JPT had five agenda items: ceasation of 
hostility (CoH) – signed on 26 August 2006; comprehensive solution to address the root causes of 
the conflict-; reconciliation and accountability - signed on 19 February 2008; permanent ceasefire; 
and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - signed on 29 February 2008. The leader of 
the Ugandan delegation, Internal Affairs Minister Ruhakana Rugunda stated in (The Monitor 
Newspaper 2006) that his priority was to obtain a quick ceasefire. The LRA delegation led by 
Martin Ojul said in a Sunday Vision, 15 July 2006 that LRA's acceptance of the peace talks should 
not be interpreted that LRA can no longer fight, but stressed that a negotiated settlement is the 
best way to end the conflict. Kony requested meetings with local religious and political leaders 
from Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan.  
While the broader context of the talks remained confused and highly watched by both LRA and 
GoU, GoSS viewed the talks as a means of ridding itself of a foreign army that is complicating 
their delicate relationship with Khartoum government. The more general peacebuilding dilemma of 
whether to prioritise justice (trying war criminals) or peace (ending the violence) was, and still is, 
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the most hotly debated issue (Simonse et al. 2010: 236). The GoU’s interest had changed against 
the ICC to suspend the war crimes indictment against leaders of the LRA. The GoU’s request was 
largely supported by Acholi leaders and civilians within Northern Uganda. The move was 
condemned by international human rights groups and some political analysts saw GoU’s request 
as a ploy to gain local support.  
The process of JPT was very slow and cumbersome and as an advisory member to the Acholi 
CSOs I found both delegations very large, a big mediation and there were many others present. 
The Acholi civil society groups were added onto these cumbersome process fairly late. The 
number of diverging processes to the talks also increased as agenda items were being far 
removed from addressing the internal and external Acholi crisis into details. Simonse et. al. (2010: 
236) argue that trust-building versus legitimising criminals needed to address the root causes of 
the conflict. Maintaining confidentiality and transparency was difficult for Pax Cristi as the 
negotiation dragged, attracted media attention and the visibility of the talks could not be hidden.  
The war in Northern Uganda became a way of life, so was the protracted Juba peace negotiation 
meeting became a place for making money, striking deals and making friends. The venues, Juba 
Raha and later Home and Away in Juba, South Sudan have since regained their names and 
businesses based on the JPTs. According to Simonse et al. (2010), not only were the individual 
parties involved in the JPT wanted to protect their reputations, but also the NGOs, UN agencies 
and governments. The negotiation was based on values and the basis of power struggle, later 
obstructed the NGOs, UN agencies and other local initiatives from the CSOs in Uganda and South 
Sudan respectively. However, LRA was not any longer operating in Acholiland. The concerns of 
the majority Acholi people, mainly those who were caught up in the IDP-Camps were that Kony 
should not be taken to The Hague. That Kony should come back and live with the community 
because this is how Acholi social reconciliation process works.  
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Generally, the emergence of peace in Northern Uganda was based on the success of the talks, 
but the potential that the talks would fail like before was apparent. The signing of the first agenda 
item on CoH between the GoU and LRA allowed for the LRA forces to leave Uganda and gather in 
two assembly areas. Ugandan government promised they would not attack LRA and the GoSS 
guaranteed the LRA safety. This was positively embraced by the IDPs as they began to move 
towards their respective villages of origins.  
Although Kony failed to show up for the final signing of the peace deal after many postponments 
and delays starting from 26 March 2008; followed on 28 March 2008 to 3 April 2008 and again to 
5 April 2008, and  another postponement to 10 April 2008, Kony was finally reported suffering 
from diarrhoea. In an interview with the retired Bishop Ochola (2009) who reflected that the word 
“Lord” in the LRA did not only attribute to the failure of the signage of JPTs, but also that Kony 
needs to confirm with that Lord, an unseen dimension in the spirited religion that the JPTs did not 
consider.  
The GoSS announced on June 8th, 2008 that they would no longer mediate arguing that there 
were multiple reasons for the decision, including the LRA resumed recent attack, and the apparent 
lack of interest in the peace process on the part of the Ugandan government. The GoU had 
another plans after the talks ended. An “Operation Lightning Thunder” was instead launched on 
LRA base in Garamba on 14 December 2008 marking to an effect end of the JPTs and pushing 
LRA further inside DRC and to Central African Republic, places where LRA continue to operate in.  
3.6 RETURN TO VILLAGES OF ORIGINS 
In a situation once termed “social torture” by Dolan (2005 and 2009) began to change after the 
September 2006 siging of the CoH agreement between LRA and GoU in a JPTs in South Sudan. 
The GoU began a process of creating “satellite camps” to decongest major IDP camps, like Pabo, 
the third biggest in East Africa. In Pader district, 28 satellite sites were occupied out of 48 
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identified IDP camps while the numbers in Kitgum district were 21 of 36 (OCHA 2006). IDPs 
further South in Teso and Lango were being encouraged to return home directly.   
The process of return was challenged first by questioning if Acholi sub-region is in a post-war 
stage, adding onto the diffuclt demise of defining post-war concept. In practical and policy terms, 
Allen et al. (2010: 279) argues that large numbers of IDPs left the camps and the process 
accelerated since the government announced the IDP-policy of “voluntary” return and a camp 
phase-out operation in 2007. Allen (2010) points out that the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) 
issued a statement like “the right to freedom of movement must be respected”, and that the 
“voluntary character of return in safety and dignity must be ensured”. Nothing about the past 
horors of IDP was acknowledged (Allen et. al 2010: 282; UNP for IDPs 2004: vi). Lederach (1999: 
33) argues that the ending of violent conflicts are nothing more than opening a door into a whole 
labyrinth of rooms that invite us to continue in the process of redefining our relationships.  
Since 1995, many returnees realised the war spoilt everything (Allen et al. 2010: 281). The culture 
changed, the social structure and many deaths had been recorded. The displacement, age, 
livelihoods, social services, shelter/land, psychosocial, HIV/AIDS have posed problems for the 
returnees and NGOs (IASC 2007). Structural violence occurred in a much wider social, economic 
and political scale and the source of conflict became difficult to trace. Rebuilding the social 
structure and relationships between returnees by NGOs’ needs to transform both the negative 
energy of war into positive peace. There is hope and expections that sustained peace (positive 
peace) will coincide with rapidly improving livelihoods, but experiences among the masses of 
forcibly displaced have been very mixed (Allen et. al. 2010: 283).  
Access to land following displacement is linked to the longer period of displacement, the difficult 
and intractable land tenure and ownership and laws (Uganda Land Act 2007). Rapid population 
increases while in IDPs was registered as returnees began to go back villages of origin. Return 
exerted pressure on land both for ownership and use. On return, only few families were given 
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seeds and tools and some basic food to enable them to plant and grow sufficient food (Oxfam 
2007). The absence of shelter made returnees face enormous daunting prospects of starting 
everything from scratch, like, roads, water sources as well as overgrown fields (IASC 2007). In a 
IASC (2007) report, establishing ownership of disputed land is stretching Uganda’s traditional 
conflict resolution mechanisms. Disputes can be taken to the formal official judicial system, but 
there is also lack of documentation to prove land ownership, for example. 
This is because, both local population and the GoU relied heavily on NGOs supportive roles to 
promote the search for durable solutions for returnees. However, the causes of displacement; 
facilitating safe and voluntary return, resettlement, integration and re-integration of the IDPs; 
ensuring that every person internally displaced or otherwise receives information relating to the 
policy and citizens would be protected from arbitrary displacement was missed out during return. 
The activities of the national and international humanitarian and development agencies have been 
mainly effective at the district and local (community) levels through the promotion of public 
awareness of the problems of the IDPs, and through support aimed at developing self-help and 
self-reliance (UN-Policy for IDPs 2004).  
Government assistance relied on the implementation of the Peace, Reconstruction and 
Development Plan (PRDP). Allen et al. (2010) argue that there was predictability that  the PRDP 
and the manner of its implementation may not regain peace, recovery and development following 
its relatively small budget of US$609 million. 70 per cent of PRDP is to be donor funded and 30 
per cent to be provided by the GoU. PRDP faced several problems of lack of ownership of 
projects, concerns that funds have been abused by politicians and basic lack of concensus about 
its management, PRDP’s geographic scope, which comprised of eighty districts. The affected 
Northern Ugandan districts are made of only twelve districts, which raises the question of why and 
how twenty-six districts have come to be subsumed under Northern Ugandan reconstruction 
(Allen et. al. 2010: 284).  
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Allen et al. (2010: 284) puts the PRDP in Georgia’s and Palestinian’s context that: after the seven 
days of conflict with Russia in August 2008 over Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, has been pledged $4 billion in aid and Palestinian Authority has been pledged $5 
billion in aid, after the three-week Israeli offensive in Gaza during 2008 (Allen et al. 2010: 284). 
The PRDP has not been different from these cases and in deed until the end of writing this thesis. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter can safely conclude that Acholi social structural authority and relationship were 
grounded in the past ethnically grounded culture and local structures during the political 
development of Uganda. Following the formation such social reality patterns, the consequent 
possible social developments were destroyed by the colonial legacy during Uganda’’s political 
development. This is because Uganda’s political development of the “tribal” and “regional” 
identities was strongly grounded based on the predominantly historical ethnic political identities 
and crises on not only Northern Uganda, but also other parts of the country.  
While the political development predates back to colonial times, ideological formations coupled 
with geopolitical, real politicking of the contemporary North-South conflict clearly annotated the 
geopolitics of Uganda as Bantu-South and Nilotic-North. The instrumental formation of an-overall 
ethnic belonging orchestrated institutionalised lineage-based political authorities – an aspect of 
external tribalistic demand by elites in the national politics.  
Historically, bullets rather than ballots have dominated Uganda’s politics in which two 
governments were removed by military coups (i.e. Obote I in 1971 and Obote II in 1985), one by 
foreign incursion [i.e. the 1979 Tanzania – Uganda National Liberation Front invasion] and another 
by armed rebellion - the NRA and Museveni rebellion of 1981 – 1985 that culminated in the 
overthrow of Tito Okello (Brett 1995: 129-152 and Odoi-Tanga 2009). Again, the military 
domination of Northern people in the army found it hard to shift  the poltical end game through 
military domination.  
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The two major crises that would, first be the basis for the breakdown of social authority in 
Acholiland emerged as a result of the return of the defeated ex-UNLA soldiers to fit into civilian 
lives in Acholiland. And, secondly the lost of political control that would lead them back to resolve 
the national crisis since the destruction of political links that tied the Acholi in the district to the 
national state is lost (see Branch 2010: 25). Attempts to resolve the crises through insurgencies 
and counter-insurgency attacks against the enemy, the NRA/M government establishment did not 
succeed. Rebel movements in Acholiland comprising of the defeated and regrouped ex-UNLA 
soldiers UPDA, HSM and LRA rebel groups escalated the crises. Both groups tried to impose 
internal order upon Acholi society by building constituency against the NRA/M based on a 
particular conception of Acholi political identity (Branch 2010: 35). These means that military 
attempts to rebuild the social structure and relations were not of any value.   
With the NRA/M government policy to protect the Acholi civilian the creation of “protected 
villages”, not entirely to deny the only rebel fighting group, the LRA safety nets and protect Acholi 
civilians was an intergral part of Uganda’s foreign-aid-driven reconstruction process (Mwenda 
2010). The focus was aid more than protection of lives. These also saw the massive influx of 
NGOs in Northern Uganda. 
While conditions of living in IDP camps worsened beyond extreme human living conditions, 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) listed the conflict in northern Uganda as one of the “Top-Ten” 
most underreported humanitarian stories of 2004 (MSF 2005). Another report by the United 
Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan 
Egland in November 2003 rated northern Ugandan situation as is getting very little international 
attention.  
Following Jan Egeland’s visit to Northern Uganda and other NGO reports, northern conflict 
became a magnet for international attention and funding with huge numbers of NGOs 
proliferations into the region from 2004 onwards. NGOs became more involved in peacebuilding 
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process and in July 14, 2006 the Juba Peace Peace Talks (JPT) in South Sudan started between 
the LRA and GoU. The International Criminal Court (ICC) had also intervened in the peace with 
justice process of warranting arrests for LRA commanders. 
NGOs played a big role in peacebuilding, including some other initiatives like the signing of the 
CPA between the SPLA and Khartoum administration for the talks to continue.  These led to the 
IDPs return to villages of origins. The process of return was announced by the government that 
IDPs must have voluntary return in safety and dignity be ensured, the right to freedom of 
movement must be respected and a camp phase-out operation was launched in 2007. Majority 
Acholi have returned home, but nothing about the past horors of IDP was acknowledged (Allen et 
al. 2010: 282; UNP-IDPs 2004: vi).  
107 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This methodology chapter addresses the research design in sub-section 4.2 leading to explaining 
why a qualitative research approach was preferred in sub-section 4.2.1. In sub-section 4.3 the 
case of Northern Uganda discusses on the sample design and the criteria used to select the 
different respondents/groups. Sub-section 4.4 addresses the data collection techniques used. 
Sub-section 4.5 is the analysis followed by the verification, validation and ethical issues in sub-
section 4.4.1 before the conclusion. The methodology adopts a context specific, qualitative study 
of the views of relevant respondents involvement in the Acholi IDPs’ crises and returnees to 
respective VoRs. The next sub-section 4.2 is the research approach. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section explains the design for this research and why other research designs were not 
chosen. This research is grounded within the interpretists research philosophy. The aim is to 
explore the subjectively constructed and interpreted social worldviews of war affected Acholi 
population. In designing this study, a decision to discard alternative designs, first, those with 
leanings towards the positivists strand had to be made. Meaning, laboratory experiment could not 
be applicable given the emphasis that it places on manipulating the independent variable so as to 
ascertain on the dependent variable (Bryman 2001: 33). It was not, for example, possible to 
manipulate how material and organisational determinants of social actors like the Government and 
NGOs are assertive of internal and external Acholi crises, displacement and return to VoRs that 
might have led to the production of current crisis in social interactions and breakdown of lineage-
based social authority within Acholi population. Survey research (cross-sectional and longitudinal) 
and statistical designs were deemed inappropriate for this thesis. 
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Ethnography, grounded theory approach and phenomenological research designs are deemed 
inappropriate for this study, despite their leaning towards a qualitative methodology (Creswell 
2003; Robson 2002). Ethnography studies are pre-occupied with describing and interpreting 
socio-cultural features of a research population, over a longer period. It [ethnography] is not the 
focus of this thesis. Grounded theory approach aims to generate theory from data, which again is 
not the case with this thesis. It is cumbersome as it involves numerous visits to the field and it 
starts from a fallacy of zero pre-assumptions and theoretical ideas about the subject (Robson 
2002). While a phenomenological research has the advantage of focusing on people’s subjective 
explanations and interpretations of the social world view, it demands, as Robson (2002: 196) 
argues, a highly specialised vocabulary and solid grounding in some challenging philosophy which 
the researcher has no background of.  
4.2.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The  approach to this research is to serve the purpose of exploring and describing post-war 
affected Acholi people’s understanding and interpretations of their social realities in respective 
villages in as far as roles of “outsiders” are concerned. The research approach bases on the 
logical generation and justification of the explanation leading to the accumulation of views of 
Acholi people, NGO workers and government officials.  
As said before, this thesis is influenced by the researcher’s underlying assumptions of 
epistemology, ontological stands, human nature and methodology. The distinguishing role of the 
researcher or the relationship of the researcher to that being researched was important. Schramm 
(1971) argues that a research strategy aims to explain “why […decisions] were taken, how they 
were implemented, and with what results in order to achieve the objectives of a research” (Yin 
2003:12).  
The basic original knowledge of Acholi people was thwarted by war that resulted into both internal 
and external crises, internal displacement, followed by returns to respective VoRs. Importantly, is 
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the epistemological issue that makes the appropriate knowledge about Acholi population and their 
social world or without natural science model of the research process becomes relevant and 
suitable for this study. The ontological issues view the social world of returnees as something 
external to returnees or as something that they are in the process of fashioning. Asserting the 
importance of following the rebuilding/transforming of the internal and external crises, social 
conditions of displacements and eventual returns to VoRs, and what it means to the returnees 
was based on accomplishment made through the support of many social actors. These social 
conditions have invariably produced new social conditions with interdeterminate knowledge that 
still haunt returnees. Creswell (1994) argues that the nature of reality, axiological issues, the role 
of values in the research and the rhetoric of the study or language of the research need a good 
choice of strategy. The choice of methodology (strategy or plan of action that links methods to 
outcomes) governs the choice and use of methods, the techniques and procedures used.  
According to Azar and Burton (1986: 49) formally controlled experiment and in empirically based 
theorising deductive approach that relied upon falsification was impractical, as such testing was 
usually not possible in open systems. Northern Uganda is a case in point where there was an 
absence of political legitimisation dominated by the lack of internal and external social authority, 
displacements and eventual return to VoRs. The attempt to impose structures that denied people 
their identity and their development in all aspects, and the attempt to impose the norms of the 
powerful, were dysfunctional and a souce of conflict (Azar and Burton 1986: 50).  
Ritchie and Lewis (2006) argue that any research purpose can be accomplished using a variety of 
methods, it is therefore important to identify the kinds of circumstances with which this might be so 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Marshall and Rossman 1999; Patton 2002 and Walker 1985). Creswell 
(2003: 4-5 and 1994) points to the interrelated levels of what epistemology informs the research, 
that is to say, lies behind the methodology in question. The justification of choosing the qualitative 
method is discussed below. 
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4.2.2 JUSTIFICATION OF CHOOSING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The choice of methodology in social science research according to (Sarantakos 1993 and Bryman 
1988) has exaggerated the differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies as 
tools for data collection and analysis. The approach serves the functions of this research, is 
contextual and theoretically based on “thick” description (Geetz 1975; Mason 2002 and Gibbs 
2010).  
Initially, the research preferred to adapt mixed methods (Creswell 2003). However, qualitative 
data analysis of words and images varied from statistical figures and numbers. Qualitative 
methods make no attempt to measure, count or classify, but rather try to capture the full 
complexity of social phenomena through descriptive analysis that focuses on views and 
perceptions. Interviews are unstructured and not structured as is rightly put by Pope and Mays 
(1995a and 1995b) that qualitative research allows people to contribute and share their views and 
feelings in a conversational format, without the constraints of a structured questionnaire. Marshall 
and Rossman (1999) and Robson (2002) argue that the functions of qualitative research have 
been called descriptive or exploratory by other authors and indeed both are key features of 
contextual research. The essential purpose is to explore and describe participants’ understanding 
and interpretations of social phenomena in a way that captures their inherent nature (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2006: 28). 
This qualitative research method requires examining and determing IDPs-returnees’ social 
conditions based on the emerging patterns that explains perceptions within the context they find 
themselves in at the moment. Marks (2000) argues that they are a useful way of finding out about 
people, what they think, feel, hope, believe and understand. According to her, qualitative research 
enables researchers to discover the range, motivations and needs behind people’s attitudes and 
behaviour, rather than measuring their incidence or rationalised opinion. The role of qualitative 
methods in providing the kinds of information and understanding needed in social research has to 
consider some of the broader functions of social investigation (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 26). The 
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undertaking of the research study therefore, requires great consideration as to the 
appropriateness and validity of any chosen method since they both influence the research 
outcomes (Denscombe 2003; and Kirk and Miller 1986). Ritchie and Lewis (2006) argue that there 
is a general agreement that the factors that determine whether qualitative methods should be the 
principle or sole method used is centrally related to the objectives of the research. “The nature of 
the information or evidence required of the purpose is concerned with understanding the context 
or process” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 32). 
Acholi IDP-returnees were newly developing unique social phenomena, such as, according to 
Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 32) the need for successful resettlement or refugees in disadvantaged 
urban areas, where previous knowledge or understanding has not fully explained occurrences or 
circumstances that are known to be widespread. They argue that the open and generative nature 
of qualitative methods evidence alone may be needed (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 32) as the 
measurement is problematic. Pope and Mays (1995a, 1995b) emphasise that qualitative research 
is reaching the parts other methods cannot reach. The qualitative context and process needed a 
carefully framed and responsive questioning to help the participants uncover and relay the 
delicacy of their perceptions and responses. Most notable sensitive issues were mainly cautioned 
on vulnerability based on, for example, previous physical or sexual abuse and bereavement 
amongst mainly returnees. Amongst the NGOs and Government officials, sensitivities arose 
based on the type of information delivered to the research team. These were overcome by prior 
arrangement to send questions and use of probing techniques and interactive exchanges of views 
during the interviews and FGDs. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that the conventional format of qualitative research methods 
puts the researcher directly in touch with participants and provides a means of getting “beneath 
the surface” of attitudes and behaviours and depth of understanding of issues within the studied 
areas. Qualitative research allows the researcher to obtain a more realistic feel of the world that 
cannot be experienced in the numerical data and statistical analysis used in quantitative research 
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(Matveev 2002) and to interact with the research subjects in their own language and on their own 
terms (Kirk & Miller 1996). According to Miles and Huberman (1994:1);  
Good Qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings and to 
new integrations; they help researchers get beyond initial conceptions and to 
generate or revise conceptual frameworks….the findings from qualitative 
studies have a quality of undeniability. Words, especially organised into 
incidents or stories, have a concrete vivid, meaningful flavour that often 
proves far more convincing to a reader – another researcher, a policy maker, 
a practitioner – than pages of summarised numbers… 
Silverman (2000) notes on the other hand that, despite the growing enthusiasm for qualitative 
analysis, there have been criticisms relating to its validity and reliability. According to Mays and 
Pope (1995b: 109): 
The most commonly heard criticisms are, firstly, that qualitative research is 
merely an assembly of anecdote and personal impressions, strongly subject to 
researcher’s bias; secondly, it is argued that qualitative research lacks 
reproducibility – the research is so personal to the researcher that there is no 
guarantee that a different researcher would not come to radically different 
conclusions; and finally, qualitative researcher is criticised for lacking 
generalisability since it tends to focus on a small sample size.  
According to Kirk and Miller (1986) qualitative research is subjective and associated with 
unsystematic selection of information from a massive amount of data, in ways that are irreducible 
or even incommunicable. They argue that qualitative findings should be questioned since no one 
can see how the researcher reduced thousands of hours of field notes into the conclusions. 
Perhaps research methods themselves are not good or bad. In other words, no single research 
method is intrinsically better than any other method, although particular purposes may be better 
served by particular method.  
Qualitative method is appropriate when the study involves the exploration of a topic or issue in 
depth, with emphasis on seeking information from the people who are experiencing or involved in 
the issue (May 1997 and 2002). The selection of the appropriate methods in a given study 
depends, among other things, on the research problem or research questions (Creswell 1994).  
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Qualitative research can illuminate why it is happening (Creswell 1994). Moreover, as Devine 
(1995) argues, they are most appropriate (I) when the researcher wants to explore people’s 
subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences, (ii) in the study of 
process, for example, the question of what is going on or why it is changing, and (iii) when the 
issue needs to be studied in a specific context or social setting. These are addressed in the next 
sub-section for the case of Northern Uganda amongst the returning Acholi people from ID-Camps. 
4.3  CASE STUDY - NORTHERN UGANDA 
The case of Northern Uganda is chosen in association with this qualitative research to provide an 
empirical inquiry that investigates the contemporary real life context of Acholi IDP-returnees. It 
finds cases rich in information from the “multiple sources of evidence for use” as are justified by 
Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 51); Yin (1994: 91–94 and 2003: 13-14); Sarantakos (1994: 259) and 
Patton (1987: 19). A case study is “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that 
study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (population)” (Gerring 2007: 
20). These definitions set hallmark to the explorations on the “rooted specific context” (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2006: 76) of the roles of NGOs so much explained within the northern Ugandan context.  
According to Ritchie and Lewis (2006) “Contextual research is concerned with 
identifying what exists in the social world and the way it manifests itself. A 
major feature of qualitative methods is their facility to describe and display 
phenomena as experienced by the study population, in fine-tuned detail and in 
the study participants’ own terms. They add that it offers the opportunity to 
“unpack” issues, to see what they are about or what lies inside, and to explore 
how they are understood by those connected with them” (Ritchie and Lewis 
2006: 27).  
“Secondary analysis of available literature, interviews with respondents and analysis of 
information has to generate data that allows participants to describe their personal or 
organisational contexts in which the research issue is located and how they relate to it” (Ibid.: 56). 
As stated above, the most basic consideration in deciding qualitative method is appropriate for the 
data that exist (Ibid.: 56). This will best illuminate the research topic and on practical 
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considerations (Marshall and Rossman 1999; Mason 2002; Patton 2002). Also, the researchers 
own epistemological and ontological position is relevant (Mason 2002).  
The study explores the grassroots case but also shows how representative such a case has been 
to the national and international levels. Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 54) argue that such a study 
would be used for example in exploring changing societal influences on attitudes, the role of 
qualitative research, with a case study design would be to identify new factors or experiences, to 
explore how they have arisen and to explain their consequences. (Rodall 2002) argues that the 
selection of a combination of respondents, as some researchers perceive it can have certain 
limitations.  
Others argue that the results of single case under investigation cannot be representative and 
cannot be generalised. Stake (2000a and b; Gomm et. al. 2000: 7-8; Schofield 2000; Lincoln and 
Guba 2000: 27-30) argue that even though case studies may not provide a sound basis for 
(scientific) generalisation of the conventional type, they do have general relevance. Stake (2000a) 
for example, argues that if research is to be of value to people, it has to be designed in a manner 
that will provide learnings about the world, firsthand. The weakness of a case study according to 
Yin (2003: 10-11) is ‘lack of rigor’ due to researcher’s bias and use of unsystematic procedures, 
and little bias for scientific generalisation. Yin (2003: 10-11) adds that a case study can “take too 
long and result in massive, unreadable document.” 
However, if a case study is properly designed and implemented, case studies facilitate 
“naturalistic generalisation” in the sense that they provide “vicarious experience” in the form of full 
and thorough knowledge of the particular case (Stake 2000a: 19-24; Gomm, Hammersley and 
Gomm 2000: 7-8). A case study approach further ‘assist in refocusing the direction of future 
investigations in the [same] area’ (Burns 2000: 461).  
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4.3.1 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES  
This study deploys a purposive sampling technique as it did not aim to sample the research 
participants at random nor by convenience. In qualitative research, purposive sampling 
considerations often apply to the sampling of the cases in which the research will be conducted 
and then to people within those cases (Bryan 2008: 414).  Peacebuilding framework of analysis in 
subsection 2.6 plays a strategic role following the categorisation and typology of top leadership, 
mid-range and local levels of actors based and the roles and activities they play. The purposive 
sampling goal is therefore to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled 
are relevant to the research questions that are being posed (Ibid.: 415). The research questions 
on how far the Acholi IDP-returnees are involved in defining and describing their experiences; 
How representative have NGOs been in the international, government and local levels for 
returnees; and, how did Acholi IDPs perceive the role NGOs play using the models and sets of 
practices NGOs deploy to mobilise and support them in post-war social recovery were relevant.  
The purpose of using the purposive sampling is to ensure that there is a good deal of variety in the 
resulting sample, so that sample members differ from each other in terms of key characteristics 
(Bryan 2008: 415). Hetereogenity of the sampled population varied so as to enable the research 
to describe and analyse the internal and external crises in Acholiland, trends, occurrences, 
experiences and perceptions not only of conflicting actors, but also of civil society groups, Acholi 
IDP-returnees [elders, youth, women employed/unemployed etc], (I)NGOs, CBOs,  local and 
national politicians and government officials. The purposive sampling technique aims to provide 
in-depth description of the groups named above, their perceptions on the need to address the 
internal and external crises coupled with prolonged internal displacements, since NGOs and other 
multiple actors remain the most promising hope. Because the population is hetereogenous, the 
sampling provides a detailed investigation of NGOs who undertake actions of rebuilding the once 
broken down lineage-based social authority and how they seek to strengthen the weakened social 
authority that once guided the society.   
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The intention and goal of this study is to capture the reality from the inside through interaction and 
with interpretive explanations, a notion that lies within the position taken in this research. 
Therefore, this sampling technique does not represent availability of samples by chance - 
convenience sampling, but has clear stated goal and intention named above. NGO officials and 
areas of their operations in the Acholi-IDP returnees’ villages of returns, elders, religious leaders 
and traditional leaders, etc are all selected in sub-section 4.3.2 below, because of their relevance 
leading to the understanding of the internal and external crises Acholi people went through, the 
IDP-camp life and the reality of eventual returns to respective villages, and how far NGOs can 
support them in the transformation and rebuilding of the once destroyed social structure. 
Since the sampling technique was not following any preferred convenience sampling approach, 
snowball sampling approach was preferred. Bryan (2008: 184) argues that with snowball 
sampling, the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the 
research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with them. My initial work in Northern 
Uganda, participation in the LRA and GoU JPTs and coming from Acholiland gave me a wide 
range of opprotunities to establish contacts with government authorities, regional leaders, 
diaspora, national key figures, Acholi traditional leaders who in turn directed me to Acholi elders of 
particular knowledge, retired civil servants from Acholiland, NGOs officials, local and national 
politicians, religious, IDPs-camps and other opinion leaders. With a  good knowledge of the 
geography of key specific areas of returns across Acholiland, I was able to specify suitable 
interviewees, respondents and informants for FGDs and interviews. 
Again, within these groups, random sampling with accessible sampling frame for the population 
from which the sample is to be taken was difficult to create. Creating such a sample frame would 
be inaccurate straight away, because Acholi IDPs were a shifting population, NGOs were being 
moved from one sector and activities to humanitarianism and recovery sectors. Some IDPs were 
still living between IDP-camps and villages of returns (Satelite camps), although many camps 
were being closed.  
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The problems faced with the purposive sampling, snowballing approach is that it became very 
unlikely that the sample was adequately representative of the population covered. Within the 
population, there were also very many categories with diverse characteristics and circumstances 
that could have fitted the sample group, for example people who never were displaced from their 
original villages. These categories was decided not convenient. Within this technique, snowballing 
approach reduced the problematic of external validity and the ability to generalise in this 
qualitative study. Tellis (1997) argues that what is important is to clearly set the parameters of the 
study, methodology and its goals. Once this is achieved with rigor, the validity of the study is 
beyond doubt. Tillis (1997) adds that the weakness of data collection techniques can be allayed 
through methodological triangulation. That way, optimising the principle of validity and reliability 
through data and methodological triangulation is helpful.  The purposive sampling technique with a 
snowballing approach guided the selection of the locations of the study areas in sub-section 4.3.2.   
A detailed description of how many categories were sampled and the numbers incuded in each 
categories, and the location of the research is discussed below. 
4.3.2 SELECTION CRITERIA - STUDY LOCATIONS  
This sub-section justifies the selection criteria of the area where the study was carried out. The 
problems and limitations of a case study in sub-section 4.6 according to Yin (2003) is common to 
other research designs and strategies. The study locations were visited from April 2009 to May 
2009 in four Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Amuru. The study locations were chosen 
based on a number of strategic reasons, namely, the areas are known to the researcher; 
background of the locations, duration and size of return/returnees of particular communities, 
NGOs typologies and sector activities in the government allocated areas of NGOs’ operations in 
Acholiland, motivation of returnees (mostly referred to as a “push and pull policy”) to encourage 
returns, and that of the general government IDP and camp phase-out policies. Some communities 
did not get support from NGOs and were not selected although their insights could have been 
informative to the research (see next sub-section below). The locations included: 
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Gulu District:  Gulu town is the regional headquarter of Northern Uganda where government 
offices and Minister of Northern Uganda Reconstruction and other government recovery 
programme officials are based. In Omoro county, one of Gulu district’s counties, Opit trading 
centre was chosen. Another chosen county in Gulu district is Achwa, Paicho area. Paicho also 
had a huge number of IDPs that converged from parts of Odek, and others from north-eastern 
parts of Gulu district including Awach area. NGOs that was allocated for IDP-return in Gulu is an  
Italian NGO, the Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI) whose linkages range 
from international, national, district to local levels. County and parish AVSI offices are located at 
both Opit, Lalogi, Acet, Paicho and Awach. 
Opit presents one of the biggest IDP camps in Gulu, 40 kilometers east of Gulu. From Opit to Tee-
Ilwa, 12 kilometers on the road to Palenga before joining the Gulu to Kampala highway, a 
community of returnees was located. Tee-Ilwa community are at the border of Lango and Gulu, 
have lived together even before the war and the Lango-Acholi have unique relation. Tee-Ilwa 
community once formed the bigger IDP community in Opit. Another location while in Opit is Lalogi 
(12 kilometres from Opit) following to Acet (10 kilometres from Lalogi). The Opit-Lalogi-Acet lies 
east of Opit on the road leading to Joseph Kony’s birthplace, Odek.  
A second county in Gulu district is Acwha county, Paicho area. Paicho lies about 25 kilometers 
north-east of Gulu town along the Gulu to Kitgum highway. While in Paicho IDP-camp that was 
located at the trading centre, mixed (male and female) youths of primary school going age were 
met at Paicho Primary School compound. Women groups were met at Anyomo-Twon, 4 
kilometers south of Paicho trading centre, and men’s group were met at Tee-Olam village 3 
kilometers north of Paicho trading centre towards Awach. Bungatira, the family place where Alice 
Auma “Lakwena” once lived is only 5 kilometers north of Gulu town. Of the 9 sites visited, 4 
locations provided strategic reasons named above for carrying out FGDs, while others offered 
interviews and key informant opportunities both from NGOs and community members.  
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Amuru District:  Amuru is one of the newly created and grafted district from Gulu by the Ugandan 
Parliament in 2006. It lies about 60 kilometers west of Gulu district bordering the Nile river in the 
east. Most of the administrative activities were still being carried out from Gulu town as the new 
district headquarter do not have facilities. Pabo trading centre was chosen as it reperesents the 
biggest IDP camp in Uganda and third biggest in East Africa. Pabo shares borders with Gulu 
district, located about 43 kilometers along the South Sudan-Gulu highway towards Nimule, South 
Sudan.  
19 kilometers along the Gulu to Nimule highway, lies Awee trading centre, a western junction from 
the highway leading to Amuru’s proposed town area. While in Amuru town centre, 22 kilometers 
south lies Alero trading centre. From Amuru town centre, about 25 kilometers eastwards lies 
Guru-Guru area. Majority of IDPs either moved to Pabo or Alero. The Norwegean Refugee 
Council (NRC), a Norwegian NGOs was allocated to work in Amuru district. Of the 3 sites visited, 
Amuru town centre provided strategic reason named above and also based on the period of 
returns, population of identified returnees, NGOs interactions/presence with them and the post-
war social challenges like land issues. This site allowed the researcher to conduct FGDs and 
while in Pabo and Alero, interviews and key informant opportunities both from NGOs and 
community members were also carried out. 
Kitgum District: Kitgum district lies north of Gulu bordering South Sudan. The areas that were 
visited in Kitgum town lies from Kitgum to Omiya-Anyima (50 kilometers from Kitgum town), 
Omiya-Anyima to Namokora (15 kilometers) lies along the Kitgum to Kidepo highway. Namokora 
is the home and birthplace of the former President, General Tito Okello who was overthrown by 
Museveni in 1986. It is the researcher’s home area too. North of Namokora along the Kitgum to 
Kidepo road at a junction (Kalabong) leads eastwards to Orom trading centre (17 kilometers), and 
along Namokora northwards through Kalabong is Akilok (25 kilometers), the home of some of the 
prominent former ex-UNLA officers who formed the UPDA. Akilok has close proximity to the South 
Sudan border, while Orom shares the eastern borders with Karamoja. 
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Another important area that was visited by the researcher is Padibe 25 kilometers north of Kitgum. 
Padibe experienced serious cases of killings, mass murders and abductions during the war. Huge 
IDP camp was located at the heart of the trading centre. West of Padibe and east of Namokora 
lies Mucwini (about 25 kilometers) is the home of the murdered Bishop Janani Lowum allegedly by 
Idi Amin in 1976. Mucwini experienced serious attrocities at the hands of LRA, where more than 
50 people were killed at Yapa village, east of the trading centre. The International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), an American NGO was located to work in Kitgum district, especially on the 
return operation programme.  
Pader District:  Pader is one of the district that was created out of Kitgum at the same time when 
Amuru was also being created. Pader locations were assessed from two major locations. From 
Namokora to Omiya-Pachwa (38 kilometers) continuing towards Kalongo (20 kilometers from 
Omiya-Pachwa) both of which lie in Pader District, and from Kitgum town southwards to Dure and 
Acholibur (20 kilometers) along the main highway towards Gulu or Lira. In Pader, the prominent 
NGOs include GOAL and the Catholic Charitable Organisations Associations (CARITAS) a 
German NGO with its headquarter based in Essen. GOAL is an international humanitarian agency 
founded in Dublin in 1977 by former sports journalist and Chief Executive, John O’Shea. GOAL 
was also moving towards post war recovery in Pader. Uganda forms one of the thirteen countries 
where they operate.  
From the twenty areas that were sampled and visited in Acholiland, thirteen communities were 
purposely sampled for this research covering the major areas of Acholiland. The potential NGOs 
whose international profiles during the more than two decades of war were targeted since they 
also have long history (fifteen years or more) of involvement in the area were purposely sampled. 
Other sampled sites included the Gulu Support the Children Organisation (GUSCO), Amnesty 
Commission and Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). GUSCO is an indigenous 
NGO working to promote the well-being of war affected children in Northern Uganda through 
provision of Psycho-Social Support, Capacity building of communities, education, advocacy and 
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peace building. Composed of six different religious sects/denominations (Anglican, Catholic, 
Muslim, Orthodox, Pentecostal, and Seventh Day Adventist) ARLPI is an interfaith peace 
building and conflict transformation organisation formed in 1997 as a proactive response to the 
conflict in Northern Uganda. The figure below shows the map of the areas the study was carried 
out from April 2009 to end of May 2010.  
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4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
The purpose is to provide an indepth description of the sampled respondents’ experiences, 
perceptions on the address to the internal and external crises in Acholiland whose background of 
prolonged internal displacements and eventual return to respective villages remained in the hands 
of NGOs. Thick (in-depth) data is needed on NGOs’ roles in rebuilding the once broken down 
Map not drawn to scale 
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Acholi lineage-based social authority and how such weak social authority that guided the Acholi 
people is strengthened, now that IDPs have returned to their respective villages.  
This study deploys both secondary and primary methods of data collection. Primary data came 
from interviews, FGDs and researcher’s records. Secondary data came from NGOs’ and 
government reports and other official government policy documents, international reports, 
published and unpublished journals, reference books, Internet and online services, newspapers 
that provided useful and well-researched information concerning the area of study.   
The overwhelming qualitative data collected needed, according to Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 52-53) 
mapping a full range and diversity of case types and incorporating all key players in each may 
result in very large overall samples. Case study analysis can be very complex, with comparisons 
made between different actors within a single case, between cases, and between groups of 
participants across cases (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006: 52-53). There were fluctuations within the 
sectored activities allocated to NGOs by the government to mobilise and support IDPs Acholi-
returnees. This proved  advantageous for data collection. While NGOs were being sectored and 
moved around the districts, the staffs met had knowledge of situations of previous districts. This 
proved helpful in Pader and Amuru whose district affiliations were still very close to their former 
districts they broke away from.  
Personal experiences: As was mentioned in subsection 1.1, my prior experience, local language 
and the previous trips to Northern Uganda on pilot studies carried out were very useful in 
collecting data within one month. For example in identifying fundamental needs, understanding 
the context or expressions and making follow-up questions, history of the conflict and quick 
identification of gaps between what IDP-returnees in villages stated earlier on and their actual 
behaviour they exhibited in their villages after return.  
Primary Data collection used choice modelling technique and ranking of options especially during 
FGDs so as to identify key needs that seemed to provide a long list of needs.  It was necessary to 
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allow the IDPs express themselves freely as they clearly identified fundamental peace dividends, 
causes of the conflict and their perceptions on roles NGOs play.  
4.4.1 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
A total of 9 FGDs were conducted in four districts of Amuru, Gulu (before a new district, Nwoya 
was created from Gulu district at the end of 2010), Pader and Kitgum (before creating a new 
district Lamwo from Kitgum district at the end of 2010). Each group compromised of well selected 
sample between 10-15 people. The districts registered different periods of return and sectoring 
allocation of different NGOs. 
“The researcher has been interested in who says what [can be opinion leader] dominating the 
discussion … how they say it [practical word that they employ]” (Bryman 2004: 349). Crucial, has 
been the size of the groups, the level of moderator involvement, selecting participants and asking 
questions, which if was not well planned could have posed problems. Three FGDs, one in Opit at 
Tee-Ilwa village in Gulu District, one in Namokora/Omiya-Anyima in Kitgum district were mixed 
FGDs and, in Padibe with the elders. In Amuru town centre, a group of AVSI volunteers were met 
during their volunteer training sessions to discuss as a group on the issues the research raised. 
An unplanned, but strategic FGDs with government officials who were mixed with NGOs workers 
was held in Gulu town at Acholi Inn during the Gulu University conference that discussed on the 
post-war reconstruction after Juba peace talks. 
According to Krueger and Casey (2000: 5) a focus group study is a carefully planned series of 
discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-
threatening environment. Three FGDs in Paicho were sampled  and chosen based on the request 
from Anyomo-Twon women, Paicho Primary School mixed youths and from Tee-Olam men’s 
groups. The three discussions were done concurrently with the help of research assistances. 
These separate invitations was based on request from the groups that the earlier researchers 
failed to present the particular views of returnees (interviewee, LC-one Chairman Paicho 2009). 
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The FGDs method made the discussions relaxed to the participants who shared their ideas and 
perceptions freely. All the nine FGDs promoted self-disclosure among participants that enabled 
the participants to discuss sensitive issues. According to  Krueger and Casey (2000) a group’s 
participants generally number from 5 to 10, but the size can range from as few as 4 to as many as 
12. The FG members comprised of homogenous participants who have had similar experiences. 
The nature of the study determined the type of heterogeneity; for example in the study, the group 
comprised of village officials, elders, women, school going youths, NGOs workers and local 
government officials.  
A discussion guide and the position, interest and need (PIN) tool was used during the half day 
planned FGDs to guide the discussions (appendix B:5-2). A number of themes based on issues 
that were not fully explored in the interviews were captured. During the administration, 
respondents were sampled to form FGDs on the basis of their age, gender, location (village) 
willingness to participants and knowledge of NGOs interventions in mobilising them. Suitable 
venues within each village were identified for the FGDs. The age of the participants ranged from 
fifteen to over seventy.  
On choice modelling (CM) technique, two Nobel Peace Prize winners in 2000 in Economic 
Sciences, James J. Heckman  and Daniel L. McFadden define CM techniqe as attempts to model 
the decision process of an individual or segment in a particular context (James J. Heckman  and 
Daniel L. McFadden 2000). CM was used to trade-off unwanted alternatives to identify and rank 
key needs. The techniques followed the IDPs’ decision who returned voluntarily to villages of 
origins, at least was being supported by the IDP-policy. The alternatives were designed in such a 
way that FGDs explored how far they were involved in defining what happens to them as they try 
to handle internal and external crises of the war. The alternatives were ordered based on 
identified themes to identify causes of the conflict (appendix B:4-2). The identified alternatives 
formed the component attributes that sometimes proved convergent and/or divergent amongst 
Acholi IDPs-returnees, NGOs and GoU-officials across Acholiland. The lists of identified 
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preferences from IDPs were described as attributes or characteristics attached to case nodes. 
There was need to describe the case nodes and attributes in terms of age, sex, education, income 
and interest and from that the CM used the ranked/ratings for possible analysis to help avoid 
protests votes.   
The contingency ranking allowed for the respondents to rank their options of peace dividends as 
were identified from the FGDs and interviews in terms of individual desirability. Respondents were 
then asked to score the alternative scenarios on the scale provided and comparisons with the 
alternatives were made using pair-wise ranking methods. Some of the peace dividends that were 
identified were discovered embedded, mainly in the areas of socio-economic dividends, the need 
to implement policy driven government programs and projects focusing on social services and 
institutions like schools, health centres and roads. Again, the interviews noted on the socio-
economic characteristics of the respondents like age, sex, interests, income and education 
included health statuses and in some cases, the EVIs/PSNs.  
Where the variations were inappropriate, the repeats with all other variations were again checked. 
These then provided identifiable interpretations and possible applicable results. These results 
formed vital reflection on the knowledge about how meaningful NGOs and GoU responses to 
transform conflict to peace, the patterns of which generated statuses of social realities within the 
society and the new social order and authority within the IDP-returnees. It also provided vital clues 
about how far the IDPs were involved in the mobilisation until return to VoR. Divergences and/or 
convergences in perspectives were checked if those vital clues complied with the extent to which 
IDPs in Acholiland were supported and mobilised after the war, and more so, against/for the study 
objectives. Lastly, a practically straightforward and attractive ways of administering the data was 
identified. Not all the issues that needed to be addressed in detail could be discussed in FGDs. 
Some research questions required interviews from a sample of key government, NGOs and Camp 
leaders.   
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ILLUSRATION 4.4.1:  FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION – ACHOLI INN, GULU  
 
(Source: Author’s version based on FGDs from NGOs, Government officials in Gulu, Acholi Inn 
from 24th-04-2009). 
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4.4.2 INTERVIEWS  
A total of 55 interviews were conducted comprising of structured or standardised, unstructured 
and semi-structured or guided interviews (May 1997; Denscombe 2003). Denscombe (2003: 167) 
distinguishes structured from semi-structured and unstructured interviews based on the degree of 
control exercised by the researcher over the nature of the responses and the length of the 
answers allowed by the respondent.  
Of the 55 interviews, 33 in-depth interviews obtained the full and unbiased account of the 
participant’s perspectives on the research topic. The researcher used every means at his disposal 
to aid this (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 159). Qualitative interviews provide an undiluted focus on 
respondents and an opportunity for detailed investigation of people’s personal perspectives, for in-
depth understanding of the personal context within which the research phenomena are located 
and for very detailed subject coverage.  Because of the depth of focus and the opportunity they 
offer for clarification and detailed understanding, qualitative research traditions are particularly well 
suited for this study (Ritchie 2003: 36 – 37).  
Respondents who took part in the in-depth interviews included IDP-returnees, camp leaders, 
NGOs and government officials, religious leaders, CBOs, camps officials, business community, 
politicians and some military officers. The person-to-person and telephone interviews, written 
responses and electronic mails assisted in gathering data from respondents. Their views were 
particularly helpful in answering the research questions (appendix A-5). 
In-depth interviews with the government officials and NGOs-policy officers were mainly to draw 
comparisons with what they hear from others (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 36). According to Ritchie 
and Lewis (2006: 37) in-depth interview can also be useful when the subject matter is complex or 
unfamiliar to participants and there is benefit in interactive or joint reflection. In-depth interviewing 
gave the respondents the opportunity to reassess the information they had initially supplied, and 
to come up with a more reliable construct through probing. According to Devine (1995), 
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Sarantakos (1994) and Rodall (2002) probing demands the researcher to request for more 
elaborate answers in order to clarify, correct verify and amplify, as the case may be from previous 
information the interviewee might have had. In order to ensure quality control over data collection 
(Lavrakas 1998: 429), the conversation was limited to soliciting the data that adds value to the 
research. This was limited to the complexity and length of the interviewing process, as it did not 
encourage probing into some of the critical and vital issues that lied outside the research 
objectives.   
Nine unstructured interviews helped in complementing the semi-structured and structured 
interviews during the data collection. The purpose was to collect data based on arrangements and 
not to be considered as main source of information. Bryman (2004: 320) notes that the researcher 
uses at most an aide memoire as a brief set of prompts to him or her to deal with a range of 
topics. A set of questions and/or specific topics that needed to be covered [see appendix A: 
interview guide] was prepared and key informants whose role and access to vital sources of 
information was adequate. These included district officials and NGOs-workers. Unstructured 
interviews according to (May 1997) is usually used as informal conversation between the 
researcher and interviewees about the topic. The researcher’s role generated and developed 
questions according to what the participants said. As an Acholi, good interpersonal skills kept the 
interviews flowing on the one hand, while on the other hand, the focus on the topics was being 
maintained.  
Semi-structured interviews are somewhere between structured and unstructured interviews in 
format. Out of the fifteen, they were not “standardised as in structured interviews and interviewee 
“talked freely without any preset questions”, as in structured ones. Unlike structured interviews 
semi-structured interviews did not follow a rigid form. Rather, the interviewer prepares an interview 
guide that includes a list of questions or issues that are to be explored (Oka and Shaw 2000; 
Denscombe 2003). 
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The method including semi-structured interviews is without a doubt, the most utilised data 
collection method in qualitative research studies (Oka and Shaw, 2000). (Oka and Shaw 2000; 
Denscombe 2003) argue that the researcher prepares in advance interviews and allows the 
researcher to generate her/his own questions to develop interesting areas of inquiry during the 
interview (Flick 1998) and thereby keeping the interview flow more focused on the topic.  
Based on the advantages each interview type offered the case study, the researcher was aware of 
the risk involved that may lead the study to go beyond the focus. Also, in order to cover all issues 
under investigation, the researcher used the time at disposal to reach out as much as possible. 
However, semi-structured interviews have more flexibility but still have the advantages of the 
structural approach. Telephone Interviews: Telephone conversation was used to speed up data 
collection, arranging meetings at sampled sites and in programming facilitation from NGOs and 
respondents.  
4.4.3 KEY INFORMANTS  
Although key informants have been mainly useful in ethnographic studies (Bryan 2008: 151), this 
study purposively sampled 24 key informants based on the predictive validity in the long list of 
community needs, NGOs’ varying background and information in the region about the internal and 
external crises in Acholiland. Predictive validity refers to the issue of whether an indicator (or sets 
of indicators) that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept (Bryan 2008: 151-
155). The purposively sampled key informants used predesigned interview guide that contained 
summarised thematic areas of the research (see appendix A-4). They were selected on the basis 
of their profession, positions, experiences and age. Some of the key informants are known to me, 
and whose insights were very informative to the research.  
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4.4.4 DATA RECORDING  
Data was collected from the wide range of respondents including IDPs Acholi-returnees in 
respective VoRs during the FGDs and interviews. From the FGDs, flip charts were used to identify 
IDPs’ preferences and peace dividends based on their knowledge of the causes of conflict during 
the ranking of options. Follow-up studies were recorded from the telephone arrangements with 
respondents and key informants in the districts, returnees, NGOs-officials, Community Based 
Organisation officials, Camp Leaders, Political leaders, traditional leaders and religious leaders.  
Data recording according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000) have their pros and cons in that, it is 
important to consider the place where interviews take place, the interview topics, (e.g. people may 
object to tape recording, if the data is of a sensitive nature), the available resources (i.e. tapes, 
records and so on), the skills of the researcher, and even more important the willingness of 
interviewees. Data was recorded to influence the process of data analysis and interpretation that 
would follow. The researcher took records from both FGDs, interviews and audiotape (those that 
were accepted to be audiotaped). Saunders et al. (1997) point out some disadvantages of tape-
recording, including (i) the possibility of adversarial relations between the researcher and the 
participants since it may cause discomfort for interviewees and they may be reluctant to talk when 
they know what they say is being recorded, (ii) there may be a technical problem during the 
interview, (iii) disruption to conversation when changing tapes, and (iv) the time consumed to 
transcribe the tapes. Person-to-person interviews were tape-recorded (with the permission of the 
respondents)  including the summarised notes the researcher was taking during the interview.  
4.4.5 DATA ADMINISTRATION  
Telephone interviews became expensive and time consuming in remote places surrounding Gulu, 
Kitgum, Pader and Amuru locations although the conscent of respondents were mostly sought by 
using phone calls through the Residence District Commissioners’ (RDC) offices. The conscent of 
any research process has to go through this presidential appointed officer in the districts, including 
all NGOs’ offices. Potential respondents to be interviewed in remote places were arranged 
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through respective NGOs officials in their sector locations. Telephone conversations helped to 
arrange meetings with respondents for FGDs or personal interviews. The impact of this process 
was also reflected in NGOs documents that were used to crosscheck information. Electronic mails 
were effective but only applicable to people with access to home/office internet connections.  
Further, most agency staffs became unwilling to answer probing questions and that which 
required much thought. Pilot interviews and FGDs helped to break the barriers and helped to 
polish thoughts while refining questions. 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS   
From the case study design and the data collection methods used in this study, a broad spectrum 
of raw data was analysed. The aim of the analysis is to consider both the process and content so 
as to give higher construct validity (Larbi 1998: 136), “considering the detailed description of the 
setting or individuals, followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues” (Stake 1995) in 
Acholiland. 
This study regards data analysis as a process by which reflection upon the data collected relating 
to research questions analyse raw data. Raw data was located in a particular context of Acholi 
IDP-returnees in order to further understanding (Blaikie 2003). The huge data were recorded and 
transcribed in words and texts, interview notes, fieldwork notes and documents were obtained on 
request from the NGOs and DDMC, NGOs and GoU-reports. Major phases of qualitative data 
analysis involved data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawings and verifications. 
According to Miles and Hubberman (1994) data reduction refers to the process of selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or 
transcriptions. This is an initial process by which material was selected and condensed on the 
basis of a conceptual framework.  
The study went further to display data, a step beyond data reduction to provide an organised, 
compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing. Data was later transcribed 
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using segmentation and a code and retrieve method. This was first done manually by tagging and 
labelling the data based on the relationship and social structural codes, the setting and context 
codes (Creswell 2003: 193). The manual coding displayed data in the textual chunks that were 
sorted according to categories and themes (see, Rosman and Rallis 1998: 17). The categories 
and themes were later collated in relation to research question. During the coding process, data 
were broken down into component parts with given names. The coding frame contained lists of 
codes in relation to analysis of data based on interviews. This was used to delineate the 
categories used in connection with each questions (open and closed). The manual coding in the 
analysis of contents provided statements of instructions that outlined all the possible categories for 
each dimension that was being coded. The categorised data helped to interpret the data so as to 
generate meaning and reach conclusions in more specific terms in consonance with the research 
questions. The interpretation of the information identified the patterns, discovered trends and 
explanations for refining, confirming, determining and evaluating the validity, validation to the 
research questions, purpose and objectives. 
These steps has been essential to label categories in the actual language of the participants, a 
step Creswell (2003: 193) calls an in vivo term. Since the qualitative data that was manually being 
analysed became so huge, using NVIVO saved money and time (see, Blaikie 2003). The logged 
in accounts was part of the interpretive process. The combination of manual coding, analysis with 
NVIVO made it easier for the researcher to identify, focus on and select potential interpretation of 
data.  
The use of NVIVO has been helpful since coding is not an analysis in itself, but only a means to 
making the analysis of data simple and the representation of the decisive link between the original 
raw data and the theoretical concepts easier. Coding is only the starting point of analysis as it (a) 
notices relevant phenomena, (b) collects examples of those phenomena, and (c) analyses those 
phenomena with the view to establishing commonalities, differences, patterns and structures 
(Seidel and Kelle 1995). Once the data is categorised into simpler analysable units, it can be 
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expanded and to reconceptualise some of the original theoretical prepositions (Strauss 1987: 55 - 
58; Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 28).   
Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 56) argue that  “the analysis of the first stage fieldwork needs to be 
organised in a way which will make it possible to integrate later stages of data, to make 
comparisons and identify changes. This means that there is a highly dense and probably 
cumbersome data set to manage and interpret. The process is aided if the same analysis method 
and thematic framework are used (with new themes added as appropriate), and if new and old 
data are displayed side by side” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 56).  
The interpretations or meanings from displayed data used triangulation techniques. Both data 
source and methodological triangulation techniques were deployed to cross-check findings. The 
use of two or more data collection techniques used by the researcher (see, Neuman (1994:141) 
examined same variable and the evidences that were gathered (investigator triangulation) were 
used to build up coherent justification for themes (Creswell 2003:196). The researcher’s 
investigator form of triangulation was used to check the integrity of, and/or extend, inferences 
drawn from the data. The use of such investigator triangulation therefore aimed to validate the 
reliability of the study’s analytical generalisations. It was also used to check consistencies of 
‘findings generated by different data-collection methods used and/or of diverse “data sources 
within the same method” (Burns 2000: 419). In other words, a means the researcher used 
triangulation to investigate the convergence of both data and conclusions derived from them. 
There were wide variations based on the triangulated perspectives of IDP from the NGOs’ and 
GoU’s. The manual coding used a retrieving method and aided by NVIVO. The major part of the 
design was to make sure it reflects onto the “real life of the IDPs returnees” since their 
experiences remained central. 
In summary, data analysis and interpretation followed the steps of organising and preparing data 
for analysis; reading through the data to obtain a general sense of the information; manual coding 
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process; generation of a description of themes; used the description and themes to convey 
representation of respondents information in a table; and the interpretation based on the meaning 
of the data - some lessons were learnt. 
4.5.1 DATA VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF FINDINGS 
Reliability and Validity: Reliability in this thesis means dependability or consistency of the data 
and its analysis (Neuman 2003: 178). Some authors are also concerned about replicability of 
research findings and whether or not they would be repeated if another study, using the same or 
similar methods, were undertaken (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 270). The constructivists position 
taken in this thesis argues that there is no single reality to be captured in the first place so 
replicability is an artificial goal to pursue (Hughes, et al. (1997) and; Marshall and Rossman 
(1999). Replicability in qualitative research is naïve given the likely complexity of the phenomena 
being studied and the inevitable impact of context (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Holstein et al. (1997) 
argue that those who believe that qualitative research is dynamic and can only be conducted 
effectively in a responsive manner argue that studies can never be, nor should be, repeated. 
Probably, concerns about reliability in qualitative research be avoided, instead, writers discuss 
similar issues using terms and concepts that are felt to have greater resonance with the goals and 
values of qualitative research (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 270).  
Other authors view reliability and replication to have direct relevance to qualitative research 
LeCompte and Goetz (1982: 31-60) and Silverman (2000a). Seale (1999) argues that complete 
replication is “a somewhat unrealistic demand” but argues that this is a consequence of practical 
problems associated with qualitative research than “insuperable philosophical problems 
concerned with conceptions and measurements of “reality”” (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 271). Seale 
(1999: 158) argues that showing the audience of the research studies as much as is possible of 
the procedures can lead to a particular set of conclusions. 
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Data gathering methods used and subsequent analysis in this thesis was guided by (a) the use of 
multiple choice of evidence (b) the creation of a case study data base – assembly by evidence 
and (c) the maintenance of a chain of evidence, i.e. linkages between questions asked, data 
collected and the conclusions drawn (Yin 1994). Yin (1994) argues that these principles help to 
solve issues of reliability and validity, and improve the quality of case studies when applied.  
This study required a clear understanding of what features of qualitative data were expected to be 
consistent, dependable or replicable, from within the original data, would recur outside of the study 
population (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 270). It was essential to understand the emerging 
perspectives about the roles NGOs played and how they [NGOs] represented grassroots 
perspectives’ on the crises that was haunting them.  
Validity:  the validity, “correctness” or “precision” of this research findings and data was 
concerned with “investigating the claim” (Arksey and Knight 1999) and the extent to which other 
contexts or settings are generated, refined and tested (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Effectiveness in 
verifying the accuracy or truth in social enquiry, even if there is a truth there to be confirmed may 
still cast doubts in other researcher’s minds. The subsidiary research questions strengthened by 
the research methods helped the analysis and interpretation (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 275).  
The triangulation of sources compared data from different qualitative methods (interviews, FGDs, 
documented accounts) provided validation of findings for this study. Patton (2002: 556) states that 
it is in the data analysis that the strategy of triangulation really pays off, not only in providing 
diverse ways of looking at the same phenomenon but in adding to credibility by strengthening 
confidence in whatever conclusions are drawn. The researcher embarked on involving the 
research participants who were interviewed to check if the meanings or interpretation assigned 
are confirmed. Different documents from different sources may contain similar information; 
therefore triangulation helped in providing a means to crosschecking accuracy. 
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By looking at the data from different theoretical perspectives, the description and explanation 
analysis needed to provide a clear account of the logical and conceptual links made in the 
interpretation, and of the evidence on which they are based. Other authors have widely discussed 
about validation of the inference once a finding appears open to generalisation, then checks 
against other evidence and corroboration from other sources are highly desirable (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2006: 278-279). This particular concern is mainly centred toward how to address 
generalisation in qualitative research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that the central condition for 
inferential generalisation is similarity between the “sending” and “receiving” contexts. This study 
provided in-depth (thick) description of the research context; of the views, processes, experiences, 
IDPs’ needs and the nature of transforming conflict; and how they appear or have experienced 
different contexts even within the very minute sample.   
Confidentiality: Neuman (2003: 127) argues that confidentiality means that information may have 
names attached to it, but the researcher holds it in confidence or keeps it secret from public. The 
information about respondents were not released in a way that permits linking specific individuals 
to responses and is publicly presented only in an aggregate form. According to Berg (2001) 
deception occurs when participants’ understanding of a purpose for analysis is different from the 
researcher has in mind. It was very important that who decided to co-operate in the research 
should not suffer any ill effects for it. The best guarantee of participants’ protection was made sure 
that nothing in the study was traced to specific individuals or groups. The researcher conveyed in 
writing the purpose of the study to the government officials at the national (see appendices of 
ethical considerations on pages 328 and 329) and districts levels, NGOs-offices and individuals, 
interviewees to solicit permissions and participants’ consent to participate, the procedures of data 
gathering and the voluntary nature of research participation.  
Confidentiality has been a major issue for security reasons in Northern Uganda where majority of 
the population did not trust each other therefore care was taken to uphold this confidentiality not to 
associate statements and quotations with specific names. Confidentiality may protect participants 
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from physical harm (Neuman 2003: 127). He adds that participants’ information must be treated 
as private property. If it is private property, a person’s right to keep, sell, or give away becomes 
clear (Neuman, 2003: 127). This study intends not to falsify, suppress or invent evidence. Neuman 
(2003) argues that these fraudulent practices are not acceptable in professional research 
communities, as they constitute scientific misconduct.  
4.6 PROBLEMS, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
The problems associated with this research study posed constraints in dealing with problems of 
reliability (Sarantakos 1994). These were caused by extreme subjectivity, problems of objectivity 
and detachment, risk of collecting "dirty" data, i.e. meaningless and useless information, time 
management, problems of ethics (entering the personal sphere of the subjects), and problems of 
representativeness and generalisability. A number of these limitations were considered in the 
interpretation of the results when generalising the results. The results considered the scope of this 
study is sub-Saharan African intra post-civil war in which social recovery was studied following the 
dynamic vaiations of the war to peace period. The study placed the scope of the roles of 
international/National Non-governmental organisations, Uganda government and its military, and 
leaders in Northern Uganda into the wider context in which Northern Ugandan war was fought. It 
has been difficult to determine when post-war commenced so that the need for peace dividends 
amongst the wider Acholi population could be supported. This required reworking the boundaries 
to the research problems. 
Conducting an interview or rather research in an immediate post-conflict situation like Northern 
Uganda was a daunting undertaking. Dates and time of each interview were difficult to determine 
as getting the interviews were disrupted by many factors. There were periods the security fears 
posed fragility of gathering information in Northern Uganda, especially where the Juba peace talks 
were failing. Suspicions on who is who has been of concerns to many Acholi people, expecially on 
the diaspora of which I was classified. These affected the research purpose from time to time 
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whether it should centre on power politics or concentrate on IDPs-perceptions, which brought so 
many attributes and categories in the study. 
The difficulties in distinguishing the effects of embedded attributes under the growing different 
categories and new emerging alternatives were commonplace events. During the data collection, 
it was obvious that in the analysis period, the “code and retrieve approach” would be faced with 
problems of grouping and comparing chunks of data outside the context in which they occurred. 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) provides explanations on this issue.  
In order to avoid these constraints, the researcher employed two research assistants, one female 
(25 years) and one male (26 years). The research assistances are all University under graduates 
who speak local Acholi language. They have been working on collecting data from the 
communities for a long time. They helped break up and reconstitute data for further analytical 
understanding. Anselm (1987: 55)  assures on this technique that coding fractures the data, 
freeing the researcher from description and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction. 
Some embedded categories of data were easily identified as either coming more from the youths 
and women than from male adults. They helped in the choice modelling ranking process during 
FGDs.  
Northern Uganda where this research was conducted is the researchers’ home place. Renewing 
contacts and placing the researchers’ hat on was one key task to face before deepening into the 
filed work. Time was spent on reviewing documents from Gulu University, government reports and 
Northern Uganda development initiatives, ARLPI, NGOs and District councillors’ offices. This 
accorded the researcher with deeper insights into the issues under research, the process and 
routine. The topic guide in appendix A helped to constantly check how best the research question, 
objectives and arguments shaped and fitted into this study. 
Ethical and moral dilemmas are an unavoidable consequence, and may be an occupational 
hazard De-Laine (2000) as the subject continues to pose “moral panic” (Van de Hoonaard, 2009). 
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It was therefore imperative that ethical transgression be observed. Ethical stances like 
universalism (never to break ethical percepts), principled relativism (deception to be considered 
on a case-by-case basis), observed  pervasive nature of ethical transgression, the deontological 
(certain good and bad things do not happen to respondents) and consequential ethics (the 
consequences for guidance of whether the acts of right or wrong) were considered. 
The ethical relationship between the researcher and the population was established prior to, and 
throughout the research (Renzetti and Lee 1993). Written consent was obtained from the the 
President’s Office, the Uganda National Council for Technology (UNCST), RDC whose phone 
calls to the relevant LCs in the respective areas opened the ways and facilitated all local level 
(agreement before conducting the research). Developing and maintaining a field relationship 
minimised a number of barriers to remove the hidden, the deviant or the tabooed. This allowed for 
personal information to be fairly and lawfully processed, for limited purpose adequately and 
relevant for this study.  
Planned visits to study locations, explaining reasons for the visits, introduction of the research 
team and aims and permission to record and revisit ideas became easier. See appendices A-1, A-
4, ethical considerations one and two respectively. Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 63) argue that it 
makes studies accessible to the groups involved, requires consideration of appropriate language 
to use in approaching them. The considerations made sure that information was not exposed to 
outsiders and unnecessarily too long. The focus were on top-level opinion leaders, religious 
leaders although some mid-level or lower-level leaders were also representative of the 
perspectives from grassroots society. The information was not transferred to other countries 
without protection. The validation of the perceptions of the participants therefore occurred through 
comparison with the perceptions of the other participants. Nothing obviously suggested a lack of 
expertise of the participants with respect to the subject of the study. However, these limitations did 
not detract hugely from the study significance. The researcher employed different strategies to 
gain access to and establish a field relation with these participants. For sustained relationships 
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and intensive interactions, some researchers have had to go through formal recruitment 
procedures to enter the “back region” of the population they wanted to study (De-Laine 2000: 71). 
Even where entrance is gained, it is not unusual for some participants to treat the researcher with 
scepticism, fearing that cooperation may bring in its wake untoward repercussions (Renzetti and 
Lee 1993: 101).  
The manner and way a researcher gains access and manages to sustain that access without 
losing the confidence of participants therefore shaped and determined the research process and 
outcome. As said, access to conducting comprehensive research required permission from the 
Office of President, (OP) based in Kampala. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2006: 63) an 
approach letter such as “please let us know if there is anything we can do to make it easier for you 
to take part in the study, was useful starting points, which allowed the potential participants to 
raise issues such as timing; location; practical needs such as childcare and travel; the appropriate 
language for interview; or communication or cognitive difficulties”. 
The lessons learnt from previous pilot studies and visits to Northern Uganda was that the 
approach to fieldwork for this study entered into negotiations with the ‘gatekeepers’, namely, those 
that have the power/authority to withhold access to information relevant for the study Bailey (1996: 
11); Punch (1986: 35–36); Creswell (2003: 184-129); De-Laine (2000); and Ritchie and Lewis 
(2006: 62-63). Negotiations with gatekeepers and subsequently with participants preferably 
centred on the participation in research, the purpose of the research, the procedures of the 
research, the risks (if any) and benefits of the research, the voluntary nature of participation, the 
right to withdraw from the research at any time, assured confidentiality and the consent for the 
research to proceed as designed.  
Creswell (2003) argues that, in research work, researchers need to anticipate the ethical issues 
that arise during their studies. He mentions that ethical issues arise in the literature about code of 
professional conduct for researchers and that researchers should be mindful of it in their research 
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plans. In research work, Creswell (2003) points out that the researcher has to avoid a research 
problem that will disempower the study participants. Generally, permission for the use of the tape 
recorder was sought and what the data would be used for was explained. The disadvantage faced 
in recording by hand has been that segment of the interviews were easily missed while trying to 
capture points in the filed notebook, thereby, losing valid point in the process. The advantage 
though was that the reearcher was able to capture the most relevant points. The advantage of 
tape recording was that, all the information needed was already on the tapes, ready for 
transcription. 
Problems of access to information were key challenges in the areas of the researcher’s topic. 
Government officials, some local and senior politicians who are representing majority opposition 
groups against the government held back information especially wherever the ethical implications 
would seem to disadvantage them. However, the researcher’s knowledge of the people and 
influence was useful. Northern Uganda has mobile communications and concentrating on the 
research process drew attentions away. Respondents were asked to switch off their phones 
before the actual interview session’s started. From previous trips to Northern Uganda, the 
researcher noted that some respondents had tendencies of straying away from the topic of 
discussion. The researcher therefore managed the discussion tactfully without offending the 
interest and sensibilities of the respondent. Choice modelling and ranking options were very 
energising exercise during the discussions.   
In order to avoid time wasting during coding and data processing, the huge volumes of collected 
data were marked with dates, names of respondents and places indicating the necessary and 
available information on them. The researcher has been aware from previous study trips about the 
massive volume of information that had a daunting work of going through them one by one and 
the time it consumed. There was huge economic implication as well; it became very costly to 
spend days after days in the research areas. The researcher was attacked by Malaria and 
decision was made at some point to stop in which case, some vital information were left out.  
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4.7 CONCLUSION        
This chapter addressed the methodological perspective of the study to gather a “thick” description 
of views from the perceptions of IDPs-returnees on roles NGOs and GoU-officials play. The 
interpretists research philosophy was adopted. The justification suggests the service it offers to 
the purpose of exploring and describing participants’ understanding and interpretations of social 
phenomena in a way that captures their inherent nature (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 28).  
Case study design was preferred because of its association with qualitative research (Yin 1994: 
91–94) has an empirical inquiry that investigated a contemporary real life context so as to find 
cases rich in information (Patton 1987: 19). A purposive sample of cases/participants was done in 
a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research (Bryan 2008: 415). A good 
deal of variety in the resulting sample gave the sample members differing key characteristics – 
heterogenous in the four districts of Acholiland. The composition of involving key participants, how 
it varied between different cases or sites (Ritchie and Lewis 2006: 52) played a big role in this 
study. 
Data was collected from both secondary and primary sources. Data arising from interviews, FGDs, 
key informants were collected. Documents, videos, reports and more were reviewed. Raw data 
was transcribed using segmentation and coding techniques through manual tagging and labelling 
the data. The relevance based on the framework of analysis, the research questions, study aim 
and objectives to help condense the data into analysable units by creating categories with and 
from the data. The data was thereafter fed into the computer-assisted software, NVIVO for final 
analysis. Data verification and validity helped the triangulation process from the categorised data 
sources that were created. Data source, investigator, methodological triangulation techniques 
were deployed. This chapter discussed on the problems met during the research process. The 
next chapter discusses about the evidences found from determining IDPs’ perceptions on their 
needs about roles NGOs and GoU-officials. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS: REBUILDING SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents findings in response to exploring on how far NGOs play their roles in 
support and mobilisation of Acholi IDPs-returnees who were faced with the realities of rebuilding 
the broken-down lineage-based social authority, and the destroyed relationships. It is prudent to 
ask why NGOs get involved in the above respect. This chapter emphasises on the ontological 
considerations of the many years of IDP-returnees’ perceptions emanating from the local context 
(sub-section 1.2) of the war and return to respective villages.  
In sub-section 5.2, the causes of Nothern Ugandan conflict were identified based on the 
framework of analysis, a basis for understanding how and why NGOs intervene in situations like 
that of Acholi people. Before intervention, NGOs require an understanding of the causes of 
conflicts. NGOs are social actors and their social interactions with Acholi people posed critical 
question on how far NGOs can facilitate post-war peacebuilding social recovery using sets of 
principles and models. In sub-section 5.3, the fundamental needs of returnees are identified with 
particular address to the crises (the internal Acholi-Acholi and external Acholi–Bantu or with other 
neighbouring tribes), rebuilding social authority structure and relationships. The triangulated views 
was based on the method of investigation, sources of data and the theoretical perspectives - 
framework of analysis. The evidences suggest that there is a rich and indepth description and 
significant information about returnees’ new formation of social lives.  
Meeting unending needs of returnees in sub-section 5.4, found divergences and/or convergences 
of IDP returnees’ exist compared  to NGOs’ and GoU officials’. The need to address Acholi 
lineage-based social authority was identified as very key in this research and the subsequent 
need to strengthen it (sub-section 5.6).  Rebuilding relationships (reconciliation) in sub-section 5.7 
was another need in key themes for social recovery in Acholiland. Linkages in these needs are 
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made in sub-section 5.8 to explore NGOs’ empirical stances with secondary data. Valuable 
knowledge on how far NGOs can play their roles and that the supporting roles of NGOs can help 
IDP-returnees ease confrontations with the harse reality of rebuilding social authoritative structure 
and relationships are discussed.  
5.2 CAUSES OF WAR IN ACHOLILAND  
The causes of war in Acholiland reaped various explanations depending on who you talk to. 
Following the unique and complex nature of the war, the political development of Uganda (chapter 
three), the internal and external crises, internal displacements and realities of return in respective 
villages of former IDPs, the causes of war in Northern Uganda has not been presented clearly. 
Finnstrom (2003), Jackson (2003), Branch (2005) and Dolan (2005) attempt to discuss on the root 
causes of the conflict in Northern Uganda from anthropological, socio-political and historical 
standpoints. Dolan (2005) cites the causes of war to the predation of Arab ivory and slave traders 
in the nineteenth century (Dolan 2005). Azar (1986: 36) argues that it is never easy to know when 
war truly begins. Some base it on deaths per year to reach a certain level or by articulating it on 
when the first short was fired.  
Of the 17 major armed conflicts analysed in 2009 in 16 locations around the world, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) identifies the case of Northern Ugandan conflict 
as was inactive or not defined as ‘major’ until 2008 (Brzoska [SIPRI Yearbook] 2007 and Schnabel 
[SIPRI Yearbook] 2008). Other problems are according to Galtung (1996) based on the lack of 
“diagnose” and proper understanding of early conditions of structural violence that were created 
and eventually lead to physical violence (Dolan 2005). Defining root causes of conflict based on 
statistical data that was not known to the outside world, and on the one hand listening to the 
returnees who were subjected to violence that later defined their accumulated experiences, still 
pose challenges to NGOs’ work.  
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For over three years till 2009, I have been using a conflict-tree analysis-tool to probe deeper into 
these various perspectives about the causes of war in Northern Uganda so as to recommend 
entry points for interventions by Non-State actors. Top ex-LRA commanders, CBOs and NGOs 
officials, IDPs and camp officials, academics, diaspora community, LRA peace talk delegation’s 
position papers, religious leaders and traditional leaders were followed on the conflict-tree-
analysis tool to identify the root causes of Northern Ugandan war.  
Firstly, I followed the basic literature prerequisite that any intervention in any conflicts by 
outsiders/insiders require a detailed understanding (analysis) of the root causes of such conflict. 
Roles of NGOs whose action target the transformation of negative peace to positive peace (sub-
section 2.3.3) followed this prerequisite. It also followed NGOs’ methods of intervention (see 
framework of analysis) in Northern Uganda, which adapted NGOs’ operational and non-
operational modes of conduct and principles. These modes did not exclude classifying NGOs as 
are political actors who played social roles while interacting, thus creating social realities in 
Acholiland.  
The second prerequisite is to follow the ontological base [social crises] of former IDPs by 
identifying the returnees’ social problems and the particular social realities based on the root 
causes of the Northern war. Addressing social realities required exploration in bringing out 
empirical data on how far NGOs identified and fulfilled basic needs of war-affected population in 
Acholiland. This was done in relation to investigating what Acholi-returnees experienced in 
attempts to rebuild the destroyed lineage-based social authority and in how to restore 
relatationships. 
Thirdly, there was need to understand the objective source of the renewed conflict in Northern 
Uganda (chapter three) of which the root causes were not only being understood as proximate 
causes and/or symptomatic in nature, but mainly centred on “needs” (Featherstone 2000: 2) and, 
see summary in appendix B:5.1 and appendix B:5.2. The changes in perspectives about what 
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returnees really want did not bring out the root causes of the war clearly. Rather, the Acholi 
people’s social world and realities were viewed by most NGOs as are very complex and dynamic 
along the realist line of argument. In real terms there was no concern from NGOs and GoU to go 
deeper in finding out the true root causes of the conflict were. This realists’ view of NGOs and 
GoU are grounded in the argument that the denial of basic needs cause conflict (Crocker 2003 
and Curl 1994). From the findings, the realist argument have been viewed by NGOs as a 
paradigm, or a cluster of assumptions [theoretical building] for practical implementation, thus 
forming roles of NGOs for intervention. The problematic is found to lie in the paradigmatic views of 
the world of returnees who opposed the practices of NGOs especially, in failing to fully support the 
rebuilding of lineage-based social authority in Acholiland. In that respect, the key needs of 
returnees in VoRs were found to be very complex and was not necessarily linked to some 
identified causes of war below.  
Chapter three notes that the war between the GoU and the LRA was unique and complex, 
denoted with exercerbated internal and external crises, internal displacements and the realities of 
return in respective villages of former IDPs. Many returnees identified Joseph Kony’s war as one 
cause of the war, a war of its own nature that has never been experienced in Uganda and 
Acholiland. However, Kony denies being the cause of war in Acholiland. He confirms in his 
recorded audio tape aired out on Mega FM, a local radio station in Gulu in April 2007 that LRA war 
is a succession from the previously failed wars. That he did not start the war but continued from 
where other insurgencies had failed. Kony expressed disappointment with the former UPDA 
officers and blamed Acholi elders who he claims, blessed his LRA take over from UPDA and at 
the same time were the very same elders and chiefs who forsook him. Kony tries in his realist 
approach to link LRA interest to Acholi needs in the name of taking over the government from 
Museveni. But, Kony’s mixing of his needs to overthrow the government using the ten biblical 
doctrine and his interests to save Acholi, poses ideological constraints, at least from amongst the 
realists NGOs who do not subscribe to this claim. Jackson (2007: 5) argues that the demonisation 
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of LRA leadership has prevented meaningful analysis in the Western media about the root causes 
of the conflict and the reason why the war has become so brutal and taken so long. In an interview 
with the former Chairperson of ARLPI, Bishop Ochola (2009) argues that probably the word “Lord” 
contained in the [L]RA and “Holy” in [H]SM are the problems2. This confusion moved Acholi-
returnees’ needs to a position (during war times) of developing interest (while in IDP camps) to 
have tremendous coping mechanism. Appendix B-5:2I summarises on the position, interest and 
needs (PIN) of returnees.  
Nobody is responsible for causes of war in Acholi sub-region but many have different interests. 
While Kony’s message seems to be facilitating his movement’s interest to fulfil the needs of Acholi 
people, it disrupts exploration to designing action based on identified causes of conflicts. 
Interviewees from NRC, CARITAS and AVSI NGO-field workers and the government district 
officials (2007-2009) reject Kony’s movement’s interest to fulfil the needs of Acholi as a basis for 
supporting Acholi people, thus facilitating Kony’s agendas. On the one hand, the government’s 
approach to solving the crises in Acholiland is found to illustrate the subjective nature of the 
perceptions and definition of Acholi social crises based on NGOs and expert views, not referring it 
to causes of the war itself. The government denied many reports on Acholi crises exist, thus no or 
less actions taken. On the other hand, the GoU’s argument is that Kony places himself in the 
position of mobilising Acholi people only within the transformative scope of waging his war, a 
perception that was heavily based on judgements about values within which Kony tends to define 
Acholi social problems and social realities.  
Acholi people find themselves caught up in the middle. Instead, they turned more to NGOs for 
interim and short term responsive, contingency and complementary support. NGOs supported 
                                                             
2 Bishop Ochola repeated his statement he gave in Stockholm on 27th September 2003 while meeting with members 
of Acholi Society in Scandinavia and the church congregation. Ochola was emphasising on the nonviolent 
approaches to fight a bad system and how to address issues relating to rebuilding a strong lineage-based Acholi 
identity and as a people to accept one another [strengthening of Achoi-Acholi Relationships] and to stand against 
humiliation and encampment which is tantamount to death [return to villages of origins]. Ochola was accompanied by 
Aruu MP, Hon Otto Odonga. 
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Acholi people more but with the government (see sub-section 2.6.1) full involvement, and in 
Fisher’s and Keashley’s (1996: 256-261; 1993 and 1991) views, this is the objective-subjective 
view that mixes interest-based challenges of the war with the changing context of the war. The 
causes of war has been muddled up with the current social crises in Acholi and government 
policy. The latter being understood in various dimensions, now that the 25 years’ war ended.  
Interviewees from NGO-field workers and government officials confirm that major underlying 
causes of the war have been based on the accumulated historical facts, rather than particular 
recent needs or interest of LRA leaderships or to those of returnees. However, majority of Acholi 
people agree that NGOs failed to support Acholi people based on the improper analysis of the 
causes of war in Acholiland. In an interviewee with Gulu NGOs-Forum (2009), LRA rebellion and 
others are not the casues of war in Acholiland. NGO-forum project manager (2009) adds that 
attention was mainly focused on suppressing the North militarily, thus allowing the conflict 
continuum to be mirrored on the LRA as an Acholi war. But in the actual sense, both LRA and 
UPDF operations were acting in concert with one another. This latter view supports the 
problematic of realism mentioned above.  
However, UNHCR (2009) puts it into context that the causes of northern Uganda war were a 
combination of historical reasons based on national political propaganda of “Acholinisation of the 
war”. The  north-south dividing factor, lack of government political will and the protraction of the 
war itself provided enough evidence about the Acholinisation of the war. Appendix B:4.2 
summarises the above points.  
Other schools of thoughts from NGOs and Government officials argue that major causes of the 
conflict lie in the self-generated failure of Acholi people to resolve and strengthen their internally 
weakened lineage-based social authority and in the broken-down relationships with other parts of 
Uganda. This view was rejected by many including the diaspora community who, for example, 
view Museveni’s action and LRA modalities of building a new Acholi lineage-based social authority 
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as are congruent in fighting Acholi people. On the other hand, NGOs support to sector activities fo 
rebuilding structural damages caused by the conflict did not come as a result of proper analysis to 
the structural causes of the war. That explains why NGOs continued support addressed only the 
symptoms/effects of the war, like confidence-building, reinforcing dialogue structures amongst 
IDP-returnees and neighbours, promoting income generating activities (IGAs), provision of social 
services and supporting Extremely Vulnerable Individuals/Persons and Persons with Special 
Needs (EVIs/PSNs).  
NGOs’ advocacy roles in rebuilding the broken-down relationships was identified to be based on 
the selective promotion of nonviolent judicial mechanisms, rather than on identified causes of the 
war so as to increase the transformation of alternative structures. According to most NGOs 
workers who were interviewed, the advocacy roles of NGOs has been to counter both LRA and 
UPDF denial that the war destrpyed Acholi social structures and relationships. The consequence 
of which usually makes NGOs’ work based on principles and codes of conduct very difficult. 
Rather, views of NGOs workers about the causes of the war have bases on the documented 
reports and books, similar to those of Government officials’. This context reflects more to four 
major causes of the war discussed below and summarised in appendix B-5.2. These triangulated 
variations from other Acholi people lie in the NGOs’ and government officials’ policy guidelines,  
reports and from previous lessons-learnt. NGOs’ roles were more reactive (short term and interim) 
than proactive (long term). 
In Kitgum, a local NGO Director (interviewee, LNGO 2009) stated that the relationship between 
Acholi IDPs with the Government and LRA widely strayed because they both could have 
contributed to the root causes of this war. Nonetheless, NGOs became stronger and closer to the 
local population, see framework of analysis in sub-section 2.6. Sections of Northern Ugandan 
population have previously argued that UPDA, the defeated and regrouped ex-UNLA soldiers 
brought war home in Acholiland, because they behaved badly during their service in the army. 
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When UPDA pioneered better resistance to Museveni’s rule in Acholiland in mid to late 1980s, this 
view was changing, in that, UPDA was justifying her insurgent action to correct their past mistakes 
and protect Acholi people. In a Kacoke Madit [Grand Meeting in Acholi lnaguage] peace 
conference held in Nairobi 2000, two elderly (male and female) argued that UPDA had good 
cause to fight NRA not entirely to defend their bad acts in previous government, but defend Acholi 
people. These elders actually endorsed the establishment of UPDA and supported them with food 
and information.  
In an interview with an ex-soldier (2009) who served in the UNLA and later joined UPDA, HSM, 
LRA and signed up for amnesty, asserts that UNLA broke because of the death of former Army 
Commander in the Obote II government. Oyite Ojok died in the mysterious helicopter crash 
(chapter three). To him, Oyite’s death escalated every cause of war in Northern Uganda. Oyite 
Ojok is a Langi by tribe and it is believed that his replacement sparked division between the Acholi 
and Langi top army officers on who should succeed Oyite Ojok. This view on the cause of war in 
Northern Uganda is localised to mostly former army officers and not civilian population in 
Acholiland. Another interviewee, an ex-soldier (2009) says that the need to defend Acholi people 
through UPDA insurgency was to stop Museveni and defend Acholi people.  
The older King’s African Riffle (KAR) veterans were weakend and Museveni took advantage of the 
internally divided and weak army. He [Museveni] took advantage of Acholi internal weaknesses to 
broaden his internal and external political domination and military support from within other tribes 
and from outside. Museveni blamed the UNLA top commanders for failing to understand and 
utilise the contemporary politics of Uganda apace modernity and globilisation. Museveni used the 
divide and rule, south and north over the years from independence in 1962 and left Northerners to 
“rot” (interviewee, Gulu University Director 2008).  
In an interview with human right workers and amnesty commission respondents (2007, 2008 and 
2009), Acholi was left to rot and that backfired on the government. As a state Uganda, failed to 
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observe principles of protections of its citizens and democratic human rights. This was named as 
one major cause of the escalated conflict in Acholiland. This justice-based perspectives were 
strengthened by all the eight FGDs carried out in (2009) to have formed a general consensus that 
Acholi people were collectively being purnished along ethnic and identity lines. This view is 
strongly expressed, that the cause of the war in Uganda as a whole is ethnic based and are inter-
linked within the preplaned structural violence (historical context), overworked mindset and 
dishearting programming against Northerners (attitude of north-south divide) and the actual 
killings, rape (behaviours) of Northerners, (see Galtung’s ABC-Triangle). The Acholi IDPs 
confirirm this view, but non-conforms with the perspectives and opinion of NGOs field workers and 
Government Officials.  
As mentioned already, the identified causes of the war mixed up what would be termed as 
symptoms/effects of the previous and existing wars with core problem. NGOs have been 
addressing primarily symptoms/effects (visible violence) rather than addressing the structural 
causes of war (invisible violence) and the overall culture of violence. The effects also included 
major failures to realise the structural causes propelled forward by government policies. For 
example, the policy of “protected villages” for example exacerbated and prolonged the war. The 
failure of the international communities to speak out and ban civilian internal confinements, 
declare Northern Uganda a disaster area, failure to recognise the too over-burdened bureaucratic 
and consent based political authority in Acholiland, all aggrevated the conflict. The perceptions of 
Acholi IDP-returnees suggest that the causes of war lies in the intended and pre-planned 
systemic/structural actions on them. Within the IDPs, these varying opinions about the causes of 
the conflict followed along sex, age, experiences, profession and level of education.  
Youths in their twenties and below were followed and they mostly referenced to proximate causes 
of the war and effects/symptoms, just like the NGOs and to some extent government officials. This 
can explain why NGOs and youths have been consistently convergent on the future development of social 
recovery in Acholiland. However, IDP-returnees’ fundamental needs remain contextual in both 
153 
 
structural and systemic nature. The fulfilment of needs and interest has created severe attitudinal 
and behavioural dependency on NGOs. Jackson (2003) argues that the economic causes of war 
based on greed and grievances that has been so much akin to most Sub-Saharan African civil 
conflict is not anymore applicable in the Northern Ugandan case.  
It was not clearly stated by a youth camp leader in Pabo, Amuru (2009) who was barely 10 years 
before the war started, that the context to the conflict and its causes and breakdown of lineage-
based social authority in Achoiland was IDPs life-style. In his view, it started from February 1986 
when the societal devolution to find ways of adjusting to civilian lives in Acholiland was 
unimaginable. Acholi needed quick readjustment through local leadership, and those who could 
locally organise civil population. However, there were no such leadership to give sense of 
directions. Therefore aggressions, assumptions of leaders[hip] roles, resistance to such drastic 
changes and confusion took over. The camp leader was mainly attributing to the lack of local 
leadership structure and non existances of the middle to top leaderships in Acholi as one historical 
cause of the war in Acholiland.  
Acholi Elders Forum member from Kitgum North (70 years) mentioned in a FGD that the causes 
of the war were tramped up by the accumulated fears Acholi people harboured starting from 
Amin’s persecution in the 1970s. And, eminently, Museveni was repeating the history of 
persecution of Acholi. He adds, “...we perceived the Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) 
would not be different from Idi Amin’s in the 1970s” (interviewee, an Elder in Kitgum 2009). 
According to this elder in Kitgum (2009), Museveni’s regime is still being perceived as having a 
clear set agenda to clear Acholi people off Uganda’s map. Acholi sons who served as soldiers of 
the UNLA lost power, ran towards Southern part of Sudan, unemployed and could not live civilian 
lives. Their fears soon became greater than the locals’, but the fears were quickly shared all over 
the region. The cause of the war was common knowledge, war propaganda and historical facts 
were all there to confirm these fears. NRA began to exhibit aggression on Acholi civilian when 
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they started tying people “kandoya” and “brief-case” 3 (North Kitgum Elder Forum member 2009), 
a very sever form of punishment. This elder was suggesting that the cause of war was actually 
based on the fear and NRA propaganda of war that tramped up rumours in soldiers that Acholi 
people are warlike and never give up easily, thus needs to be crashed. NRA became more brutal 
and were acting like an invading army in the name of liberation advocating for the country’s ten 
point program that would effect Uganda’s system overhaul. 
Most Acholi elders and traditional chiefs who were interviewed argue that the complex nature and 
continuums of conflict to peace patterns and its historical impact on Acholi people was due to bad 
leaders[hip]. Leadership issue stands out as one major gap based on the failure to trace the 
causes of war in Uganda. To them, what is being seen in Northern Uganda has been as a result of 
ignored roles of elders and the lack of respect that could have strengthened the lineage-based 
social authority in Acholiland, which used to bind Acholi people together. These patterns did not 
help mobilise the supporting linkages between the resolution of internal and external crises. Army 
officers who claimed the military ranks assumed leadership statuses as was sometimes opposed 
to the middle class peasantry who worked to gain their statuses in the society.  
Chapter four discusses that it was mostly the elderly and the educated Acholi people who believe 
that the colonially designed economic imbalance that was part of divide-and-rule policy is one 
major cause of conflict in Northern Uganda, was being deployed by the Museveni regime. An IDP 
women camp leader (72) years old argues that the majority of Acholi people lacked strong and 
organised leadership structure to mobilise people as there is no lineage-based functional authority 
to centrally bind them. Her view seems to oppose the colonialist’s past policy. Her view tallys well 
with all the nine FGDs members who agree that Acholi leadership structure has since been weak. 
FGDs argue that military ranks and positions formed the pioneering roles and models in the 
                                                             
3 Kandoya is a method of torture where hands were tied on victim’s back hard enough to expose the chess to block 
breathing. Death and paralysis occurs as time went on. Brief-case is when the two hands and legs would be tied 
together and the victim would be hang dangling like a brief-case.  
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society. There has not been any strengthened mix of leadership from middle-class and veteran 
soldiers to promote and support the Rwot-Kweri (Hoe Chief), elders and chiefs in Acholiland. 
Paicho men’s FGDs (2009) add that the criteria for choosing Hoe Chiefs were earned based on 
knowledge, experience and age, not army ranks. But NGOs have filled in the current missing gaps 
by forming Camp Leadership social structure. The introduced government policy on urbanisation 
of IDP-Camps and the militarisation of agricultural reform, introduced by Museveni’s brother, 
Salim Saleh in his Security and Production Plan (SSP) 2003, is rejected by returnees. NGOs did 
not work with that. Rather, better option for addressing the leadership, economic and security 
deficit in Acholi which is perceived by many academics as a source of conflict and poverty in 
Acholiland are left between government governance system, traditional leaders and a vacuum 
NGOs created. 
Gulu University Director (2009) predates his diagnosed poor leadership structure of contemporary 
Acholi to the traces of the historical myth of Acholi in today’s Uganda as the first cause of the 
break-down in lineage-based social authority of elders and would-be leaders. The mythical history 
is based on the story of the ancestral father, Olum whose two sons, Labongo and Gipiir had bitter 
separation at Pubungu, currently known as Pakwach in West Nile. The historical context narrates 
that the separation led to opposite migration from Pakwach. The separation also lead to the 
formation of eastern Luo, the Acholi people from Labongo and Gipiir form the western Luo. The 
Gulu University Director claims that the bitterness continues to haunt Acholi people from garnering 
better sense of unity and forging attitudes to respect their leaders.  
The Director also believes that the apparent divergences in views lack knowledge about the 
contextual socio-economic, cultural and direct forms of violence, that was structured in the political 
and socio-economic systems in Uganda over time. Most Acholi people are not well aware of the 
deep-seated structural causes of the war and how to unpack the structurally designed 
consequences following from the past. These have played major structured and systemic roles 
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that NGOs, and the younger generations may not be bothered about. NGOs and youths 
understand very well the current economic imbalances the war brought in Acholiland, but not as 
an historically compounded and generated past.  
In a rare occasion, the LRA delegation in the JPTs claimed some of the deep-seated root causes 
of the war in Uganda as lack of power sharing, unfair representations in national political positions, 
destructions and looting of properties from Acholiland. Returnees and civlian Acholi people argue 
that the LRA delegation who were mostly from the diasporas did not reflect local contexts and 
grassrottos perspective. The LRA position paper on root causes of the conflict gave different 
views. It was definitely opposed to the GoU’s peace talk delegations. Both parties failed to pursue 
on how to address the root causes of the conflicts. They also failed to explain the extent to which 
CSOs would play a part in transforming the war towards peace under the JPTs protocols.  
The Gulu Human Rights Focus Director (2008) thought it was all about power sharing between top 
LRA and the GoU officials, which could not be overlooked to include parties’ common interests. In 
his view, the Director (2008) says it was not unusual for the emotionally charged and seemingly 
violent parties to hotly pursue peace talks, and yet their rigid positions and interests were 
concealed in their (Kony’s and Museveni’s) individualistic and/or socially binding claims to own 
fundamental needs - power. Darweish (2010) and Francis (2002) maintain that once the cause of 
war is based on the imbalance in power and it came through negotiated agreements, a relapse 
into fresher wars are possible. The failure to address power-shring deal seen as a root cause of 
the war left doubts and mistrust not only amongst the LRA negotiators but also amongst 
returnees.  
The Acholi CSOs identified the causes of the war for official representation at the JPTs but both 
CSOs, traditional leaders and NGOs were only allowed to observe. Grouped under the Ker Kwaro 
Acholi Paramount Chief, Rwot Acana, CSOs and LNGOs compiled root causes of conflict 
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contained in appendix B-4.2. The causes have been similar to (Galtung 1995) ideas and the 
historical facts in Uganda.  
The divergences in perspectives about the root causes of the conflict in Northern Uganda made it 
difficult to exactly secure a further apportioning of JPTs agenda, questioning on responsibility, 
accountability and reconciliation for post-war recovery. The perspectives would have explained 
how the war started and the destruction it brought, how it ended and how a new beginning can be 
supported by NGOs. IDP-returnees could not define the causes of war and to express what 
happened to them properly. These were similar kinds of patterns and responses NGOs and the 
government officials expressed about returnees. This could be because, many returnees saw 
themselves as victims, while others as perpetuators or both, the resulting force of which made 
many to shy away from talking details. In an interview with the project manager of GOAL (2009) in 
Kalongo argues that NGOs did not give enough pressure and progressive plans to the 
government because they did not know the true causes of the conflict to address. He adds that 
had NGOs gotten the clear background to the causes of conflicts, they would have been able to 
give pressure to the government. The war would have ended a long time.  
The above reflection suggets that the causes of conflict had some ontological patterns that 
impacted on human lives, juxtaposed with the confusion between locating the positions, interests 
and needs of the multiple actors in the war in Acholiland. There was a general consensus 
amongst middle class and highly educated Acholi people that the root causes of the conflict has 
links to the historical facts based on the British, colonial policy of divide-and-rule. That, the divide-
and-rule policy unbalanced occupations and professions in the country. The struggle to gain 
power and its shift that generated fear of reprisals was another that is annotated by ethnic fault 
lines and hatred. The latter is believed by middle class Acholi to have systematically developed 
while the former were radical measures the British used to mobilise the contemporary Uganda. 
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Again, most middle class population agree that NGOs’ roles centred on responses and actions 
without involving Acholi people to address the root causes to the war.  
These common views can be concluded that in a nested paradigm structure like the lineage-
based social system of Acholi people, there is need to address not only the root causes of 
conflicts, but also actors, relational and structural dimensions. There is also the contextual causes 
of Northern Ugandan conflict, uniqueness of the human dimensions of understanding relationships 
and the social structures involved. Most NGOs have moved towards reconstruction by identifying 
the many post-war social recovery gaps. Identification of root causes do not only form the 
perspectives of the shifting NGOs’ activities from relief to reconstruction but also the roles they 
play to mobilise and support the returnees. The GoUs’ and NGOs’ views concur on issues of 
policy implementations. The local government leadership structure needed NGOs to continue with 
relief aid distribution and provide assistance, especially to EVIs/PSNs. These perspectives 
showed reflections about the wider problem of deep-seated causes of persistent violent conflicts 
that inclines towards the perpetuator–victim dycotomy, as well as to the victim-perpetuator co-
existence that generally lacked attention.  
Generally, this sub-ssection can be summarised to have found four major causes of the war (see 
details in appendix B-4.20). The first is about the unbalanced distribution of occupations and 
professions by the colonial leaders. The core problems has been lack of a united spirit of 
nationalism, division between the militarily that was dominated by the north against the 
economically better southern Bantu ethnic groups. Linked to that is the second consistent issues 
of ethnicity and identity, some of which are aggravating while others are triggering factors. 
Diveristy was not used as a positive force to unite Ugandans, rather formed the core problem to 
effect collective punishment arguments, bureaucratic and consent-based political repressions on 
the subsequent serving regimes. The subsequent regimes usually fail to protect the civilian 
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population on the loosing sides. The effect of this has been identified as constituting to the 
creation of internal crisis like internal displacements and refugees.  
Thirdly, the socio-political causes of war in Uganda reveals many aggravating and triggering root 
causes too. Desparities in the socio-political casues of war aggravated the poor public sector 
management, corruption, marginalisation, and obsessions to manipulate power through nepotisms 
as are centrally steered. Those in government have power and vested interest in keeping it going 
because they benefit personally through corruption (interviewee, NGO official in Gulu 2009). The 
result has been widespread oppressions and promotion of self-enrichment and countrywide 
poverty.  
Lastly, the socio-economic exclusions has had at its core policies of social sanctions that excluded 
northerners from the mainstream economic growth. The effects have also formed the major 
context to the lack of social services, weak and corrupt judicial systems, and poor infrastructural, 
political and decayed moral standard. Dolan (2005) summarises these as social torture. The next 
sub-section 5.3 narrows down to identifying Acholi IDPs-returnees’ needs in VoRs. This follows on 
the changing IDP-returnees’ social realities [ontological basis], the patterns of NGO support 
provided and the representative roles of NGOs and government officials in Acholiland.  
5.3 MEETING UNENDING NEEDS OF RETURNEES  
Fundamentally, the needs to socially rebuild Acholiland, and the priorities on what roles NGOs 
play considerably varied from contingency support, advocacy to institutional transformation and 
development roles. Appendix B-5.2 summarises IDP-returnees’ positions, interests and needs. 
The variations depended on how NGOs have been working with both GoU and UN policies to 
allocate specific roles and activities to different NGOs. In an interview with Akwinya (2009) both 
the GoU and NGOs say many things but they do not deliver. Tee-Ilwa FGDs (2009) confirm that 
NGOs have indeed tried to do their best, but government initiatives failed to deliver, especially the 
National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) who are very corrupt. 
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Responses arising from IDP-returnees about any reduced dependency on NGOs gave mixed 
perspectives, depending on whether GoU officials made the promises or NGOs. Some IDPs were 
positive about cattle restocking schemes and provision of seeds and farm implements as best way 
of meeting fundamental needs of returnees in VoRs. At the grassroots level, the failure to provide 
for example, clean drinking water in VoRs were seen as one big failure of NGO activities’ 
implementation. Concerns from IDP-returnees agree that NGOs duplicate activities, which were 
sometimes not easily accepted by the representatives of other NGOs, but were blamed on the 
changing government policies.  
My framework of analysis suggests that this kind of duplication is more prevalent within INGOs 
who fail to intergrate horizontal and vertical activities with grassroots and middle range leaders. 
The middle-range leaders known mostly as middle-class elites whose background were grounded 
on the linkages from grassroots farmers, teachers, religious leaders to the district and national 
levels are very weak or missing. These have made the various and unending list of needs of 
returnees fundamentally changing in demands and difficult to streamline. This view was explained 
in subsection 2.5 in which Max-Neefs and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs diverge. Max-Neef et al 
(1991) treat needs in their 36-cell matrix as satisfiers (see appendix B-5.1). The prioritisation 
follows from analysing NGOs’ activities and roles that found returnees’ needs have always 
remained basic - a “must have”.  
Returnees’ needs diverged from those of NGOs’ and government officials’ especially, on how far 
safety, sense of belonging, esteem to prosper and self-actualisation are reached. Max-Neef 
(1991) includes subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, 
identity and freedom. The perceptions of Acholi IDPs-returnees also include existential categories 
of being, having own space (an Rwot ki oda) meaning in Acholi, “I am a chief in my own home” 
(see Appendix B-5.1). The perspectives of returnees are heavily reinforced by Max-Neef’s view of 
identifying needs. It provides logical and analytical considerations in understanding roles NGOs 
played in mobilising and supporting them.  
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The typology of NGOs provided in chapter two suggest that empowerment and transformation 
scope of NGO roles include, but are not limited to developing local institutions. However, there are 
simultaneity, complementarities and trade-offs in NGOs’ roles-sets as can be distinguished from 
returnees’ perceptions, especially in the  process of needs satisfaction. This is because NGOs 
continued to support and mobilise the IDPs into the post-conflict recovery phase in an ad-hoc 
relief/aid supporting manner, providing hands-on direct services (see sub-section 2.6). Major 
activities that remain to be addressed include support in fulfilling physiological and biological 
needs that was created in the over 25 years of war. In an interview with NRC workers (2009), 
IDPs have become passive and redundant. IDPs believe that it is the role of NRC to support 
locally-based social services like building schools, health centres, huts and road constructions. 
Such NGOs have done less in areas of advocacy and policy changes aimed at improving the lives 
of returnees. 
5.3.1  SUPPORTING LOCALLY BASED SOCIAL SERVICES  
One NGO roles identified by the framework of analysis is the provision of both direct and indirect 
services to support locally-based social services. Grassroots perspectives diverged widely from 
those of NGOs’ and government officials’. Based on the framework, locally-based social services 
may form part of what can be fundamentally systematised human needs, which in NGOs’ and 
government officials’ views are mostly driven by NGOs’ budgets and GoU’s policy. The IDP-
returnees, some NGO-field workers and most government officials did not clearly express the 
extent to which policy-driven activities were impacting on rebuilding, say locally-based social 
authority and reconciliation.  
NGOs’ involvement to strengthen and rebuild Acholi people’s social services fall within the 
empowerment and transformative bottom right quadrant of NGOs’ typology and activities in figure 
2.6.2 which requires policy orientation and funding. It is mentioned in the framework of analysis 
that the services require long term strategy from NGOs. Rebuilding social infrastructures and 
supporting government related social institutions like schools, health centres, road rehabilitation, 
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livelihood support, micro-finance and IGAs have become primarily roles of NGOs. However, 
returnees still need continued relief aid distribution for at least two or more years. An interviewee, 
Opobo (2009) argues on the “no reason to go home” when at 70 years of age he bears no 
attachment to. Other elders rebuke Opobo’s attitude on the loss of coping mechanisms, excessive 
drinking habit and in the loss of family members many bear experience to.  
According to a female interviewee, Lakot (2009) who is 70 years old, locally-based social services 
never were made available by the GoU, but some NGOs have tried a lot. In VoRs, there are no 
schools, no health centres and no water points compared to while it was in IDP-camps. Food 
ratios, start up packages to facilitate returns were not provided, because return still remains 
voluntary and must be done in safety and by informed consent of individual returnee. Lakot’s 
comment refers to the failure on the part of implementing the push and pull government policy by 
NGOs, a section of analysis which deals with systemic and long-term policy and fund-raising 
methods of indirect service provision. An interview with Too-rac (2009) who runs a local NGO 
which is contracted to build schools, estates and latrines in villages and parishes shares Lakot’s 
perceptions. The views suggest that LNGOs are always caught up in competition with highly 
funded NGOs. LNGOs lack strong lobbying power and the withdrawal of INGOs leaves behind 
dependency syndrome, redundant social realities as opposed to hardwork which is now evident in 
Acholiland. Too-rac argues that Acholi people do not have work spirit and hygienic feeling to dig 
own latrines in VoRs because NGOs have taken over simple but voluntary community spirits and 
responsibility. 
Literatures especially from Atkin (2007) argue that NGO workers fill every available hotel room, 
which are so sought after. NGOs occupy ground floors while the first floor is still being 
constructed. NGO employees drive in “four by four vehicles”, young white volunteers walk and 
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cycle through the town as casually as if they were going to college at home.4  Staffs from NGO 
Forum in Gulu (2009) consider the fluctuating record of an estimated 500 NGOs5 in Gulu town 
alone towards the end of 2007 as having redrawn their strategies to suit post-war social 
conditions. NGOs have become sub-contractors of government and INGO projects and are 
grassroots agents of social and financial power, driving lifeline for the communities, businesses, 
architectural designs, education career to suit labour markets after graduation” (interviewee, Kitara 
2009). “NGOs are our main customers and they pay us in US dollars. They are depriving local 
efforts to rebuild social structures in villages, rather, younger people are moving to cities” 
(interviewee, an Estate Broker only named as Estate 2008 and 2009). “NGOs erect very poor 
schools and health centres and are sometimes semi-finished” (interviewee, Otim-Ogal 2009). For 
example, in Lakwana, Save the Children simply painted one unfinished school that was being built 
by AVSI. The school was built to demonstrate government push-policy (interviewees, Adong and 
Ocen 2009). The government is unseen in villages, but the pace of moving away from relief to 
reconstruction is faster than mass education (interviewees, Ocen and Adong 2009). 
LRA returnees have been treated carefully at the GUSCO centre. In the interviews conducted with 
Anywar (2009) and Atkinson (2009) the actions necessary to support ex-LRA soldiers and 
abducted returnees still treat most ex-LRA returnees as EVIs/PSNs. The fundamental needs of 
ex-LRA in respective villages especially in the areas of physiological and biological needs are 
unattended to. The activities of GUSCO in this area has stopped during the camp phase out 
(interviewee, GUSCO 2009).  
Education amongst youths, retired teachers, councillors and NGO workers were distinctively cited 
to support caricullum based civic education, vocational training and mainstream education, that is 
                                                             
4  This view is consistent with (Hilary Atkins from SOS-Kinderdorf International, 16-04-07). This idea alludes to 
Toorach who runs his LNGO from Ayul in Kitgum District but has his offices in Pader, Gulu and Amuru. 
5 This figure was reported on the AllAfrican.com and NGO Forum in Gulu, but the actual figures keep fluctuating 
depending on the government regulation of NGOs policy and partly, the redrawing of NGO strategies to suit the post-
war conditions.  
164 
 
to say, formal and informal education. However, IDP-returnees are failing to balance most 
immediate needs with the long-term educational investment needs (interviewee, Adong 2009). 
NGOs can not bridge the gaps through capacity building training alone as we tend to close down 
many activities (interviewee, Kilama 2009). In rebuilding a future Acholi social structure, almost all 
interviewees believe that education is the key. Interviews with many youths agree that many 
youths missed out their quality education and lack substantial knowledge to analyse and reflect on 
the changes from war to peace, which greatly hinders their successes (interviewee, Latigo 2009). 
Youths prefer formal education in schools to get better paid up jobs, preferably with NGOs. Youths 
who dropped out of schools prefer IGAs with the capital boost to be coming from agricultural 
production and NGOs, not from the government who fail on their [government] promise.  
Youths’ FGDs in Paicho (2009) note that the reason for remaining in the camp before return 
and/or passing through transit camps, and eventually join parents and relatives in VoRs is 
because, there are no social services like schools and health centers. Everything is starting from 
scratch. Scholastic materials and teachers are not there. Teachers still cycle from Gulu town to 
over 20 miles away, and sometimes they never turn up for work. An informant, NGO-field worker 
who lived through the more than two decades of war says that returnees need reconstruction and 
development and minimised support and mobilisation to address physiological and biological 
needs like before. His view is that capacity building and education so received can bridge the gap 
of knowledge. But his view is disapproaved by the fact that NGOs do not put effort in post-war 
reconstruction and development, meaning, NGOs mostly offer intermediary services at the post-
war social recovery period. For example, NRC employed about 600 trained volunteers at the peak 
of the insurgency downsized her staffs to about 150 workers by the end of 2009. Hundreds of 
educated youths are jobless as INGOs pull out or scale down their activities in the north 
(interviewee, Ogwok 2009).  
As a result, there is alarming increase in the number of unemployed, and educated youths are 
causing social problems, because of lack of planning to absorb jobless young graduates. An 
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interview with AVSI employee, Adong (2009) notes that IDPs are in constant need, because they 
see NGOs as the only lifeline in providing humanitarian relief. Therefore, social recovery becomes 
slow because changes in perceptions amongst returnees especially young graduates is to persue 
education with the intention of getting job with NGOs. Almost every graduate want to work with 
NGOs in Acholi. This dependency syndrome on NGOs is cancerous against boosting up coping 
mechanisms, self motivation and creativity. Anywar (2009) raises issues regarding “coping 
mechanism”, highly articulated by Atkinson (2010) that the Acholi IDPs-returnees used to learn 
how to survive as a community, but it is unclear now that return process and camp-phase-out has 
posed many challenges to individual survival.  
5.3.2  CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS 
Of all the FGDs the researcher conducted, the need to build the capacity of IDPs-returnees has 
been suggested to embrace the wider community sensitisation. Capacity building training has 
most of the time been attributed to the context of fundamental need for both formal and informal 
education. This is to mainstream and reinforce both formal and informal curriculum in education 
sector. Informal education in the form of community sensitisation has to prioritise strengthening 
agricultural sector and IGAs leading to self-employment. NGOs are closing shops but returnees 
cannot compete for white-collar jobs. “As farmers, we need to diversify our agricultural 
mechanisms, skills in storing and preserving food, what is consumable and what is for sale and 
marketing” (interviewee, Otim 2009).  
Informal education that targets major areas of agriculture can be included amongst NGO exit 
strategies (interviewee, IRC  and UNHCR officials 2009). But there is lack of resources and ill 
preparedness on the part of the GoU to own return programs and projects. In an interview with 
AVSI project coordinator (2009), AVSI’s capacity building programmes are to design exit 
strategies to allow the government to begin setting up local council leadership elections in villages. 
But the government claims incapacitation based on lack of finances and qualified personel 
(interviewee, Adong 2009).  
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Capacity building programmes are also hindered by the lack of qualified trainers, teachers, 
scholastic materials, medicines and unqualified doctors. Exorbitant money has to be paid to 
access these services (interviewee, Olango 2009). Returnees agree that capacity building training 
offered many new ideas, especially on how to generate income, something many learnt while in 
camps. As was mentioned above, capacity building needs is closely linked to education needs. 
Likewise, perceptions about capacity building varied considerably. In an interview with Olaa 
(2009) there are lots of weaknesses from conflict transforming actors if one looks at the quality, 
structure of training, familiarities and impacts of the series of seminars, workshops, sensitisation 
programmes, human rights meetings, DDMC reports, policy reviews and distribution of Per Diem 
at the end of the day” (Olaa 2009). An AVSI employee (2009) says that a lot of money is spent on 
administration compared to what should be delivered to IDPs. The quality of trainings are 
sometimes very poor. Most IDPs are illiterate, so trainings must be tailored according to their 
levels of understanding.  
Despite the lack of in-depth capacity building, the experience and know-how of NGOs are being 
used in Acholiland, but, this study finds that, that can only be used to fulfil the short- and to the 
mid-term needs. The framework of analysis argues that the presence of a strong foreign NGOs, 
namely most INGOs, may complicate the role of the government, instead of adding value to 
national development, as well as creating a new form of social reality in Acholiland.  
5.3.3  NEED FOR INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES 
Although there are ambivalent attitudes adopted towards NGOs, attempts to rebuild Acholi social 
structure through income generating activities (IGAs) micro-finance schemes have given much 
more desired relationsips with NGOs like AVSI and IA. IGA scheme is a new and eye-catching 
social phenomenon that has attracted mostly women and youths. NGOs are supporting IGAs as a 
means of achieving sustainable durable solution.  
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In a joint NGOs’ report, IGA has clearly reaped results in the neighbouring districts of Lango, Teso 
and West Nile6 where return took place earlier. The report cites the successful micro-finance and 
IGA schemes that became one important means of raising living conditions and mobilising actors 
to rebuild social structures. IGA persuit is directly linked to socio-economic developmental 
activites and are mainly connected to sales of agricultural products, bee keeping, pottery and 
charcoal burning. The GoU provides very little support in these sectors compared to NGOs’.  
IGAs are now being seen as one of the most sustainable activities amongst returnees to support 
agricultural production in a commercialised mode and scale. An interviewed AVSI NGO-field 
worker (2009) in Paicho says that returnees want to be independent economically. However, since 
return, the level of household income declined so low that most families can not afford two meals 
a day. Returnees are exploiting the natural environment and agricultural production to boost 
income. In Amuru district, discussants from the NRC-field workers (2009) agree that household 
economy must be boosted so that the community are able to support their children up to 
University level of education.  
Returnees need road access to market their agricultural products, health centres and water points. 
While IDP-returnees’ requests are directed towards NGOs rather than to the GoU. In turn, NGOs 
direct similar views and gaps they identify and gather from IDPs to the GoU. This vicious cycle of 
referencing sectored NGOs activities has left returnees doubtful about how far NGOs are able to 
support and represent their views localy, nationaly and internationaly.  
Further, there are divergences that are primarily based on peasantry occupation using self-
employment (farming) to generate agricultural activities for income, accessing roads, maintaining 
human and food security, supporting education and payment of school fees and making 
                                                             
6 The displacement in Lango and Teso started much later than in Acoli, and the war ended quicker so many people 
could still identify themselves very strongly with the return programmes, unlike in Acoli sub-region which has bee 
there for nearly 23 years.  
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medicines available in health centres and clinics. The international community supports the views 
that the GoU must take full control of returnees’ needs.  
Convergences of opinions, especially amongst Acholi IDP-returnees, NGOs and government 
officials are that the EVIs/PSNs need more support because they cannot cope with the new 
changes in VoRs. EVIs/PSNs are identified as old male and female of over 60 years of age, but 
have no other younger family members to build huts, cook or take care of them. This convergence 
of views is also backed up by the International Alert (IA) (September 2008) views of “Investing in 
Peace” with the central hypothesis that peacebuilding in Northern Uganda require positive 
approaches to socio-economic recovery that are both strategic and cognisant of political realities. 
IA’s emphasis is to use political economy and conflict-sensitive lens to understand broad trends 
and challenges, and in identifying positive and negative examples of sectored and inter-sectored 
planning.  
The role of NGOs is seen by many as are adding value to social development. But interviews with 
Paicho, AVSI NGO-field workers, Local Council Chairman-I (LC-I) (2009), CARITAS in Kalongo, 
Menya (2009) and the NRC-field worker in Gulu (2009) both argue that added-value should 
increase productive livelihood activities like food security, commercial farming, and cost sharing 
programmes. NGOs should also add-value by supporting confidence-building, reinforcing dialogue 
between LRA, Acholi and GoU. In an interview with Rwot Acana (2009), NGOs need to get IDP-
returnees out from continued relief assistances, “bad culture” of aid dependency, drunkeness and 
prostitution to normality. As long as security (human and food) is restored, IGAs can boost socio-
economic social recovery although land ownership have become a major source of disputes. 
In all their roles, NGOs remain to be considered to be much more effective employers compared 
to state institutions. NGO funding sources and their engagement with the grassroots population 
went beyond government’s writ. It is possible that such situations may increase the risk of anti-
government actions. 
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5.3.4  RESTORING SECURITY   
The major role of NGOs identified in restoring security has been to reduce vulnerability, avoid 
and/or escape the insecurity of human, food and property inequalities. Returnees’ shared views 
on security reform, a form of combating vulnerability, is about the core function of the state to stop 
LRA abductions and protect them. Some of these views confirm the Weberian standpoint that a 
state like Uganda can actually monopolise the use of force in the name of persuing LRA. The 
mistrust Acholi people have on the army and police are prevalent. Prevously, local militias 
performed the role of local defence (LDUs), but are now being trained to perform the roles of 
community police, commonly referred to as Special Police Constables (SPCs). The programme is 
being supported by World Vision.  
While food and human security has been defined outside state protection, the fear of insecurity 
was expressed, reduced from the regional LRA return to Northern Uganda to focusing mainly on 
food and human security. This heaped more responsibilities on NGOs and the government to 
provide seeds and agricultural implements. GoU-officials and NGO workers expressed 
considerable knowledge on security policy implications citing mainly national, food and human 
security in that order. This structuralist or holist approach NGOs and GoU undertook regarded 
new emerging social structures introduced by NGOs and GoU have powers that actualy created 
social realities and social structures that we now see in villages of origins. According to Wednt 
(2008) social structures are irreducible to individuals and societies have social realities based on 
those idividuals who are members of the society.  
The Acholi-IDP-returnees prioritised food, human and national security. Fragmented security 
services in Acholiland such as Karimojong cattle raids and rag-tag highway robbers like, Boo-Kec 
[“vegetable is bitter” – prefer meat by stealing goats, cows and chicken] still pose threat although 
the national coherence to stop LRA is sustained. During the war and towards the JPTs, the 
perceived social reality was that, civil society groups be involved in institutionalising the tradition of 
sustained peace. The role of NGOs in Northern Uganda would identify social services and social 
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institutional transformation to assist in the process of survival, and security so as to overcome 
structural violence non-violently (Galtung 1996: 103-113). NGOs, CSOs and other actors opted for 
peace by peaceful means, addressed structural ties of oppressions that the LRA and UPDF 
inflicted. NGOs worked on empowerment programmes like boosting income generating activities, 
support to PSNs/EVIs, provision of medicines and more, for most Acholi IDPs who were in camps.  
Before and immediately after JPTs in July 2006, the emphasis to improve security situation seems 
to tally well with the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)  (OECD-DAC). OECD-DAC suggests that the security 
sector reform framework requires a coordinated approach on police and military reform in an 
immediate and medium term support to returnees. However, this did not work in reality in VoRs. 
During return, evidences showed that, the transformation of security sectors focused on 
supporting and mobilising former Local Defence Forces/Units (LDF/U) re-trained and turned the 
forces into SPCs.  
In an interview with Gulu elders (2009) the systems of social representations and material gains, 
language disclosures emphasised the missing political links between security strategy, public 
finances and civilian oversight of the local police to prevent LRA fresh attacks, represent and 
protect civilians. While NGOs trained their own personnel in removing Un-exploded Ordinances 
(UXO) like land mines that caused fear on return, the World Vision supported and mobilised IDPs 
to build social security structures manned by SPCs in VoRs. Interviewee, Aboda (2009) argues 
that the security is now dependent on SPCs because they are the local sons. Majority of the SPCs 
were former LDF/U or former LRA ex-combatants who have returned home, and some were newly 
recruited.  
“Robbery and stealing is still rampant in villages” (interviewee, Oketayot 2009). The nature of 
conflict transformation in Uganda in chapter three argues that reintegration of former LRA and 
other belligerent groups did not take a formal Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and 
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Reintegration (DDRR), rather fighters were integrated into the NRA before demobilisation and 
reintegration program in 1992 when the Uganda Vetterans Assistance Program was launched 
(Colleta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996). Acholi Inn FGDs (2009) agree that most IDPs feel the 
government security is invisible in villages. Both human security (protection) and food security 
(livelihood) still refer personal security as processes which are mainly embedded in the structures 
of the new institutional transformation of government security structures in VoRs. Basic security, in 
terms of protection from roaming bandits is a new concern in the countryside. The transformed 
police are few. 
Unlike in South Africa where the wage bill was expanded for security services as a transitional 
measure (South Africa Ministry of Defence 1996; Williams 2002; Batchelor and Dunne 1998), 
NGOs dealt more with food security leaving the GoU to cater for national and regional security. 
Literatures point out that formal DDR is not a guarantee as former ex-combatants may re-merge 
as hired killers. The trusts to guarantee legitimacy to serve the function of effective return amongst 
IDPs lacked professional handling, especially where psychosocial institutional reconstruction are 
most neded. Returnees have little social security especially when confronted with trauma, 
memories and alledged spirits and ghosts of those who were brutally killed. Indirectly, some 
NGOs provided professional measures (material spport through chiefs) to deal with the evidence 
of collecting and burying human bones found lying in abandoned homes and water wells. 
Security reforms in urban areas, like in Gulu police station is not different. It has more than 70 
percent of prisoners who are juveniles.  Most of them were former LRA ex-combatants who were 
once housed at Gulu Support the Children Organisation (GUSCO) psychosocial reception centre. 
In an interview with the police superintendent in Gulu (2009) there are no supporting community 
care for these children. Criminality remains a problem in the aftermath of the war (interviewee, 
Oryang 2009). Within return, returnees enjoyed mutual advantage and peaceful cooperation with 
NGOs rather than mutual hostility and destruction (Haralambos, et al. 2000: 1036) as opposed to 
GoU and LRA. NGOs’provision of food security and human security placed NGOs to directly 
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support only a targeted  people, the EVIs/PSNs. Allocation of funds and its criteria was later 
perceived by most IDPs as discriminating. Calling returnees “able or disable” IDPs create social 
sanctions, only in the strictest term to qualify others NGO support. Elders who should be classified 
ad EVIs/PSNs in Amuru town centre (2009) and Padibe in Kitgum – now Lamwo districts (2009) 
suggest that security should focus on the regional and national rather than localised groups.  
Perspectives emanating from NGO-field workers, IDPs and government officials confirm that 
reforming security structures to community policing (SPC) did not combat robbery from Boo-Kec, 
criminality and Karimojong raids. NGOs and the state are actors who facilitate social 
reconstruction and such social structures and institutions are specifically leaving returnees as very 
“light” things, thus compromising the ideas that conflict transformation goals are holistic. This 
traditional view that the state is “givens” of world politics unfairly represents classes, agencies, 
gender and ethnicities, for example, in Kalongo, SPCs cannot withstand the aggressive 
Karimojong cattle rustlers from the neighbouring Karamoja. Pader and eastern part of Kitgum 
districts are most affected.  
The rationalist on the one end relate preferences for food security to continue relief aid supplies 
from World Food Program (WFP) to remedy gaps in returnees’ mobilisation and sustainability. An 
interview with AVSI field-worker in Opit (2009) security situation in villages is now assured and 
access to the wider environment can be exploited, the level of income has also increased.  
In Northern Uganda, policewomen were not mentioned by GoU officials as partners of SPCs but 
are represented in the national police force. In Namibia, Women and Child Protection Unit were 
created within the national police to address local and domestic and gender based violence 
(OECD 2007b). Similarly, in Liberia, the UN Mission (UNIMIL) all-female Formed Police Unit was 
a joint initiative to prevent crime and conduct night patrols with police amongst the locals (OECD 
2007b). Like in Sierra Leone, the female victims were reluctant to come out in Northern Uganda, 
but, with the UN mission in Sirrea Leonean, helped create a Family Support Unit within the police 
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department that included women police (OECD 2007b). The Uganda police in Northern Uganda 
have both military and police backgrounds arising from the trained militias.  
5.4 THE NEED TO REBUILD ACHOLI LINEAGE-BASED SOCIAL AUTHORITY  
One major theme of rebuilding a post-war population after war, articulated in the Korten’s second 
generation of NGOs, is to create a community with greater harmony, tolerance, liberalism, even 
consensus between conflicting parties, and have a tautological peacebuilding institution. Rwot 
Lugai argues that Acholi institutional and systemic social transformation has not been fully 
implemented by NGOs (interviewee, Rwot Lugai 2009). In a much subjective interests, the dynmic 
Acholi lineage-based social authority has been severely destroyed by the war and NGOs could 
not rationalise state-oriented policy with the grassroots demands.  
Within the framework of analysis, it can be confirmed that the Acholi people agree to their lineage-
based social authority in VoRs as very weak or does not exist. And that NGOs’ hands-on and 
systemic scope of operation actually provided incentives, but also paved very little diplomatic 
interventions to end the war. During the war, followed by internal displacements, authoritative 
social structure of the Acholi people and, especially elders authority were severly challenged and 
lost. NGOs’ support and mobilisation to rebuild a strong Acholi social authority is inadequate or 
missing (interviewee, Okwera 2009). NGOs and government officials believe that Acholi lineage-
based social authority will never be the same again although the ancestral land seems to be the 
drawing factor for returnees. The views are qualified by identifying an accompaniment through 
provision of quality education and capacity building of traditional leaderships. NGOs are also 
expected to play a role in facilitating traditional social reconciliation, sustainable development, 
providing space for job opportunities, acces to land in both practical and policy ways, clearance of 
land mines, IGAs, micro-finance (soft loans) and sustainable solutions.  
IDP-returnees really want peace and permanent returns in respective villages, traditional 
reconciliation, human and food security, roads to provide access to markets, agricultural tools and 
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seeds, IGAs, empowerment (soft loans and tax free years). These were repeated across 
Acholiland and the analytical framework suggests that the transformation of social structure and 
the development of Acholi people has to be boosted by the support of NGOs for long term 
recovery. Instead, key needs have always maintained on security, food, clean drinking water, 
schools, shelter and health care, land use and ownership and survival.7 These “must have” made 
NGOs to focus mainly on mitigating escalatory dynamics of returns on an ad-hoc basis and not 
long-term strategies that are embedded in the norms and values of Acholi people. This is not 
enough representation of Acholi views, now that they have returned home. 
Acholi people and most NGOs agree that the GoU has been only interested in establishing 
national authority and control in the region, consolidation of national wealth by implementing 
(enforcement) development policies under the PRDP (2007-2010). This view has been 
established partly because the implementation of IDP- and NGO-policies that aimed at reducing 
poverty and promoting economic investment began to center mostly on land ownership and land-
use. It was also being done through routing and permanenting the local council governance 
systems in Acholi so as to woe Acholi people into the national political system. All these have 
been possible because NGOs are packing their bags and partly the government cannot be 
overseen. This has down played participatory politics of NGOs in which political regulation of 
conflicts, accountability and corruption, media role, political cynicisms by government officials, 
values and ideals, security, and external support vanished. 
Over the years, the GoU really wants to maintain political, military and economic power, control 
and authority over Northern Uganda. The government needs popular national support in the north, 
good international image, and have been using free universal primary and secondary education as 
political points gained. However, health centres, roads, leadership at the local council one (LC1) 
and (LC2) are still weak and are not aimed at supporting and strengthening Acholi lineage-based 
                                                             
7 Detailed information are contained in the bottom left hand square in appendix B-5.2 and the diagram showing 
summary and linkages in perspectives. 
175 
 
social authroity. The advocacy and policy orientation role of NGOs fails to support the local 
context in Acholiand. Rather, GoU land ownership and land use policy is still being seen as best 
opportunity for international, national and [local) investment. A representative of the elder’s forum 
in Amuru (2009) argued in the interview that the GoU desparately wants to increase its control, 
consolidate power and recognition and assume legitimate government authority in northern 
Uganda.8   
Most Acholi returnees who were met by the researcher, especially in all FGDs agree that most 
advocacy roles of NGOs are for soliciting funds. That, NGOs have been working to protect their 
good national and international working image, so is the government. In a FGDs in Tee-Ilwa 
(2009) self-sustaining projects and promotion of self-reliant community, working on identified gaps 
(EVIs/PSNs), monitoring and protecting returnees, camp demolitions and provision of sustainable 
livelihood to returnees are secondary work of intermediary NGOs. In Namokora (2009) FGDs, 
NGOs are understood to strife towards maintaining their neutrality in the name of nonviolent 
actors but tend to protect their mandate, codes of conducts, identity and legitimacy more than 
putting IDP needs afore. NGOs are only interested in extending their funding proposal in the name 
of maintaining their development plans and controls and not strengthening lineage-based 
authoritaty of Acholi people (interviewee, elder in Alero 2009). 
Although returnees’ views diverge from NGOs’ and that of government officials’, both agree that 
rebuilding a strong lineage-based social authority is key for returnees. However, this can only be 
done in the context of strengthening the social structure in VoRs. 
5.4.1 STRENGTHENING ACHOLI SOCIAL STRUCTURE  
NGOs can provide integrated services, create systems and scales social operations once the 
principle of effective delivery and sustainable development seek on locally appropriate and 
                                                             
8 Detailed information are contained in the bottom right hand square in appendix B-5.2 and the diagram showing 
summary and linkages in perspectives. 
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grounded structures. However, NGO officials agree that the strength of Acholi is only depedent on 
owning and using land. Strengthening traditional leadership, social services, capacity building, 
education and boosting IGAs are huge challenges of social intergration. The integrative role of 
NGOs, according to my framework of analysis is one way of rebuilding the lineage-based social 
authority. The Acholi people call it roco tee kwaro pa Acholi meaning, “re-juvinating/regenerating 
lineage-based traditional authority of Acholi”. The destruction of Acholi social structure following 
the internal and external crises (discussed in chapter three) challenged the extent to which NGOs 
may be able to provide integrative roles.  
The internal Acholi political order that was built since 1950s was significantly held by Acholi 
middle-class elites. Elites formed highly organised and linked authority from the decentralised pre-
colonial socio-political structure to the grassroots. The linkages stabilised Achoil people from top, 
middle to grassroots level of leadership. Tandon (1996) argues in sub-section 2.6.2 that INGOs 
should be more involved in supportive roles rather than direct provision of services by identifying 
to strengthen local indigenous institutions and knowledge systems. 
In the post-conflcit peacebuilding stages of Acholi IDP-returns, the socio-political order had 
already been replaced not only by the colonial administrative chiefs and not only by anointed 
chiefs, but also with camp life. In an interview with Lawoko (2009) who was one of the pioneers of 
political establishment in Acholi in 1950s, return to villages of origin is a moral obligation that has 
to be justified by Acholi dignity and culture. These, according to Lawoko has been so much 
destroyed by camp life even when NGOs tried to give some relief/aid. Rebuilding societal 
structure has to start with the restoration of Acholi values, identity, dignity, reaping and feeding 
from the ancestral Acholiland. All these must draw emotional attachments from elders, traditional 
leaders, women and through to the youths (interviewee, Lawoko 2009). This is reflected based on 
the poor state of camp living experiences.  
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Lawoko’s view above links directly to the petty bourgeoisie group of Acholi people who lacked 
large landholding class and significantly depended on private sector state employment and 
resources for its position. These groups are better placed to understanding NGO roles and can 
fund-raise and work with policy much better than the grassroots Acholi returnees. However, both 
groups resent the discretionary powers of the British-appointed chiefs, and sought out economic 
and political concessions from the colonial government, got recruited in the army and occupied the 
middle-class Acholi elites. This position has changed during the Museveni regime and especially, 
amongst returnees who have come back home. Not many feel the same way Lawoko assumes, 
going back to the old ways would put chiefs in charge, rather, younger generations are not willing 
to be controlled by the chiefs and traditional values in the countryside as they prefer to live urban 
lifestyle (interviewee, Atimo-ango 2009). 
In an interview with Otim-Okello (2009) the introduction of district councils, formation of political 
alliance between the lineage-based authorities and the emergence of petty bourgeoisie Acholi 
people were co-opted into instutionalised politics. Otim-Okello believes that attempts to 
regenerate the Acholi societal structural arrangement after 25 years of war did encourage gradual 
return to respective homestead that must also consider land ownership and land use. He does not 
link any NGO supporting roles to this view. This could be possible because there seem to be 
emerging a new form of Acholi social realities brought about by NGOs world views. For example, 
IGAs promotion amongst Acholi returnees is new – entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, Acholi values 
and identity are vividly seen in their traditional hut building, family responsibilities and set-up, 
marriages, funerals and support system to families to meet own basic needs. However, some of 
these social attiributes are being suppressed by the GoU’s politically structured national politics 
which seems to catalyse on returnees’ progress.  
Interviews conducted with most Acholi local politicians, the Acholi petty bourgeoisie who became 
the key link between Acholi peasantry and national government needed to effect local structures 
at local levels, but this is missing. Young Acholi politicians have tried to effect new political order 
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within Acholiland and link the rural Acholi by bringing Northern Uganda into Museveni’s national 
movement politics (interviewee, Otim-Ogal 2009). Accepting this new political order is seen either 
as opportunisms, temporal, or there are no other options left but to work with the devil or cessate 
for that matter. Post-war socio-economic foundations in Acholiland is incongruent with Uganda’s 
new political order of Museveni’s regime. 
One Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) member (2009) said in an interview that the claims to 
bring Acholi identity and the assertion of Acholi unity by the petty bourgeoise in national politics, 
made ethnicity in Uganda a viable discourse in which Acholi lineage-based authority is at least 
being recognised. The APG and some followers of Museveni’s political party represent Acholi 
middle-class. Elected positions in parliaments, appointed positions in government civil service and 
officer positions in the military and the rural Acholi structure is not very helpful in strengthening an 
internal social order and structure in Acholi. IDP-returnees have turned to asking for more support 
from NGOs even after return, continued food distribution, few household utensils and agricultural 
tools and seeds (interviewee, Ateeri 2009).  
On the policy role of NGOs, grassroots perspectives from all the nine FGDs suggested some 
variations in the government push and pull policy that should have assisted in the social structural 
transformation. NGOs are phasing-out IDP-camps at the same time pushing returnees to VoRs 
saying, services will follow them in respective villages. But NGOs only want to maintain their good 
image and boost their budget because there are no structures to pull youths back home 
(interviewee, Otim-Okello, 2009). IDP-returnees agree that the implementation of government’s 
push-and-pull policy gave false promises and does not take into consideration how reshaping of 
the destroyed social setting of the Acholi people can be done. But it also strengthened the need to 
vulountarily return home since the government had played very little roles.  
This study finds that NGO officials find Acholi social structure was already severely destroyed and 
lost between participatory politics of NGOs, setting up socio-economic foundations and cultural 
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and individual assumptions. But, cultural assumptions on return to respective villages gave not 
much priorities for rebuilding. NGOs turned to work more and better with organised groups 
(participatory politics) rather than support structural rebuilding of localised authorities. Again, the 
linkages between the petty bourgeoisie who are Acholi peasants, the emerging middle class and 
the non-existing local structures in VoRs remained a missing link. The traditional leadership 
structure was expected to continue after NGOs departures from Acholiland.  
5.4.2  STRENGTHENING TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP  
As mentioned above, the typology of NGOs’ involvement in the systemic and long term goals tend 
to focus on the structural and institutional scope of social transformation. In my framework of 
analysis, activities of NGOs that relate to indirect services to returnees mainly suggest policy and 
fund-raising roles, while direct services with returnees at the grassroots level are mainly 
empowerment and transformational. In an interview with one of the NRC-field worker (2009), 
argues that Acholi elders gave up leadership too early. This, to him cannot be blamed on NGOs. 
He believes that Rwodi-Kweri, meaning hoe chiefs in Acholi language, are younger than expected 
and they cannot perform complicated issues like settling land wrangles that is primarily their role 
and not NGOs. Rwodi Kweri have intermediary leadership roles in rebuilding social structure, but 
they also require contingency and incentives to empower them. This could be the supportive roles 
of NGOs to undertake but is not practical. From 2002, I tried to follow up this unclear argument 
with traditional chiefs who maintain that youths are becoming more ambitious in pursuing paid-up 
leadership careers. My interest has been to see if the influence was coming from NGOs, GoUs or 
there is a new form of social transformation in the leadership structure in Acholiland. 
My findings is that, while annointed traditional chiefs must come through the hier of the father by 
the first son in the lineage, Rwot-Kweri position in Acholi that used to be a voluntary, skills-set and 
requires age-old experiences was being lost. Most elders have died and the powers of annointed 
chiefs is above hoe chiefs’. However, younger generations and a big section of Acholi people do 
not respect regulatory customary roles of both annointed and hoe chiefs. NGOs policy officials 
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believe that this is partly because of the camp leadership structure that came into existence during 
displacement, was immediately institutionalised, have salaried positions and are endorsed for 
easy administration by the government and NGOs’ operations. The new leadership structure was 
merged with the government’s local governance system, remained functional until when camp-
phase-out started in July 2007. Youths have seen career development in elective and paid up 
camp leadership positions and in the local government (LC) leadership structure than in the 
voluntary hoe chiefs roles.  
Identifying future and prominent Acholi traditional leaders amidst NGOs and the Local Council 
(LC) government leadership system is hard. Camp leaders believe that they can perform both LCs 
and Rwodi-Kweri roles, for example the chiefs and hoe-chiefs have played a role in cleansing evil 
spirits and formalising decent burials of those whose remains have been discovered in VoRs. 
Some traditional chiefs still belief that Kony’s spirits exists, probably are more powerful, but both 
cannot be one of both combining roles. Government policies and Uganda’s constitution (2009) 
suggest that there are huge distinctions between the Local Council (LC) government and the local 
Rwot-Kweri traditional structures. Advocay and service intermediary NGOs lack funding, thus 
affecting a wide variation on roles NGOs play to mobilise and support returnees.  
These findings suggest that there are major faults in the current peacebuilding efforts that lie 
within the lack of coordination of actions [NGO operations] in the three levels of Lederach’s 
framework. This is because there are lack of horizontal and vertical integration of NGO actions, 
especially where leaders within the same level develop relationships with each other and 
coordinate efforts. Traditional leaders are failing to cultivate relationships with the returnees and 
yet most INGOs tend to partner and aid horizontal intergration. These gaps are filled in by either 
traditional leaders turning into seeking indirect services through advocacy and fundraising from 
NGOs and the goverment or through NGOs capacity building trainings which are not enough and 
well thought of through for the future.  
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Traditional local and camp leadership structures will never be the same again although some still 
see direct services of NGOs of distributing relief aid eminent, but in actual sense will provide only 
interim and short term responsive contingency and incentives. Currently, rebuilding Acholi lineage-
based social authority cannot be left to the decision-making body of the traditional authorities 
alone as they are very weak. They cannot mobilise resources and their leadership statuses and 
skills are from time to time questioned by NGOs, Acholi people, GoU officials and sometimes 
chiefs themselves.   
Paicho FGDs (2009) notes that Acholi traditional leaders have no assistances to offer to IDP-
returnees in respective villages, be it humanitarian assistances, land disputes or reconstruction of 
huts and water points, except preside over family and other traditionally minor issues. They are 
the custodians of cultural and social mobilisation, but they depend heavily on NGOs and 
government wages. Confirming the analysis above, FGDs (2009) in Paicho reflects that chiefs 
lobby NGOs for financial assistance on behalf of their subordinates, but many have never seen 
such help coming. 
An elder informant who was picked from FGDs (2009) said that surbodinates share the same 
trauma with chiefs. Chiefs have become NGOs’ and GoU’s subordinates, so they cannot see us 
as their subordinates in the same way anymore. Chiefs are also exposed and vulnerable to insults 
from their locals. They cannot teach new ideas, and many argue that chiefs sit in capacity building 
trainings together and yet the trainers are even sometimes younger Acholi graduate who are 
working with NGOs. 
An interview with one elder, Lawoko (2009) denies that some chiefs are simply inexperienced, 
cheap and young. His argument is that elders have been adamant even when they were in IDP-
camps. NGO workers assume that everyone needs to be taught Acholi values because they need 
to be prepared for return. Like many elders, Lawoko was unhappy about some NGO roles who 
first came to ask him about Acholi values and at the same time invited him to come for a seminar 
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that trains Acholi values, the very same idea he mentored to NGOs. Generally, future traditional 
leadership in Acholi will continue to rely on both outside support (NGOs) and the government 
governance system. The demand to keep the chiefs will permanant chiefs’ roles as arbiters of 
traditional justice at the local level.   
5.5 LET US RECONCILE OR BE RECONCILED    
The supporting roles of NGOs to rebuild relationships internally (Acholi versus Acholi), Acholi and 
the nationals and other disricts is one major challenges of NGOs (interviewee, Rwot Olango 
2009). Externally (Acholi versus others), Acholi people want to be part of the growing community 
in Uganda and globally, although some sections of Acholi believe that Northern Uganda will 
remain impoverished as long as Museveni (Bantu-led government) is in power (interviewee, 
Omona 2009). Both request have asked for NGO roles to advocate, represent their views and 
resource directly to the Northern development.  
One striking finding is that, although positive and negative peace (see subsection 2.3.2) 
discussions in literatures support relationship building, people working within the government and 
younger respondents talk more of investments, developments and IGAs (see subsection 5.3.4 
above) than reconciliation. The traditional leaders, elders, older generation and women present 
fundamental needs for social reconciliation. Societal reconciliation is a thing of the past that can 
be dealt with later (FGD, Omiya-Anyima 2009). However, both traditional and religious leaders 
disagree with the above argument saying that reconciliation cannot be postponed and therefore 
traditional reconciliation mechanisms must project viable means for stabilising and harmonising 
peaceful coexistence within returnees. This view also aims at strengthening the weakened 
lineage-based social authority Acholi once enjoyed. The religious leaders stressed that 
authoritative social structure must encourage peaceful-coexistence, hope and common good 
practice as a means of reconciling Acholi people with herself and her neighbours.  
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Returnees argued during the interviews that traditional leaders have taken the lead to ask NGOs 
to support them so as to conduct decent burials for their dead ones. In this way, the process of 
reconciliation can begin anytime. In an interview with Labeja (2009), exposing social realities of 
returnees, like for example, in the many discoveries of the remains of dead people in water wells, 
bushes and abandoned huts are being made and are scary. In an interviewee with Okumu (2008) 
Acholi politicians have been calling for a national reconciliation, human rights address and social 
justice. In his view, local social reconciliation can best be handled by traditional leaders. It is only 
in the outcome of JPTs that a middle ground hybrid justice mechanism came to be. This later 
reflection contradicts the conventional ways of analysing conflict in literatures, partly because 
JPTs never sealed a comprehensive peace agreement. Partly it never came into force and lacks 
knowledge and resource balances. 
Reconciliation with the LRA rebel leader, Joseph Kony who is still at large and is wanted by the 
ICC is hard earned. Evidence shows  that national reconciliation is downplayed and most 
perspectives reflect on destructive conflict, the negative peace discourse cited in the literatures. 
On the one end, traditional reconciliation that has been taking place during the war is primarily 
amongst ex-LRA and the communities. The two processes question on the lack of balancing 
power asymmetries from the national to local levels, as well as between LRA and GoU to that of 
ICC. This was previously raised in Darweish’s (2010) and Diana’s (2002) arguments on 
empowerment need in post-war social recovery especially whenever such an outcome to peace 
was negotiated.  
The distinction is important for any reconciliation so that mobilisation roles of NGOs represent and 
analyse activities from the local context of returnees. Earlier interview with Bishop Ochola (2003) 
emphasises on the focus to change the bad systems and structures that enforces and maintains 
the conflict over a period of time. The elderly and middle aged men and women in Acholi have 
kept positive peace view very consistent irrespective of NGOs’ assistances. Mego Lakor (2009) 
relates her views of traditional reconciliation with the reflection closer to understanding the root 
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causes of the conflict in Acholi before NGOs came to Acholiland in this war. For her, reconciliation 
is a deferred concept based on its own timing. She says in an interview that many questions need 
to be answered. The people to answer them are still either in powerful positions in the current 
government and/or are running loose in the bush. She adds that the current peace is only fulfilling 
the local fundamental needs and immediate priorities, but has not found a place in the national 
(GoU) and international (ICC) long-term priorities.  
Achieving peace and reconciliation is a journey with a purpose in most people’s minds but was not 
clearly reflected as priorities in Maslow’s lower level needs. Attempts by NGOs to mobilise the 
people resonates well with the address to meeting fundamental human needs, which offers short-
term outcomes along the journey, but diverge at the national and international level. In an 
interview with Rwot Acana (2009) the need to support and mobilise IDPs were suppressed by 
various social problems during the war and IDP-camp living condition. People are finding their 
ways to knowing themselves, one another and committing to their new environments. It is a 
process full of emotional affection, which needs time and in the spaces they now inhabit. 
In appendix B-5.1, Max-Neef introduces a matrix of fundamental human needs centring onto 
making tighter interactions within the IDP-returnees in VoR. It goes beyond Maslow’s heirachical 
human needs discussed in subsection 2.5.1. There is also the question about identity within the 
dimensions of reconciliations explained above. In the same interview, Acana (2009) adds that 
Acholi people are identifying themselves with their new habitat, adjusting to freedom and not 
encampment, socialising and understanding their needs in a more systematic way. NGOs have 
probably created such conditions which later on will consolidate their representative roles. 
Perspectives of returnees on NGOs transpired from the FGDs in Tee-Ilwa that there were indeed 
unnecessarily too many NGOs in their area. One of my informants, Emmanuela (2009) blames it 
on the government NGO-Policy (2003) for previously sectoring activities that left some NGO 
experts to work in the local settings as if they left their hearts in their regional and 
national/international offices. Reconciliation lies with the community and the work of the 
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Government and NGOs is to facilitate, in part, through financial process (interviewee, Ochola 
2009).  
The new generations in Acholiland believe that the local government system, the camp leadership 
structures supported by NGOs provide better co-existence and tighter relationship. It is in this 
relationship where they tend to define reconciliation, Bedo Maber meaning living in harmony with 
one another. In Pabo, NRC became “dual-citizens” with their assimilated experts working with the 
IDPs in villages. This view is unclear as the younger group of IDP-returnees in Pabo (2009) 
confuse Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as their government National Resistance Council 
(NRC). Closing and phasing-out IDP-camps clearly shows that NGOs are packing their bags and 
doing very little. An elder in Paicho notes that there are so many NGOs coming to consult on 
health issues, schools, boreholes and water wells, promoting micro-finance schemes, training to 
build the capacity and many more but not on reconciliation. Some divergences on how 
reconciliation is understood leaves it as an open textured concept. This distinction offers this study 
with additional knowledge in analysing degrees/types of reconciliation within peaceful environment 
as co-existence. These degrees tend to take surface reconciliation of non-lethal co-existance, 
shallow reconciliation of parallel lives and deep reconciliation of the community. This is discused 
in details in chapter seven.  
5.5.1  ACHOLI HOMESTEAD AND ANCESTRAL LAND 
Most NGOs confirm peace has returned, a post-conflict era in Acholiland that allowed Acholi 
people to go back to their respective homesteads and ancestral land, [Dwogo cen i wii Obur] 
meaning “returning back to old homesteads”. This was seen as one factor that would let returnees 
reconcile or even be reconciled over past issues. Ancestral land is more than anything in 
Acholiland. Many IDPs were denied access to their ancestral land and were exploitated by camp 
land owners. Return to homesteads and ancestral land after more than two decades of living in 
IDP-Camps was therefore highly desired. Return to a once abandoned homesteads was part of 
mental start to rebuilding the once broken-down relationships and lineage-based social authority.  
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The GoU and some NGOs view support only the short term support after return to respective 
villages (see figure 2.6.3). NGOs focused on identification of PSNs/EVIs for hut construction and 
minimal support to meet basic physiological needs. The transformation and institutional 
development of social authority in the top to middle level activities of NGOs remained mainly in the 
policy orientations (figure 2.6.3). The IDP policy guidelines failed to balance the short-term goals 
with long-term goals in sofar as grassroots needs were concerned. Both direct and indirect service 
intermediaries like the churches carried out widespread advocy roles but not contributed fully to 
the rebuilding of a strong Acholi lineage based social authority and relationships. The churches 
and traditional institutions are creating more awareness in the spiritual balance of needs and 
traditional reconciliation than NGOs.  
5.6 LINKAGES IN PERSPECTIVES  
Socio-economic foundations of social recovery, participatory politics, cultural and individual 
changes and general political environment in post-war reconstruction can be seen in the diagram 
5.4.1 below. The diagram shows linkages between perspectives on NGOs’ actions to the left, the 
GoU and NGOs’ actions in the middle and GoU actions on the right. NGOs’ actions on the right 
have mainly shown empirical impacts on returnees. But NGOs’ closer links with the government in 
the middle are strengthened by policies and frameworks. Because GoU actions on the left have 
been mixed with military operation, amnesty, peace talks and corruption, the transformation of the 
war to peace have mainly focused on removing physical violence.  
Literature review states that the removal of physical violence promotes negative peace because 
systemic and structural violence will have remained within the existing unchanged systems and 
structures of the government in control. These are indicated by doted arrows on the left hand side 
of the diagram. Returnees are located in the middle of the diagram, directly linked as victims and 
EVIs/PSNs. Because the needs of returnees are many and have shifted hugely from a hierarchical 
to systematised and fundamental structure, the GoU tries to clientalise them in a form of 
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neopatrimonial political movement under Museveni’s personalised leadership. Meaning Acholi 
people are slowly moving towards an inchoate political environment in Uganda. 
In a nutshell, the digram suggests that NGOs’ actions in peacebuilding in Acholiland tend to 
broaden and hinder the transformation process of rebuilding the internal and external crises in 
Acholiland. These includes policies, inconsistent theories and practices of the Government and 
NGOs.  
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DIAGRAM 5.4.1: SHOWING LINKAGES IN PERSPECTIVES OF 
IDP-RETURNEES ON NGOS’ AND GOU’S ROLES 
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5.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has identified perspectives of respondents about the causes of the conflict arguing 
that the objective source of conflict lies heavily in the ontological base in denial of basic human 
needs -procedural and substantive (Fisher 2000). Convergences on perspectives emerged 
between NGOs and some GoU officials, but diverged from the Acholi IDPs-returnees’. The 
divergences from returnees bases mainly on knowledge and age. As shown in appendix B-5.2, 
four major causes of the war was identified. The Acholi IDPs-returnees’ views matched with 
Maslow’s physiological and biological needs priorities and also in the pragmatic problems of 
realism to determine between interest-based and needs-based solutions. The actions of NGOs 
pose contingency and complementary objective to subjectively mix roles of middle level and top-
level government priorities. It found that policy-driven needs are embedded in the roles NGOs play 
and that it cannot be avoided, but such may not be so clear to Acholi IDP-returnees..  
This chapter raises many issues relating to how far NGOs can mobilise and support Acholi IDPs-
returnees. Adding onto the complex nature of conflict to peace transformation patterns, the 
returnees’ needs overwhelmed the support needed to especially rebuild the once destroyed 
lineage-based  authority and social structural breakdown of relationships. There are fractured 
concepts about reconciliation especially when issues of victims and EVIs/PSNs arise. The need 
for continued relief assistance converge amongst IDP-returnees. Because the root causes of the 
conflict offer divergent views, most IDPs can not go beyond identifying why NGOs and GoU 
officials are not addressing Acholi crises, especially in rebuilding the destroyed lineage-based 
social authority and supporting local reconciliation.  
NGOs did not give enough pressure on war protagonists and were not representative enough of 
Acholi crises. Evidences show that these issues were deeply rooted and embedded in the existing 
and past structures and systems that deepened political antagonism aganst Acholi people – the 
“Acholinisation of the war”. 
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While the debates on interest-based and needs-based overshadow NGOs’ contingency and 
complementary roles, many promises, push and pull policy campaigns to convince IDPs to return, 
and other unfulfilled policy-driven activities have not supported Acholi people in rebuilding the 
social authority and reconciliation. Consistencies remain with the ever growing numbers of NGOs 
who have stayed in the region for nearly two decades now. It has caused imbalance because they 
rely so much on NGOs.   
The glimmer of hope remains mainly in the land that most IDPs have to return to utilise. Any 
attempt to exploit the returnees on issues of land in the name of IGAs and investment can causes 
volatile potentialities for new conflict, because the transformation in relationships and adaptation 
to new social structures are still weak. The nature of how far war can be transformed to peace 
after such a long time still carry impacts of structural and cultural violence in this negative peace 
times.    
NGO-officials do not know when NGOs will leave the region. NGOs’ exit strategies are not 
feasible for government to adopt as both government and IDPs have traditionally become 
dependent on NGOs. Instead, NGOs are shifting their strategies from relief aid to reconstruction 
that may take as double the years the war took. Doubts and mistrust about NGOs’ engagements 
with the IDP-returnees raised ethical issues and lack of moral obligation to fully support and 
mobilise IDP-returnees. 
The sizes of NGOs’ responses to both visible and invisible impacts of the war are mirrored on the 
capacities NGOs have in the region. Agricultural tools and implements, seeds, IGAs and micro 
finance, measurable capacity building trainings, schools and water wells, health centres and roads 
are underdeveloped or does not exist. These services (direct/indirect) are slow to play a role in 
strengthening social authority and interactions of Acholi people. NGOs have the legitimacy and 
mandate to go at the pace they find fit for their agendas/budgets. It spans beyond accountability, 
neutrality and responsibilities, suggesting that the need to focus on supporting returnees is slow or 
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ca be neglected. Determining the extent to which NGOs will continue to mobilise and support 
returnees is premature. This seems to be far from being real, as an interviewee, Anywar (2009) 
says, restoring a strong lineage-based social authority and reconciling Acholi with itself which is so 
much at imbalance. Interestingly, most Acholi people have exhibited amazing coping mechanisms 
in terms of adhering to culture and tradition, pride and social contract amongst themselves. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the roles of NGOs in rebuilding the brokendown linege-
based social structure and relationships amongst the Acholi IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda. 
The study also seeks to explore on the in-depth description of IDP-returnees’ perceptions on their 
need to address the crises, now that NGOs and other multiple actors remain the most promising 
hope. The chapter discusses about the extent to which perspectives of IDPs on the roles 
government officials and NGOs play a role in rebuilding the brokendown linege-based social 
structure and relationships amongst the Acholi IDP-returnees in Northern Uganda.  
Chapter six focuses on rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority, an expansion of the 
identified returnees’ needs in this chapter. Chapter seven expands on rebuilding societal 
relationship mainly reconciliation that forges an understanding to resolve external crises in 
Acholiland.  
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CHAPTER SIX: REBUILDING ACHOLI LINEAGE-BASED SOCIAL AUTHORITY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses issues relating to rebuilding Acholi-lineage based social authority which 
was discussed in the earlier chapter, requires support and mobilisation from within, NGOs and 
where possible, from the GoU. Following from sub-section 5.3.1, Acholi people need to strengthen 
their social authoritative order and local institutions by themselves addressed (sub-section 6.2). 
While NGOs have had the legitimacy to work following approaval from the government 
administrative systems and policies, returnees have weak copping mechanism. NGOs have to 
provide support for security, justice and socio-economic support to first improve the conditions of 
Acholi IDPs-returnees.  
According to Lederarch (1999) one goal of conflict transformation is to strengthen social 
institutions through the international, national, regional NGOs who can also play the 
representative role of grassroots perspectives. However, NGOs representation of Acholi crises to 
the national and internal domain failed to critically analyse structural and social conditions of 
Acholi people. The social realities of war to peace and NGOs’ interventions in Acholiland has 
affected new changes in the current Acholi social order and structures in VoR. This is also the 
objective views shared mostly amongst returnees.  
To a greater extent, NGO undertakings miss out on the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social 
institutions, a process by which local peacebuilding is supported. It also misses out on how 
substantive justice and maximal participation (procedural justice) is met. Section 6.2 is about 
rebuilding Acholi social authority that has particular attention to restoring security, understanding 
the gap created in the middle-class and elite group, traditional leadership and restorative form of 
justice of Acholi people. These social authority are the cornerstones of Acholi social authoritative 
institution.  
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Sub-section 6.3 is about socio-economic regeneration which plays a big role in the current social 
regeneration in Acholiland. Employment, education and health care support is viewed as are 
coming from land use through agriculture, but are also to generate income. This is a form of new 
social realities which is regenerating and shifting Acholi people towards “modernity” or 
“stagnation”. 
6.2 REBUILDING ACHOLI SOCIAL AUTHORITY 
Before analysing the roles of NGOs in rebuilding Acholi social authority, it is important to note that 
the interpretation of Uganda’s war in the north is directly linked with the political crises and ethnic 
politics in Acholiland (chapter three). With the view that Uganda is an actor with such a pluralist’s 
state-as-structure and an institutional-legal-order organisation. The crises in Acholi was also a 
political advantage to the GoU. Besides, most NGOs whose structuralists’ roles of rebuilding a 
strong social authority, and are social and political actors, failed to consider the interpretation of 
peace and return of Acholi people. The failure lies in understanding how social transformation of 
Acholi people had been structured in the historically accumulated violence.  
The failures did not consider internal crises of Acholi as had its roots in the destruction of the 
dominant internal social-political order, an order that had been anchored, on the one hand, by 
male Acholi elders and lineage-based authorities and, on the other, by an Acholi political middle 
class, both of which justified their authority through a discourse of Acholi ethnicity (Branch 
2010:26). While the various reasons given by who you talk to about the root causes of the war, a 
combination of Idi Amin’s destabilisation of Acholi middle class, and  national political propaganda 
of “Acholinisation of the war” during Museveni’s regime, links between Acholi peasantry and the 
central state are separated.   
It is important to analyse the methods and scope of NGOs involvement to transform the Acholi 
social structure from the short-term to medium-term goals of advocacy and relief distribution. The 
analysis regard levels of many NGOs’ typologies and activities in the conflict transformation mode 
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to mainly serve the middle to grassroots communities. In the systemic and long-term structural 
and institutional transformation of Acholi social structure, policy and fundraising, empowerment 
and transformation have mainly remained at the middle to top levels of NGOs and government 
activities. There are also intermediary NGOs who are subsets of NGOs. The intermediary NGOs 
did not exist in Acholiland as such but the responsive, contingency and incentive activities of 
indirect services to support structural and institutional transformation were done either by NGOs 
camp leaders or the government.  
Also, the transformation of Acholi social institutions require restoration of human and food security 
and rebuilding traditional justice system. As said, Acholi social structures operate within the 
national social and political institutions with considerate reliance on NGOs roles. Therefore both 
the state (social norms and behaviours and ability of leaders to change sectarian political 
differences through NGOs to create greater national and political cohesion) and non-state 
institutions (to advocate for improved rule of law, inclusivity for local returnees) are important 
without necessarily copying “legitimate” Western institutions.  
Literatures argue that conflict is a normal part of social and political interaction. It is, however, a 
failures of development when institutional and structural causes of conflict takes violent forms 
(Kaldor et al. 2006: 1). According to Tocci (2008) Western institutions like the WB and IMF tend to 
focus too much on the forms of transformation rather than its functions in the contemporary social 
conditions of post-war Sub-Saharan African societies. NGO roles are to serve the functions rather 
than the forms of social transformational realities and not those interested parties who may 
become “conflict dictators”, dictating a settlement in their own interest (Galtung 1996). IDPs-
returnees’ socio-structural conditions were understood to have been shaped by government 
internal protection policy and the LRA brutal abductions of own people. LRA carried much more 
interest-based forms of social transformation. 
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Dolan (2004) bases his arguement on the policy that was used to prevent the population from 
seeing reality, prevent Acholi people from mobilising themselves after defeat in 1986, continuously 
fragment them and make them become vulnerable and beggars. Government encampment policy 
was mainly used to prevent consciousness-formation by subjecting slow but sure “social torture”” 
(Dolan 2004). It is argued in this thesis that social realities of war to peace systems were created 
from the daily meanings of IDPs and social constructions that bears social and political realities. 
Therefore, the security, justice and socio-economic disparities in Acholiland require institutional 
social authority transformation in Acholiland.  
In an interview with one of the Chief Administrative Officer ([CAO] 2009) rebuilding and 
transforming Acholi social institutional and authority has its own scope. The scope has widened to 
include Acholi middle class, traditional leaders whose traditional justice authority are still relevant 
and the supporting socio-economic base that linked the peasants to districts and national 
representations. Representations of the local context is hard to strike for and a best-fit approach 
even for NGOs is missing (interviewee, CAO 2009). 
6.2.1  ACHOLI POLITICAL MIDDLE CLASS AND ELITES   
Each elements of the internal crisis in 1986 – the returning UNLA soldiers, the missing local 
political elites, and threatened Acholi lineage-based autroities – has undergone change (Branch 
2010: 43). The Acholi political middle class is missing. In an interview with Okeny Tiberio (2009), 
initially, Acholi middle class elites served as a linking group of rural population with the national 
government.  
In his view, the gap has been replaced by the donor-supported, NGO-oriented, unrepresentative, 
non-political Acholi civil society. Almost all NGO interviewees agree that NGOs have tried to 
bridge this gap. Although the status of Acholi-llineage based authority is still a matter of 
controversy under the leadership of traditional chiefs, grassroots views are that the authority is 
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incapable. As said, foreign donors’ support within the “traditional justice” agenda is rendering the 
traditional leaders lose status in filling the gap between Acholi middle class and elites.   
While women and youths have profited from foreign-sponsored humanitarian and peace-building 
initiatives in the camps, the older men have seen their role of providing for their families, stripped 
off. Foreign relief agencies has taken over the particular function of providing food and other 
essential material for all. However, women and youths have not come that far enough to play key 
roles in bridging the Acholi middle class elite with the local, northern region and nationally. At the 
time of completing this research, the Acholi political middle class elite remained divided in their 
roles between the diasporas and the local non-political NGO-based civil society. Sometimes 
driven by idelogoical indifference, but also ethnic politics. The traditional institution is also relying 
on NGOs and tend to act with NGO-based attitude of playing a non-political but social authority of 
Acholi people.  
6.2.3  ACHOLI TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP LINEAGE-BASED AUTHORITY   
While the interlocking nexus, security transformation and realities of returnees leave them stuck 
between a rock and hard place, NGOs are seen as complicit bystanders. While there is lack of 
proper traditional institution and mechanisms of justice and reconciliation, traditional leaders are 
caught between fulfilling the moral obligation of the Acholi, but without support. The internal and 
external crises in Acholi have contributed immensely to the knowledge distortion about traditional 
institution especially, amongst younger individuals and in the society at large. The Acholi cultural 
norms are widely formed by cultural and historical  realities, some based on past wars and 
attrocities inflicted on the society during Idi Amin (Chapter 3).  
Returnees believe that corruption within the Government officials dealing with the Northern 
Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) project, PRDP and NAADS hinder the implementation of 
government plans in VoRs. Peace dividends that allows for the revival of Acholi culture, 
relationships, social contracts, roles and responsibilities within the social processes is different 
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from socio-economic, and political changes. In an interview with one cultural leader, Oryang 
(2009), NGOs’ attempts to reverse the social and historical roots of suffering is not a guarantee 
that the reality of returnees can be fixed by any forthcoming traditional lineage-based social 
authority. Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority is taking a natural order just like the 
promotion of building IDP-camps to become peri-urban townships would have (interviewee, 
Oryang 2009). Acholi traditional leaders are the custodians of the traditional institution. In an 
interview with Rwot Lugai (2007) chiefs need resources to handle social problems in VoRs rather 
than build townships which are positive percept in the long run. According to Lugai, war-affected 
children will never recover especially, for those whose psychosocial habits have been 
permanently damaged. These, according to Lugai are unavoidable social baggage (problems) 
(interviewee, Lugai 2007 and Acana 2009).  
Few NGO officials agree that Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), an Acholi traditional institution can change 
repressive, retaliatory and resistant nature of perpetration once supported. Such support failed to 
address the contextual and experiential change processes with KKA traditional institutions during 
and after war. On the other end, Women FGDs in Paicho (2009) argue that the repression, 
retaliation and resistance against social issues, traditional rules, social structures by traditional 
institutions, cannot be transformed by traditional mechanism. This view was proved against 
reviewing on how KKA addresses Gender Based Violence (GBV) (see diagram 6.2.1).  
In a JPTs resumption conference in 2008, highly educated Acholi women, mostly living in cities 
concurred with Paicho women FGDs. Many women are divided over this, with some saying that, 
for example, elopting a girl is part of Acholi culture that sometimes tolerates the use of 
reasonable force to seduce a girl to a boy’s bedroom. This argument has been countered against 
the mode of LRA abduction and the formal eloption process. The Diaspora women delegatation 
to the JPTs resumption conference argued that LRA abduction and formal eloption is not the 
same and Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority has to take leadership in explaining the 
differences.  
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NGOs’ workshops to sensitise women misses factual elements of reality to influence 
classifications of weak Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority. Instead women returnees 
seek jobs in restaurants, hotels. Most of them have histories of  sexual abuse, rape and are 
victims of social stigmitisations and exclusion. Instead of turning to Acholi traditional lineage-
based social authoritative guidances many returnees train on household economics, bakery and 
hygiene. Most NGOs seem to be appreciating these initiatives. NGOs seem to produce new 
forms of traditional ideology to fit into Acholi people’s contemporary social realities. NGOs provide 
initial support to women who may not be able to receive support under traditional structures, 
especially, legal services.   
With many years of my interactions with Acholi traditional chiefs, have always said, traditional 
mechanisms address GBV but under different values and principles, posing the ontological 
notions on what is “real” and “unreal” about traditional transformation or there needs to be more 
social interventions to support Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority. Taking the 
example of addressing GBV are included in it victim-perpetrator and perpetrator-victim dilemmas 
in villages of returns. There is a collective view amongst returnees that NGOs’ support to Acholi 
traditional lineage-based social authority may intentionality neglect GBV debate in a more 
conventional manner.  
The failure of the traditional institution to address community violence couldn’t be attributed to 
blaming the institution because the aftermath of the war in Acholi is huge. Sometimes the police 
and court magistrates equally fail to address, say GBV committed by UPDF, some LRA and other 
cases (interviewee, Ochora 2006). Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority is weak so is 
access to all forms of justices. The weak Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority has been 
subjected to particular circumstances of historical testable conjecture of Acholi people’s real world. 
The internal crisis was taken advantage of by Uganda’s political inculcating and re-enforced 
opinion about LRA tactics to constitute ineluctable environment. A claim used to justify the views 
that Acholi institutions are irreducibly self-referential to their standard arrogance and warlike 
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people. Acholi traditional lineage-based social authority has been believed by many to have 
ineluctable claim to justify it as truth. However, the actualisation of government promise of popular 
participation embodied in the RC/LC system is countering the legitimacy of Acholi traditional social 
authority as the government advance many new internal political social authority using local 
democratisation plan through RC/LC. While the government recognises the Acholi traditional 
social authority, the government’s democratic political configurations tend to incapacitate local 
initiatives, meant to raise national political articipation and representations of the government. 
6.2.4  ACHOLI TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY 
Acholi traditional justice authority stands amongst the highest practices anywhere in the world 
(Allen 2010: 246). This restorative justice practice is based on traditional social reconciliation 
called Mato-Oput (drinking a bitter root from a common gourd). Mato-Oput requires 
acknowledgement of responsibility by the offender, repentence and then payment of 
compensation. The process involves a number of rituals, aims at a-not-again change of offender’s 
attitude, cooling the situation (stopping revenge), healing the land and restoring relationship (Allen 
2010: 46). 
Reviving Acholi traditional authority face challenges from acquiring finances both for running the 
process as well as in how compensation should be handled. According to Pain (1997), 
international NGOs should be asked to liaise with peace and reconciliation infrastructure as part of 
their legitimate brief in addition to their aid and development functions. International donors should 
be approached as a matter of urgency to support the traditional authroities in establishing the 
reconciliation procedures to be used in resolving the conflict (Ibid.: 110-15).  
There is a consensus amongst opinion leaders, chiefs and elders that reflects on the attitudes of 
the Acholi people to revive Acholi traditional authority. Unlike GoU’s combined military operations, 
coercion, amnesty, peace envoys and peace talks, false promises and to a greater extent corrupt 
military officials who gain from war, reviving the traditional chieftaincy system, namely KKA was 
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blamed on few individuals who have vested interests (Bradbury 1999: 17-20). Many agree that 
while the government approach tends to promote negative peace, KKA system may be used to 
sustain the bad government systems and structures left behind by war. It was hopped that NGOs 
would play a bigger role.  
In diagram 5.4.1, for example, compensation is negotiated to target the physically deformed; land 
is seen as capital asset for large scale investment while returnees see that as an asset. Returnees 
perceive the support of NGOs will support them with IGAs, cultural attachments, local and national 
markets with improved road access and education. The transformation of a workable justice 
system is negotiated with the traditional leadership and legislated by the GoU for NGOs to 
implement. Attempts by ARLPI to provide mobile courts, train paralegals and lobby for free legal 
services were backstopped by lawyers, that it cannot act as a supplement to formal justice in the 
complex issue of Northern Uganda. The problematic lies in the categorisation of mechanisms of 
transitional justice as “formal” or “informal” to be a convenient tool (Quinn 2006). Yet this 
distinction between “formal” and “informal” is problematic for a number of reasons. It is often the 
case that customary mechanisms are recognised and adopted by the state apparatus, thereby 
becoming “formalised” (Quinn 2006). 
In an interview with Oulanya (2008) the challenge of justice reform was how to bridge the 
traditional – Mato-Oput with the formal criminal system at an early stage of peace talks and 
ceasfire agreement. While the traditional system seemed more accepted by Acholi people, the 
combination of local institutions and state mechanism needs a middle ground Uganda Special 
Court Division (USCD). Although returnees heard about the USCD that amalgamates traditional 
justice with government criminal and to some extent ICC’s, has not been transformed to embrace 
a national reconciliation or truth commissions. Apologists of the ICC system prefer the provision of 
accessible, accountable and affordable security and justice that protects people’s rights and 
property, keeps families safe and resolves disputes and purnishes perpetuators.  
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Such amalgamations have worked in Mali where land disputes were recorded in judgements at 
local prefecture. Civil war in Guatamala recorded massive abuses, Palestinian refugee camps and 
Lebanon recorded rapes during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres (Bastick, Grim, and Kunz 
2007), but informal women court have been successful. Although the GoU officials turned around 
against ICC, a form of transformation in the justice system, many Acholi people believe that the 
ICC is a UPDF-Museveni apologist. The ICC has been seeking its “justice” with the support of the 
hoard of profiteering NGOs, against the critical voices of the local people who are demanding that 
all parties to the conflict be investigated and those found guilty – be they on the LRA or UPDF, be 
prosecuted (Blackstar News Paper 2010). But the ICC sticks to its guns that only the LRA and 
Kony committed crimes in Northern Uganda.  
This discussion is dealt with in detail in the next chapter. The diverging and converging 
perspectives failed to identify the necessary distinctions between traditional mechanisms and the 
criminal justice. The transformation of Acholi justice system has not gone further than attempting 
to decode ICC protocols. The process of recognising and reforming the capacity of traditional 
leaders in Mato-Oput requires gradual orientation towards mercy, peace and reconciliation for 
national norms, which is missing (interviewee, Bishop Ochola 2009). Within Acholi people, there is 
heritage in Mato Oput, but many NGOs do not bother (interviewee, IRC field worker 2009). 
In an interview with Acholi Paramount Chief Acana (2010) the traditional mechanism that handles 
the highly contentious issue regarding GBV exist within the cultural institution of Ker Kwaro Acholi 
(KKA) (see diagram 6.2.4 below). His view is that KKA needs resources to add value to the 
existing chieftainship in order to strike the balance in relational transformation. Within the wider 
forum in Uganda and literatures, justice is concerned with ensuring equitable access to state 
resources, not NGOs. Corruption has taken passive bribery even from within NGOs as financial 
control as procurement continues to delude anti-corruption strategy. Acana adds that, instead a lot 
of violence is usually blamed on culture, of which KKA tends to disassociate itself from such 
cowardice men’s bad attitudes towards women. 
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DIAGRAM 6.4.1: SHOWING ACHOLI CULTURAL STRUCTURE USED TO ADDRESS 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author’s version based on Juba Peace Conference held in Gulu and position papers of 
peace talks delegates; December 2007). 
 
Diagram 6.4.1 above summarises the cultural principles that provides an overview of how cultural 
process is integrated to deal with GBV, for example, rape. GBV is addressed as community 
special needs through experience sharing or reparation, restitution and compensation or both. 
Both processes aim at restoring dignity and providing privacy and security to the victim. Cultural 
leaders and elders investigate the different cultural institutional approaches and how best cultural 
principles are implemented to incorporate existing systems (Dijik 2009:13-14). Clear monitoring 
mechanisms, which takes into account experiences and perspectives of elders emphasise on the 
need to structurally transform, protect and restore the once eroded “good” culture of Acholi 
people.  
Following from Acana’s perspectives, literatures discuss on cultural transformation that reflects on 
the identity of Acholi people so much destroyed, lost and changed in IDP-Camps. The Acholi 
traditional elders’ views cover a broad array of rebuilding Acholi social authority including 
individuals (victims and perpetuators) who should bridge the generation gap and strengthen the 
traditional leadership institutions. The figure fails to provide transparent information that can be 
used to integrate early stages of reviving traditional justice system within government legal 
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systems. Since the GoU and NGOs started giving support in the name of compensations to 
victims, mostly identified as PSNs/EVIs, most Acholi say they are as well victims, a view so hard 
to disregard (see diagram 5.4.1). There is also a consensus that Acholi people are not involved in 
defining what happens to them because of the fear of accountability. The figure below suggests 
three ways to address accountability. 
DIAGRAM 6.4.2: SHOWING TRADITIONALLY-BASED STRUCTURE TO ADDRESS ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND RECONCILIATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author’s version based on Juba Peace Conference held in Gulu and position papers of 
peace talks delegates (December 2007). 
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and reparation through courts to bring community social peace and security (e), thus, addresses 
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later has never been tried. In the next section the perspectives of returnees on NGO actions for 
structural transformation heavily focused on transforming the socio-economic sectors. 
6.3 REBUILDING SOCIO-ECONOMIC SUPPORTING MECHANISM 
An aspect of overcoming distortions dubed as “economy of war” is to re-establish a stable macro-
economic framework, reconstruct productive infrastructure, reactivate agro-based production, 
increase the demand and supply to local markets, strengthen food security, promote structural 
reforms in the social and socio-economic transformation after the end of the war. Socio-economic 
transformation in most post-conflict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is also tightened to policy 
frameworks for transitional donor funding from post-conflict to sustainable development. Olu et al. 
(2009) argue that economic and social policy-making in SSA countries is expected to be distinct 
from that usually undertaken in non-conflict countries, thus signalling the need for each country, 
given its circumstances, to articulate policy benchmarks that may, or may not, overlap with those 
proposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors. Th framework of analysis 
suggests that long-term structural and institutional policy and fund-raising services of NGOs 
includes all levels of top, middle and grassroots population. Direct and indirect services of 
empowering and transforming the grassroots could offer the best option to support returnees. This 
view is also re-enforced by Schermerhorn (1961: 12) who argues that socio-economic 
development is an empowerment tool that should be done in conformity with intended policies. 
One identified cause of the war in Northern Uganda is rooted in the socio-economic imbalance the 
colonialist imposed as a policy to divide-and-rule Uganda (see chapter three). The core problems 
resulted in social sanctions and harse structural adjustment policies, the intended social 
exclusions of Northern Uganda, lack of opportunities, physical infrastructure and institutional 
transformation (see appendix B-4.2, diagrams 5.4.1, 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). Uganda’s economic and 
political reform caught responses from international donors that opened cash taps since May 
1987. In these reforms, the entire population in the north has been looked at as enemies of the 
state.  
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On return to villages of origins, rebuilding socio-economic activities identified IGAs, access to 
markets, land use, cultural attachments to peasantry occupation. These were identified in the 
context of addressing the effects/symptoms of the war. Moral and economic development in 
Acholiland does not address corruption/lack of judicial system, poor education, and diversion of 
developmental projects. However, the GoU is focusing on how to control the population by 
advocating on political awareness to educate Acholi people through structured systems of GoU 
party politics. On that basis, government officials argue that the roles of NGOs are to add value to 
government initiatives and empower returnees.  
NGOs carry out needs assessments, but fail to feedback. In an interview with the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) (2009) the relationship between returnees and NGOs are modally 
characterised by asymmetrical predominance coupled with negative sanctions meant to dominate 
the lifestyle of returnees. The GoU employed mechanisms for financing post-conflict recovery 
aimed at poverty reduction strategies during post-conflict recovery and using distinctive features of 
post-conflict recovery strategies. Such top-down approach have always remained the major 
concerns for community-driven track one actors as is discussed in chapter two, subsection 2.6.  
Like many SSA civil wars and internal violence, bilateral donor agencies, intergovernmental 
organisations, and NGOs have been playing an increasingly critical role in rehabilitation efforts 
once an acute conflict is over. In Northern Uganda, it has become clear that the traditional aid 
focused on developing economic sectors, but has not been sufficient, mainly because the political 
and social institutions of war-torn societies has to be reconstructed. NGO assessment looks at 
returnees’ levels of income starting from tracking disposable income through sales of agricultural 
products (interview with AVSI policy oficer, 2009). Studies from former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Angola indicate that rebuilding socio-economic supporting mechanism needs to address 
the bad culture and the gap of independence that is found in the society. In a FGDs with elders in 
Padibe (2009) rebuilding socio-economic lineage-based Acholi authority is not about money, but 
culture, informal Acholi education (Wang-Kongo, meaning “by the fire teaching”), respect, morals, 
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and more. Most NGOs have not reached such service oriented roles of supporting Acholi people, 
evident by the view that capacity building, changing attitudes and allowing NGOs to support social 
authority and capabilities are limited or missing. 90 per cent of 30 males over 60 years and 20 
females from 46 years old and above who were interviewed emphasised on the options to have 
continued relief assistances from World Food Programme (WFP).  This view diverged from the 
youths’ and middle aged women who prefer to begin working on their farms and eating fresh 
foods. The EVIs/PSNs, whose security and survival were jeopardised within the community, 
including single mothers and widows between 20-35 years of age, and orphans are considered 
PSNs/EVIs. The need for self-reliance diverged widely, manily on security and institutional 
transformation.  
The convergence was that NGOs have own agendas and were making profits, colluding in project 
allocation with government officials during the mobilisation process. Changes in attitudes and in 
behaviours are pointing more towards agriculture and land utilisation to lift IGAs as additional 
support within returnees. IGAs comes mainly from the sales of agricultural produce. Few students 
and businesswomen/men are engaged in charcoal burning, carpentry and pottery (interviewee 
NRC field officer 2009). In Acholiland, agriculture provides the main job opportunities from land 
cultivation, but a good percentage of people are illiterate. Due to lack of education qualifications 
and requirements, returnees cannot compete for white-collar jobs, like in the NGOs sectors 
(interviewee, AVSI field officer 2009). Sales from farm products (cash crops) is the only traditional 
support for financing educational and scholastic needs. There are no mechanised farming and 
hybrid seeds since NGOs view land use and land ownership as part of socio-economic 
development in Uganda at large. But NGOs’ involvement as suggested in figure 2.6.2 in the 
framework of analysis shows that levels of NGO engagement can spark conflict between NGOs 
and grassroots population because of the contention about land in Acholiand. Such basis would 
not help both parties [NGOs and grassroots population] to work towards rebuilding and 
strengthening Acholi social authority in VoRs. 
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Informant, Omona (2007) says that rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority that aims at 
socio-economic issues amongst returnees has become a reciprocating demand and a trade off 
with political affiliations as long as livelihood is still a crisis and kept constant. INGOs cooperate 
with governments and to some extent serve as contractors. This may allow the local population to 
perceive NGOs to be having better logistic capabilities to implement projects at the local level, but 
the transfer of projects to the local population may fail. In Bosnia and Hezegovnia, Angola, East 
Timor, Ahiti, Salvador  and many countries, the dynamic partnership of NGOs with the 
governments were questioned. In his address at Post-JPTs conference in Gulu in December 
2008, President Museveni urged Acholi to give their lands for investment or remain unemployed 
as they already lagged behind in national economic growth compared to other parts of Uganda.9 
In that meeting, opinion leaders asked President Museveni to demonstrate his words by 
establishing social contract with Acholi people, to build at least one new government run food 
processing industries that can be remembered in the name of NRM government. Else, renovate 
cooperative societies which were destroyed during the war, rehabilitate and build roads and 
bridges, supply power in rural areas, provide clean drinking water to the people, build hospitals 
and health centres. Sending investors like Madvhani to occupy 40,000 hectres of Acholi virgin 
land for sugar plantation is unwelcoming even when Acholi people may be asking for 
development. 
Broader socio-economic transformation support reflects more on the prominence of new cultures, 
which many youth tends to follow. With considerable level of illiteracy and ignorance, many young 
people want to catch up with international standards, like watching western movies, viewing direct 
football games from satellite TVs, striving towards owning at least a motor-bike rather than a 
bicycle, and ownn smart mobile phones. Even when countries like Afghanistan fear NGOs could 
weaken its fragile position and help opposition, NGOs have contributed hugely in Northern 
                                                             
9President Museveni was officiating in a Post-Juba peace conference held in Gulu. The conference was organised by 
the northern Uganda traditional chiefs in December 2008. Museveni emphasised that there is always only one post for 
white collar jobs: President post is only for one person, Ministerial post needs one person, etc. 
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Uganda through its mobilisation of the population. Local artists sing songs to get the attention 
funding (money) as well as target international and government supports.  
In an interview with Rwot Acana (2009) NGOs encourage group mobilisation so that they can be 
given soft micro-loans to start up retail businesses. Some groups have used the traditional 
methods of “sharing labour” – awak that the Acholi had before and still practice. Most chiefs and 
elders view awak as one viable means of mobilising people to engage in farming, although not 
necessarily rebuilding a strong Acholi social authority. Rwot Otinga-Yai (2008) explains awak that 
during the process of organising awak, shared responsibilities are exercised, human rights issues 
are addressed so that work-rotas are fair to all members, and women, youth and men all work 
together under various roles. 
6.3.1  SUPPORTING EMPLOYMENT SECTORS AND EDUCATION  
In an interview with Ongwec (2009) NGOs work best with organised social groups through well 
written projects, while government design programmes do not. For example, the government 
programme of livestock restocking run under Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme 
Initiatives (NURPI) scheme left some people still waiting for cows and goats, now for over fifteen 
years. People have lost hope and patience and that has undermined the local initiatives of 
“sharing labour” (awak), which used to unite people along various social lineages and family 
authoritative settings.   
In support of employment and education, initiatives like awak cannot be enough. Service 
intermediary NGOs and INGOs like World Vision, Oxfam etc have been very influencial in these 
areas. To that effect, schools have gone ahead to establish structures including parents, teachers, 
pupils (students) under the “Parents and Teachers Association” (PTA), LNGOs like Acholi 
Education Initiatives (AEI). However, achieving the level of rebuilding these sectors have 
government goals which are tied to political democratisation plan. This makes it diffiuclt for NGOs 
to build schools and provide scholastic materials. The advancement of the actors’ own interests, 
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with whose violent coercion was the means of achieving those ends, is assured part of 
government hegemony. “In most, if not all Acholi households, education is seen as an investment, 
just like the currently most preferred IGAs, and the success in education is a culture measured 
against how far a child went to school” (Interviewee, Lawoko 2009) (see the left hand wing of 
diagram 5.4.1).  
These ideas seem to fit in with what Collier considers why economic policies may need to be 
distinctive if a country like Uganda where most parts were peaceful but Northern Uganda is in 
post-conflict can recover. Collier (2009) argues that, appropriate responses are job creation for 
young men, and deep cuts in military spending. In his view, political opportunities are likely to be 
distinctive because reform may be easier than at other times. Economic opportunities are unlikely 
to be distinctive because conflict distorts the structure of the economy. Standard approaches to 
economic development are therefore often inapplicable, yet the capacity of government to devise 
tailored solutions is very limited (Collier 2009). 
The district officials have diverging views stating that job opportunities are reaped from education, 
even if Universial Primary Education (UPE) is producing low-quality graduates due to problems of 
overcrowded classrooms and inadequate scholastic materials (interviewee, Makmot 2010). 
Amongst this group, no mention was clearly made about the need to boost the IGAs that 
returnees desperately preferred, a view NGOs have been supporting through awak and micro-
finance groups. Rather, the central Government officials are positive about UPE achievement that 
it made massive increase in enrolment. Government officials are not seeing investing in education 
through land use (IGA through agriculture) in VoR as a means to create jobs in the long run. 
Rather, IGAs are seen as a bonus per se. In an interview with Akaka (2009), a retired primary 
school teacher, UPE is good on paper, but cannot fully support returnees in practice, may be 
World Vision and War Child INGOs. Many children do not benefit from it in terms of quality. There 
is automatic promotion for children and by the age of 13 they should all have finished primary 
education, but parents end up paying additionally exhorbitant fees anyway.  
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Generally, economic support through quality education investment was preferred by many, but 
mostly related to earnings contributed to from agricultural production and small scale IGAs. In an 
interview with Ochen (2009) NGOs should mobilise and support IDPs with commercialised 
farming to sustain IGAs since it is now the most wanted household economy. It should be boosted 
so that people are able to sponsor their children to school and up to university level. With the 
return of regional security, economic reconstruction needs NGOs and government support. 
Rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority and the creation of Acholi elites and middle class 
has to fester its root from the rural community, district to national representation. Kumar (1996) 
argues that the subsequent challenges faced, achievements gained, and hurdles to be overcomed 
to achieve a lasting peace in deeply divided societies must focus on how the needs, demands and 
pressures faced by those recuperating from civil wars centre on fundamental issues that in turn 
determine if the peace achieved would be a temporary or lasting one. This subsequent challenge 
is on land use and land ownership (next sub-section). 
Evidence amongst Acholi people show that many respondents failed to underpin the need to 
transform the political and social institutions after the GoU and LRA war ended. It is equally 
difficult for NGOs to support the population since the system is structured, legitimated and 
sometimes negotiated with hegemonic powers to handle Acholi people as clients of government’s 
political community. Social reconstruction aimed at socio-economic transformation and equitable 
distribution of wealth played a big role in the history of Uganda’s national politics and power 
struggle. Acholi missed their chances and needed to go through this time of suffering. That is why 
Acholi woke up and started developing Gulu even during the war. Nobody would imagine Gulu 
town was besieged by war for over two and half decades (interviewee, Obuku in Alero -Amuru 
District 2009). It was not because of NGOs, but the Acholi people did it. 
It is interesting to note that yearning for peace and security through innovative socio-economic 
transformation came at the price of human suffering from this war and its displacements. Probably 
it answers the pronounced sharp differences in needs for food security and human security from 
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returnees, NGOs and government officials. Investing in cash crops now depends on availability of 
security, rain, soil and market prices but people lost the consistencies in growing cash crops. 
Besides the confinement in camps, the current mobilisation and operations and agendas of NGOs 
in the region, showed that it was increasingly becoming irrelevant to rely entirely on cash crops 
(interviewee, Obuku 2009). 
6.3.2  LAND IS LIFE 
Most NGOs have distanced themselves from the “land-is-life” advocacy campaign, because of the 
contentions and potential land issues in Acholiland. This has made huge divergences in 
perspectives on the dychotomies surrounding land use and land ownership. In an interview with 
Odur (2009) the government is using NGOs to convince returnees to give land to investors. Land 
ownership and use has a very strong attachment to Acholi people. It is the only resource they 
have left and can hold onto.  
Baranyi and Weitzner (2008) argue that land is life. It is a “surface” that people live on, an 
economic asset, a point of access for other resources like minerals, territory for states and 
peoples, and a central element informing certain communities’ identities and spiritual worldviews” 
(Baranyi et al. 2008). Acholi people define land as a “property for the dead and unborn”. This 
means that the living are custodians of the property whose rights are shared by clan or family 
members. This definition of Acholiland targets primarily customary land tenure system. Returnees 
encountered various land tenure problems in VoRs, mainly the customary regulation of ownership 
and access that challenged the traditional definition of land and roles of NGOs. The Uganda land 
policy has transformed from individual interests to government interests especially on the Acholi 
customary authorities’ intentions on land tenure, land use and land administration in Northern 
Uganda.  
Most NGOs workers agree that major changes in the legal and institutional framework governing 
land tenure are state-led, market-oriented or hybrid models of land reforms. It is affecting land use 
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and ownership in VoRs. According to an interviewee Lorna (2009) land conflicts or disputes have 
become inherent to relations within and between families and neighbours. In Amuru, there are 
increasing concerns about the escalation of land related conflicts, leading to open conflicts and 
violence. Initially, the internal Acholi crisis did not include land disputes, at least, not its current 
magnitude, until after acquiring camp life and return to villages respectively (interview with Director 
of Kitgum LNGO, 2009). Younger generations who became adults and parents while in IDP-
Camps increased, some died leaving spouses with children, but on return they cannot go to claim 
ownership of land in VoRs. In a FGD in Omiya-Anyima (2009) the view holds that both NGOs and 
the government missed the opportunity to prevent land dispute, which was the best option before 
return to respective villages. The FGDs agree that the transformation of land for use and 
ownership needed to forecast in defusing violence or preventing conflict by implementing 
government reforms that could also address the underlying causes of conflicts. The involved 
stakeholders has to involve elders who knew bounderies and relationships amongst the 
community. NGOs did not anticipate the magnitude of land grabbing and disputes, since they 
[NGOs] are bookish whenever it comes to pointing out the root causes of the conflict in Northern 
Uganda (Interview with IRC Policy officer 2009). Many people have preferred IGAs from NGOs to 
support themselves, preferably in towns which is a different case in VoRs.  
In an interview with Ochora (2009) the consolidation of human and food security that puts in place 
sustainable peace, allowing people to go back home from camps and resume normal life in the 
whole region was government priority, not land. Ochora adds that after such normalcy, investment 
from land use in order to create jobs would then follow. While interviewing the former top LRA 
commander, Banya (2009) who is engaged in extensive farming, the only way to sustain families, 
create employment and bring people together is land use. Government Army commanders, 
traditional chiefs, businessmen/women and others have embarked on acquiring huge land 
coverage for extensive farming, mainly in the name of reaping huge investments from agricultural 
products. Some of them are being accused for land-grabbing. 
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In an interview with one veteran Acholi politician (2007 and 2009) many people look for work in 
farms not for money, but salt, soap and other basic essentials items. They also primarily socialise 
in the most cultural ways and tell/counscel each other through stories. Communal-work is not for 
earning income but a socialising therapy. In a report by Nalugo in the Monitor Newspaper (2010) 
the Uganda's Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Kadaga asked the government in a review of the 10 
years of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 that was organised by Care International in 
Kampala, that the resettlement process in Northern Uganda need to invest more in post-war 
healing programme. Kadaga was meaning the victims who go through a number of challenges, 
which the government must address for example how many of the victims are accessing medical 
services. An NGO worker with International Alert, Acellam (2009) says that post-war 
reconstruction programmes has disjointed responses at all levels of support and mobilisation. 
Recalling Lederach’s track II middle leadership level and linking it with grassroots level and track I 
top-level actors, Wallenstein concurs with Lederach on issues of coordination of actions as part of 
post-war social development. As said in sub-section 6.3, the broader socio-economic policy 
incentives and linkages of actors has to link from top to bottom and vice versa. An interviewee, 
Arweny (2009) in Omiya-Pacwa suggests that it is the responsibilities of the government to 
resource and empower returnees, but NGOs are the most seen. In an interview with Owak (2009) 
the would-be government resources under PRDP-2007-2010 to support returnees pass through 
many hands with policies that put burdens on decisions and in the end never reach the local 
communities. Returnees cannot demand from the Government nor from NGOs, meaning only 
trusted members of the government – The Movement Political Party can receive support. The 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) (2008) questions in their final 
appraisal report of PRDP (2007-2010) whether PRDP is actually a policy framework, plan of 
action or simply a guiding document. The doubts questions the impact of PRDP and its 
coordination framework to support returnees.  
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“Land is life” in sub-section 6.3.2 is one fundamental needs of all Acholi grassroots realities, but 
the reality is that Acholi population depended on NGOs for too long and too much expectations 
from the government is not fulfilling. Younger generations, Acholi middle class and would-be 
investors lack knowledge and national market-base that can be competitive in the country. This 
evidence is not only confirming the difficulties the would-be Acholi middle class elites may rise up 
through farming as it was in the late 1950s and 1960s. The root causes and the proximate causes 
or symptoms/effects of the war in appendix B-4.2, may not serve as a benchmark for rebuilding 
middle class. 
Many returnees see the rebuilding of socio-economic authority lies in land use, but primarily with 
the support from NGOs since the day-to-day fundamental needs – livelihood, survival and security 
are hardly met. Huge and complex socio-economic issues focusing on “unemployment, expanding 
IGAs to increase disposable income (probably to reach a mechanised level of investment), 
increased standard of living, managing food and agricultural prices, reduction in bad culture of 
drunkenness and raping young girls are social issues NGOs can not transform (interviewee, CAO 
2009).  
6.3.3  SUPPORTING HEALTH SECTORS  
According to Mwenda (2010) the outbreak of HIV/AIDS pandemic disease scaled the devastation 
of the spread by 40 per cent amongst the NRA killing the best top officers, when they assumed 
power in February 1986. Coupled with the insurgency in the north before NRA established formal 
structures in the army, the prosecution of the war in Northern Uganda took precedence over 
institutionalisation (Mwenda 2010:47). The spread of HIV/AIDS is mostly narrated back to this time 
of NRA arrival in Acholiland. By the turn of camp life, many people were already infected by 
HIV/AIDS, Ebola and other unusual outbreak of pandemic diseases.   
The iconic identification of NRA as are complicit in spreading the silent killing weapons [sexually 
related diseases] in Acholiland is widely talked about. These also included rape of men infront of 
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their families during the war (interviewee, Pabo camp leader 2009). Carrying out sensitisation 
programmes on rape and HIV/AIDS education is very hard in villages compared to when 
returnees were in camps. In an interview with Oringa (2009) stigmatisation is a silent killer in VoRs  
because rape victims do not want to disclose their odeals. HIV positive patients must walk the 
distance to obtain ARV medications, thus exposing their concealed identity as carriers of 
HIV/AIDS. Despite these challenges, NGOs have advocated to the community and government to 
make sure ARV are given to the affected population. 
According to one patient, Mary (not real name) (2009) the movement of HIV positive victims to 
bigger cities and or towns is one of the ways of avoiding stigmatisation or getting access to ARV 
without being identified. This rural to urban migration is an ongoing exercise. Currently, there is a 
new internal crisis amongst Acholi people, how to deal with the pandemic diseases like HIV/AIDS. 
It has no borders, does not discriminate age or sex and wears people slowly (interview with 
Kitgum District Health Officer, 2009). Cultural norms, for example, wife inheritance that used to 
form part of lineage-based bonding and share of compounded family responsibility is dying out 
because of HIV/AIDS spread. This is affecting not only the socio-economic relations but also the 
basis for revisiting on how to rebuild lineage-based social authority as it might have been once 
enjoyed.  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The perspectives in this chapter are about rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority and the 
need to rebuild sets of social institutions that can be supported by NGOs’ peacebuilding actions 
locally. The internal and external crises in Acholi needs to address the missing political middle 
class and elites gap, restoration of both human and food security, traditional leadership and 
traditional justice. Other sectors include socio-economic support mainly in the areas of 
employment, education, land ownership and use and health which is widely perceived as intended 
killing weaponry of the government. In all these institutional transformation process, NGOs are 
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relied upon to facilitate and moderate with flexible government reform agendas, so that Northern 
Uganda reaches a maintained social cohesion at national level.  
This chapter concludes that social conditions that gave rise to conflict effect changes in the 
returnees’ social structures and patterns in VoRs. The roles of NGOs and government officials 
provided considerations to the underlying causes and social conditions that created and fostered 
violent conflict. NGOs promote nonviolent mechanisms that can reduce adversariness and 
ultimately eliminate violence (substantive justice discussed in chapter 5). NGOs can foster 
structures that met basic needs and maximise participation of returnees (procedural justice in 
chapter, 5 and 7).  
Some NGOs like IA, Safer World have taken the realists’ epistemological position to acknowledge 
the realities of Acholi people by asserting that returnees’ social world should be concerned with 
the identification of structures that generate such world. Timeliness has also become essential for 
bridging the gap between Acholi lineage-based social institutions and authority. These arguments 
form the basis for government of Uganda’s approaval of NGOs’ roles to establish special police 
posts that would later lead to the maintainance of security (human and property and not food 
security). There has not been any DDRR that would be applicable to Northern Ugandan war that 
can be viewed may create a new form of social institutions in Acholiland. Rather, the particular 
needs for human and food security, social services like health, schools, roads and water points, 
agricultural production mainly farm implements and seeds, socio-economic needs focuses on IGA 
and leadership are the needed basis for strengthening Acholi social authority.  
It became so clear from this chapter that approaches to social development has domains in 
participatory politics and policy of NGOs, which can be affected by government interference. 
Lederarch’s three-tier-levels of actors’ analysis of returnees’ social structure and socio-economic 
transformation suggest that a tighter social policy and participatory politics can distinguise the 
potentials of NGOs facilitation from nonfacilitative roles. Also, it may distinguise the realities of 
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local social institutions that are the beneficiaries. For example, the social reintegration within 
family re-unification, LRA returnees and neighbours shows that institutional and systems-
integrations are inter-linked. The appeal is to protect the good culture against the bad cultures 
witnessed in camps, and to bridge the gap of generational independence on NGOs.  
Another example can be seen from the distinction between the traditional and criminal court 
system and adapting the limited role of the middle ground hybrid Uganda Crime Court on 
returnees’ social realities. The transformation of courts and the need for village policing structures 
is confusing the implementation of justice  mechanisms, the traditional and/or the criminal. As a 
result, the Acholi people are failing to make amends to procedural justice, that is to say, 
maximising political and social participation in decision-making that affect them along side 
substantive justice, and fostering structures that meet their human needs. Although the youths 
tend to have acquired “business-as-usual attitude” form of identity after the end of the war, the 
return to VoRs still poses new challenegs on the culture of “how-things-used-to-be” for the elders 
and chiefs. None of these have been the view of NGOs and the Government officials. The 
common benchmark for both NGOs, returnees, and government officials are the constant 
demands for a better life, more IGAs, good quality education that is affordable and health care. 
Unfortunately, all these have to depend on land ownership and land use for agricultural production 
[giving pressure to social adjustment]. However, the hegemonic politics where probably neither 
NGOs’ participatory politics nor socio-economic foundations needed to rebuild a strong Acholi 
lineage-based social authority may resolve land is life paradox.  
The transformation of leadership in VoRs is not in conformity with IDP-Camp leadership structure 
and the Local Government system of leadership (LCs), in that the reality of traditional Rwot-Kweri 
– hoe chief attaches itself with the new meanings of wage payments. FGDs in Opit, Paicho, and 
Omiya-Anyima agree that Rwot-Kweri leadership structure is linked to the socio-economic and 
structural transformation of collective and shared labour, called Awak. Again, the needed 
leadership styles that can sustain the level of social services and social institutions in villages of 
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returns based on the facilitative/non-facilitative roles of NGOs. This leads to the next chapter on 
relational transformation. 
Generally, new sets of institutions which support peacebuilding are either understood structured 
and systematised under government regulations or defined by returnees in terms of support, 
development are expected to be coming from NGOs. The question remains, what is it that can be 
necessary for peacebuilding by NGOs? It emerged that rebuilding of Acholi lineage-based social 
authority leans towards the government and NGOs responsibility, but rebuilding the social 
structure is at its worst and/or non-existance. From compensation of victims, rehabilitation of 
schools and roads, health centres, national reconciliation and setting up truth commissions, 
political awareness, national and local security, the government tows the hegemonic versus 
clientalisation politics, suggesting negative peace promotion. Much as parts of Acholi people want 
rule by the people - democracy, rule by the elite - oligarchy exist from within the fractured 
population, making government’s rule by one person –authocracy posing unequitable goals of 
social recovery in Acholiland.  
This is opposed to the findings that NGOs’ actions whose empirical impact of war to peace 
transformation suggests positive peace although the anger on them suggests they continue to be 
complicit bystanders in the recovery process. There is also a whole range of sequencing and 
prioritising of institutional transformations which NGOs can expand on from current state’s 
capacity for Northern Uganda. The role NGOs play is confirmed best a mixture of state and 
nonstate bottom-up and top-down inside-out conflated approach to support returnees for long-
term institutional transformation. These ranged from camp-phase-out with minimised relief 
distribution to internal support from policies and systems that allows actions for community-driven 
interventions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOVERING OF SOCIAL RELATIONS - 
RECONCILIATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter follows on from the thematic findings about the need for Acholi people to recover the 
functioning social relationhips amongst themselves, the neighbours, and how the national and 
global relations can be facilitated from external support. Within own society, relationships amongst 
Acholi people has been mainly understood in terms of traditional social reconciliation with 
preference to peace first and justice later. The purpose of this chapter is to explore returnees’ 
perspectives on the representative roles of NGOs and government officials on the preferred 
changing social relationships of Acholi people in respective VoRs. Social reconciliation is part of 
the re-enforcing element of the long history of Acholi lineage-based social authority and relations 
(chapter six). 
In sub-section 7.2, internal relationships amongst Acholi people requires social reconciliation and 
peace that can also be understood externally. Acholi social reconciliation has been sometimes 
understood to contradict with the notion of justice. Returnees understand the “means to end” 
processes of Mato-Oput traditional social reconciliation as a “never again” outcome in a more 
restorative justice framework, than retributive.  
Sub-section 7.3 discusses about external relations that NGOs play, mainly to advocate and 
facilitate relationships building. However, NGOs have own principles and strategies in mobilising 
returnees. NGOs have had tighter relationships with IDPs in camps whilst delivering what the 
government could not, or added value where necessary. This has created a gap for the 
government to practice a political system in which power is dispersed, of which sharing of the 
national growths is assumed to unify politics. 
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Sub-section 7.4 discusses on the perceptions of returnees on GoUs’ roles. It discusses the 
external and internal relationships of Acholi people. The next section begins with returnees’ 
perspectives on own internal relationships. 
7.2 INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST ACHOLI PEOPLE  
Extending social bridges and bondings in Acholiland, northern region and the country as a whole 
is not only about promoting participatory politics with non-state actors, but also about establishing 
social reconciliation. Social relations’ recovery amongst Acholi people is identified to be of context 
specific to grassroots traditional resolution. Pain (1997) argues that Acholi traditional resolution of 
conflict and violence stands among the highest practices anywhere in the world.  
In my findings, what varies are the perspectives from NGOs, GoU officials and returnees about 
how NGOs do play a role in forging internal social recovery relations amongst Acholi retunees in 
VoRs. NGOs formed reciprocal perceptions against other competing NGOs and the GoU through 
their advocacy roles. For example, in Afghanistan, the U.S. and Western European countries, the 
United States Council for World Federation or Committee for a Free Afghanistan got directly 
involved in the politicisation of NGOs thus eroding the neutrality of NGOs. The loss of neutrality 
within the country and at the grassroots level led to the Museveni government to have formed a 
polyachy way of deploying popular democracy by potraying the government image as the lead 
authority to protect Acholiland.  
In chapter five, most Acholi people worry that LRA returnees are abducted children, victims turned 
perpetuators against own communities or close relatives, requiring a wider social transformation. 
By focusing only on individual and/or personal social transformation and viewing formerly 
abducted LRA returnees as are collectively guilty, or Acholi population for that matter, may 
misrepresent the true nature and scope of social reconciliation in Acholiland. It may also fail to 
fully understand the processes by which substantive and procedural justice can be reached. The 
state claims and strategies have evaded the essential and pragmatic questions the Acholi people 
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are raising about their abducted children. State claims and hopes of returnees have to be 
separated from necessity which NGOs are able to provide. All these may represent the likelihood 
of social reconciliation, but not actual. 
Initially, the perspectives of returnees on the root causes of the war in Acholiland in sub-section 
5.2 suggest that returnees’ bonding process within families were not supportive of NGO attempts 
to restore social authoritative structure. It has affected ways by which any strong authoritative 
lineage-based social structure of Acholi people are to be rebuilt after returning “home”. Many still 
continue to ask why the war took so long, the war that prevented them from making attachment to 
the ancestral homestead. Parts of some of the answers are provided on the likelihood that felt 
needs of returnees are associated with both met and unmet needs so much necessary to be 
facilitated by NGOs and the GoU. Instead this has broadened and delayed the goal of rebuilding 
social reconciliation. The other debate is that traditional justice are only a part of a long-standing 
local contest about who should interpret the Acholi spiritual world and traditional customs of social 
life (Allen 2010:254). For example, the relevance of amnesty, international criminal court (ICC) or 
any hybrid court of Uganda only occurred in each situation in which they have been introduced. 
However, returnees believe that traditional justice, after achieving peace, has to stress on righting 
wrongs and amending broken relationships by way of Mato Oput. 
Where, external societal rebuilding and bonding of Acholi people with other districts and regions, 
mainly west Nile and Lango are concerned, social polirisation from the past has to be addressed. 
Internally, formal DDRR programme did not take place in the entire Northern Uganda leaving 
societal reconciliation to have been by-passed. Apart from the high ranking officers of the LRA 
who enjoyed amnesty from the GoU, many Ex-LRA returnees who were abducted children are 
housed in reception centres like GUSCO (Gulu), KICWA (Kitgum) and Rakile (Lira) and are later 
handed over to the parents (if the parents can be found), to relatives or are sometimes recycled 
back into the UPDF.  
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Social reconciliation of [Mato-Oput for Acholi; Kayo Cuk for Lango, Ailus for Teso and Tulu Koki of 
Madi] tend to prefer peace before justice and not vice versa. In the eastern sub-region of Teso, 
Buckley-Zistel (2008) finds that the relationship between various parties has not been transformed 
and peace remains shallow. What seems uniting in both Teso, Acholi, Lango and West Nile cases 
is that majority of the population prioritise peace before justice.  
7.2.1  TRADITIONAL SOCIAL RECONCILIATION – MATO OPUT  
 
Mato Oput reconciliation isn’t necessarily a replacement of any justice, rather is rated as a form of 
traditional restorative justice of Acholi people, now widely preferred in Northern Uganda. Mato-
Oput creates social cohesion and tends to invest in developing social human capital that may not 
neccessariy rely on the context of relief and emergency aid NGOs used to provide. The process of 
Mato-Oput searches for restorative justice by understanding crime that compares and contrasts 
the “legal” or criminal justice to that of restorative justice, brings the two approaches to different 
views regarding key questions. Acholi restorative justice asks key questions of who has been hurt. 
What are their needs and whose obligations are these? It assumes “peaceful coexistence” which if 
it takes long time may fail to achieve its authenticity. Mato-Oput falls within the arguments 
pertaining to the “no-post-conflict rehabilitation model” that can be universally applied. 
 
Generally, Schreiter (1992) argues that reconciliation is not “managed process”. People cannot be 
merely exhorted or manipulated into a truly heart-felt reconciliation. It most often has to be initiated 
from the side of the victim, since the perpetrators are always unable to forgive themselves or even 
to recognise honestly, the enormity of what they have done; “it comes upon us like a healing,” for 
“reconciliation is something that comes upon the victim, something that the victim discovers, 
rather than a well-managed therapy or process. It is more of a spirituality than a strategy” 
(Schreiter 1992).  
 
Criminal justice views crime as a violation of the law of the state and that violation creates guilt to 
the state and individual. The victims are considered the state as well as the individual, therefore, 
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justice requires the state to determine blame (guilt) and impose pain (punishment) and the central 
focus is on offenders getting what they deserve. The key questions of criminal justice are what 
laws have been broken? Who did it? And what do they deserve? 
Broadly speaking, the Acholi traditional system of reconciliation looks at elements of harms and 
related needs of victims first, but also of the community’s and the offender’s, the community’s 
obligations that have resulted from and given rise to this harm. Stakeholders in the offense and 
those who have legitimate interest in its resolution, usually the victims, offenders, and community 
members are engaged. The system requires to address victim’s harms and needs, hold offenders 
accountable to put right those harms, and involve victims, offenders, and communities in the 
process. It puts the offender under intense psychological obligation and moral fit. Participation and 
public consultation vary from both justice proceedures. 
In all the nine FGDs I carried out during my data collection, peace was chosen over justice. The 
first step towards social reconciliation is to initiate the Mato Oput ritual process. Convictions in any 
criminal trials are not of a universially recognised approach to justice with the Acholi people who 
tend to prefer social reconciliation than retribution. Amnesty and truth-telling seem to be much 
more acceptable particularly if those who have suffered can receive some form of compensation 
(Allen 2010: 244). Despite community’s pursuit for peace first, returnees agree that most NGOs 
and the Government are continuing to strive towards post-conflict recovery programme 
(interviewee, Chief Administrative Officer 2009). This question was posed when NGOs were 
facing pressing social issues of camp-phase-out and the emergence to enter into social 
reconciliation process. Social reconciliation would also require compensation of “victims” which 
must come from donor funding. This is believed will support the process of Mato Oput through 
anointed chiefs Rwodi Moo.  
In an interview with a senior staff of the International Alert (IA) (2009), the impact of war that took 
so long and overshadowed developments in Acholiland needs to invest on and consolidate the 
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positive peace. In an interview with the retired Anglican Bishop Ochola and who was also the 
Chariman of Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI) (2009) argues that Acholi people 
hanged on only hope. Hope in his view connected Acholi people to peace and justice and that 
hope brought Acholi people together (Interviewee, Bishop Ochola 2009). Ochola believes that 
rebuilding relationships requires continued attitude of sharing the past pain, sorrows, stories (bad 
and good), dreams and hope. He says, “I find that majority of younger and educated Acholi people 
talk about Mato Oput as if it is unique” (Ochola 2009).  
In Mozambique, Honwana (1997) shares the view that after a long period of social and material 
destructions in rural communities as a consequence of regional destabilisation and civil war, the 
communities were faced with both its material rehabilitation and social reconstruction challenges. 
The Mozambiquean strategy for post-war healing and social reconstruction involves the role of 
traditional leaders and families in healing the social wounds within which the context applies. The 
traditional institutions in Mozambique were able to bring back social balance, harmony, co-
existence and social stability.  
In Northern Uganda, the possibilities also lies in the philosophy that underlines the practices of 
these institutions and funding to partly strengthen the traditional institution and facilitate 
compensation. It was not clearly stated if the cosmological model of healing social wounds to 
regulate social life, particularly in rural communities after return can be facilitated by funding alone. 
In the past, compensation for a conviction based on killing using Mato Oput ritual process would 
involve giving away a girl to the family of the bereaved, both to bind the families together, and so 
that a child could be born to the bereaved lineage to replace the one that had died (Allen 2010: 
245). In Desmond Tutu’s (2002) Ubuntu philosophy, both the Mozambiquean and Acholi tend to 
see the world as fundamentally resting on the two-folded foundation of unity and diversity and as a 
goal to strive for harmony between the two. Returnees prefer NGOs facilitatation to the restoration 
of hope in people and begin to invest in the very people who can magnify own peace, just like 
Tutu’s philosophy and that of the Mozanbiquean’s cosmology. Currently, the bigger Acholi 
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population prefer traditional methods of reconciliation of Mato Oput that focuses on outcome with 
compensation to victims, but not payment of a girl to the bereaved family. The effort made in 1996 
by the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD) to facilitate the 
reinstitution of anointed traditional chiefs have not met to strive for harmony within all Acholi 
people.  Bradbury (1999) also made a comparative fact finding study to the ACORD research that 
concluded that; traditional structures were weak and fragmented; many “elders” were themselves 
not sure how to carry out traditional rituals; there were widespread disagreement about who were 
the real traditional leaders; and that few people considered the traditional structures a key priority 
(Dolan 2000a; Acord 2000).  
Generally, the foundation of any unity and diversity to rebuild and represent Acholi traditional 
social authority and relationships to the outside world has become more complex, probably more 
political and economical in nature. Already in the 1990s, Bradbury (1999: 17-20) argues that there 
were tensions between elders over the possible financial benefits from the government who had 
shown interest in restituting KKA. There were concerns that the external support for traditional 
chiefs from the government was just another way of trying to bring the region under closer 
government control without contributing to improve education and economic development. Some 
of these gaps were expected to be bridged by Kacoke Madit (KM) “Big Meeting”. However, KM 
advocacy-oriented organised style failed to provide direct services to the local context. KM 
mandated itself to strengthen Acholi unity and Acholi cultural heritage (Allen 2010: 245). But, KM 
could not match the growing field of traditional peace movements and pacifist discourses, Pax 
Kristi’s realists role in organising JPTs, and the evolving civilisation of the war. KM vanished 
although its presence only lies with individual convictions amongst very few Acholi people. 
In an interview with a member of the Kitgum Women Peace Group (KWPG) (2009) who chose 
peace first with the reflecting perspectives to exercise harmony and coexistence as a part of Mato 
Oput process, to them, realism meant tangible IGAs. Taking actions for household’s and 
communities’ well-being, unity (to work together as a group – for example, Awak), respect (to 
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recognise one another’s’ pain and share stories – social healing) and security, reflects concerns of 
food and human security as are neccessary in the social reconciliation processes.  
For support, many women I talked to argue that healing process needs economic support from 
NGOs, not GoU who tend to frustrate Acholi peoples’ collective attempts to recover. Acholi region 
is already far below economic national growths rate. These women believe that economic 
relations can strengthen internal and external relationships. Internally, majority of Acholi women 
especially, express in their songs of peace, war and funerals, dance and drama about peace. 
They welcome any societal support leading to healing process. Songs are sung in times of 
hardship, war and protection, happiness, marriages, health, well being, good harvest and 
reconciliation. The significance of songs, dance and drama and symbols in Acholi offers a 
powerful reflection in putting memories to words. Sometimes songs are quickly and spontaneously 
composed for any occasion. For more than fifteen years outside my hime, I went to spend 
Christmas and visit my village and relatives in Namokora, in December 2006. My communities 
quickly composed songs and danced to rekindle my relationship with them. Such songs would 
also provide space for grieving the past and orientiering towards the future.  
Amongst the younger Acholi generation, music industry flourished, for example, a song was 
composed to express, “it is unbearable to live in camps” (Bedo i “kem” lare kuu) was a song that 
was composed  to express social sufferings and grievances about live in internal displacement 
(protected villages). The song was sold and played widely to west Nile and Lango and other 
districts.  The word (kem) comes from the english word “camp”, did not exist in Acholi vocabulary 
(see sub-section 3.4). These songs became questionable whether forgiveness portrayed by the 
younger generations in their songs clearly means peace, truth, mercy and justice or 
transcendence or the youths did not want to associate with the past. It seems that a new 
generator for strengthening traditional social reconciliation, and/or a replacement of the new 
emerging traditional system is not the question either, although Acholi songs have dominated 
local, national and regional relations. 
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However, there is no evidence of any new emerging, or re-emerging traditional system of Acholi 
justice (Allen 2010: 249). In an interview with one Gulu Women camp leader (72 years) in 2009, 
accepting ex-LRA returnees must involve a number of rituals which are not new emerging 
traditional system. Songs only redeem, comfort, prepares for forgiveness and narates about past 
pain and so on. Rituals include “chasing away evil spirits”  (ryemo cen). In order to “forgive” and 
have compassion, rituals like (ryemo cen), stepping on the eggs (nyono tong-gweno), washing 
away the tears (lwoko pig wang), cleansing the spirit/ghost (mayo tipu), cleansing for an 
abominable act (tumu kir), chasing spirits from a wide area (ryemo gemo), cleansing someone 
who has been killed in war (kwero merok), chasing a “roaming” spirit (ryemo jok or jwee) and 
payment for compensation (culu kwor) are all contained in Acholi ritual performances. The 
process of “cooling” the situation, Kweyo Piny meaning “pacification”, traditionally involves 
everyone to first sit down and then a “lamb is sacrificed” Tumo Romo, whose blood was 
considered to “calm down the land”. This is mainly to stop the cycle of violence (culu kwor) from 
happening once there has been a homicide.  
Although “forgiveness” has been termed (timo kica) which has sometimes been used to describe 
amnesty and social reconciliation, the proliferation of recognised rituals, however, does not 
resolve the basic difficulty of turning selected practices into something new (Allen 2010: 252). 
Returnees maintain their central argument that truth-telling and acknowledgement of guilt from 
both the Government and LRA may not justify forgotten justice (amnesia). For returnees, clarity, 
acknowledgement and truth-telling from the GoU and LRA arises from the breaches of security 
guarantees of the past, and in the fear that the unsealed JPTs’ comprehensive peace agreement 
may once again result in LRA repraisal attacks in Northern Uganda.  
Acholi attitudes, perceptions and trust may have had a wider socio-political and socio-economic 
implications on social reconciliation and peace. The impacts suggest that some broader peace 
(peace-writ-large) needs to be translated into actions at the socio-political and socio-economic 
levels of the returnees before justice takes its course. Such demand depends on the supportive 
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roles of NGOs and the GoU willingness to give meanings to the realities of returnees who feel 
they are caught up in the (peace-writ small) processes. NGO activities that needs to engage 
returnees’ strategic political leaders bases on (Lederarch’s) three levels, where peace-writ-large. It 
can be effective if it relies on acknowledgment, hope, mercy and forgiveness amidst all 
performances of rituals named above. In that, Acholi values and emotive reflections on traditional 
mechanisms of social reconciliations and forgiveness becomes central.  
In an interview with Rwot Lugai (2009) forgiveness cannot be demanded, but once it is allowed to 
germinate at the epicentre of peace, it will not be denied. Peace and reconciliation will be drawn 
much closer to societal co-existence and harmony, support and compassion than any single focus 
on compensation of victims. In the interview, Rwot Lugai George William (2009) argues that the 
war in Northern Uganda left victims who cannot and will not, even with the help of NGOs, 
compensate or be compensated amidst the mass violence. The question is who can be forgiven 
and who can forgive.  
The government officials on the other hand are to be tasked with identifying LRA victims and start 
the process of compensation. In such government’s attempt, over 4,000 LRA victims with physical 
disabilities, of which 2,846 have some form of LRA mutulatilations were identified. Many Acholi 
believe that this is more of a political tool than an agenda that can address the deeper and real 
compensation process. Returnees argue that the principles of truth-telling, confession, mediation 
and reparation resulting into reconciliation and restoration of relationships is being by-passed.  
The diagram 7.2 below demonstrates how Acholi traditional approach and structure is used, for 
example, on issues relating to how the social authoritative structure of Acholi people address 
victims, leading to social reconciliation.10 Based on the governements identifications, it is simply 
too hard to define, identify and classify victims if, say, one takes into consideration the major 
                                                             
10 Joint declaration on agenda item 3 of the Juba Peace Talks (accountability and reconciliation) by cultural leaders 
and religious leaders, women and youth from Madi, Teso, Lango and Acholi sub-region held at St Augustine Hall-Lira, 
on 11th August 2007, presented by Rwot Acana II. 
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causes of victims while relying on the three types of violence: physically deformed, cultural 
classifications especially,  those classified under the psycho-social trauma and marginalisation, 
and thirdly those who are structurally denied the supporting livelihood to promote human 
potentials and development, and access to services and equal opportunities.  
7.2 Diagram Showing Traditional Approach and Social Authority Structure used to 
Address Issues of Victims 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s version from Post-Juba Conference, Adel, Gulu, 17th–20th December 2007 
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in the society. The basis for the arguments against such criticism by most elders give are that the 
lack of respect and humility (woro ki mwolo) cannot be bought by money in the society or 
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or particular community to first understand the acknowledgement and secondly follow truth-telling 
process. This may result into compensation, thus, social reconciliation.  
Truth-telling through indepth narrative, forensic, social and individual truths can sometimes lead to 
reconciliation (interviewee, Elders’ FGDs 2009). However, some NGOs do not approve of the 
above process, especially those subscribing to feminist contemporary burden-sharing 
responsibilities and accountability. Their argument is that women bear the biggest burden based 
on the structural and cultural violence they went through. These types of violence are invisible. 
This view is cearly stated in Galtung’s literatures.  
In representing the Acholi views in the diagram above, it seems there is need for a consistent 
balance in the reflection on where support, compassion and where acknowledgement and truth-
telling requires any NGOs action-oriented elements to promote mercy. Mercy may promote mutal 
actions of the past, current and future targets of co-operantion, support and compassion of the 
Acholi social traditional relationsips and responsibilities. Social responsibilities in this case plays a 
shaping role of social reconciliation process in Acholiland, something NGOs could pick up. 
According to an IRC protection manager in Kitgum (2009) it is difficult for NGOs to address issues 
of fairness, since lack of respect and humility (woro ki mwolo) is far from being understood in the 
society. Returnees need external relationships and exposure so as to compare lessons from other 
regions, and these can be done partly with the help of NGOs. 
7.3 ACHOLI EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS - NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS  
This section focuses on the perceptions of Acholi people on NGOs contributions in ending the war 
and in mobilising returnees from IDPs to respective villages, mainly in external representations. 
Key players in post-conflict reconciliation processes are often governments or non-governmental 
organisations (Buckley-Zistel 2008: 140). The international dimension can be directed towads the 
transference of peace to local control, integration into cooperative and equitable regional and 
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global structures, advocacy and transformation (see post-war peacebuilding framework in figure 
2.5.2).  
The views of NGOs and government officials, religious leaders, local organisations and the 
international communities are explored. They (NGOs) are social (focus on people) and political 
(work with state, policies, public administration, etc) actors. The intermediary services of INGOs 
did not include formal DDRR programme in Acholiland. Instead, issues of compensation of 
victims’, accountability, responsibility and unification in national politics attracted more views from 
NGOs workers and those of GoU’s. By way of connecting Acholi people to the external world, 
social reconciliation was conveyed in different forms and functions. Most GoU officials believe that 
social incoherence can have different perceptions that requires the government to strategise on 
using polyarchy. Polyarchy is a political system in which power is dispersed, of which sharing of 
the national growth would unify politics and ethnics division. 
The war in Northern Uganda had a late internationalisation (interviewees, Okumu and Achan 
2009). The extra-moral violence used by the LRA (forced child conscription, exactions on civilians, 
maiming …), the absence of a clearly articulated political agenda, its constant reference to 
supernatural forces, the ten biblical commandements which are hermetical to Western rationality 
of warfare – had partly obscured the complexity of the political and social processess the LRA has 
developed (Perrot 2010: 188). Western ways of addressing traditional reconciliation has been 
formed to establish confidence and trust-building amidst the huge humanitarian assistance that 
overshadowed what form of social recovery would emerge. The aim has been to address social 
indifferences and antagonisms in Acholiland. NGOs are working to forge harmony and co-
existence in the name of peace (interviewee, Bishop Onono 2009). 
In an interview conducted with the AVSI field officer in Paicho (2009), the relationships NGOs 
have with ex-IDPs (returnees) has been very close and tight, but some have failed to play a 
representative role of supporting Acholi social bondage. The failure to represent Acholi people 
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arises from the associated problems NGOs have especially those who regard themselves 
unconsciously as structuralist. They [NGOs] make for example assumptions that human rights are 
uniform and are non-political, but they actually become politicised over time.  
Literature has been clear that social relations between individuals, groups, NGOs and government 
are a part of relational transformation. In an interviewee with Ocen (2009), whose work with NRC 
has followed Acholi returnees for many years, NGOs workers including (Bazungus – Swahili word 
meaning whites) have been freely working in returnees’ villages and some of them have adapted 
native culture. “Some NGOs workers seem to have left every bit of their hearts in Western 
countries, mainly those working as international experts, and are coming from regional and 
national coordinating offices” (interviewee, GOAL project manager 2009). Few in the FGDs 
reflected upon NGO workers who acted like “dual citizens” (see appendix B-7.3). Dual citizen 
NGOs have become locally institutionalised forging what Lederach calls mechanism to engage 
with each other as humans-in-relations (Lederach 1999: 29). 
In policy terms, the government began to regulate all LNGOs to be legitimately registered 
following the NGO national policy (NGO-National Policy June 2008). Regional NGO (RNGOs), 
National NGOs (NNGOs) and some INGOs maintained their legitimacy and continued to work with 
INGOs and the communities. For local actors and peace activists, the internationalisation of the 
conflict was expected to raise international awareness. But, the humanitarian and security 
situation heretofore were barely reported in the brief articles in the regional section of the national 
newspapers (Perrot 2010: 188-189). The external representation of northern connections by 
NGOs to the international communities was missing or being blocked by the government. In what 
could have been the international basis to conceptualise reconciliation based on truth, mercy and 
justice, negative peace was pursued in the confines of time, political space NGOs have with the 
government and people and financial provision that was made available to completed date-line 
projects.  
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In financial terms, the total humanitarian assistance that increased from US$19.5 millinon in 2000 
to US$56million in 2002 and US$119.5 million in 2007 ([United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs] OCHA 2000, 2002, 2007) raised so much hope of financial continuity in 
the post-war period. According to Rwot Acana [interviewee] (2009) reconciliation is a process-
oriented exercise that is to be achieved at the end, when peace, security, truth etc are 
established. The process requires financial assistance. In an interview with Acana (2009) the 
preferable process of reconcilaition Mato Oput can take months if not years, unlike retribution 
where outcomes are achieved immediately with the purpose of punishing the wrongdoers. Any 
supporting NGOs can walk Acholi through – meaning empowerment, especially when the offender 
comes out and tells the truth about his/her action, the process cannot be denied. 
Still on financial contribution to societal reconciliation, in a FGDs (2009) development assistance 
and official aid increase from US$17 million in 2000 to US$1.2 billion in 2005 (World Bank 2007) 
stops with the national NGOs and government officials, district political leaders and some 
government appointed individuals. A very low relations with the population registers whenever 
such a big financial contribution is earmarked but no representations are established with the local 
people - beneficiaries. District and national government officials collude with NGOs to solicit funds 
and steal because these officials are committed to own careers to remain in the good books of the 
government and/or parent NGOs. For example, the government’s National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (NAAD) officials were cited as the most corrupt government body acting locally (FGDs 
2009).  
 Although the national and international media coverage brought the sqalid conditions of IDPs’ 
living conditions to the fore front, corruption became a way of life that nobody speaks about. After 
Egeland’s humanitarian crisis alert in Northern Uganda, the international information, sensitisation, 
lobbying and fund-raising initiatives flourished. Like in figure 2.6.2 the types of NGOs ranged from 
the Uganda Conflict Action Network-Uganda-CAN, the joint international Crisis-Group-Centre for 
American Progress’s ENOUGH project, Gulu Walk was initiated by two Canadians, Invisible 
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Children targeted teenagers, International Rescue Committee’s campaign, Oprah Winfred 
coverage, CNN, the National Gegraphic Channel and many free-agents.  
However, in an interview with a member of Gulu Teacher’s Association (GTA) (2009) Gulu town 
did not only become the northern hub for NGO free-agents, but also corruption corridors. When 
the emergence of public awareness and international civil mobilisation started making headlines in 
public medias, the top levels political support from international forums, UN members and 
diplomatic circles started growing for a quick resolution (Security Council 2006). New actors in the 
diplomatic landscape in Uganda and in the UN alerted many Government and NGOs sectors. But 
Uganda’s political ascension promoted many individual-merits-based support to be recognised by 
Kampala regime. This has also grown wider to the UN, IMF and WB levels who did not consider 
how their relations with the government has had an impact on the grassroot population.  
There are also NGOs and individuals who worked with the ICC, behaved as if they left their hearts 
in the court chambers in The Hague or were individual-merit-based people seeking national/local 
popularity. They have no sensitivities about what impacts it has on IDPs. This view is widely 
shared across Acholiland. The traditional court mechanisms are down played without considering 
the importance it has on traditionally transforming relationships. In an interview with Mego Lakor 
(2009) who questioned if “the person named ICC” has a mother and ever gave birth to a child, 
called peace. 
Individuals whose behaviours suggest profiteering from the war and/or spoilers of peace tend to 
create NGOs that are termed Brief-Case NGOs and/or USB-Memory Stick NGOs. Such 
individuals fail to play any facilitative roles of linking returnees to the international community. 
Government initiatives like the National Agricultural Advisory development (NAAD) did not directly 
work to finance reconciliation amongst returnees. But her support for agriculture seemed to have 
re-enforced the socio-cultural interactions amongst Acholi people. NAAD has produced many 
plateau-career free agents, most of who write fantastic project proposals and resorted to lobbying 
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INGOs mainly to seek domestic and international political and financial backing. These plateau-
agents move freely in VoRs to engage in “stateside” operations hoping that there are INGO-global 
stints, which will change financial packages in their favours (Poverty Reduction and Developement 
Programm [PRDP] 2009).  
Together with INGOs, local and international plateau-career free agents frequently change jobs 
from one NGOs to another. Some resort to running their own NGOs, besides working with the 
INGOs. Some work with NNGO, INGOs for bigger paying positions while acting nationally from 
Kampala to local Gulu, Kitgum, Pader or Amuru locations. This particular group also tend to think 
globally as well as are acting locally. Returnees believe that rebuilding any external relationships 
while relying on free agents in the name of social reconciliation sometimes prioritise support for 
general peace dividends. More than 90 per cent of Acholi youths prefer to study hard and work for 
NGOs along this argument.  
Free-agents are distinct from plateau-career agents and others who have adapted themselves to 
the native roles. For example, the Quaker Peace Witness (QPW), Conciliation Resources (CR) 
are few track one actors whose link with track three returnees expose themselves (QPW) and 
(CR) as are expert groups working on the ground to demonstrate their native actions. They 
identify programmes and support related projects at track-three mainly driven by non-political 
traditional and religious leaders. These NGOs tend to externally link Acholi people based on the 
importance of their local resources, practices and attitudes with local Acholi people.  
While native-like NGOs tend to despatch closer psychological share in their medium of identity, 
returnees are left to assign values to keep it to commit by. Usually, the parent NGOs, say from 
United Kingdom, USA, Canada, etc coordinate through country directors in Kampala or Gulu. But 
it is unclear how far such NGOs with native nature can commit, relate and act consistently at the 
local level. These NGOs are very few. They depart so quickly than expected after coming so close 
to the people after raising too much hope. Some of whom might have become too local and 
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stayed to assume CBOs statuses. Probably this confirms the view that, “acting locally and thinking 
globally” suits actions of NGOs that have adapted a local culture and context of returnees.  
In sub-section 2.6.2, the typology of NGOs’ involvements follow patterns of interactions that can 
change with the understanding of their environment and the current rules-in-use (Ostrom, Garden 
and Walker 1994). While some NGOs have tried to inject incentives into altering the social 
structures, the implementing policies dictates on attitudes of some of the national/local 
government officials who do not want to take responsibilities on settling returnees (interviewee, 
IRC 2009). Such policies have resulted into unintended consequences, especially where short-
term to long-term relationships has to shape NGOs exit strategy. In our interview with the IRC field 
coordinator (2009) NGOs may take longer to withdraw entirely from Acholi sub-region.  
The complex nature of rebuilding societal relations was perceived to include changes in the 
cultural and social structure of Acholi people rather than relying on the past. The goal to reconcile 
Acholi people or support national reconciliation is downplayed and denounced by the GoU. This is 
because most INGOs acted naïvely without ethical and Pearsonian conception of international 
relations although Nordic country representatives had been among the most vocal in denouncing 
Museveni’s military policy in Northern Uganda (Perrot 2010: 192). According to an interviewee, 
Lawoko (2009), such naïve versus realists conception affected the way NGOs relayed information 
to the outside world. He argues that some NGOs sometimes consulted with elders to ask for 
Acholi traditional training scheme. Suprisingly, the very same elders are called for the training 
scheme as participants.  
The perspectives and reflections of most religious INGOs like AVSI, World Vision and CARITAS 
converged with those of IDPs and ARLPI who have their hearts in truly investing in peace and 
hope (interviewee, Director of LNGO 2009). These INGOs tend to thread ties and commitment 
well with both their parent organisations and the returnees. This reflection qualify “dual-citizen 
NGOs” whose ties with the Acholi people focused on relational process rather than short term 
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“nice-to-see-you” and a “see-you-again”” outcomes. They dual-citizens NGOs] had long-term 
tighter communications and relationships with the IDPs. They are highly reflected upon by Acholi 
people as having had a much desirably continued support to mobilise and work with the 
population. These INGOs act contrary to Terry’s (2002) argument that paradoxical protection by 
humanitarian NGOs in refugee camps have little incentives to see the conflict end because it will 
dry up their own source of revenues (see page 76). 
Acholi external relations with NGOs goes back to the JPTs as was outlined in chapter three. 
However, the post-Juba conference held in Gulu (May 2009) points out that justice has become a 
contentious issue. Returnees continue to be confused whether Uganda which does not have a 
war-crime court, but basing on war-crime division and Mato Oput are enough. In an interview with 
Ochora (2009) over 23,000 men and women have been rescued from LRA and Uganda war-crime 
division can actually try those who have cases to answer. NGOs’ options to invest in hope-raising, 
support psychosocial issues, act on the practice of mercy and forgiveness were not freely 
dispensed without revisiting their budget. Ochora argues in our interview that government Poverty 
Reduction and Development Plan aims to target Acholi returnees and over 1,500 victims are 
identified in Gulu alone and education takes district priority.   
A donor conference was being talked about a lot as one of the supportive and facilitating role 
INGOs can directly undertake, at least Acholi people will be known externally. An official of the 
UNHCR (2009) argues in our interview that donor conference are pledges and not tangible. Donor 
pledges are sceptical and yet unsuccessful reintegration and resettlement of formerly abducted 
LRA returnees, the civilian returnees facing the realities of unexploded ordinance (UXO) are 
paramount. Even when illegal guns are being collected nearing between 35,000–40,000 
(interviewee, Ochora 2009), donor conference is similar to NGOs quarterly or yearly budgets. In 
July 2005 Ministry of Health report on mortality rates in the IDP camps, known as the “WHO 
Report” (Ugandan Ministry of Health 2005), and the Human Rights Watch report on the UPDF 
exactions on civilians (Human Rights Watch 2005b) were issued. With some rival emotional 
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declarations concerning the Uganda plight, ambassadors and foreign representatives called for 
action to put an end to the conflict (Perrot 2010: 192). An AVSI informant (2007) argues that lives 
of some returnees do not wait to balance financial budget books as NGOs usually do or wait for 
pledges. Direct relations with external world have not been so frequent, but relied mostly on media 
reports, books, few field visits by researchers. Acholi people were confined in their remote and 
trapped social realities and Acholi start-up-packages to rekindle kinships amongst themselves, 
lagged behind the modern process of any contemporary social transformation.  
Empirical evidence from NGO-field workers who work closely with track-three actors are not 
consistent with the grassroots’ perspectives, especially following on the nature and impact of 
NGOs workshops, capacity building and conferences. Their arguments are that empowering 
Acholi IDP-returnees that aim at supporting or even generating local struggles for social justice in 
respective VoRs are missing out the wider socio-structural changes. It is not proven that NGOs’ 
support to rebuild lineage-based social authority, strengthening political middle class and elites, 
and relying on traditional leadership lineage-based authority would consolidate socio-economic 
foundation of Acholi structure. Miall (2002) summarises that, conflict transformation emphasises 
on support needed for groups within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of 
outsiders. It also recognises that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or 
larger changes as well as specific steps by means of which a variety of actors may play important 
roles, in this case, inter-connectivity and relationship building. 
It was apparent that NGOs’ relationships with returnees carry a lot of manipulation of incentives to 
harmonise returnees’ realities to NGOs’ central missions in the fear of losing out their neutrality 
and independence to lobby governments and the UN to take actions (Reif 2002). The proliferation 
of individual initiatives led to cross-cutting and duplicative programmes. Given the high level of 
competition among donors, (international) NGOs and agencies seek to develop niches, 
sometimes creating programmes where they are not necessarily needed (Ginifer 2006). This is 
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not what may be required in VoRs, and NGOs support to rebuild societal relations may have come 
to the end of the road. 
7.4 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS OF ACHOLI PEOPLE  
The external and internal crises of Acholi people have not been mediated well by NGOs as seen 
above and in chapter three. Blind-eye diplomacy that blurred the naïve donors versus the realists 
did not improve external and internal relationships of Acholi people. A member of Acholi 
Parliamentary Group (2008 and 2009) argues in our interview that from the start of JPTs and 
return of IDPs to VoRs in Acholiland, donors, international NGOs and UN agencies disagreed on 
the poltical position to adopt on central issues left unexplored from JPTs.  
Between traditional diplomacy and the tougher policy of new external actors: some prominent UN 
Security Council Permanent Five (P5) members as well as some ambassadors, were irritated by 
the aggressive and jostling post-Westiphalian style of non-members (Perrot 2010: 197). The UN 
P5 member states include: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Within external actors, internal jealously has kept leadership for peace initiatives and the small 
emerging international actors mixed up with generous naïve donors who have good humanitarian 
intentions (Ibid.: 197). Reconciling Acholi people has not been an issue of these externally jealous 
actors. GoU played well and maintains good relationships with donor countries. Donors’ twofold 
diplomatic strategy has been relying on support for and in collaboration with the government on 
the one hand and constructive pressure on the other.  
In an interview with key government National Resistance Movement (NRM) politicians the support 
for Acholi internal to external bond must follow international legal lines too. The Uganda War 
Crimes Court (Jurist Legal News & Research 2008) support this argument even when the court 
has failed to familiarise its practical implementations. Not many people I spoke to know well about 
the Uganda special division court. UN and donors understand too well about their confrontation 
policy they have had. UK’s humanitarian diplomat John Holmes was being succeeded by 
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Canadian, Allan Rock, who gave a clear indication of shifting back to a realist approach. From mid 
1990s the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI), traditional leaders and most Acholi 
people would have preferred similar approach. ARPLI travelled widely around the world to explain 
the impact of not only the war, but also the traditional customs that unite Acholi. While the ICC 
stood its ground by insisting that the LRA leaders must be arrested and indicted in mid early 2000, 
the GoU took a side-step to prioritise a combination of traditional and retributive forms of justices. 
It is a new re-negotiating position of justice backed by Ugandan Judiciary Court system and Acholi 
traditional reconciliation mechanism.  
Besides, the Government policies of ending the war, national and regional reconciliation remains 
on paper. It has rendered reconciliation a fractured-concept. Uganda walked on a tightrope, 
oscilating between authoritarianism and democracy, restricting political liberties but enhancing 
freedom of speech, and using a very sophisticated grammar of half-restraint violence. National 
reconciliation initiatives to serve the wider national truth commissions, and local societal levels 
through Mato Oput were insulted and neglected by government officials. There has been fear in 
the government that any call for national reconciliation would require truth commissions that will 
also implicate key government officials. National reconciliation became a collective agenda for 
political discourse. Any social change agenda for national and local context, external and internal 
linkages to Acholi social authority have been kept away. Regionally, the enforcement of the South 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to create a separate country seem to impress 
political willingness to strengthen regional, external to internal Acholi relations.   
As seen before, any viable justice system without traditional system to address the massive 
internal broken-down relationships, externally driven justice may further fracture internal relations. 
Neighbouring districts would also find solace in the traditional system, but if the GoU is at its hub. 
Buckley-Zistel (2008: 140) clarifies that since the strategy of the government is mainly to create a 
unified nation … unification policies [rather than national reconciliation – my addition], top-down 
efforts are hard to influence relationships of turning war-torn society into one collective identity. 
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Buckley-Zistel (2008: 141) assures that this creates national identity that is, citizenship that can be 
a vehicle for overcoming cleavages that have led to violent conflict in the past. Such top-down 
influences have failed to establish any viable national truth commissions, now in its seventh 
attempts (chapter three). 
Buckley-Zistel’s point is that any proven unified reality of national to local influence of national 
identity only works when there are good leadership structure. In an interviewe with Otim Galdino 
(2009), without giving opportunities to local relationship to strengthen and rebuild their poor 
leadership structure in VoR, low levels of actions from the traditional and local population cannot 
create a unification of purpose that can address the external cause of the social crises. The need 
to bridge the existing generational gaps, integrate LRA-returnees into the communities and some 
top-LRA commanders is a challenge to social cohesion, realities and resources. Some of these 
commanders went back to their farms or assumed adult education, but not young ones. Although 
the government officials say that ex-LRA combatants have had nowhere to return to after leaving 
GUSCO and that decision to re-join government army was voluntary and of informed choices, 
there remained a wide gap in the nature of rebuilding societal relations from within Acholi IDPs-
returnees. Ex-LRA returnees are trained and taken back to CAR to fight their remaining abducted 
brothers who are still with the LRA. This worsens the Acholi external relations with own Acholi. 
Acholi elders believe that the root causes of the war, the fear of exterminating Acholi people and 
the lack of government political will is using Acholi people again as shields and spears in battle 
fields, just like it was when they were in “protected villages – IDPs” (interviewee, Akera [80 years 
old] 2006). These views were explained within the context of the historical, structural and cultural 
violence that caused the internal and external crises in Acholiland.  
The unclear labelling of the conflict as local, without classifying it as a national and regional crisis 
understaved the formulation and implementation of a clear policy by external actors towards 
Northern Uganda. In figure 2.6.3 periods of recovery in which the transformation of Acholi 
institution and social authority focuses on implementation policies for returnees. But such policies 
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remained at the top and middle levels only. Humanitarian bias used by external actor to analyse 
the conflict could not avoid the depoliticising of the conflict and its resolution. These participatory 
politics used by NGOs favoured humanitarian bias during crises management in Northern Uganda 
but failed returnees in respective VoRs. 
7.5 ACHOLI RELATIONSHIPS  EXTERNALLY – NGOS ’ REPRESENTATIVE 
ROLES  
Northern Ugandan insurgency extended into regional dynamics especially with South Sudan and 
DRC. Ugandan government continued to distract international attention by advancing internal 
military and political developments politics. It also prevented donors from intervening directy in the 
Ugandan political sphere, especially in the northern situation. When the northern situation was 
referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in late 2003, the LRA had been fighting the 
government for over fifteen years. ICC went ahead to issue arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and 
four of his top commanders in 2005. The role of ICC in Uganda was attacked as an effort to 
impose a partial and compromised “Western” form of justice, one which sets aside or ignores local 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and social reconciliation. The Acholi relationships became the 
more diluted case, making traditional reconciliation and justice being conceptually misunderstood. 
The contention is widened by the ICC pursuit of criminal justice. 
Generally, government officials who first supported referring the Northern Ugandan conflict to the 
ICC in pursuit of justice against LRA leaders turned against the referral. Many Acholi returnees 
think such a turn around by the government is a manipulation of justice, acting sometimes as free 
agents and certifiers to the international agenda and at the same time trying to improve on her 
relationships with donors. At the start of ICC investigation in Northern Uganda, UPDF had 
renewed its “Iron Fist” military offensive, crossing the so-called Red line for the first time 
(Brubacher 2010: 270). This evidence has shown that there has not been any uniformity when 
actions were required after reflections on what justice should be followed in the case of Northern 
Uganda.  
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After realising that the “drinking of a bitter root – Mato Oput” does not support convictions in 
criminal trials, ICC which was already termed a “briefcase of the white man” saw their officials 
sneaking in and out of Acholiland to talk to selected people (interviewee, Opoka 2009). Local ICC 
offices in Gulu and Kampala emerged (interviewee, Rwot Lugai 2009). For ICC to make justice a 
component of peace in Northern Uganda is difficult although some experiences of previous 
international criminal courts demonstrates that the pursuit of justice is linked to efforts arising from 
other actors in any context, including peace processes (Horowitz 1985; Mark 1995; Sisk 1996;  
Lake and Rothchild 1996; William and Scarf 2002). Probably this argument lies in the lak of trust 
Acholi people have in the government, thus denying elements of trust, so much needed in any 
reconciliation process. According to Lederarch (1999) elements of trust is attributed to 
acknowledgement of guilt and respect. Trust on the government is masured based on her pursit of 
criminal justice of ICC, Amnesty Act, to what Acholi people and what many LRA have preferred to 
respond to. The Amnesty Act pardoned 12,645 LRA-returnees and the overall total of 23,526 
(appendix C-3) including other former rebel groups. However, there has been assumptions on the 
functionality of Amnesty from the Uganda Amnesty Commissions (UAC). UAC called on the 
government for fresher amendment to cater for the presence of the ICC. Government judges 
argue that the old law which did not provide for the trial of people who committed attrocities 
against nationals be enacted because wrongdoers could use the old law to escape trial (New 
Vision 2010). Based on my informant (2009) Amnesty Act that brought out many ex-LRA 
combatants was high-jacked by the ICC and some Acholi lawyers supported the government. 
External relationships of Acholi people in the international community are sometimes mixed with 
principles and standards for accountability. The GoU holds some Acholi people accountable, as 
was previously mentioned. Oosterveld (2008) argues that issues of principles and standards for 
accountability mechanism classified community level issues, under general Acholi and clan based 
reconciliation are not taken into account in the ICC pre-trial chamber. 
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These minimise trust building amongst IDP-returnees that can become more fragile. For example, 
accepting and responding to amnesty has been hard, expressed in the local language as ada lit – 
the truth is painful. Top LRA leadership still reject amnesty and Kony maintains that LRA soldiers 
are his recruits not abductees. Kony’s statement increased fears that the government Amnesty 
Act was a tool to lure LRA and kill or imprison them once they take up the offer. To that effect, 
traditional chiefs started a radio programme called dwog-paco meaning “come back home”. Those 
who responded were a mixture of the highly traumatised children and few commanders 
(interviewee, Lugai 2008). Amnesty Act made an impact to work jointly with the traditional 
institutions (interviewee, Otinga 2009). Athough Amnesty Act and ICC have not made headways 
but traditional reconciliation remains acceptable mechanism to address truth-telling at the 
grassroots level (interviewee, Kitgum Teachers’ Association 2009).   
Other than political rhetoric of the government, ICC’s approach and traditional mechanisms have 
greatly hindered the wider conflict transformation goal. With the government, reconciliation 
remains an abstract rhetoric that continues to occupy verbal political space and not attracting 
actions. The national reconciliation aid foundation (NAREAF) delivered their concept paper in 
2001 outlining specific areas of NGOs, UN Agencies, and ICRC inadequacy to implement 
Amnesty laws.11 However, the interests and needs of returnees was not shared by UN agencies, 
HRW, ICC and GoU (Interviewee, Adong 2009). Any external relationships with the international 
community has to go through the GoU. Consequently, Acholi people have long known that the 
Government has been lying to them about ending the war and may not provide peace dividends 
and future developments (interviewee, Okello 2009).  
In a Museveni’s address in Gulu on the 12-20th December 2007 peace conference, the president 
wants to expose Acholi people to extensive farming and lift them to become middle class citizens. 
                                                             
11 When I met with the executive director of NAREAF, Mr Olowo-Sirrah Joseph in 2007, his organisation based in 
Kampala, Box 27356 suggested implementation issues by NGOs on issues of national reconciliation. It has not been 
heard off by the time I finalised this thesis. 
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However, his view about forgiving Kony was mixed. “I am surprised Acholi people are begging 
Kony for forgiveness when Kony should be begging Acholi people for forgiveness and reconcile 
with them. Kony is the one who wronged you and recently killed Otii. Kony has no right to kill 
anybody. Why did he kill Otii who was pro-peace? This showed that Kony is not for peace” 
(Musevein’s address in Gulu 2007). Museveni’s perceptions on peace separated forgiveness, 
truth and justice to the distinctively varying perception from that of Acholi people, religious leaders 
and peace facilitating NGOs. The President’s converging views to the ICC’s and HRW doctrine to 
prevent impunity and protect human rights minimises Acholi people’s views on forgiveness seen 
as a process of relinquishing one’s feelings and resentment and thoughts of vengeance and the 
process of fostering compassion, generosity and even love towards those who have afflicted pain. 
In other words Museveni wants Kony tried in a criminal court of justice in Uganda.  
Leaderach (1999) argues that forgiveness can be unilateral, that is to say, proceed from the levels 
of cognitive, emotional and spiritual, and of course, without forgetting what injustices have done, 
meaning the evils perpetrated by human agents needs to be confronted. Apology, repentance or 
acknowledgement of the past, willingness to suffer, unilateral and bilateral expressions of gesture, 
legal compensation, justice and restoration, making the past wrongs right and interpersonal 
versus executions of remorse are forms of forgiveness (Wrange 2009). Arendt says that 
forgiveness is a means to which repetitive cycle of violence ties new generations to sin of the past.  
Literatures remind us that reconciliation, forgiveness and mercy is definitely an issue of post-war 
societal relationships. Much as these elements exhibit social responsibility that must be shared, 
the external relations of Acholi people cannot precondition any future need for national 
reconciliation as the northern war was understood to have been theirs. In an interview with (Auma 
2009), the love of sharing, comes with giving. She argues that the LRA are abducted children and 
how can they be rejected since they share in us our humanity? Auma’s view is supported by the 
argument that Acholi society is now composed of perpetuators and victims in every households, 
individuals, clans and people. Throwing away one section of those perpetuators would also mean 
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throwing away own which we will result in people taking on one another as enemies. Auma argues 
that there is a degree of tolerance and measure for forgiveness that are required during the 
process of rebuilding the society (interviewee, Auma 2009). The younger generation only support 
and practice traditional mechanism of reconciliation in the context of maintaining the culture. The 
reality is that the war in Acholiland brought new identities and preferences for other traditional 
methods, probably a mixture of criminal and restorative justice system. 
While the traditional institutional mechanisms emphasise on consensus and confidence building, 
truth and acknowledgment, compensation and restoration of relationships are according to Acana 
(2009) lies in establishing “truth and clarification commission”. Acana’s (2009) view looks more 
into annexing regional reconciliation with the neighbouring South Sudan. Acholi reconciliation 
entails, honest acknowledgement of harm, sincere regrets and remorse from perpetuator, 
readiness to apologise to victims and victims to readily accept so as to set the process of letting 
anger and bitterness subside, addressing other grievances caused for accurate compensation and 
eventual mutual enriching relationships. As said already, Acholi traditional justice system is 
primarily about trust, voluntary process, compensation and restoration, a combination of rituals, 
sometimes leaving justice as un-attended to social phenomena. The desire for the expected 
process of reconciliation that sinks deep into as many areas as possible where there has been 
social break-down is a misnormer. The destruction of traditional institutions and rewinding the 
search for universal truth isn’t basic to the achievement of reconciliation in Acholi after so much 
suffering. However, seeking the truth has made it possible for neighbouring non-Acholis to 
express the need for regional reconciliation. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter is about rebuilding societal relationships of returnees in Acholiland. The relationships 
between Acholi IDPs-returnees and NGOs, CBOs and the government suggest that most village 
volunteers were formerly running their CBOs, who could forge better relationship with the people. 
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Their prescriptions is also hoped to link post-conflict Acholi people’s realities in rebuilding the 
Acholi homestage and Acholi-Acholi reconciliation for a wider national social inclusion in Uganda.  
Internal relationship amongst Acholi is context specific traditional societal reconciliation – Mato 
Oput. It is a ritual that does not necessarily play a replacement role of justice, rather a form of 
restorative justice. The roles NGOs and Government play in the local context of returnees 
confirms that people are the key, since people formulate and implement strategies, build socially 
organised structures, people invent and utilise technology. While the psychological obligation and 
moral fit remains with the offender, victims and the community are part of the moral fitness. It is 
not an issue of most NGOs. 
But, the concept of reconciliation remains open-textured although returnees, NGOs and GoU 
officials refence reconciliation to restoration of broken relationships. Reconciliation is a journey 
with a purpose, but justice seems to be misunderstood in Acholiland. The returnees are stuck in 
the middle between NGOs, the government and LRA. The tension between intentional 
intervention by NGOs to IDP-returnees are minimised by government officials and international 
community mainly ICC. Explicit relational fears about LRA re-emergence washed away hopes and 
goals of the returnees in terms of affectivity and interdependence in VoR. This view represents 
reconciliation as one dimension of peacebuilding that promotes co-existence between LRA and 
Acholi people, but initiatives differed in terms of means to achieve it within the units of analysis. 
Two levels of analysis to restore broken relationships discussed the nature of relationship with 
both the GoU and LRA. The first asked for specific and multifaceted roles of NGOs to represent 
Acholi views in the national and international fora – reconciliation to pain of the past. The other 
level is the nature of the process (preparing for future co-existence) that includes individuals and 
the collective ways of dealing with trauma and pain. 
Earlier, Buckley-Zistel (2008: 21, 140) suggests that conflict transformation seeks to encourage 
wider social change amongst antagonistic parties to the conflict. But key players in post-conflict 
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reconciliation processes are often governments and non-governmental organisations. The 
government and NGOs understand reconciliation as a thing of the past, exercised in the post-
conflict peaceful environment where the seeds of co-existance create calm, truth, peace, mercy, 
justice and transparency if they exist in the protagonists’ wish. The diverging perspectives from 
government officials show the consistently rhetorically preferred top-down unification policies of 
constitutional rights than ethnically sectored reconciliation. Government officials’ understanding of 
reconciliation is shallow and runs parallel to Acholi-returnees needs, hinders the wider goals of 
rebuilding broken relationships. Returnees perceive this not as representative of their views 
although their priorities were on peace first over justice.  
The need for reconciliation was shared by many, but would only relay common knowledge. 
Returnees felt that there were no realistic sensitivities to their need to promote co-existence. This 
contradicts Desmond Tutu’s vision of Ubuntu where returnees widely believe that “you are one of 
those reconciliation people”. Like in Northern Ireland, Acholi people are ready for peace, but 
reconciliation takes two, which is hard to establish in a victim-perpetrator and perpetrator-victim 
environment. There seem to be more emphasis on forgiveness which can be unilateral to UPDF 
and LRA. IDPs express reconciliation to be coming in instalments, a process-oriented to seed 
social reality that must be allowed to germinate amongst returnees. The seemingly frustrating IDP-
returnees’ views is that actors like the European communities and World Bank come too close for 
comfort with the implementing NGOs working locally, likewise, NGOs have come too close for 
comfort with the governments, leaving grassroots population stuck in the middle. In the case 
where the government seem detached from returnees, the space offered for social change is 
suppressed once NGOs try to bridge the gap of independence with returnees. For NGOs, 
reconciliation becomes a thing of the past with new gaps and challenges yet to be identified. With 
mixed roles from NGOs sometimes acting as free-agents, those that adapted native mode of 
operations, the hearts-left-home and dual-citizen experts, the Acholi-returnees remain with 
reconciliation as their social responsibility. This is clearly seen where individuals and LRA 
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returnees have to face a sense of collective social responsibility, which primarily does not exist 
when it comes to compensations. NGO workers and government officials tend to balance societal 
relationship building with their budgets and merited achievements. Interviews with NGO workers 
and FGDs (2009) term some NGO workers as self-seekers who individually seek merits or wage 
earnings. That, NGOs tend to service only livelihood irrespective of entering into a new phase of 
post-war recovery.  
In an interview with a UPDF army official (2009) government officials are keen to let go the LRA 
returnees but quite a number of ex-LRA are co-opted into army professions. The experiences of 
the past, present and future is recycling Acholi people into the army to fight LRA in the bush. Many 
Acholi elders argue that such acts exploit justice at the expense of peace, but the community is 
locked in the middle. Since the government sees reconciliation as a need to the unification of 
democratic process in the country, the facilitative roles of NGOs tend to hinder the wider section of 
rebuilding societal relations. The middle hybrid transitional justice (War-Crime Division) cannot 
serve the local context since trials and tribunals leads to self-victimisation and resentment within 
the returnees. If peace is a precondition anchored on justice, substantive cases that reflect on 
lessons-learnt should now provide a fairly smoother social contract (HRW May 2009). 
This chapter adds vital knowledge about the distinguishing types and degrees of reconciliation 
within the desired peaceful environment of co-existence. Three types and degrees of relational 
transformation leading to reconciliation emerged to first take a surface reconciliation of non-lethal 
co-existance between Acholi people and LRA returnees. Secondly, there is a shallow 
reconciliation of parallel lives with of grassroots population with the GoU and ICC. The third 
degree is the deeper reconciliation of the community, which seem to be missing. With the different 
degrees of reconciliation at play, Acholi people remain stuck between a rock and hard place in 
VoRs with very lose lineage-based and lesser authoritative social structure.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: IN CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
My research is about the roles NGOs play in post-war social recovery following grassroots 
perspectives in a post-war social setting after over twenty years of war in Acholiland, Northern 
Uganda. The findings are discussed in light of the objectives set to answer the research questions 
using the analytical framework (sub-section 2.6) to underpin grassroots perspectives of Acholi 
people discussed in (sub-section 8.2). Grassroots perspectives focuses on how far and why 
NGOs’ roles may/can facilitate mobilisation and/or support in rebuilding the once broken-down 
lineage-based social authority and relationships in Acholiland. The overall framework is discussed 
in sub-section 8.2. 
While there are abundant literatures on NGOs with their evolution from CSOs (sub-section 2.2), 
there are on the other hand, meagre literatures on NGO interactions with traditional authority in 
war affected societies in Sub-Saharan Africa and how these literatures evolved over time and 
why. This study highlights critical pot-war social recovery issues of rebuilding Acholi lineage-based 
social reconciliation and social authoritative institutions, and suggests that there are still significant 
shortcomings to overcome (sub-section 8.1.1). At the same time, the comparative nature of the 
research, the limits in breadth and global trends limited the scope of the research conclusions. 
The limitations in such a complex subject area, particularly in the methodology (sub-section 8.3.2) 
is discussed. However, findings from my research in Acholiland offer interesting areas for further 
investigation and draw conclusions from the nature of the research process itself. 
8.1.1 METHODS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
The roles of NGOs in post-conflict recovery can be contentious and involve a separation of 
inflated expectations from what is achievable. The social realities of Acholi returnees show this 
clearly in that the theoretical and idealistic approaches are frequently over-ridden by practical 
concerns such as funding limitations. This has limited the roles, expectations and image of NGOs 
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as deliverables are reduced. Insights on this came from multiple respondents operating in a 
context where NGOs are the main source of survival for former IDP-returnees in Acholiland. 
Peacebuilding and conflict transformation involves individuals, returnees, organisations, 
respective governments and international actors  playing a role of producing a complex web of 
activities with multiple aims and objectives. At the same time, there is no post-conflict 
reconstruction model that is universally valid, because it is contextual and difficult with NGOs and 
many actors who would be producing differences in the pressures and mixtures of activities.   
The complexity of peace building as is rooted in its own history, culture and the particularities of 
the war makes NGO roles difficult to carry out. In this study, Northern Uganda is held to highlight 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the literature  (sub-section 2.3) and its relevance to the roles 
of NGOs and CSOs (sub-section 2.5). The analytical framework (2.6) concentrates on the 
empirical reality of returnees and the clash of ideals with the roles of NGOs which seem to 
overlook many of complexities and paradoxes to the modalities of non-state interventions.  
8.2  THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The core contribution to knowledge arising from this study is the evidence found in the grounded 
reality of Acholi returnees and how this relates to the approaches and ideology of NGOs. There 
are two major cross-cutting issues: Firstly, the rebuilding of  Acholi lineage-based social authority 
(chapter six); and, secondly, the relationships surrounding social reconciliation (chapter seven). 
The analysis that has been applied throughout in this study follows on post-structuralism’s 
conception, basing the idea on the ‘transformation approach’. This contribution incorporates the 
wider socio-political sources of conflict (sub-section 5.2), with the modalities of how NGOs can 
transform negative energy of war for long-term positive socio-political changes (Fisher et. al 
2000). My peacebuilding framework in sub-section 2.6 is deployed to firstly analyse NGOs’ 
typologies with the purpose of understanding the levels of actors (Knox and Quirk 2000, Lederach 
1993, 1995, 1997 and 2001) and NGOs’ activities. The framework is deployed to find out how far 
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NGOs played a role in supporting and mobilising IDP-returnees after Acholiland experienced 
crises in the breakdown- of lineage-based social authority and in the -relationships during the war.  
It is used to analyse how far Acholi IDP-returnees were involved in defining their models of post-
war social recovery and how they related to particular types of NGOs. The distinguishing activities 
of NGOs tend to vary not only in the levels but also in the social, economic, socio-psychological 
and spiritual changes and activities they apply and consequently in the way that impacts on the 
lives of returnees. This role created more gaps between some Acholi elites and grassroots 
population. The variation is widened by the respective NGOs’ codes of conducts, lessons learnt, 
the size of their funding and adaptability to grassroots environment (sub-section 3.4.1).  
My framework of analysis moves on from Lederach’s general peacebuilding framework in that the 
Lederach framework lacks no order of priorities for NGOs to undertake. In addition, there are also 
problems associated with NGOs coordination and allocation of resources on practicalities of 
engagement and actions needed in post-conflict environments as well as unclear and 
contradictory international approaches to co-ordination and engagement. A mismatch is found to 
exist between the high visibility granted to NGOs by high level officials and the amount of practical 
knowledge generated by NGOs on the ground about the conflict itself and the issues of 
peacebuilding. In particular, the publicly stated aims of many NGOs to address the root causes of 
the war in Northern Uganda were not matched by their actions or activities on the ground.  
The enhanced Lederach framework is designed to build on the arguments raised in sub-section 
5.2 where the GoU’s problem-solving approach in Acholiland is found to have illustrated the 
subjective nature of perceptions and definition of Acholi crises, sometimes based on NGOs expert 
analysis as well as Southern Ugandan prejudices. The findings suggest that there are those 
NGOs who have acted as dual-citizens (counter productive to the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-
based social authority) and those who maintain a level of preconceived ideas about the war and 
about the nature of rebuilding Acholi society (not very supportive of grassroots needs). In addition, 
the nature of LRA modalities, realities and hyper-realities shaped  perceptions of the Acholi in 
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general and led to value-based judgement on future solutions for Acholi people after the war. In 
this context, NGOs may not be entirely able to facilitate post-war peace building and social 
recovery (research question 1.1) and similarly implement the representative nature of NGOs’ roles 
(research question 1.2.1).   
8.2.1. STRENGTHENING THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The strongest support to the framework of analysis came from empirical data, analyses and 
improvement to the combined framework on findings in chapters five, six and seven. While 
Lederach’s peacebuilding framework is considered comprehensive, other complementary 
contributions from Miall’s post-settlement framework were adapted to suit the objectives of this 
study.  
Two specific areas of findings have strengthened and contributed to the improvement of the 
combined framework. The first being on the insufficient attention of NGOs’ roles in rebuilding 
social structures (lineage-based authority) and in using traditional mechanisms that might provide 
legitimacy amongst the Acholi. The improved framework allows discussion of particular types of 
NGOs which are better suited to activities within different levels of interventions that may include 
traditional as well as more technical modes of operation. Levels of NGOs activities, the typology of 
NGOs involved and the activities they engaged in to support post-war social recovering Acholi 
population has clearly shown that direct and indirect services can be matched with NGOs’ 
typologies for various activities at the different levels during recovery. This can enable NGOs 
within this framework to follow NGOs’ actions before, during and after return to VoRs.  
It does concur with Lederach’s model in that, such a study would not pre-empt the prevention to a 
relapse into another war, thus breaking social relationships and destruction of social structures. 
This criticism comes mainly from positivists that claim that every intervention becomes itself part 
of a conflict system that needs to be analysed and planned accordingly and separately (Bloomfield 
and Schmelzle 2006: 6). The framework also attempts to improve on ways of understanding 
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particular levels and forms of conflict and the differences from structured violence (Ross 1993: 35 
and Vivienne 1996: 60-61). Lederach did not explain this, especially at the outbreak of any 
particular incident of violence or where conflict needs to direct attention to forces which makes 
returnees more or less prone to conflict than another. It can be concluded that although various 
typologies of NGOs deal with various activities, they actually leave structurally embedded social 
issues of post-war social burden, raising more disappointment on NGOs (see sub-section 8.3 
below). The overall view remains that social transformation underlies structural and context 
specific conflicts, coupled with many invisible actors. This study projects the empirical realities of 
returnees in the post-war social recovery as are opposed to the ideal roles of NGOs that fails to 
address structural causes of conflicts. At the same time, the study finds that the process of post-
conflict integration and peacebuilding is far more complex and political than that recognised within 
the technical models usually applied by international NGOs, and also more expensive than many 
of their budgets. 
The second is on rebuilding relationships and the representative roles of NGOs that assisted in 
the support of humanitarian crises and the subsequent methods of survival and hope for peace. 
Miall’s framework can be applied by NGOs outlining several core practices that are useful in 
addressing social conflict from a transformational approach. This study finds useful ways of 
developing a capacity to see presenting issues as a window; the capacity to recognise what sorts 
of processes and time frames that may be needed to address the different kinds of change. The 
framework developed in this study can be used to enable NGOs to more clearly identify goals and 
seek innovative options for action. NGOs and grassroot communities can develop a capacity to 
make complexity of war-related social issues more user friendly for both returnees and 
Governments. This was shown in chapter seven that developing a capacity to hear and engage 
the voice of identity and relationship can serve as a nexus between internal and external need for 
rebuilding relationships in Acholiland.  
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Rebuilding social structures (lineage-based authority) requires a lot of campaigning, lobbying and 
representing the local context to the national and international forum, so as to stop the violence. 
The role of NGOs in advocating and campaigning against GoU’s military intervention has been 
one of interlocution and of encouraging a discourse between different elements with interests in 
the conflict but at different times they have been less than direct in dealing with the core problems.  
In Northern Uganda, the methodological make-up of NGOs’ actions did not play much 
advocacy/campaigning role in denouncing military intervention in view of local support during 
military operational options. At such times, the scope of transformation by NGOs in the interim and 
medium-term was limited to responsive and contingency roles (figure 2.5.2), advocacy and relief 
aid distribution (figure 2.6.1). The GoU controlled the situation although some local initiatives like 
ARLPI and APG advocated that Northern Uganda be declared a disaster region. In this sense, the 
international NGOs were followers rather than leaders of the discourse. 
While the political, social, economic and international responses continued to attract NGOs 
regionally and internationally, the wide range of state and non-state actors participating in 
peacebuilding in the region meant that much had to be assimilated and led to the discouragement 
of many local initiatives. This was destructive to rebuilding of local social structures and local 
relationships with neighbouring districts and regions. For example, the intervention of the ICC, the 
Uganda’s hybrid justice mechanisms and the grassroots preference for traditional system of 
restorative justice of Mato Oput were a national and internal mismatch to the overall needs of 
justice amongst returnees. The JPTs succeeded in negotiating passages of LRA out of Northern 
Uganda and many LRA-returnees went directly to either traditional chiefs, GUSCO, families, 
NGOs or joined the UPDF rather than participating in a more regular DDR programme that could 
be managed. However, during the later periods of JPTs, NGOs provided economic support to the 
peace process.  
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The eventual reconstruction that did take place in fragile states after the war, actually provided an 
outcome that offered implicit psychosocial support to the Acholi people. The local coping 
mechanisms that allowed them to return to their respective villages relied on the expectation that 
NGOs’ support would continue, the GoU will stop the LRA from returning to Northern Uganda and 
justice (ICC) will halt it persuit of LRA leaders in the name of peace. However, the role of NGOs in 
supporting local integration of grassroots returnees (vertical and horizontal) into cooperative and 
equitable regional and global structures - as recommended by Lederach - was missing. This was 
mainly because there was little or sometimes no horizontal links between NGOs’ actors or links 
with the grassroots population.  
Appendix B-7.2 summarises the level of intervention (analysis and action) based on the dimension 
(personal, relational - reconciling or to be reconciled (sub-section 5.5.4 and chapter 7), structured 
lineage-based social authority (5.5.2 and chapter 6) and in the cultural norms (fighting against bad 
culture derived from IDP-Camps). The added value of this study is that the scope of 
transformation addressed both horizontal and vertical dimensions in addressing the systemic and 
structural institutional building of Acholi lineage-based authority and social relations that NGOs 
might deploy in future. This was done by analysing grassroots perspectives on NGO roles, 
particularly in relating to indirect service provision. Both dimensions are actually mono-casual and 
linear in practice. Again, the direct service provision by NGOs -- in terms of empowerment to the 
grassroots level - took workshops, seminars, and meetings formats and methods to design 
grassroots actions to meet grassroots needs. In reality, however, the structural transformations 
were mainly offered by the local government levels and many actual grassroots perspectives were 
ignored on provision of schools ( teachers), health centres (with medicine and staff) (see figure 
2.6.2).   
The role of NGOs in peace-making which should have been directed towards reconciling political 
and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation at elite and local 
level took varied perspectives (chapter seven). Again the horizontal and vertical integration of 
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international action with internal relationships amongst Acholi people (sub-section 7.2) missed out 
the context specific traditional practices of Acholi people since the middle class seemed to be 
missing or are just resurfacing. Without the help of NGOs, the middle class Acholi elites some of 
who are parliamentarians advocated for national truth commission. In this situation, the grassroots 
perspectives on the role of NGOs stagnated since people concentrated to meeting basic 
physiological needs (Maslow’s view) which reduced the emphasis on social reconciliation needs. 
Instead, many Acholi people are beginning to form social realities of individualism rather than 
universial (community) social linkages. This implies that the process of transformation can be 
viewed as a complex matrix similar to MaxNeef’s system and structures of satisfiers. For example, 
security needs, using land for investment have made more subjective impacts on returnees than 
waiting for resettlement packages (food, shelter and blankets) from NGOs, or to wait for the  GoU 
to allow return to respective villages.  
Where the need for traditional social reconciliation Mato Oput arose, four major elements (mercy, 
truth, peace and justice) actually confirmed Lederach’s design that exercising mercy, returnees 
were living with hope and support from NGOs. Trust building was expressed as an important 
element between the locals and returnees and that would be cemented if there was any functional 
government truth commission. Acknowledgement of guilt from former LRA returnees and 
commanders was widely practiced but at the same time not much of that came from UPDF, and 
yet both UPDF and LRA are viewed as perpetrators. This dynamic has allowed Mato-Oput 
reconciliation processes to rebuild relations and has changed local ways of understanding peace 
as a priority before justice. The dynamics also defined and understood peace as “co-existence”, 
living in “harmony” with other family members, mainly done along village- clan- or chieftainship-
lineages (jami pa kaka) meaning clan issues. These findings increased understanding of social 
reconciliation and allowed recognition by grassroots population based on reconciliation.  
The first approach was expressed as a means of dealing with the pain of the past and, the second 
was to prepare for the future co-existence with/between victims/ perpetuators. In both cases, 
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NGOs’ roles have not gone deep enough to provide practical co-existence to returnees, an 
element defined locally from achieved peace as a form of reconciliation process. NGOs therefore 
remain on the outside of these processes. In addition, the GoU excluded itself from both forms of 
social reconciliations (based on the past) and (looking into the future). Therefore, social 
reconciliation remained the community’s responsibilities along with the accompanying social 
burden. The burden continues to destroy the strong memory and coping mechanisms of the 
interpersonal forgiveness that had strong links to amend relationships in the past, and is now 
being interpreted based on NGOs’ world views within the historical memory reconstruction of the 
Acholi people. The concealed feelings of hatred and desire for future revenge may not be entirely 
overcome, leaving residual issues such as a desire for revenge, alienation and resentment. 
However, NGOs did facilitate the process of peaceful coexistence that resulted in surface-level 
social reconciliation that reduces non-lethal actions but is really a partial form of co-existence. 
Some of this style of social reconciliation is happening between some LRA-returnees, IDP-
returnees, neighbouring districts and the GoU. However, this is likely to remain at the surface level 
since the deeper forms of reconciliation associated with truth commissions are unlikely to be 
developed.  
Social justice was another important element of social reconciliation. Galtung (1990: 293) views 
social justice to be in the structural/systematic violence that was intended/unintended to harm, 
irreversible beyond the visible or invisible and are customised. Within Acholi context, justice was 
vividly explained as restorative, not retributive. The difference was also found in the process-
orientation of restorative justice as having elements of community moral continuity starting with 
peace then justice (Lee 1996: 78). From social reconciliation to rebuilding of lineage-based social 
authority, this study concludes that the act of violence in Acholiland left returnees stuck between 
peace and co-existence, peace and justice and restorative and criminal justice respectively. Social 
reconciliation is faced with the hard choice to distinguish victims of justice from victims of violence.  
259 
 
The ARLPI have been encouraging traditional reconciliation of the Acholi which is part of social 
interactive process to adopt an informal structure of social reconciliation. What is lacking are 
NGOs’ incentives to motivate both vertical and horizontal social integration that has made Acholi-
returnees stagnant, lack creativity and innovations, feeling of powerlessness and hopelessness. 
ARLPI expresses the need to include daily church prayers for peace in an informal structure of 
social reconciliation, in conformity to the fear in God, and live in hope. Lederach, himself a 
Mennonite from the group of spiritual community, stress the need for spiritual elements and 
practices when he developed his peace building framework amongst divided societies in the mid-
1980s. What is unique in ARLPI recommendations is that in the history of early missionary arrival 
in Uganda, churches never accepted the mixtures of church prayers and traditional practices. 
Neither the ICC nor Human Rights Watch groups have accepted traditional mechanisms, and 
would only do so if certain conditions were met. The paradoxical remix of LRA’s Christian and 
Islamic doctrine with the ideological and actions are unique, confusing and do not comform to 
NGOs’ levels of activity interventions. 
The contributions most spiritual discussions bring in this study are that the changing social and 
cultural NGOs’ orientations to support returnees can actually yield positive peace once followed 
and funded by providing a source or form of spiritual healing that may enhance peace and social 
transformation. This is particularly powerful because of the LRA motivation to fight a spiritual war 
with the aim of changing the social and cultural structures of Acholi society. The LRA model was 
rejected and since the GoU’s political will has been low, NGOs were most hoped for. However, the 
post-war social study reveals that NGOs did not clearly meet the goals of rebuilding social 
authoritative structure. The ICC in fact stands in the way to make practical implementation of the 
symbolic day to day social reconciliation Acholi people use (see below sub-section).  
No viable truth commission (TC) designed to bridge the gap between peace and justice was ever 
successfully implemented in the entire history of Uganda (Quinn 2007). The practical realities of 
truth commissions that are perceived by returnees, politicians, government and international 
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actors only rest with Acholi opposition politicians. TC proposals are either contradicted or 
neglected at the national level. The core reasons for this are the view that TCs in Northern 
Uganda are ‘unbecoming’ but also that a TC represents a risk to the GoU and to some specific 
officials as well as the LRA.  Within this scenario, NGOs have largely remained out of the debate, 
concentrating on the more tactical issues and their usual operations and business-as-usual, 
outwardly espousing impartiality and neutral roles, whilst the government asserts their political 
authority.  
It was clear from the analysis that NGOs do not assess and/or disclose their own risks adequately 
before pursuing work in the public sphere. If they do, they tend to adjust the risks amongst the 
organisational members (experts) so as to make the public have the impression that they are 
doing something worthwhile. Such low risk assessment and apathy creation frees public 
authorities of their responsibilities which can only be discovered after NGOs have left. In Northern 
Uganda, too many NGOs, some without experience, were operating government recommended 
programmes partly because of funding but also partly because of government backing. Within 
Lederach’s and Miall’s combined framework, NGOs working in that manner cared more about 
governmental policies and international donor programmes than grassroots. Barakat and Chard 
(2002: 817-835) argue that NGOs and INGOs offer politically global rhetoric that masks the 
contradictory aims pursued in the field. In Northern Uganda, this study finds that NGOs assumed 
tasks to provide direct and indirect services that seemed to give the government more attention 
than the grassroots population, thus mirroring this view.  
There were consistent perspectives from returnees about NGOs practical implementation of 
building peace through socio-economic reconstruction and development. This was held by most 
returnees who were being critical to the lack of support for long-lasting development to maintain 
the current peace through IGAs. However, the systemic actions of NGOs that was required to 
empower/transform, build the capacity of returnees for better services, change the attitudes and 
improve on social institutions targeted only those EVIs/PSNs (identifying gaps after return). The 
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target was underestimating that the entire Acholi population are EVIs/PSNs. NGOs working on 
psychosocial issues of war, like GUSCO, over-emphasised on material conditions of addressing 
the social life of LRA returnees that further constrained the psychosocial development of 
returnees’ full potentials. For example, GUSCO would take between two to three weeks to re-
orient LRA-returnees before relocating them to respective relatives. Basically, NGOs working in 
this area showed traversing roles from advocacy, relief distribution, policy and fund raising, but 
only to a lesser extent try to empower and transform the lives of LRA-returnees (figure 2.6.2). 
Post-war social recovery has hugely attracted government manipulations based on incentives 
arising from NGOs which in turn jeopardised their [NGO] missions and neutrality. For example, 
working with victims, free access to higher offices and seeking funds from donors opened up 
many NGOs for manipulation. It was apparent in this study that the GoU took advantage of such 
NGO actions, especially where relief/advocacy was combined with empowerment/transformation 
in the post-war stages. The PRDP was a government initiative but a “suitcase without portfolio”. 
The government proclaimed that PRDP money was being used to drill bore holes in Pabo, for 
example, when it was actually the NRC doing it. This controversy implies that Lederach’s peace 
building framework should look at particular periods of recovery and at the deployment of 
inappropriate responses, since the local context relayed a different story to the theory. Miall’s idea 
that, say, in the period of IDP stay in IDP-camps, short-term responsive contingency was 
appropriate, while during returns, medium-term responses and incentives actually works well. But 
where agriculture decides the long term future of returnees, NGOs’ support was still needed 
because of the costs and risks of starting an agricultural enterprise. However, NGOs left the long-
term rebuilding of lineage-based social authority and relational and socio-economic well-being of 
returnees either to the returnees themselves or to the GoU and therefore performed a partial 
rebuilding rather than a comprehensive transformation. There was no order of priority in the 
activities as returnees continued to view themselves as victims and as qualified EVIs/PSNs.  
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8.3 ROLES OF NGOS – THE GOOD AND THE BAD 
The war in Northern Uganda did not follow fragile states argument where post-war reconstruction 
resources would require external financial assistance, like in Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia and 
many more. In most African intrastate conflicts, Northern Ugandan war was generated by 
systemic and structured impediments, of which impacts to the local population simultaneously 
experienced elusive peace amidst eventual recovery (Laurie 2000:212). Financial assistances 
from the international community came both from NGOs and international communities, the need 
Acholi returnees required to rebuild their social structure and social reconciliation. However, the 
case of Northern Uganda, amongst others, attracts warnings from post-structuralisms on NGOs 
that NGOs’ code of conduct manual like that of IA, Fisher’s, LPI’s, Anderson’s Do-No-Harm and 
others in sub-section 2.4, not to rely too much on outsiders. Despite these, Uganda’s militarised 
politics, post-war social recovery policy, poverty reduction, human capital and attempts to work on 
hopelessness and accumulated fears of rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social authority has not 
given NGOs success story from returnees. NGOs still do badly even when they continue to add 
value to the national development process and/or work closely with grassroots. 
In Northern Uganda, a number of scaling issues like, the simplistic criminalising of LRA by the 
GoU and the branding of the LRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation diffused the realist discussions 
which changed the attitude of donors. This made it difficult to follow on roles NGOs played in 
representing Acholi crises to the international, regional and/or national levels. NGOs mobilised 
huge financial support in the rush to compete and establish themselves in Northern Uganda. 
NGOs are not democratic institutions and they work from the basis of fulfilling funders’ 
requirements and gaining access to resources. This made NGOs relied heavily on objective, 
bureaucratic and often centrally produced criteria, rather than on sustained contact between 
skilled and experienced staff and local partners in Acholiland. NGOs focused heavily on budgets 
and funding which normally leads to short-termism that made them become too rigid on post-war 
recovery, too little or sometimes, paradoxically, too much and too fast withdrawal. Too many 
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competitions have led NGOs in Acholiland to adapt a “hoop-jumping” activity mode of operation 
leading to Government’s introduction of strict policies and regulations on NGOs like in Burundi, 
Rwanda, East Timor, and Afghanistan.  
NGOs’ lack of justice-based approaches to bringing social order using a legislated act in 
parliament than traditional approaches, for example in resolving land disputes left most returnees 
without hope. Now, there are massive land disputes. Traditional leaders need funding to support 
in the rebuilding of social authority, but, what is untold is that NGOs are also weak in negotiations 
with the international funders, unlike governments or other international bodies. Many projects 
were closed down half way through the proposed project period and failed to support rebuilding 
social structure and reconciliation. Because it is not part of NGOs mandate, the implication of the 
justice-based support to develop the human capital by providing new skills to VoRs was neglected 
in post-war social recovery. Instead, the role of NGOs in capacity building has been widely 
applauded, a positive contribution to empowering returnees to rebuild social relationships and 
understand social structure of Acholiland. NGOs’ interventions brought changes in behaviours, 
identity, levels of income (IGAs), job opportunities, alcohol consumption and self-reflecting 
cognitive ability to cope with change.  
Conflicting roles between NGOs and the GoU, especially, where sectored projects and 
collaboration is expected generated structural problems in that, the widespread corruption exist 
between NGOs and GoU officials. NGOs and the GoU did not consider the wider need of 
rebuilding the internal and external crises in Acholiland. This research finds that where NGOs’ 
sector programmes and government initiatives are to be implemented, the various NGOs’ codes 
of conducts, policies and principles keep local projects unfulfilled, uncompleted or relocated 
somewhere else (see subsection 8.3). This explains why many returnees view NGOs as have 
been complacent with GoU who did not represent enough of their problems to the international 
communities. It also explains why NGOs’ identities were difficult to differentiate, just like in 
Afghanistan where NGOs, UN agencies and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) workers 
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were referred to as “muzzesi” [organisations]. The perception of Afghani people based on the fact 
that muzzesi are promoters of Western (or American) values and principles, while other Afghani 
people would consider it as democratisation, liberalisation and emancipation. Consequently, this 
similar perspective has also lead Acholi people to conclude that both the GoU and NGOs share 
the same bed, leaving them with even a more difficult social burden and dependency. The culture 
of dependency is also viewed as a form of neo-colonialism by middle class elites and politicians.  
The overall scope of NGOs’ roles could be seen as destructive to the rebuilding of Acholi lineage-
based social authority, identity and to the preservation of traditional Acholi values because of 
NGOs’ budgetary constrains in post-war reconstruction. Other reason is based on the objective 
selectivity of NGOs’ projects who focus on short-term humanitarian relief aid which fails to address 
returnees’ long term assessments and priorities of post-war social recovery. For example, hut 
construction for EVIs/PSNs is short-term, while traditional chiefs’ needs to strengthen Acholi social 
authority, which is long-term, turned against chiefs that they [chiefs] are the conduits of 
government mouthpiece and whose financial dispossessions are taken advantage of by the state. 
To that effect, Acholi traditional authority body (KKA) is believed to be behaving as an NGO. This 
posed hugely implicated on GoU’s and NGOs’ policies and practices, because what NGOs ought 
to do (the required actions) in post-war peacebuilding is believed to be consensual on the linkages 
between policy and practice (Barakat and Chard 2002: 817-835, and Llamazares 2005: 28) and 
with the grassroots population. 
This study confirms that policies of post-war society tend to change more frequent and faster than 
its day to day practice, especially where NGOs become the middle man between governments 
and local contexts. NGOs are rebuked by local population for extreme incomes, high standard of 
living conditions and formation of elitism in a post-war recovering society. The good part of NGOs’ 
roles are that, the nature of what NGOs’ have done in Acholiland tried to depend on local 
circumstances, similar to the case of Moldova where for example, acute shortages of clean water 
minimised the tradition of dependency by people asking for help to develop their skills instead 
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[building local capacity]. NGOs were also able to pass on information and skills to encourage a 
more active citizenship role in Moldova, Sierra Leone and Liberia, to mention but a few. It is clear 
in Northern Uganda that NGOs generally moved further away from voluntarism to professionalism 
(subsection 2.2). Their [NGOs] management codes of conducts have become more rational and 
often more controlled from the centre and nationally. In Acholiland, the policies of NGOs’ project-
based management lacked proper design of exit strategies because such exit strategies did not 
anymore follow track two and three policy orientation that most funders and donors need. This left 
Acholi returnees stuck between expectation for continued relief aid and what would come from 
NGOs for long term post-war social reconstruction support.  
Positively, NGOs are actually continuing to develop their capacities to act as counter weights to 
donor pressures and at the same time engaging with policy debates. Few NGOs are able to work 
with such policies of donor agencies, international departments and countries to generate support 
needed in the innate characteristics of returnees, like the EVIs/PSNs, elderly, widows and 
orphans, younger generation who only knew camp lives. Much as the policy of voluntariness to 
return to villages of origin (IDP-Policy 2006) took the major part in the lives of returnees, the return 
environment called for exploring the wider embedded socio-economic advancements and socio-
political freedom (chapter seven).  
NGOs’ actions are still globally “branded” with the emphasis placed on humanitarian actions, not 
development, because aid architectures are changing with new options, treats and new 
opportunities. Acholi grassroots perspectives remained hopeful that NGOs will support them in 
rebuilding Acholi lineage-based social structure. Within the typology framework discussed earlier 
on, NGOs were subcontracted to work not for profit, leaving most Acholi civil society outside the 
confines of branding global aid a form on neo-colonialism. By making future choices globally, 
country-wise, sector-wise, locally, NGOs lose genuine struggle on how-to-do-it in supporting or 
franchising on the value of independence with governments rather than IDPs. In a case like 
Northern Uganda, NGOs’ complacency and complementarity roles were not decided from the 
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local context alone, but global and state laden with value-added government intricacies. Locally, 
NGOs operated in Acholiland up to a very high track one level and vice versa. The impacts are 
seen at the local level of family demography, education policy for returnees in Acholiland, which is 
characterised by the culture of migrating further to better schools in Kampala and not in Northern 
Ugandan villages. This is common amongst secondary and advanced level students who go to 
schools with the hope of working with NGOs. The Government’s policy of free Universal Primary 
Education and Universal Secondary Education (UPE/USE) education is inconsistent to practice. 
This is because, firstly the quality of free education is appalling and secondly, the policy of 
pushing or pulling returnees to VoRs has never made social realities of returnees any better rather 
than increased social burden and imbalanced the normalcy after return.  
In general, Acholi-returnees perceive NGOs to be working towards fulfilling specific missions, 
improved organisational culture and outsourced support, making them [NGOs] dominate local and 
national peacebuilding constituencies. Any new NGO strategy of communication with the 
government and grassroots population can act as guidelines and/or code of conduct that can 
serve as a basis for a normative framework for NGO activities and their employees. This helps 
NGOs who are poor in giving feedback to conduct needs and impact assessments on how to 
forge relationship building and rebuild lineage-based social authority. Voluntary returns in 
Acholiland was partly hindered by the lack of these NGO-policy guidelines, especially for the case 
of those who moved through “satellite” camps with the hope that the guiding principles will provide 
support to them.  
However, this study finds that NGOs’ roles were mainly played from the centre (inside-out 
impartiality) that facilitated rebuilding social structures, minimal social reconciliation and socio-
economic developments. This dominated and overwhelmed the grassroots at the initial stages and 
on the other hand underserved post-war social recovery initiatives. The dichotomy of preaching 
good practices while communicating implicit and ubiquitous messages under various projects is 
generally slow thinking for practitioners and has been actually easy politics for local population. In 
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Northern Uganda, conflict transformation NGOs who are mostly working with nonviolent 
participatory processes, not with enforcement, lack ability to use force, but was able to provide 
checks and balances needed to build peace (create space for social reconciliation), the basis for a 
normative framework. 
The good and bad roles of NGOs can also be viewed from politics of promises. The politics of 
promises are participatory and has been commonplace from NGOs and GoU to returnees even if 
the means were known to be limited. More excuses and making new promises always kept Acholi 
people up to believe that such promises will fulfil the need to rebuild lineage-based social authority 
and social reconciliation. Knowledge in the form of experiential learning theory from practitioners 
did not equip community-based peacebuilders with “Reflective Peacebuilding” so highly 
recommended by Lederach and his colleagues. This is a view that would pair up Acholi grassroots 
reflection as a learning community with NGOs’ monitoring and evaluation framework. On the other 
hand, Acholi people is still a learning community and this research can inform NGOs’ behaviours, 
programming and provide practical and theoretical attitudinal change towards sustainability 
amongst target groups.  
8.4 CONCLUDING CONTRIBUTION 
The outcome of this thesis sought to synthesise roles of NGOs and perspectives of grassroots 
population by applying to it conflict transformation and peacebuilding principles that guided the 
research process. Prominently, interventions of NGOs are more effective if it is placed in a 
general framework of sustainable peacebuilding like that of Lederach and Miall, but basing it on 
capacities and priorities as long as it allows for the affected people by war to be attended to in a 
neutral and impartial manner. These may not warrant supporting social coping mechanism to 
adjust to new environment in villages of returns, but NGOs and actors involved in projects and 
programme identification are more focused to the review of national context and international 
initiatives. The “paradox of NGO plurality”, that is, the exceeding high number of actors, 
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performing the same or similar activities in parallel and without coordination can work with my 
framework of analysis, although the quicker distribution of aid through NGOs may limit application 
and coordination at grassroots levels.  
This study contributes to the debate that NGOs should locate and explain thematic sectors they 
work on and the activities they pursue to the local context before intervention and involving public 
authorities and other social sectors. The basis is that the transformation of war to peace is now a 
highly politicised exercise at all levels of society. Such basis would need to understand the 
structural causes of the conflict before any intervention. This can be clearly seen when 
preliminary and rigorous studies like this is conducted in the post-war social recovery following 
carefully at the social realities of people who are subjected to prolonged war and internal 
displacement like the Acholi. An interactive State-NGOs-Acholi interconnected process of 
societal relationship building is emerging with various claims. The political relations among Acholi 
returnees, regional interests and NGOs vary when compared with the Governments. The 
variations also depend on resource scarcity where NGOs have to add value to Government 
initiatives.  
There is also social incoherence within the Acholi social authoritative structure, overdeveloped 
parts of central and western Uganda, lack of legitimacy accorded to traditional systems/leaders 
and the weak and reduced state cohesive power that eradicated the middle class political elites in 
Acholi. These have led to reciprocal perceptions of returnees on the part of NGOs as have 
exhibited essentialist roles but have failed to consider their pragmatic work, instead NGOs have 
mostly been reciprocated with the local context under government policy guidance. It is at this 
stage that the GoU builds on regularised political strategies that are not able to decongest social 
burden and imbalance and dependency.   
The extent to which NGOs play their role have structured and systemic conditions linked to an 
interactive state which is always bigger and stronger, and probably more preferred to local claims. 
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The internal crises Acholi people went through and the claim that NGOs create social conditions 
that can rebuild the society still pose questions about rebuilding the internal breakdown of lineage-
based institutional authority. The Government claim which is mainly a realist claim (highly 
politicised war by the government) contends with the naïve tendencies of NGOs practices, 
principles and policies. Here again, Acholi people are left in a difficult place. The government 
pursued military and displacement tactics, but also took advantage of the major historical events 
(chapter four) to enforce peaceful coexistence through Northern Ugandan reconstruction plans. 
This is also an opportunity for the government to show that national political correctness is viable 
to all citizens, a possibility which strengthens political position of the government in the country.  
A wider scope for further critical research can still be directed at analysing roles NGOs play in 
transforming civil conflict in an inherently local social context using more theories of change. 
Analysis of NGOs’ roles in supporting post-war recovering population from different countries may 
focus on the objective observation of external reality that tends to locate both violent and non-
violent actors within the study of their behaviours and a question can be asked, why?  Since there 
are practically difficult measurable concepts, new research areas should focus on particular 
characteristics of returnees within the broader social group of IDPs, or on units that can be 
apparently measured in the study countries, households and/or individuals. Such further research 
should be critical of the “means to ends” dichotomies of war and its stages of change and 
transformative politics that can be structured by personalised state to local environments.  
This study already outlines that NGOs-state relations are more clearly defined and undeniable in 
most SSA countries. Going by the strict legal framework of “legitimacy” may limit NGOs roles for 
local benefits and the case of Acholi demonstrates that an objective value-free analysis is both 
impossible and undesirable. INGOs will continue to bring their foreign funds from outside the 
country and at the same time be part of the social and political internal games in countries of 
interventions. For Acholi lineage-based bonding and the political links to be rebuilt, a new start 
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from the very basic local level need to understand how hyper-reality avoids dependency and 
improves coping mechanism so as to set provisions for social construction and give meanings to 
war-ravaged population. Whatever the case, peacebuilding work is easy to criticise since effective 
peacebuilding requires change. Change is in itself hard even if the people concerned really want 
change, worst off if they do not want it, and their work is impossible if there is a lack of political will 
from the respective government. Every process will seem like ‘peacebusiness’ and not 
peacebuilding, something that deserves more attention in terms of both theoretical contributions 
and their practical implications.  
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APPENDIX  
APPENDIX A: TOPIC GUIDE 
APPENDIX A-1: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION: LOCATIONS, COMPOSITIONS AND 
DATES 
NR Name of Location Categories and numbers of members of 
FGDs 
Date 
1 Acholi Inn – Gulu Town 
Conference organised by 
Gulu University 
Conference on Post-
Juba, Post-war in 
Acholiland 
Mixed Conference Groups (Government 
officials, religious leaders, civil servants, 
NGOs, traditional leaders, Elders, NGO-
Forums and CBO heads. 
14 Members of FGDs assisted by 2 
informants and 1 research assistance 
 
24th April 2009 
 
2 
 
Amuru Town Council  
With focus on Guru-guru 
Vilage 
Village Mobilisers and some AVSI Volunteers 
(Mixed ages, sex and occupation) 
12 Members of FGDs, 2 Informants, 2 
research assistants and the researcher  
 
26th April 2009 
3 Paicho Sub-County 
Anyomo-Twon Ward 
Village 
Women Group (Mixed ages) 
14 members of FGD, 4 informants from group 
and 1 female research assistant 
 
30th April 2009 
 
4 
Paicho Sub-County 
Tee-Olam Village 
Men’s Group (Mixed ages) 
14 members of FGD, 4 informants from group  
and 1 male research assistant 
 
30th April 2009 
 
5 
Paicho Sub-County 
Paicho Primary School 
Youth Group (from 15 – 17) years of age 
9 members of FGD. 
30th April 2009 
 
 
6 
 
 
Lakwana Sub-County  
Parak Parish 
Tee-Ilwa Village 
18 Members of FGDs and 5 informants from 
the village, 2 research assistances and the 
researcher  
Note: Out of 798 +1 new born baby on the 
day (789) in the village, 132 people turned 
up. 2 hours of unstructured interview and 
observations took time to select prominent 
members for FGDs and informants 
 
01st May 2009 
7 Elders Forum – North 
Kitugm- Padibe 
7 Members and 1 became the key informant 7th May 2009 
8 Omiya-Anyima Sub-
county 
Panyum Parish 
10 Members of FGDs, 2 informants and the 
researcher 
09th May 2009 
9 Namokora Sub-county 
Namokora Trading 
Centre 
14 Members of FGDs, 2 informants and the 
researcher 
10th May 2009 
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APPENDIX A-2: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS TOPIC GUIDE  
Pre-arrangements: Involved clearances from Presidents Office, the Uganda National Council for 
Science and Technology (UNCST) in Kampala (SS-2208) on permission and approaval to conduct 
research in northern Uganda. This was followed by clearance by the District Residence Officers 
(RDC) on notification to the intentions and submission of applications to UNCST. Clearance from 
Local Concilors in the locations followed.  
With the purposively sampled Acholi communities, there was clarity on not to raise too high hopes 
that seemed like; the researchers were coming to give support and/or standing as a voice for the 
IDP-returnees. The researchers followed the process using official procedures of gaining access 
from the local government village councillor. The names, locations, time, date and telephone 
numbers were given to the researchers by the authorities.  
Planned Visits to Locations: Had to fit the criteria for choosing the returned populations, 
duration after return, closeness to any support and mobilisation from government and NGOs or 
never.  
Explaining Reasons for the Visit: The explanations were first discussed amongst the research 
team, later were communicated to the sampled groups.  
Introduction of the Research Team and aims: Good for confidence building, openness, profiling 
details and eliminating possible threats or any other related fear.  
Permission to record and revisit ideas: Permissions were asked to record discussions in the 
groups. 
Activities Carried Out During the FGD 
1. Brainstorming exercise was used to tease out emerging themes from FGDs for classification 
in major categories. 
Theme1: Identification of major crises and the root-causes of the war in northern Uganda. 
Theme2: Identification of IDP needs and preferred preferences. 
Theme3: Rebuilding of relationships – reconciliation issues.   
Theme4: Identifying the bases for rebuilding lineage-based social authority body in Acholiland 
using indicators like: tradition, income, job, education, marital status and age.                   
  
The extent to which actors were involved in transforming war to peace in northern Uganda 
posed the following questions  
1. Knowledge about the causes of the war? Why the war took so long to end? 
2. Where support and mobilisation assistance has to come from and/or came from? Who can 
address/addressed the crises?  
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3. On return, how long time did it take to finally resettle permanently? 
4. Identifying peace dividends and prioritising them.   
5. Why more continued return and resettlement packages after return?  
6. Was that help from NGOs or from somewhere else? 
7. How to deal with threats and forced return? 
8. Immediate challenges faced on return? And other related social issues after return?  
9. How these social issues are dealt with without support from government and NGOs? 
1. Identification of needs whether the returnees are able to rebuild a strong authoritative 
social structure in the immediate and later return to VoRs. 
2. In own views, how much do returnees feel involved in the entire process? 
3. In own views, how representative has NGOs been to you locally, in the district, 
nationally and internally.  
2. From every FGDs, key informants were selected to fill in their choices and rank options. 
Where the larger numbers turned up for FGDs, rule one applied and later FGDs out of the 
bigger population were separated to discuss, chose and rank options. Key informants who 
were identified from NGO workers and government officials also used this technique.  
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APPENDIX A-3: MATRIX TABLE OF ROLES AND ORGANISATIONS OF 
INTERVIEWEES ON DATES AND METHODS  
Nr Interviewees Organisation Position Date 
 
1.   
Interview  
In-depth  
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
IDP Protection 
Department Officer 
12th May 
2009 
2. 
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Opit Monitoring Resident 
Field Officer- Base1 
 
 
 
 
27th April 
2009 
 
 
 
3.  
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Opit Project Field 
Worker- Base2 
4.  
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Lalogi Project Field 
Worker- Base1 
5.  
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Lalogi Project Field 
Workers- Base2 
6.  
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Acet Project Field 
Worker - Base1 
7.  Interview  
Unstructured 
Local Government Official - 
Local Council One Chairman 
Community Mobiliser 
Opit 
8.  
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Field Worker Paicho 
Base1 
 
 
 
28th April 
2009 
9.  
 
Interview  
In-depth 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
Field Worker  Paicho 
Base2 
10.  Interview  
Unstructured 
Local Government Official - 
Local Council Two Chairman 
Paicho Community 
Mobiliser 
11.  Interview  
Telephone & 
Semi-
Structured 
The Association of Volunteers 
in International Service 
(AVSI): An  Italian NGOs 
AVSI Programme 
Coordinator 
09th June 
2009 
12.  Interview  
In-depth 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation Forum member 
12 (NGO-F12) 
Director 04th May 
2009 
13.  Interview  Non-Governmental 
Organisation Forum member 
Project Manager 04th May 
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In-depth 13 (NGO-F13) 2009 
14.  Interview  
In-depth 
Gulu University 
The Department of Peace and 
Strategic Studies 
(DGU) 
Director and Lecturer April 2009 
15.  Interview  
In-depth 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) 
IDP Protection Officer - 
Base1 
21st April 
2009 
16.  Interview  
In-depth 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) 
IDP Protection Officer - 
Base2 
29th April 
2009 
17.  Interview  
In-depth 
Local Government (IDP Camp 
Leadership Structure) 
(PCL) 
Pabo Camp Leader April 2009 
18.  Interview  
Telephone 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) 
IDP Protection Project 
Manager 
16th June 
2009 
19.  Interview  
Semi-
Structured 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) 
IDP Logistics Manager April 2009 
20.  Interview  
In-depth 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) 
IDP Monitoring Project 
Manager 
April 2009 
21.  Interview  
In-depth 
International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) 
Kitgum Protection 
Coordinator 
09th May 
2009 
22.  Interview  
In-depth 
International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) 
Kitgum Protection 
Manager 
09th May 
2009 
23.  Interview  
In-depth 
NGO: GOAL Pader 
Kalongo 
(NGO-GOAL) 
Pader Project Manager 11th May 
2011 
24.  Interview  
In-depth 
NGO: GOAL Pader 
Kalongo 
(NGO-GOAL) 
Pader Project 
Coordinator 
11th May 
2011  
25.  Interview 
(semi-
Structured) 
United High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 
UNHCR-GPW 
Gulu Project Worker April 2009 
26.  Interview 
(semi-
structured) 
Kitgum Local NGO 
(LNGO-43) 
Director May 2009 
27.  Interview  
In-depth  
District Service Commission 
(CAO- DSC) 
Chief Administrative 
Office (CAO) 
04th May 
2009 
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28.  Interview  
In-depth 
Local Government (Semi-
Structured Camp Leadership) 
( Gulu-WCL) 
IDP Women Camp  
Leader (72 years) 
April 2009 
29.  Interview  
(semi-
structured) 
Local Government Camp 
Leadership 
(Amuru-WCL) 
IDP Women Camp 
Leader (69 years) 
April 2009 
30.  Interview 
(semi-
structured) 
Local Government Camp 
Leadership in Pabo 
IDP Camp Youth Leader April 2009 
31.  Interview  
In-depth 
Gulu Teacher’s Association 
(GTA) 
Gulu Primary Teacher 
(59 years old) - Retired 
April 2009 
32.  Interview  
In-depth 
GuluTeacher’s Association 
(GTA) 
Senior Secondary 
Teacher 
April 2009 
33.  Interview  
In-depth 
Kitgum Teacher’s Association 
(KTA) 
Retired Primary Head 
Teacher (65 years old) 
May 2009 
34.  Interview  
In-depth 
KitgumTeacher’s Association 
(KTA) 
Senior Secondary 
School Teacher 
(70 years old) 
May 2009 
35.  Interview  
In-depth 
Amuru Teacher’s Association 
(ATA) 
Senior Secondary 
School Teacher 
(66 years old) 
April 2009 
36.  Interview  
In-depth 
Amuru Teacher’s Association 
(ATA) 
Primary Teacher (59 
years old) - Retired 
April 2009 
37.  Interview  
In-depth 
Pader Teacher’s Association 
(PTA) 
Retired Primary Head 
Teacher (65 years old) 
May 2009 
38.  Interview 
(semi-
structured) 
Kitgum Elder Forum Leader 
(Male-Elder) 
Elder  2000 
39.  Interview 
(Semi-
Structured) 
Kitgum Elder Leader 
(Female-Elder) 
Elder 2000 
40.  Interview  
In-depth 
Acholi Elder’s Forum (Gulu-
West) 
(AEF-GW) 
Elder  (70 years old) April 2009 
41.  Interview  
In-depth 
Acholi Elder’s Forum (Kitgum-
North) 
(AEF-KN) 
Elder (79 years old) 09th May 
2009 
42.  Interview  
In-depth 
Acholi Elder’s Forum (Gulu-
East) 
(AEF-GE) 
Elder (73 years old) April 2009 
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43.  Interview  
In-depth 
Acholi Elder’s Forum (Kitgum 
East) 
(AEF-KE) 
Elder (79 years old) May 2009 
44.  Interview 
Unstructured 
Kitgum District Health Officer 
(KDHO) 
Medical Doctor May 2009 
45.  Interview  
In-depth 
Kitgum Local Government 
Council 
(KLC3) 
Local Councillor Three 
(LC3) Leader 
May 2009 
46.  Interview  
All forms 
Acholi Traditional Institution 
Ker Kwaro Acholi 
(KKA- PC) 
Paramount Chief 2006, 2007, 
2008 & 2009 
47.  Interview  
All forms 
Acholi Traditional Institution 
Ker Kwaro Acholi 
(KKA -Kitgum) 
Chief and Traditional  
Leader (Kitgum) 
2006, 2007, 
2008 & 2009 
48.  Interview  
All forms 
Acholi Traditional Institution 
Ker Kwaro Acholi 
(KKA-Gulu) 
Chief and Traditional  
Leader (Gulu) 
2006, 2007, 
2008 & 2009 
49.  Interview  
Semi-
Structured 
Acholi Traditional Institution 
Ker Kwaro Acholi 
(KKA-WL) 
Women Traditional  
Leader  
April 2009 
50.  Interview  
Semi-
Structured 
Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI) 
Chairperson of ARLPI 2008 & 2009 
51.  Interview  
Unstructured 
Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI) 
Member of ARLPI April 2009 
52.  Interview  
Unstructured 
Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI) 
Member of ARLPI April 2009 
53.  Interview 
Semi-
Structured 
Women Empowerment 
Network 
(WEN-Gulu) 
Director 2006, 2007, 
2008 & 2009 
54.  Interview  
Unstructured 
Human Rights Focus 
(HRF) 
Director December 
2008 
55.  Interview  
Semi-
Structured 
Ex-UNLA, joined UPDA, HSM, 
LRA and retired after taking 
Amnesty from Uganda 
Amnesty Commission (UAC) 
Ex- Soldier May 2009 
 
 
 
313 
 
APPENDIX A-4: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS  
Pre-arrangements for all interviews involved showing clearances from Presidents Office, the 
Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) in Kampala (SS-2208) on 
permission and approaval to conduct research in northern Uganda. This was followed by 
clearance by the District Residence Officers (RDC) on notification to the intentions and 
submission of applications to UNCST. Clearance from Local Concilors in the locations and 
individuals followed. The researcher followed the process using official procedures of gaining 
access from the local government village councillor. The names, locations, time, date and 
telephone numbers were given to the researchers by the authorities.  
Planned Visits to Locations: Had to fit the criteria for purposively samling respondents whose 
knowledge about the returned populations, duration after return, closeness to any support and 
mobilisation from government and NGOs or never was clear. Explaining reasons for the visit were 
first discussed amongst the research team, later were communicated to the respondent. 
Introduction of the researcher and aims was aimed to build confidence, openness, profiling details 
and eliminating possible threats or any other related fear.  
Rebuilding after displacement to return 
Exploring the possible IDP needs for social changes based on their perceptions and conditions of 
war to peace transformations (displacements and return). 
1. Understanding the major crises in Acholiland and the root-causes of the war in Acholiland 
2. Perceptions of IDP-returnees from camps through to Villages of Returns 
3. Exploring conditions of returnees and wider social condition of the returnees in respective 
villages. 
 
Causes of the conflict and displacement in northern Uganda 
Explain in your opinion the major crises and the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda.  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Explain the changes in social authoritative structures since the war displaced you in camps. 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
The Return Process 
Explain your experiences of return from Internal Displacement Camp to your villages?  
(IDP-policy says: IDPs return is voluntary, own informed choice, in safety and dignity). 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Do you think the social conditions were conducive enough to feel safe and dignified to return to 
the villages?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Based on your experience, do you think there will be re-displacement after your return to the 
village? Have you seen anything like that happening? 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
What is your view about the levels of your security and safety now that you have come back 
home?  
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…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Have you experienced any incidences where anybody in your villages suffered attacks, 
harassments, intimidation, persecution or any other form of punitive action upon return to the 
villages?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Social Services, livelihood and Income Generating Activities  
What are your experiences about availability and access to basic social services and institutions, 
food security, livelihoods and income in your village? 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Continued Support and Mobilisation 
What economic support were/are continually provided for return and after when you came back to 
the villages? 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
How about after return?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
How long do you think you need continued support and mobilisation?  
Yrs...........................Months..................................Weeks...........................Days........................ 
Where would that support be coming from?  
 Regulated support and mobilisation [The focus is on facilitation / Non-facilitation] 
Were there any forms of regulations for return to your village?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
How about after return? 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Regulated by:  
NGO (explain) .......….............................……………………….………………………………..………. 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
GoU roles (explain)  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
In information for Mobilisation and support: Experience on Government roles 
Do you think there was enough information from GoU that supported your decision to return to 
your village?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
How about after return? …………………...........................………………………………………..……. 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Information for Mobilisation and support: Experience on NGO roles 
Do you think there was enough information from NGOs that supported your decision to return to 
your village?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
How about after return? ………...................……………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
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…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Mobilisation and Support for Transforming Social Relations amongst yourselves 
Explain your social relations with each other that supported you to mobilise for change?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Before Return (while in camps)  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
During Return to Villages of Origin 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
After Return to Villages of Origin 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Mobilisation and Support for Transforming Social Relations from NGOs and the 
Government  
Explain your experience on social relations with the Government in supporting and mobilising 
you?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Before Return (while in camps)  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
During 
Return………………..............................………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
After Return ..............................……………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Explain your experience on social relations with the NGOs in supporting and mobilising you?  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
Before Return (while in camps)  
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
During 
Return………..............................………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
…………………………………………………….……………………………………………..................... 
After 
Return...…………..............................……………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………….…………………………………………….....................
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Appendix A-5: Topic Guide For In-Depth Interviews  
The following generic questions were asked for in-depth interviews. Key informants assisted with 
collection of data from IDP-returnees on the post-war social recovery in Northern Uganda - 
Acholiland.  
Questions to Non-Governmental Organisation Workers  
The Major Question Sought: How far can Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a role 
in the support and mobilisation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)-returnees? 
 
 How long have you been working with this NGO in northern Uganda? 
 What is the background of your NGO involvement in post-war social recovery for community 
return and resettlement in Acholiland (Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader)? 
 Can you tell me what your organisation think are the root causes of this conflict? 
 What are you doing to address them as you mobilise and support the IDPs? 
NGO-Regulations to Support and Mobilise IDPs: (Facilitative and Non-facilitative Support 
and Mobisation by NGOs 
 Did you regulate your facilitation work with IDPs? 
 What specific ones? 
 Does it vary from programmes to programmes and/or community to community? Why? 
 Are there some post-war social activities your NGO could have done, but are left out? Which 
ones are those? Why? 
 How local can your NGO facilitate mobilisation and support?  
 When will you stop facilitating IDPs return and resettlement, or generally on this conflict? 
On the Return Process of IDPs: How far were Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining 
what happens to them? And; how did Acholi IDPs perceive the different patterns of 
interventions and responses that helped them? 
 
 Can you tell me how you involve IDPs-returnees in the process of return to their respective 
villages? 
 How many days [long] does it take to resettle a family from IDP to the desired location in the 
village? 
 What is involved during the processes? What are their perceptions? 
 Are there other INGOs that you know are doing similar programmes with same community 
you are involved with? (Follow-up: How do you deal with duplication of activities?) 
 What (in) direct impact did your NGO have on return and resettlement of IDPs? 
 What kind of social changes have you recorded so far from the resettled returnees?  
 What are you doing for those who decided to stay put (Stayees) in IDP-camps?  
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 How has these affected your capacity to work?  
 Do you have any estimate to resettle a family from IDP to the village of settlements? 
 How about in maintaining a resettled family, per day/week? 
 Do you think the returnees are now stable enough to balance their own lives since return?  
NGO Relations with Returnees and Stayees [Can returnees define their needs [sustainable 
livelihood] by themselves?] 
 Do you have any social relations with IDP returnees who are now in their villages of origin? 
 How about with those who are still in IDP-Camps? 
 Explain the frequencies of your relations with returnees/stayees?  
 How would you describe your relationship with other agencies?  
 Are returnees still heavily dependent on your organisation? 
 When do you think you will stop continuing to support mobilising the returnees? 
 Has it ever occurred to you that the returnees refused your assistances? Reasons? Who? 
How many? Male of female? Age group?  
In-depth Interview with District Chief Administrative Officers (CAO), NGO-Forum, Local 
Government District Councillors Planning and Implementation Committees 
The Major Question Sought: How far can Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a 
role in the support and mobilisation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)-returnees? 
 
 Tell me about your background involvement in the conflict in northern Uganda, and now IDP 
return and resettlement to villages of origins? 
 In your capacity, how long have you been working on the return and resettlement of 
returnees? 
 Can you tell me what you think are the root causes of this conflict? 
 What are you doing to address them as you mobilise and support the IDPs? 
Regulations to Support and Mobilise IDPs (Facilitative and Non-facilitative Support and 
Mobisation by NGOs) 
 Did you regulate your work with IDPs? How about NGOs? 
 What specific post-war social recovery programmes have you chosen to do with the 
community? 
 Does it vary from programmes to programmes and/or community to community? Why? 
 Are there some post-war social activities you could have done, but are left out? Which ones 
are those? Why? 
 How local do you work?  
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 When will you stop working on IDPs return and resettlement, or generally on this conflict? 
On the Return Process of IDPs: How far were Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining 
what happens to them? And; how did Acholi IDPs perceive the different patterns of 
interventions and responses that helped them? 
 
 Can you tell me how you resettle IDPs, the process from IDP-Camps to Villages of return? 
 How many days does it take to resettle a family from IDP to the desired location in the village? 
 What is involved during the processes? 
 Are there other supports that you know, offer similar programmes with same community you 
are involved with? (Follow-up: How do you deal with duplication of activities?) 
 What (in) direct impact did you have on return and resettlement of IDPs? 
 What kind of social changes have you recorded so far from the resettled returnees?  
 What are you doing for those who decided to stay put (Stayees) in IDP-camps?  
 How has these affected your capacity to work?  
 Do you have any estimate to resettle a family from IDP to the village of settlements? 
 How about in maintaining a resettled family, per day/week? 
 Do you think the returnees are now stable enough to balance their own lives since return?  
Relations with Returnees and Stayees [Can returnees define their needs [sustainable 
livelihood] by themselves?] 
 Do you have any social relations with IDP returnees who are now in their villages of origin? 
 How about with those who are still in IDP-Camps? 
 Explain the frequencies of your relations with returnees/stayees?  
 How would you describe your relationship with other agencies in the district?  
 Are returnees still heavily dependent on your organisation? Who else are dependent? 
 When do you think you will stop continuing support and mobilisation to the returnees? 
 Has it ever occurred to you that the returnees refused your assistances? Reasons? Who? 
How many? Male of female? Age group?  
 
Selected Returnees to Villages of Origin from Internally Displaced People’s Camps (IDPCs) 
– Family Heads 
The Major Question Sought: How far can Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a 
role in the support and mobilisation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)-returnees? 
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 What is the background of your family before the war started? 
 Can you tell me what you think are the root causes of this conflict? 
 Did you get support when you wanted to return and resettle? Who supported you? 
 As a family, how long have you been assisted during the return and resettlement back to your 
village? 
 Why could you not choose your own return and resettlement plans?  
o Addressing facilitative and non-facilitative Support and Mobisation by NGOs, 
GoU etc. 
 Are there other social conditions apart from security issues that affected your family 
resettlement and return? 
 What are those specific issues of central impact on your family after return and resettlement? 
 What specific return and resettlement social recovery programmes helped you most?  
 Are there left out programmes that could have helped even more? Which are those? 
 Did you have set datelines for return and resettlement programmes for you and your family?  
 How many days did it take you to return and resettle as a complete family from IDP to your 
village of origin? 
 What processes were involved in doing that? 
 Are/were there other international organisations that your family are/were getting similar 
assistances from?  
 What would you say about the impacts of NGO work who assisted your family?  
o Would you say you do not need them anymore? 
 Tell me more about the NGOs that used to assist you, did they choose to leave helping you or 
you did?  
o What reasons did they give?  
 What social changes do you think you have seen so far from the time you returned to the 
village? 
 Has these increased or decreased the family capacity to work on their own or still dependent 
on NGOs/Government?  
 What are your experiences about NGOs support and mobilisation for your family?  
o Addressing: How far were Acholi IDP-returnees involved in defining what 
happens to them? And; how did Acholi IDPs perceive the different patterns of 
interventions and responses that helped them? 
 
 What relationship do you have with the NGO/government? 
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 How do you maintain the relationship with the NGO who assisted you with the return? 
 What relationship do you have with other NGOs here? 
 How involved are you personally in maintaining the relationships between the NGO, and your 
family? 
 How do you maintain the relationship between the local officials and NGOs? 
 Is your family still heavily dependent on NGO resettlement and return packages? 
o Is this a similar case for all families in this village/community? 
 How long do you think your family will continue depending on NGOs assistances? 
 How many villages have the same NGOs resettled under the home return policy in this 
community? 
 Do you have some people who have refused the home return assistances, but have returned 
to their villages? Who are they? 
 What reasons do they give for not taking NGO assistances? 
 Are those who returned through NGO assistances mostly male, female, youth or old ones?  
 How about for those who refused to return, are they male, female, youth or old ones? 
o What reasons do they give you? 
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APPENDIX A-6: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM KEY INFORMANTS: NGOS, 
TRADITIONAL LEADERS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, CAMP LEADERS AND OTHER 
OPINION LEADERS IN THE DISTRICTS 
 
District Name  Organisation Type of Social 
Recovery 
Operations 
Type of  
Community 
1. RVO 
2. SSIDPCs 
3. SIDPCs 
4. DNM 
Gulu Sex: [Male/Female] 
 
Age 
Occupation 
International 
Regional 
Amuru National Funded 
Local Voluntary 
Kitgum Revisit Required for Corrections  [Yes / No]   Revisit and Corrections Done 
Signature……………………………… Date…………………………….………  
Pader 
 
First, Can you tell me whether you are now in a post-war social recovery? 
Yes: Proceed to section 2, “Basic Data on Settled Communities’.   
No:  Proceed to the next question 
Do you experience any post-war social recovery related activities now? 
                                      Yes: Proceed to section 2, “Basic Data on Settled Communities’. 
                                       No: Proceed to the next question 
Thank you for your cooperation. We will now go into some details! 
Please Sate  
Settlement Area (Village)……………………………………................……………………… 
Area (Sub-Location)……………………………………………..………………..............….. 
Town/District/City…………………………………………………………...................……… 
Interviewer’s Name……………………………………………………………..............……… 
Interview Completed   Yes / No 
Refusal                         Yes / No 
Date of 1st call ……………   Date of 2nd recall …………… Date of 3rd recall……............….. 
Information checked: Signature…………………………………..…Date……………….…          
     
Basic Data on Settled Communities 
First, I would like to ask levels of returnees’ income, how long time it took to resettle in the 
villages, the age group of people who returned, village location, major activities of jobs creation, 
particular kinds and amount of assistances offered, if there are any cooperation/partnership within 
communities, with others various NGOs, institutions and community leaders. I will also ask you 
about your maintained relationships amongst yourselves, with the NGOs, Local council leaders, 
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government officials, other neighbouring communities and for how long. Lastly I will ask you how 
much it cost you to resettle at the initial stages to date. Can you tell me about these? (Col 1) 
Nr Provision of data 
1.  Details of Resettlement Village Locations 
2.  Time Taken to Resettle Communities 
3.  Amount of Assistances Offered for resettling a family 
4.  Cost of Resettling a Family 
5.  Age composition of Returnees 
6.  Jobs Opportunities 
7.  Income Level (Income Generating Activities)  
8.  Maintained Partnership (MP) with other agencies 
9.  Time taken to Maintain Relationships (TTMR) 
Nr 1 Details of Resettlement of Village Locations 
Col:1 Is this the final location of the settlement village after leaving the IDPCs? [Yes/ No] 
If Yes Go to Col.2. 
Nr-2                             Time Taken to Resettle Communities 
Col:2 How long time did it finally take to resettle in the village after return from IDPCs? 
Nr-3                            Explaining and identifying Assistances Offered 
Col:3 Explain the type of assistance offered for return if any?  
Col:3-1 How much in monetary value?    
Col:3 Explain the type of assistance offered after return if any? 
Col:3-2 How much in monetary value?   
Nr-4                                       Cost of Resettling a Family 
Col:4 Explain how much in total is offered to sustain the family for a month? 
Col:4-1 Is the assistance coming mainly from NGOs? 
Col:4-2 Is this preferably enough? 
Col:4-3 What would be the preferable amount that can sustain fully? 
Col:4-4 How long would the preferred amount in col4.3 last?   
Col:4-5 Do you think there is adequate progress that can provide sustainable solutions after 
return and settlement? 
To a greater extent Some extent Fairly well Not at all 
Nr 5                                     Age Composition of Returnees 
Col:5 State what age group have easily preferred to settle in villages of origin? 
Col:5-1 Indicate M (         ) for Male numbers or F  (          ) for  Female, or Both (            ) 
Nr 6                                                 Jobs Opportunities 
Col:6 What job opportunities are mostly preferred for engaging in forging sustainable 
return solution? 
 
Col:6-1 
What other jobs are you engaged in? 
Paid sustainable 
employment 
Paid part-time 
employment 
Self     -
Employed 
Temporal Manual 
Employment 
None 
 
Col:6-2 
 
How much on a 
Monthly Salary Weekly Wage Cash at hand Battered Other 
Col:6-3   What job offer would be most preferable?   Why? 
Col:6-4   What job offer would be least preferable?  Why? 
Nr-7                                                    Income Level 
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Col:7 Indicate if you think the level of income increased or decreased since return into 
the villages of origins? 
                                      Tick: Increased  (+)                /             Decreased (-) 
By how much in (UgShs)? From  
(+) 
(-) 
To 
(-) 
(+) 
Col:7-1 What level of income would you prefer to have can be 
acceptable for a balanced livelihood level? 
Between  
UgShs:                                    
To 
 
Col:7-2 
Would you prefer to have additional income for 
support?  If yes state from where, what specific 
income and by how much. 
From:  
How much: 
Type of Income Support: 
 
Col:7-3 
How long do you expect this to last?  
For ever One more year Six Months One Month Never 
 
 
Col:7-4 
To what extent would you rate the level of dependencies? 
To a greater extent  
On NGOs 
On GoU 
Else 
Some extent 
On NGOs 
On GoU 
Else 
Fairly Well 
On NGOs 
On GoU 
Else 
Not all 
On NGOs 
On GoU 
Else 
Nr 8                                          Maintained Partnership (MP) 
 
 
 
 
Col:8 
 
 
Did you have any ongoing and maintained partnerships after return to village of 
origin?       (Tick) if:              Yes                /                    No  
If Yes: With 
(Tick) 
NGOs Government Chiefs ARLPI Other 
Explain 
If NO: With 
(Tick) 
NGOs Government Chiefs ARLPI Other 
Explain 
Col:8-1 Is the partnership based on arrangement which are: 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Locally (Specific) 
Universally (widespread) 
Assured 
Randomly organised 
Long-Term 
Short-term 
Col:8-2 What impact has the partnership arrangement had? 
Col:8-3 Was it intended to be so or unintended? 
To a greater extent Some extent Fairly Well Not at all 
Col:8-4 Do you think this is positively or negatively preferable options for a balance social 
change? 
Nr-9                                     Maintained Relationships  
 
 
Col:9 
How is your relationship with other agencies that are also doing social recovery and 
return? 
Excellent Good Fair Poor Not at all 
What is the relationship based on 
 
 
Col:9-1 
How is your relationship with returnees who have returned and resettled back to 
villages of origin? 
Excellent Good Fair Poor Not at all 
What is the relationship based on 
 How is your relationship with traditional leaders? 
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Col:9-2 
Excellent Good Fair Poor Not at all 
What is the relationship based on 
 
 
Col:9-3 
How is your relationship with religious leaders? 
Excellent Good Fair Poor Not at all 
What is the relationship based on 
Col:9-4 How did/do you maintain your relationship with the NGOs that assisted or continues 
to assist in the return and resettlement? 
Face to 
Face Visits 
Organised 
Workshops 
Letters Phones Word of Mouth Not at all 
Col:9-5 Do/did you maintain your relationship with other communities who are resettled by 
other NGOs through …? 
Face to 
Face Visits 
Organised 
Workshops 
Letters Phones Word of Mouth Not at all 
Col:9-6 How do/did you maintain your relationship with the traditional leaders?  
Face to 
Face Visits 
Organised 
Workshops 
Letters Phones Word of Mouth Not at all 
Col:9-7 How do/did you maintain your relationship with the religious leaders? 
Face to 
Face Visits 
Organised 
Workshops 
Letters Phones Word of Mouth Not at all 
Col:9-8 
 
How do/did you maintain your relationship with the district council officials?  
Face to 
Face Visits 
Organised 
Workshops 
Letters Phones Word of Mouth Not at all 
Col:9-9 For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with your own settled 
communities? 
We live 
with them 
Once a 
month 
Twice a 
Month 
Once a week Never Other 
Col:9-10 For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with the traditional leaders? 
We live 
with them 
Once a 
month 
Twice a 
Month 
Once a week Never Other 
Col:9-11 For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with the religious leaders? 
We live 
with them 
Once a 
month 
Twice a 
Month 
Once a week Never Other 
Col:9-12 For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with the district council leaders? 
We live 
with them 
Once a 
month 
Twice a 
Month 
Once a week Never Other 
Col:9-13 For how long did/will you maintain your relationship with other NGOs/agencies? 
 We live 
with them 
Once a 
month 
Twice a 
Month 
Once a week Never Other 
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3.  Additional data from NGO-field workers (Questions asked as if NGO-FW is a respondent) 
Additional Provision of data from NGO-Field Workers 
Name                                                         Age                            Name of Current NGO 
Position                                                      Duties 
Type of Communities                                 Type of Support and Mobilisation Role 
Rank Which type of communities below has the most to the least preference needs for 
assistance? Please rank, 1 for most needs, 2, 3, 4 (to the least) etc.  
1.  Details of Returnees to Villages of Origin (RVOs) 
2.  Satellite IDPCs – (SatIDPCs) 
3.  Displaced and Staying Put in IDPCs – (DSPIDPCs) 
4.  Never were displaced 
5.  Other 
Were you employed with other NGO(s) before? Y               /                N   
If YES: 
1.Name of former NGO(s) 
Position held 
Duties 
2.Name of former NGO(s) 
Position held 
Duties 
If answered NO were you  
Office Based, full-time employed 
Office Based, part-time employed 
Office Based contract employed 
Field-based, full-time employed   
Field-based, part-time employed 
Field-based contract employed 
Self-Employed  
Consultancy 
Other 
If answered YES were you  
Office Based, full-time employed 
Office Based, part-time employed 
Office Based contract employed 
Field-based, full-time employed   
Field-based, part-time employed 
Field-based contract employed 
Self-Employed  
Consultancy 
Other 
State what language you use in your CURRENT community work?   
Is Lwo your mother language?  [Y / N]  
If NO, how do/did you communicate with the local community? 
Translated from                          to                           Lwo 
What number of returnees/stayees/satellites do/did you mainly work with? (Probe: Did/do you 
approach them, allocated to you by your NGO, authorities or chose them?) 
Individuals (<50) 
Village (< 50 people)  
Parish (50 – 200 people) 
Sub-county (200 – 500) 
County (500 – 5000) 
District (5,000 > ) 
Do/did you convey information and help based on NGO designs/plans or government’s? 
Based on ONLY our NGO plans, mandates and 
regulations 
Based on ONLY local government plans, mandates and 
regulations 
Based on ONLY community 
recommendations/plans 
Both 
Other 
Do/did you know how many returnees have been resettled since the return started? 
Do/did you know how many stayees - the Stay Put in IDPCs – (SPIDPCs) who still need 
support?  
What reasons do they give for continued assistances from you or other NGOs? 
Tick what sex and age categories are those returnees who continue to need assistance? 
Male between (25-30) : (31-45) : (46-60) : Over 60 
Female between  (20-25) : (26-30) : (31-45) : (46-
60) : Over 60 
Male youth  (under 13) : (13-18) : (19-24) 
Female Youth (under 13): (13-15) : (16-
19) 
Disabled 
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What particular work of social recovery process do you do based on the recommended plans 
with the community you have chosen that you work with? 
What are your main responsibilities with them? 
Tick one or more options below, what kind of relationship you would prefer to have with them? 
Temporal Permanent 
Random  
Assured  
Short Term 
Long term 
Specific to local setting 
Widespread to universal settings 
How often do you visit them? 
We live with the community 
Once a week 
Once a month 
Once every three months 
Every six months 
Once a year 
When was the last time you visited them? 
Since the last visit, have you seen any changes in their social statuses? 
Explain What would you prefer? 
Explain the progress/decline in the level of income you have witnessed. 
Explain What would you prefer? 
Explain what prospects of jobs opportunities they have? 
Explain What would you prefer? 
Is the level of educational standard within the returnees/stayees and satellites compared to 
when they were in IDPCs become well or worst?   
Explain What would you prefer? 
Is the level of income increases/decreased compared to when they were in IDPCs?   
Explain What would you prefer? 
How would you prefer they should be supported and mobilised?   
Explain What would you prefer? 
Explain what these mean to you in terms of support and mobilisation impacts.  
Has such support and mobilisation had any direct 
impacts?  
Has such support and mobilisation had 
any indirect impacts? 
Has such support and mobilisation had any short 
term preferences?  
Has such support and mobilisation had 
any long term preferences?  
Summary: Explain what you prefer should be done to allow the community you are working 
with realise the need to be sustained in the need for radical social change they are exposed to 
now. 
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APPENDIX - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ONE: SAMPLE INTRODUCTION 
LETTER FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM12 
 
13th April 2009  
UNIVERSITYOF BIRMINGHAM 
International Development 
Department (IDD) School of 
Public Policy 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
I am writing to introduce Mr Sunday Angoma OKELLO, who is studying for a doctoral degree in 
Public Policy at the Department of International Development Department, University of 
Birmingham, UK. 
Mr Okello is writing a doctoral thesis on: “Non Governmental Organisation Involvement in 
Mobilising Post-War Communities in Northern Uganda”. This is a very interesting and important 
area of research, which has huge implications for making the NGOs, CBOs, Governments, 
International Agencies and the affected communities in civil conflicts address social and policy 
issues.   
To enable him undertake this study, Mr Okello requires access to the communities and other 
relevant public, private organisations / institutions and officials in Uganda. The Department and 
the University of Birmingham would like to ask for your cooperation and support during Mr Okello’s 
field research in Uganda, Northern Uganda in Acholiland. I should be very grateful if you could 
facilitate his work and help him in any way possible.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
  
Professor Paul B. Jackson                                                            Dr Heather Marquette      
Research Supervisor      Co-Supervisor 
Director/Head of School  
 
 
 
                                                             
12 The original letter used during the field work had the official logo of the University of Birmingham and had been 
signed by both Professor (then Dr) Paul Jackson and Dr Heather Marquette.  
328 
 
APPENDIX - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS TWO: SAMPLE INTRODUCTION 
NOTIFICATION OF UNCST APPROVAL LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH13  
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA 
UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (UNCST) 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
 
Notification of UNCST approval 
 
By e-mail from Leah [l.nawegulo@uncst.go.ug]  
Sent:  23 April 2009 19:57  
To:  sao697@bham.ac.uk  
Cc:  leahtabo@yahoo.com  
 
Dear Mr. Okello,   
  
NGO involvement in mobilising post-war recovering communities in N. Uganda, SS 2208 
 
This is to notify you that on 22nd April 2009, Uganda National Council for Science and Technology 
reviewed and approved your research project. The RS 6 forms have been forwarded to the 
Research Secretariat Office of the President for clearance to the study districts.  
Once we obtain feedback from Office of the President, We shall notify you. You will also be 
required to pay the research fees before clearance letters can be issued to you. Details regarding 
research fee will be sent to you once clearance has been obtained from Office of the President. 
  
Yours sincerely, 
   
Leah Nawegulo  
Head, Research Safety & Ethics Unit 
for: Executive Secretary 
Uganda National Council for Science and Technology 
  
                                                             
13 This notification letter was e-mailed to me and signed by the Head of Research & Ethics Unit, Lea Nawegulo 
after having processed it from the President’s Office, Research Secretariat, Kampala, Uganda. Data collection 
was permitted on the phone to begin prior to this e-mail notification, on condition that the Residence District 
Commissioner was informed on the planed fieldwork.  
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APPENDIX B: TABLES   
APPENDIX B-4.2: ROOT-CAUSES, CORE PROBLEMS AND EFFECTS OF WAR IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA 
ROOT 
CAUSES 
CORE PROBLEM EFFECTS/SYMPTOMS 
1. Unbalanced 
Occupation and 
Professions 
from colonial 
rule 
National division of occupation between 
the North (Military) and South (Economic)  
Lack of a united spirit of nationalism  
Domination of security/military 
professions by northerners  
 
2. Ethnicity and 
Identity 
 
Internal and external crises caused by loss 
of power (caused by 2.1) 
Collective punishment by NRA/UPDF  
Establishments of internal territorial 
confinements, bureaucratic and consent-
based political authority in the traditional 
sense of eliminating Acholi people. 
The failure of Uganda as a state in 
observing principles of protections of its 
citizen and democratic human rights 
Killing of civilian population by bith 
UPDF and LRA 
The Internally Displaced Camps, 
Exiles and refugees 
2.1 Aggravating 
and Triggering 
Root Causes  
 
3.  Socio-
Political 
Failure of regimes to address tribalism, 
obsession to power nepotism, corruption, 
poor public sector.  
Ineffective government officials, 
oppression, and opportunism for 
self-enrichments.  
 
 
4. Socio-
Economic 
Exclusion 
Policies of Social Sanctions and intended 
social exclusion of Northern Uganda from 
National mainstream activities 
Lack of Opportunities, Widespread 
Economic Injustices; 
1. Lack of structural adjustment policies; 
2. Lack of Physical infrastructure and 
Institutional.  
Corrupt judicial system, poor 
health conditions, poor policing, 
and poor education.  
Diversion of the developmental 
projects in physical infrastructures 
like road constructions, water, and 
power construction to other parts 
of Uganda. 
Limited operations of political, 
moral and economic levels of 
recognisable progress and 
development of the country 
Lack of trust, opportunistic 
behaviours within the government.  
4.1 Aggravating 
and Triggering 
Root Causes  
(Source:  (November 2009) - This tabulated version of the Juba Peace Talks Position Papers 
presented to Chief Mediator, Riek Machar from (August 2006-2009)) was also identified by key 
informants and respondents. 
330 
 
APPENDIX B-4.3: TIME LINE OF NORTHERN UGANDAN CONFLICT  
Dateline Uganda People’s 
Democratic 
Movement 
(UPDM) 
Holy Spirit 
Movement 
Force (HSMF) 
Lord’s 
Resistance 
Army (LRA) 
NRA-Army now 
Uganda People’s 
Defence Force 
(UPDF) 
Jannuary 1986 NRA topples Okello government. 
May 1986 Fighting in the North between NRA and fleeing UNLA troops; Gulu and 
Kitgum declared war zones.   
August, 1986 Former soldiers of 
the UNLA attacks 
Bibia in Gulu and 
30 are killed by 
the NRA. First 
UPDA incursions 
from Sudan. 
Alice Auma, a little known medium 
in Kitgum, claims the spirit 
Lakwena ordered her to stop 
healing and raise HSMF to wage 
war against evil in Acholi. 
NRA 35th battalion 
composed of 
FEDEMU fighters 
massacres civilians 
in Namokora, in 
response to UPDA 
attack. 
October 1986    HSMF attack Gulu and are defeated.   
November 1986 Alice takes over 150 troops from UPDA and successfully attacks NRA at 
Corner Kilak (Kitgum).   
December 1986 Attack against NRA in Pajule, then Lira, Soroti. 
February 1987 Kony joins UPDA as “spiritual Mobiliser” in Major Benjamin Apia’s black 
battalion. Kony and his followers seize UPDA division commanded by Okello 
Okeno; more UPDA soldiers later join Kony from 80
th 
brigade.   
March 1987 First protected camps for civilians created in Gulu.   
June 1987 Government declares amnesty for rebels willing to surrender.   
July 1987 
September 1987 
“Operation Coy” to flush out UPDA 
November 1987 HSMF defeated near Jinja. Alice 
arrested in Kenya for illegal entry on 
30 December 
Kony attacks UPDA HQ near Pawel 
Owor 
January 1988 Alice’s father (Severino Lukoya) 
attempts to continue HSMF in 
Kitgum.  
Kony attacks 115
th 
Brigade of UPDA 
and integrates it into his force  
23rd March 1988  Agree to ceasefire 
and sign formal 
peace agreement 
with NRA.  
Lukoya joins Kony, as 
well as Lukonyomoi of 
United Uganda Godly 
Movement (UUGM).   
Sign peace agreement with 
UPDA.  
May1988   Peace talks with 
NRA led by Salim 
Saleh in Gulu.  
Overall commander of 
UPDA, Odong Latek, joins 
Kony with 39 soldiers.  
President Museveni 
extends amnesty to all 
armed groups.  
331 
 
June 1988 Peace Treaty 
between UPDA 
and NRA. Over 
2000 UPDA join 
NRA 
Peace Treaty with UPDA. Also start of major operations 
by NRA against remaining rebels 
February 1989 Museveni declares three-month moratorium on military operations near Gulu; 
after failure, NRA intensifies assaults and moves people back into camps. 
April 1991 Launches a major four-month “Operation North” led by Minister of State for 
Defence; David Tinyefunza to end insurgency. 
July 1991 Major revenge killings and atrocities against citizens 
January 1994 Peace talks started, led by Betty Bigombe; talks break down after President 
issues ultimatum for conclusion in seven days.  
1994   Sudanese support for Kony; mass abductions of children start.   
February 1996 LRA offensive in Gulu.   
June 1996 to  
Dec ember 1996 
Kony spreads the message 
that if Paul Semwogerere of 
DP becomes president, he 
will lay down arms.   
Presidential and Parliamentary elections; 
Museveni wins but receives little support in 
Acholi areas. Acholi living in the Diaspora 
convene “Kacoke Madit”, a series of London 
meetings to seek a solution for the conflict.  
January – 
December 1997 
Kony starts a series of heavy 
attacks on Kitgum 
population; into 1999; many 
atrocities by LRA against 
Acholi 
Parliament recommends escalation of military 
efforts to end war. Saint Egidio host meeting 
of LRA and government in Rome. 
March 1998 to 
June 1998 
The Acholi Religious Leader’s Peace Initiative presents a memorandum for 
peace to Museveni and hold Bedo-Piny, a three-day consultative meeting to 
focus on ending the war 
September 1998 Amnesty Act is published in Uganda Government Gazette 
December 1999 Signing of Nairobi Peace Agreement between Uganda and Sudan 
June 2001 Local Peace Talks in Gulu under auspices of District Reconciliation and 
Peace Team (which ends in failure) 
April 2002 Army launches “Operation Iron Fist” against LRA in Sudanese territory after 
agreement with Khartoum; this shatters a two-year period of relative quite. 
LRA scatters in small groups from Sudan and crosses back to northern 
Uganda.  
2003 Unilateral ceasefire by LRA produces limited government ceasefire; 
nomination of presidential peace team and unsuccessful attempts to start 
negotiations; large0scale violations of ceasefire; expansion of conflict to Teso 
and West Nile. LRA moves to Soroti, Katakwi and Lira. The Arrow Group and 
Amuka Group formed in Teso and Lango to fight LRA. Top LRA 
Commanders Charles Tabuley, Tolbert Nyeko and Ceasar Acellam killed.  
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January 2004 Musevenei asks International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate LRA 
abuses. ICC presecutor appears willing to explore this. Frontier Guards 
formed in Kitgum to fight LRA. UPDF offensive against LRA continues. 
Sudanese ambassador to Uganda, Sirajal-Din Hamid, says Khartoum 
prepared to help investigate Kony and have him arrested. 
July 2005 Peace deals between Sudan Government and Southern Sudanes People’s 
Liberation paved new avenues to peace deals between SPLA leader John 
Garang and Museveni. Garang later dies in helicpter crash. 
2006 Juba Peace Talks Starts  
2007 Consultations on Agenda Item No. 3 / Skirmishes between UPDF and ADF. 
February 2008 The Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army, signed 
annexure to Agenda Item No. 3 on Accountability and Reconciliation, 
originally signed on 27 June 2007. 
November 2008  A Declaration of the Stakeholders Conference on the Juba Peace Process is 
issued. Joachim Chissano, UN special envoy to the Juba peace talks 
convenes meeting in Kampala to restart stalled juba peace talks. Joseph 
Kony again fails to sign final peace agreement; 
December 2008 Ugandan, DR Congo and South Sudan forces launch a joint offensive on 
LRA bases in Garamba in DRC. Government and ADF rebels agree to hold 
peace talks in early 2009. 
January 2009 LRA leaders ask for a ceasefire amidst attacks of the joint forces of Uganda, 
DRC and South Sudan. LRA continues rampage on citizens of the DRC 
leaving hundreds dead. Reports of the firing of Matsanga, the LRA 
spokesperson causes chaos within the peace team. Odhiambo, LRA second 
in command, is wounded during attacks in Garamba hideout.  
February 2009 Reports that Odhiambo will surrender through facilitation by IOM do not come 
to fruition. 
March 2009 Thomas Kwoyelo, LRA fourth in command, is captured and returned to 
Uganda aboard a UPDF plane. Catherine Ajok, the last abductees from St. 
Mary's College Aboke is rescued and reunited with her family at State House 
in Nakasero, Kampala. UPDF starts pulling out of Congo bringing an end to 
Operation Lightning Thunder. LRA leader Joseph Kony and a few fighters are 
still at large with reports that they are heading to the Central African 
Republic. The DRC government takes over the hunt for the LRA in Congo. 
April 2009 Ugandan soldiers clash with LRA. Concerns abound about LRA receiving 
fresh supplies. The Government of Uganda investigates Belgium citizens 
suspected of delivering the supplies to LRA in northeastern DRC. 
May 2009 Calls for a fresh military offensive against the LRA from select human rights 
groups and a bill on Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda 
Recovery Act of 2009 presented to the US Congress. LRA continues attacks 
in Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South 
Sudan. 
June 2009 LRA reprisal attacks continue in the Democratic Republic of Congo causing 
thousands to flee their homes. Two LRA commanders, George Labongo and 
Ocan Bunia reported killed. LRA launch attacks on a southern Sudanese 
army post near the DRC border killing 14 SPLA soldiers and 4 civilians. 
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July 2009 LRA continue committing atrocities in north east Democratic republic of 
Congo. 
August 2009 LRA carry out attacks in the western Equatorial Region creating a mass 
displacement of people in southern Sudan with the border of the DRC and 
Central African Republic. 
September 2009 Sudanese Bishop asks for international help in dealing with the LRA who 
continue to wage terror in Sudan, DRC and CAR. 
November 2009 47 LRA rebels surrender in Yei in central equatorial. 
December 2009 Sudan and Uganda in a border conflict dispute over a stretch of land in Moyo 
district. A meeting held in Moyo is unsuccessful as tempers flare. LRA 
continues attacks in DRC. 
Source:  Author’s version (2006) based on Van Acker, Frank. (2004). Uganda and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army: The new order no one ordered. African Affairs. 103(412): 335-357. Table 1, p. 
48. From 2006 when the Juba Peace Talks commences, the source is from RLP website 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/conflict_timeline.php assessed 30/12/2010. 
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APPENDIX B-5.1: MAX-NEEF: FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN NEEDS 
Need Being 
(qualities) 
Having (things) Doing (actions) Interacting 
(settings) 
Subsistence physical and 
mental health 
food, shelter, 
work 
feed, clothe, rest, 
work 
living 
environment, 
social setting 
Protection care, 
adaptability, 
autonomy 
social security, 
health systems, 
work 
co-operate, plan, 
take care of, help 
social 
environment, 
dwelling 
affection Respect, sense 
of humour, 
generosity, 
sensuality 
friendships, 
family, 
relationships with 
nature 
share, take care of, 
make love, express 
emotions 
privacy, intimate 
spaces of 
togetherness 
Understanding critical capacity, 
curiosity, 
intuition 
Literature, 
teachers, policies, 
educational 
analyse, study, 
meditate, 
investigate, 
schools, families, 
universities, 
communities, 
Participation receptiveness, 
dedication, 
sense of 
humour 
responsibilities, 
duties, work, 
rights 
Cooperate, 
dissent, express 
opinions 
associations, 
parties, 
churches, 
neighbourhoods 
leisure imagination, 
tranquillity, 
spontaneity 
games, parties, 
peace of mind 
day-dream, 
remember, relax, 
have fun 
landscapes, 
intimate spaces, 
places to be 
alone 
creation imagination, 
boldness, 
inventiveness, 
curiosity 
abilities, skills, 
work, techniques 
invent, build, 
design, work, 
compose, interpret 
Spaces for 
expression, 
workshops, 
audiences 
identity sense of 
belonging, self-
esteem, 
consistency 
Language, 
religions, work, 
customs, values, 
norms 
get to know 
oneself, grow, 
commit oneself 
Places one 
belongs to, 
everyday settings 
freedom autonomy, 
passion, self-
esteem, open-
mindedness 
Equal rights dissent, choose, 
run risks, develop 
awareness 
Anywhere 
Source: Author’s version (2009), based on modernised version of Max-Neef’s (1991) Human scale 
development: conception, application and further reflections. New York: Apex. Chpt.2. “Development 
and Human Needs”. 
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APPENDIX B-5.2: SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED PREFERENCES BASED ON POSITION, 
INTERESTS AND NEEDS OF IDPS, NGOS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
 
Summary of 
perspectives from IDP-
Returnees 
Perspectives from 
Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) 
Perspectives from 
Government (Local 
and Central) 
 
Positions 
What 
they say 
they want 
Education, 
Reconciliation, 
Development, Job 
opportunities, Land, 
Income Generating 
Activities (IGAs), Micro-
Finance (soft loans), 
sustainable livelihood, 
Durable peace 
Legitimacy on IDP-
Policies, national NGO-
policy, Funding,  Peri-
Urban development of 
Camps, Achievement 
of Sustainable Durable 
Solution goals,  
Power and Authority, 
National Wealth, 
Democracy, 
Development Policies: 
PRDP-2007-2011), 
NGO-Policy, Poverty 
reduction, Investment 
Economy            
 
 
Interests 
What 
they 
really 
want 
Peace, Human and Food 
security, Roads, 
Markets, Agricultural 
tools and Seeds, Income 
Generating Activities 
(IGAs), Empowerment, 
Land Ownership 
Funds, Good image, 
self-sustaining projects 
& community, Working 
on identified Gaps 
(EVIs), monitoring and 
protection, Camps 
demolitions, 
sustainable livelihood, 
Power, popular Support, 
Good Image, Education, 
Leadership (LC1, LC2 
etc), Land-use for 
investment,  
 
Needs 
Must 
have 
Food, Clean Water, 
Schools, Shelter & 
Health Care, Land 
ownership 
Identity, Legitimacy, 
Return & Resettlement 
of all IDPs, Extended 
Funds, Power and 
Control, Development 
Power, Recognition, 
Legitimacy, Land, 
Control, ownership 
Source: Author’s version based summarised perspectives from IDP returnees, NGO workers 
and Government officials showed similarities and convergence of shared interests, but were 
not commonly bringing out convergences, else major divergences in the perspectives on 
roles NGO play in supporting and mobilising returnees in villages of origins, (2009). 
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APPENDIX B-7.1: ROLES IN THE SUPPORT AND MOBILISATION ON RETURN TO 
VILLAGES OF ORIGINS  
Roles of 
Government 
Roles of NGOs 
 
Roles of Local 
Leaders 
Stake holders 
Health Centres Training for Health 
Promotion  
 
 
 
 
Work hand in hand 
with the central, 
government, district 
officials and NGOs  to 
solve local problems 
 
 
 
Encouraged manual 
labour (Aleya) 
Charcoal burning 
Farming (agriculture) 
 
NGOs 
 
Government 
 
Local Leaders 
 
Elders 
 
Former LRA 
Commanders  
(LRA abductees) 
 
Individuals  
 
Youths  
 
Men  
 
Women 
Road Construction  
(Poor Roads) 
 
Transport 
Improved Network 
Systems (access) 
Water Services Bore holes, water 
wells  
Schools for better 
Education 
Scholastic Materials 
Inadequate teachers 
Security Food Security 
(hunger)  
provide relief aid 
(SPRING) 
Human Security 
Iron Sheets only to 
selected few 
Training on Land 
Mines (UXO) 
 Soap  
Blankets 
Agriculture 
NAADS dominated 
government 
projects 
Farming tools, 
Seedlings, Hoes  
Restocking 
Solve national 
problems like Land 
Dispute during 
return, e.g. border 
dispute between 
Acholi and Lango 
Work hand in hand 
with the government 
to solve local 
problems 
Advocate on 
behalf of the 
community 
Help where 
Government has 
failed 
(Source: Author’s version based on FGD 
from among others, Youths in Paicho (1st 
May 2009). (Source: Author’s version based on FGD from 
among others Tee-Ilwa, Parak Parish, Omoro 
County (1st May 2009). 
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APPENDIX B-7.2: SHOWING DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AND TWO LEVELS OF 
INTERVENTION  
 
Level of 
Intervention                    
Dimension 
Personal Relational – 
mainly 
reconciliation 
Structural – 
Lineage based 
authority 
Cultural 
 
 
Analysis 
Feelings, 
Emotions 
Perceptions,  
Fears 
Person-Group 
Person-person 
Group-group 
Social structures, 
systems  
(political, 
economic, 
Social…)  
Ideologies, 
Values, Norms, 
Identities 
Customs 
 
 
Actions 
Therapy 
Psycho-
social 
accompanim
ent… 
Tranditional 
reconciliation 
(Mediation 
Negotiation 
Reflection) 
Community 
Mediation 
 and Negotiation 
and Social 
reflection 
Traditional 
(Mediation 
Negotiation 
Reflection) 
Advocacy 
Sensitisation 
 
To resume 
relations 
Defending 
interests 
Advocacy  
Long term actions 
(e.g. Development 
work) 
To modify 
structures 
Cultural activities, 
etc.… 
 
To change 
mentalities 
Words not in italics indicate interventions that was 
executed by NGOs 
Words in italics indicate conflict 
transformation actions was executed by 
other actors 
(Source: Author’s version adapted for this study from www.beyondintractibility.org accessed on 
10th July 2009 
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APPENDIX B-7.3: SHOWING PATTERNS OF NGO RELATIONS IN NORTHERN 
UGANDA 
 
 
 
 
NGO 
relations in 
northern 
Uganda with 
IDPs, GoU 
and other 
NGOs 
                                        NGO relations to Parent Organisation 
 
 
Low 
               Low                   High 
Employees of these NGOs see 
themselves as free agents acting 
as hired-gun free agents and/or 
plateau-career free agents. 
NGO employees who left their 
“Hearts at Home”. 
 
High 
Employees working with NGOs 
here have tended to adapted 
native environment. 
Employees of NGOs who see 
themselves as “Dual 
Citizens”. 
Source: Author’s (2009) version adapted from Black J. Stewart; Gregesen Hal B.; Mendenhall 
Mark E.; and Stroh (1999) Globalizing People through International Assignments; Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, San Francisco, USA for analysing NGO relations with IDPs, District and 
Government Officials and other NGOs in northern Uganda from (1986-2010). 
339 
 
APPENDIX C: ILLUSTRATIONS 
APPENDIX C-1: ILLUSTRATED LIST OF MEMBER ORGANISATIONS OF GULU 
NGOS FORUM  
File 
Nr  
Organisation Name Description 
01 Acholi Muslim Community Response on AIDS. Gulu District NGO 
Forum is an umbrella 
organisation 
representing the 
interest 
Of Civil Society 
Organisations 
operating in Gulu 
District. 
 
 
It is member to apex 
organisations 
including National 
NGO Forum, DENIVA 
and CSOPNU. It 
works in partnership 
with the LIU Institute 
for the study of global 
issues and Kabarole 
Research Centre 
(KRC) 
02 Awich Youth Group. 
03 Bungatira Poverty Alleviation Integrated Project. 
04 Charity Foundation for the Disabled Children Northern 
Region. NGO 
05 Community Welfare Initiatives. NGO 
06 Dyere Tek (PLWA) Group. CBO 
07 Gulu Lancashire Local Agenda 21 Link Association. NGO 
08  Gulu Development Agency. NGO 
09 Gulu Government & NGO Drivers Association. CBO 
10 Gulu Youth for Action.  
11 Gulu Women Empowerment Network. NGO 
12 Gwokke the Trust. NGO 
13 Koch Development Association. NGO 
14 Laroo Child and Family Programme.(Laroo CCF) –NGO 
Local 
15 Lwo Development Incorporated. (LDI) - NGO 
16 Organisation of Old Age Association. 
17 PAAL Community Based Organisation. NGO 
18 Patriot Development Services (PDS). NGO 
19 Redeemed Bible Way Church. -NGO 
20 Rural Community Development Association. 
21 UOSPA. 
22 Uganda Red Cross Society. (URCS) - NGO 
23 Waloko-kwo Support Organisation. -NGO 
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24 Watemu Lapianat Agro-forestry Association (WLAA). NGO 
25 Youth Rehabilitation Project. NGO 
26 Nwoya Rural Community Development Project. NGO 
27 KochGoma Bee Keeping Association. NGO 
28 Uganda National Non-Governmental Organisation. NGO 
29 Punena Child & Family Programme.(Punena CCF) –NGO 
Local 
30 Africa Development Network.  
31 Gulu Youth Development Association (GYDA) 
32 Gulu Youth Florist Association. CBO 
33 Gulu Youth Development Project. 
34 Gulu District NGO Forum (GDNF). NGO 
35 Charity for Peace Foundation. 
36 Foundation for Cultural & Sport Development. 
37 GUKIPA Hope Ministries.  
38 Acholi Women Fish Mongers. 
39 Gulu Community Social Support & Counselling 
Organisation. 
40 Rural Focus Uganda. 
41 National Association of Women Organisation in Uganda.  
42 Heifer International. – NGO International 
43 Xx 
44 Can Deg Cabe Association (CBO). 
45 Alliance for African Assistance. NGO 
46 Ang Ecapa Rwot Women’s Organisation. CBO 
47 Human Life & Community Organisation. CBO 
48 African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF).- NGO 
International 
49 Gulu Organisation for Children in Distress. NGO 
50 Concerned Parents Association. (CPA). -NGO  
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51 Gulu Rural Women Empowerment Association (GUWEA).  
52 Grassroots Women Association for Development (GWAD). 
NGO 
53 Uganda Change Agent Association. (UCAA). NGO 
54 Xx 
55 Quaker Peace and Social Witness. (QPSW). -NGO 
International 
56 PAAL Community Based Orphanage and Children Care 
Programme. NGO 
57 Education for Peace and Prevention of Violence and 
HIV/AIDS (EPPOVHA). NGO 
58 Peoples’ Voice for Peace. (PVP) –NGO       [59]       XXXXX 
 
APPENDIX C-2: ARMED REBEL GROUPS AGAINST UGANDAN GOVERNMENT UNTIL 
FEBRUARY 2006 
Action Restore Peace (ARP), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Apac Rebellion (AR), Citizen 
Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP), Force Obote Back (FOBA), Former Uganda National 
Army FUNA), Holy Spirit Movement HSM), the Lord’s Army (LA), Lord’s Resistance Army 
LRA), National Federal Army (NFA), National Union for the Liberation of Uganda (NULA), 
Ninth October Movement (NOM), People’s Redemption Army (PRA), Uganda Christian 
Democratic Army (UCDA), Uganda Federal Democratic Front (UFDF), Uganda Freedom 
Movement (UFM), Ugandan National Democratic Army (UNDA), Uganda National Federal 
Army (UNFA), Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), Ugandan National Rescue Fronts 
I and II (UNRF I and II), Ugandan People’s Army (UPA), Ugandan People’s Democratic Army 
(UPDA), Uganda Salvation Army (USA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). 
Source: Authors compilation (October 2006) from Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, Working 
Paper 11: Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the 
War in Northern Uganda, (Kampala: Refugee Law Project, Feb. 2004), 4; and Lucy Hovil and 
Zachary Lomo, Working Paper 15: Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: 
The Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation (Kampala: Refugee Law 
Project, Feb. 2005). Also available from: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
“Uganda: War-ravaged north rues Museveni win” IRINnews.org (1 March 2006); available from 
www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51960; accessed 10 March 2006. 
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APPENDIX C-3: ILLUSTRATED LIST OF REBELS WHO GOT AMNESTY 
 
Rebel Group Number Rebel Group Number 
1 Action Restore Peace 20 15. UFDF 23 
2 Allied Democratic Forces  1,907 16. Uganda Freedom Front 1 
3 Anti-Dictatorship Forces  2 17. Uganda Freedom 
Movement 
21 
4 Citizen Army for Multi-Party 
Politics  
6 18. Uganda National Freedom 
Movement 
162 
5 FOBA/NOM  225 19. Uganda National 
Independence Liberation 
1 
6 FOBA/UPA  70 20. Uganda National Rescue 
Front II 
3,115 
7 FUNA  6 21. Uganda People’s Army 420 
8 Holy Spirit Movement  41 22. Uganda Salvation Army 3 
9 Lord’s Resistance Army  12,645 23. Uganda Democratic 
Alliance/ Front 
5 
10 NALU  198 24. UNDA 2 
11 National Democratic 
Alliance 
5 25. UNLA 3 
12 National Freedom Army 4 26. UNLF 32 
13 Not Specified 188 27. UPDA 537 
14 People’s Redemption Army  68 28. West Nile Bank Front 4,316 
                   Total:                                                                      23,526 
Source: New Vision - Government News Paper: Thursday, 1st October, 2009; By  Madinah 
Tebajjukira 
